postgres.git / summary / log / commit / refs
commit 36bb95ef2b5fdefaa99afbd859889a360e3c7763
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Mon Nov 08 16:14:56 2021 +0000
First released in: 15.0, 9.6.24, 10.19, 11.14, 12.9, 13.5, 14.1
libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.
This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.
To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.
Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2021-23222
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
index ec8565298d6..57e5333e388 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
@@ -1471,6 +1471,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
and proceed without requesting <acronym>SSL</acronym>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ When <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
+ is expected to send only the single <literal>S</literal> byte and then
+ wait for the frontend to initiate an <acronym>SSL</acronym> handshake.
+ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
+ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
+ buffer-stuffing attack
+ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
+ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
+ socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to
+ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
+ bytes.
+ </para>
+
<para>
An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
opened to send a CancelRequest message.
@@ -1532,6 +1546,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
encryption.
</para>
+ <para>
+ When <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server
+ is expected to send only the single <literal>G</literal> byte and then
+ wait for the frontend to initiate a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> handshake.
+ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely
+ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a
+ buffer-stuffing attack
+ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/">CVE-2021-23222</ulink>).
+ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the
+ socket before turning the socket over to their GSSAPI library, or to
+ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional
+ bytes.
+ </para>
+
<para>
An initial GSSENCRequest can also be used in a connection that is being
opened to send a CancelRequest message.
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index dfa50ede152..5e505e19bd0 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -2986,6 +2986,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn);
if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
{
+ /*
+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
+ * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL
+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
+ */
+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
+ {
+ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n"));
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
/* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */
conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
@@ -3085,6 +3098,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn);
if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
{
+ /*
+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
+ * If we do, it was received before we performed the GSS
+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
+ */
+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
+ {
+ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption response\n"));
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
/* All set for startup packet */
conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
[parent: d1bd26740a62]