postgres.git / summary / log / commit / refs
commit 44909f44d99a7511ae7e2d7f106d09676b4026be
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Thu Feb 23 22:48:13 2012 +0000
First released in: 9.2.0, 8.3.18, 8.4.11, 9.0.7, 9.1.3
Last-minute release note updates.
Security: CVE-2012-0866, CVE-2012-0867, CVE-2012-0868
doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
index e80743f463b..09f867b527d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,36 @@
<itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+ <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+ function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+ This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+ <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+ as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+ comments (Robert Haas)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+ that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
+ containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+ incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+ injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
index 2cddc5ec0c4..7dbc78e500c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
<itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+ <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+ function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+ This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+ <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+ as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
+ certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
+ extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
+ cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
+ are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
+ certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
+ have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
+ to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
+ name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
+ require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
+ (CVE-2012-0867)
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+ comments (Robert Haas)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+ that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
+ containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+ incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+ injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
[parent: d975e166052e]