postgres.git / summary / log / commit / refs

commit    9394fb828998b4e71e4ef95eac6b80acac742835
Author:   Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date:     Mon Nov 08 16:01:43 2021 +0000
First released in: 15.0, 9.6.24, 10.19, 11.14, 12.9, 13.5, 14.1

    Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
    
    The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
    from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
    during startup, any additional data received with the initial
    request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
    already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
    Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
    TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
    a supposedly encryption-protected database session.
    
    This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
    although that would only work if the server did not demand any
    authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
    authentication might well not do so.)
    
    To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
    is not empty after the encryption handshake.
    
    Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
    
    Security: CVE-2021-23214


 src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
 src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
index a4f6d4deeb4..95903d60f8e 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
@@ -1199,6 +1199,18 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s)
 	}
 }
 
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_buffer_has_data		- is any buffered data available to read?
+ *
+ * This will *not* attempt to read more data.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+bool
+pq_buffer_has_data(void)
+{
+	return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength);
+}
+
 
 /* --------------------------------
  *		pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client.
diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
index 11c61ca746f..b9098930744 100644
--- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
@@ -2012,6 +2012,19 @@ retry1:
 		if (SSLok == 'S' && secure_open_server(port) == -1)
 			return STATUS_ERROR;
 #endif
+
+		/*
+		 * At this point we should have no data already buffered.  If we do,
+		 * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't
+		 * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
+		 * We report this case to the client.
+		 */
+		if (pq_buffer_has_data())
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"),
+					 errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
+
 		/* regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow... */
 		/* but not another SSL negotiation request */
 		return ProcessStartupPacket(port, true);
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index 7bf06c65e96..23e9905b1e0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern int	pq_getmessage(StringInfo s, int maxlen);
 extern int	pq_getbyte(void);
 extern int	pq_peekbyte(void);
 extern int	pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c);
+extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void);
 extern int	pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len);
 
 /*


[parent: 3aa572b8b296]