X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC4AAD1D82D for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:14:32 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 61431-02 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:14:27 -0400 (AST) Received: from megazone.bigpanda.com (megazone.bigpanda.com [64.147.171.210]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9B91D1D6CC for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:14:25 -0400 (AST) Received: by megazone.bigpanda.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 33ADB3594F; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:14:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by megazone.bigpanda.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EB353594A; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:14:27 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:14:27 -0800 (PST) From: Stephan Szabo To: Silvana Di Martino Cc: Alex Page , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) In-Reply-To: <200403052024.38291.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Message-ID: <20040305120845.H92233@megazone.bigpanda.com> References: <200403050951.33230.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <40488640.1040409@spacemonkeylabs.com> <20040305151154.GC11311@halcyon.ox.icnet.uk> <200403052024.38291.silvanadimartino@tin.it> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/64 X-Sequence-Number: 12634 On Fri, 5 Mar 2004, Silvana Di Martino wrote: > Alle 15:11, venerd=EC 5 marzo 2004, Alex Page ha scritto: > > If you're trying to protect against somebody taking down your server > > room door with a sledgehammer, lifting your server out of the rack, > > driving it away and booting off an alternative medium to avoid needing > > to know your root password, then a loopback encrypted partition (or data > > encrypted in GPG where the decryption key is not stored on the database > > server) is a sensible precaution. > > Unfortunately, the new Italian law forces us to take seriously into accou= nt > this catastrophic scenario and another one that is almost as worring: an > unfaithful SysAdmin that copies your data and sells them to KGB. So, data= base > encryption (and not disk encryption) is the _only_ answer. But since your sysadmin (if not trusted) could go behind your back and replace the database, any applications that are using the data, etc, I'm not sure that's even sufficient. > > Of course, this loopback encryption with a boot-time passphrase may fail > > if they take the rackmount UPS as *well*, and keep the machine powered > > at all times ;) > > The server should listen to the (encrypted/digitally signed) "Heartbeat" = of a > password server through the net to prevent this kind of attack. That'll help prevent this sort of attack (although doesn't entirely unless you can guarantee that the password server cannot be taken at the same time) but also gives you a remote point of failure.