X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF867D1C4EB for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:44:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 64811-08 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:44:36 -0400 (AST) Received: from megazone.bigpanda.com (megazone.bigpanda.com [64.147.171.210]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51E45D1B906 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:44:34 -0400 (AST) Received: by megazone.bigpanda.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 5FF2535302; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:44:35 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by megazone.bigpanda.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EA51350A3; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:44:35 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 12:44:35 -0800 (PST) From: Stephan Szabo To: Silvana Di Martino Cc: Alex Page , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) In-Reply-To: <200403052137.51384.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Message-ID: <20040305124059.T92989@megazone.bigpanda.com> References: <200403050951.33230.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <200403052024.38291.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <20040305120845.H92233@megazone.bigpanda.com> <200403052137.51384.silvanadimartino@tin.it> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=X-UNKNOWN Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/69 X-Sequence-Number: 12638 On Fri, 5 Mar 2004, Silvana Di Martino wrote: > Alle 20:14, venerd=EC 5 marzo 2004, Stephan Szabo ha scritto: > > > Unfortunately, the new Italian law forces us to take seriously into > > > account this catastrophic scenario and another one that is almost as > > > worring: an unfaithful SysAdmin that copies your data and sells them = to > > > KGB. So, database encryption (and not disk encryption) is the _only_ > > > answer. > > > > But since your sysadmin (if not trusted) could go behind your back and > > replace the database, any applications that are using the data, etc, I'm > > not sure that's even sufficient. > > Replacing the RDBMS engine and/or the "client" application, would be usel= ess: > the "cracker" still need the password to access the encrypted data. Only for data that's already there though, right? What about any additions (and possibly changes) made after that point?