X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 118DED1D17E for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 13:50:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 19683-06 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 09:50:57 -0400 (AST) Received: from elbereth.noviforum.si (unknown [193.189.169.66]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5FB3D1D10B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 09:50:52 -0400 (AST) Received: from elbereth.noviforum.si (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by elbereth.noviforum.si (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id i25DlrHh001715 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:47:53 +0100 Received: (from gregab@localhost) by elbereth.noviforum.si (8.12.10/8.12.10/Submit) id i25DlrWU001714 for pgsql-admin@postgresql.org; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:47:53 +0100 Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:47:53 +0100 From: Grega Bremec To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Message-ID: <20040305134753.GA1560@elbereth.noviforum.si> References: <20040305092041.GB13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> <20040305120802.GJ13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="uAKRQypu60I7Lcqm" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040305120802.GJ13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2i Organization: Noviforum, Ltd., Software & Media X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/40 X-Sequence-Number: 12610 --uAKRQypu60I7Lcqm Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable ...and on Fri, Mar 05, 2004 at 12:08:02PM +0000, Dave Ewart used the keyboa= rd: > > > > [1] There are ways of avoiding having to enter the info manually, but > > they're very tricky to implement securely. >=20 > Not sure I follow this - there's no point AT ALL in using LoopAES if you > can mount the encrypted partitions without needing manual intervention > at boot time. >=20 Why not, Dave? As far as I understand it, one of the major values of fs-lev= el data encryption was protection from the abused data being collected via the means of stolen laptops or even failed hard disks that've been handed over to various data-rescue labs. If a machine is reasonably secure both locally and remotely (i.e. secure- -enough passwords, rotated on a regular basis and frequently enough, or even some sort of PKID mechanism such as smartcards etc. and proper access contr= ol for local security, tight and reasonably reliable encrypted authentication = and authorization for remote use), implementing an extra layer of any level of security is plain senseless and simply too expensive, both in terms of CPU overhead and thus performance drop (in the event of application-level encryption, for example), and time dedicated to research and implementation, as far as I'm concerned. One is better off by improving techniques in active use, investigating for the real weaknesses of their information system or dedicating the time to finding a better general solution that would cover as many areas as possible in one step. Same goes for interactive booting. In the world where even power failures are accounted for and automated, what does a user have to do with booting a machine? Implementing strong authentication in boot loaders for any kind of configuration other than the default would be perfectly sufficient, if you ask me. Also, if I may remind you at this point, human failure has so far remained to be one of the top reasons for security compromises, social engineering not being an uncommon one, so eliminating an extra point of failure in the case of an operator being required to guide the machine through the boot process doesn't harm in my opinion. One of the most important guidelines in implementing and assuring security for one's data would be the fact that security pays off only as long as the total cost of its implementation is lower than or equal to the maximum reasonably expectable harm done in the case of a security breach. Cheers, --=20 Grega Bremec Senior Administrator Noviforum Ltd., Software & Media http://www.noviforum.si/ --uAKRQypu60I7Lcqm Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFASIUJDo/EMYD4+osRAhvTAKCrmvcDWOZdzeRgZNXWjzjkh3VRCwCfQplh Dnwl5neYEHhJajO+oTFM+2g= =ZeSm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --uAKRQypu60I7Lcqm--