X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE736D1D43B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:32:01 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 35922-02 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 10:32:02 -0400 (AST) Received: from magic.lif.icnet.uk (magic.lif.icnet.uk [143.65.100.6]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3B9FD1D300 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 10:31:51 -0400 (AST) Received: from atlantis.ox.icnet.uk (atlantis.ox.icnet.uk [143.65.27.60]) by magic.lif.icnet.uk (8.9.3p2/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA28044 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:31:51 GMT Received: from nemesis.ox.icnet.uk (mail@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk [143.65.27.59]) by atlantis.ox.icnet.uk (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id i25EVoPS016892 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:31:50 GMT Received: from davee by nemesis.ox.icnet.uk with local (Exim 3.36 #1 (Debian)) id 1AzGMg-00064G-00 for ; Fri, 05 Mar 2004 14:31:50 +0000 Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 14:31:50 +0000 From: Dave Ewart To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Message-ID: <20040305143150.GO13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> Mail-Followup-To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org References: <20040305092041.GB13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> <20040305120802.GJ13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> <20040305134753.GA1560@elbereth.noviforum.si> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; x-action=pgp-signed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040305134753.GA1560@elbereth.noviforum.si> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.5.1+davee+cvs20040105i X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/43 X-Sequence-Number: 12613 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Friday, 05.03.2004 at 14:47 +0100, Grega Bremec wrote: > > > [1] There are ways of avoiding having to enter the info manually, > > > but they're very tricky to implement securely. > > > > Not sure I follow this - there's no point AT ALL in using LoopAES if > > you can mount the encrypted partitions without needing manual > > intervention at boot time. > > Why not, Dave? As far as I understand it, one of the major values of > fs-level data encryption was protection from the abused data being > collected via the means of stolen laptops or even failed hard disks > that've been handed over to various data-rescue labs. Yes, that's exactly my point. Yet it sounds like you're disagreeing with me?! > If a machine is reasonably secure both locally and remotely (i.e. > secure- -enough passwords, rotated on a regular basis and frequently > enough, or even some sort of PKID mechanism such as smartcards etc. > and proper access control for local security, tight and reasonably > reliable encrypted authentication and authorization for remote use), > implementing an extra layer of any level of security is plain > senseless and simply too expensive, both in terms of CPU overhead and > thus performance drop (in the event of application-level encryption, > for example), and time dedicated to research and implementation, as > far as I'm concerned. One is better off by improving techniques in > active use, investigating for the real weaknesses of their information > system or dedicating the time to finding a better general solution > that would cover as many areas as possible in one step. I agree with this too. Yet I still get the feeling you're disagreeing with my original point ... ! > Same goes for interactive booting. In the world where even power > failures are accounted for and automated, what does a user have to do > with booting a machine? Implementing strong authentication in boot > loaders for any kind of configuration other than the default would be > perfectly sufficient, if you ask me. Also, if I may remind you at this > point, human failure has so far remained to be one of the top reasons > for security compromises, social engineering not being an uncommon > one, so eliminating an extra point of failure in the case of an > operator being required to guide the machine through the boot process > doesn't harm in my opinion. > > One of the most important guidelines in implementing and assuring > security for one's data would be the fact that security pays off only > as long as the total cost of its implementation is lower than or equal > to the maximum reasonably expectable harm done in the case of a > security breach. I'm not sure I get your point, Grega - are you suggesting that using LoopAES is a good idea and that a system with LoopAES should also boot up automatically? I don't understand that at all. If it boots up automatically, then the encryption is effectively transparent and pointless. All data on the disk is 'pre-decrypted', very conveniently for whoever has just stolen the server/disk. If you're using LoopAES, it should *require* manual intervention, i.e. passphrase to be entered. If you want the system to boot up automatically, using LoopAES is redundant and so should not be used. Dave. - -- Dave Ewart Dave.Ewart@cancer.org.uk Computing Manager, Epidemiology Unit, Oxford Cancer Research UK PGP: CC70 1883 BD92 E665 B840 118B 6E94 2CFD 694D E370 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFASI9VbpQs/WlN43ARAoJdAKDSEGYJ4QpAiavHjQo9faNDK9ihIgCdG/CP X0nuHIF989baKSfaq4oy7c8= =Na0T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----