X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF3F9D1D38E for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 15:55:18 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 64371-09 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 11:55:20 -0400 (AST) Received: from elbereth.noviforum.si (unknown [193.189.169.66]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1FA9D1D38B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 11:55:14 -0400 (AST) Received: from elbereth.noviforum.si (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by elbereth.noviforum.si (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id i25FqGHh002345 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:52:16 +0100 Received: (from gregab@localhost) by elbereth.noviforum.si (8.12.10/8.12.10/Submit) id i25FqGM7002344 for pgsql-admin@postgresql.org; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:52:16 +0100 Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:52:16 +0100 From: Grega Bremec To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Message-ID: <20040305155216.GA2228@elbereth.noviforum.si> References: <20040305092041.GB13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> <20040305120802.GJ13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> <20040305134753.GA1560@elbereth.noviforum.si> <20040305143150.GO13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="u3/rZRmxL6MmkK24" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040305143150.GO13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2i Organization: Noviforum, Ltd., Software & Media X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/76 X-Sequence-Number: 12645 --u3/rZRmxL6MmkK24 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable ...and on Fri, Mar 05, 2004 at 02:31:50PM +0000, Dave Ewart used the keyboa= rd: >=20 > I'm not sure I get your point, Grega - are you suggesting that using > LoopAES is a good idea and that a system with LoopAES should also boot > up automatically? >=20 > I don't understand that at all. If it boots up automatically, then the > encryption is effectively transparent and pointless. All data on the > disk is 'pre-decrypted', very conveniently for whoever has just stolen > the server/disk. >=20 > If you're using LoopAES, it should *require* manual intervention, i.e. > passphrase to be entered. If you want the system to boot up > automatically, using LoopAES is redundant and so should not be used. Darn, you made me shorten my hefty post into ten lines. :-( Just when I I was beginning to like it the way it was... :) Mind, this is not only in reference to LoopAES. All I'm saying is that good local security _can_ provide for lack of any kind of interactive unlock procedure during boot in case the piece of information required to un(b)lock access to encrypted media can be securely stored and used by the boot loader in a non-revelatory manner, for example by pushing the authentication process one step down. One example of that would be a PSK-protecting boot loader (for boot arguments) and some sort of key-encrypted boot loader config file. That way, even if someone can boot the Damn Thing [tm], they can not log into the system and access the protected data, nor do they have access to information required to access unencrypted data (passphrases, keys, ...). Cheers, --=20 Grega Bremec Senior Administrator Noviforum Ltd., Software & Media http://www.noviforum.si/ --u3/rZRmxL6MmkK24 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFASKIwDo/EMYD4+osRAl8qAKCPoREncVWlwxxNmbGAbmjumADMYQCeI1bB Vn7c8AUDOvp+SFCapWDzvGw= =k7wl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --u3/rZRmxL6MmkK24--