X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 479D3D1D2CE for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 19:28:43 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 40525-07 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 15:28:36 -0400 (AST) Received: from vsmtp3.tin.it (vsmtp3alice.tin.it [212.216.176.143]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 635E9D1D887 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 15:28:35 -0400 (AST) Received: from host91-33.pool8248.interbusiness.it (82.48.33.91) by vsmtp3.tin.it (7.0.019) (authenticated as silvanadimartino) id 402CD18F0041E708; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:28:30 +0100 From: Silvana Di Martino To: "Matt Clark" , "Dave Ewart" , Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:29:47 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.5 References: In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200403051919.51117.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/62 X-Sequence-Number: 12632 Alle 11:17, venerd=EC 5 marzo 2004, Matt Clark ha scritto: > Yes, but only if the password has to entered manually [1] at boot time. > And it gives zero protection against someone who gains root access to the > server. This is a problem for italian users because the italian law clearly states= =20 that only the people delegated to perform maintenance on the personal data= =20 can have access to them. SysAdmin are clearly escluded. So, we do have to= =20 protect the data even from the "prying eyes" of our SysAdmin... :-( > So you _also_ have to encrypt the sensitive data before giving it to the > DB, using a key that is not stored on the DB server. Right. > Of course that means your app servers have to have _those_ passwords/ > keys entered manually at boot time, or else someone who roots them can > read your sensitive data quite trivially. Right. > And to do any better than that you need one of those very snazzy cards > from nCipher or whoever, that allow you to process encrypted data in a > hardware sandbox so even your application doesn't see it, or at least > only allow signed code to manipulate the data. Actually, we are considering the adoption of USB cryptographic keys for thi= s=20 task. Having the passwords stored in a USB EPROM should be safer and easier= =20 to use than a set of hard-to-remember/hard-to-crack alphanumeric passwords= =20 (each at least 8 characters long, accordingly with our law). IMHO, this crypto topic should be seriously taken into account by the=20 developers of all of the major Open Source Database Engines (PostgreSQL,=20 MySQL and Firebird). Given that a large part of the data stored into these = DB=20 are somehow "personal" or even "sensitive", the lack of built-in=20 cryptographic protection could push our beloved GPL RDBMS out of the market. See you ----------------------------------------- Alessandro Bottoni and Silvana Di Martino alessandrobottoni@interfree.it silvanadimartino@tin.it