X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31695D1D887 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 19:28:31 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 40358-08 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 15:28:30 -0400 (AST) Received: from vsmtp3.tin.it (vsmtp3alice.tin.it [212.216.176.143]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A52BFD1D85F for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 15:28:28 -0400 (AST) Received: from host91-33.pool8248.interbusiness.it (82.48.33.91) by vsmtp3.tin.it (7.0.019) (authenticated as silvanadimartino) id 402CD18F0041E704; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:28:27 +0100 From: Silvana Di Martino To: Mitch Pirtle , Matt Davies Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:12:37 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.5 Cc: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org References: <200403050951.33230.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <1078497790.404891feec25d@www.mattdavies.net> <40489607.1040204@spacemonkeylabs.com> In-Reply-To: <40489607.1040204@spacemonkeylabs.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200403052012.37564.silvanadimartino@tin.it> X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/59 X-Sequence-Number: 12629 Alle 15:00, venerd=EC 5 marzo 2004, Mitch Pirtle ha scritto: > My question is much more basic than that: Why encrypt anything beyond > passwords? If you secure the accounts on the machine, and encrypt all > network traffic to the machine (ssh, scp, ssl) then what additional > security can you add? The following: - protect your data from the "prying eyes" of your SysAdmins (our law impos= es=20 this kind of protection) - protect your data in case of hardware theft > I have servers in remote facilities all over the world. It is just not > possible for me to fly to each datacenter to be there at boot time when > I upgrade the kernel. I'd love the travel, but it is not feasible. Technically speaking, this is not required:=20 - we could have a boot system that requires the password on the net to a=20 "password server" or a human. A few network-based booting systems for=20 diskless workstations do something like that already. We just need a=20 network-based password system similar to Kerberos or DHCP. It does not exis= ts=20 yet, and it will be hard to implement, but it can be created. > Second, hard-disk encryption will only come into play if someone stole > the hardware, right? And even then, as long as the thing boots, then > they would have access! That is, unless we went back to the > human-required-at-boot scenario. See above. The laptop must ask for a password on the net. You just lock the= =20 password of any stolen/missing PC on your password server. > As a former CSO for an 18000-person company, I'm a horribly paranoid > person when it comes to security; but security that is easily bypassed > (or dificult-to-impossible to enforce) is just added effort, isn't it? That's why I did not vote Berlusconi: he is prone to enforce this kind of= =20 "security"... ;-) > Here is an idea to beat up on: how about having the end user of the > application supply the key that is used to decrypt their data, and only > their data? Take your basic, garden variety PHP website, for example. > > When the user is given an account, they are also given a password. This > password is also used as the key for the (blowfish, via mcrypt maybe?) > encryption of the data that gets stored for that person. If you do not > have that key, then you cannot decrypt their data. To boot, their key > is useless for everyone else's data as they used their own... This is not a solution: "delegated operators" must be able to access the da= ta=20 without bothering the data "owner" (that is: the person described by the=20 data). They cannot (and must not) ask the owner to grant them access to the= =20 data every time they need to use them. > Excellent discussion, maybe we could all come up with a sort of best > practices for PostgreSQL and security :) I do hope so: this problem is going to affect a lot of SysAdmins EU-wide an= d=20 deserves a standard solution. See you BTW: if you have a USA-based company and collect info regarding Italian=20 people, you have to comply with this absurd Italian law. Funny, isn't it? ----------------------------------------- Alessandro Bottoni and Silvana Di Martino alessandrobottoni@interfree.it silvanadimartino@tin.it