X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2360AD1D10B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 20:40:09 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 66384-04 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:40:08 -0400 (AST) Received: from vsmtp2.tin.it (vsmtp2alice.tin.it [212.216.176.142]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DBBCD1CB21 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 16:40:07 -0400 (AST) Received: from host100-31.pool80116.interbusiness.it (80.116.31.100) by vsmtp2.tin.it (7.0.019) (authenticated as silvanadimartino) id 4043D1B5000CF664; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 21:39:56 +0100 From: Silvana Di Martino To: Stephan Szabo Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 21:39:49 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.5 Cc: Alex Page , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org References: <200403050951.33230.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <200403052024.38291.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <20040305120845.H92233@megazone.bigpanda.com> In-Reply-To: <20040305120845.H92233@megazone.bigpanda.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200403052137.51384.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/67 X-Sequence-Number: 12636 Alle 20:14, venerd=EC 5 marzo 2004, Stephan Szabo ha scritto: > > Unfortunately, the new Italian law forces us to take seriously into > > account this catastrophic scenario and another one that is almost as > > worring: an unfaithful SysAdmin that copies your data and sells them to > > KGB. So, database encryption (and not disk encryption) is the _only_ > > answer. > > But since your sysadmin (if not trusted) could go behind your back and > replace the database, any applications that are using the data, etc, I'm > not sure that's even sufficient. Replacing the RDBMS engine and/or the "client" application, would be useles= s:=20 the "cracker" still need the password to access the encrypted data. > > > Of course, this loopback encryption with a boot-time passphrase may > > > fail if they take the rackmount UPS as *well*, and keep the machine > > > powered at all times ;) > > > > The server should listen to the (encrypted/digitally signed) "Heartbeat" > > of a password server through the net to prevent this kind of attack. > > That'll help prevent this sort of attack (although doesn't entirely unless > you can guarantee that the password server cannot be taken at the same > time) but also gives you a remote point of failure. Right. See you ----------------------------------------- Alessandro Bottoni and Silvana Di Martino alessandrobottoni@interfree.it silvanadimartino@tin.it