X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07C19D1C4EB for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 07:54:59 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 10899-05 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 03:54:58 -0400 (AST) Received: from vsmtp2.tin.it (vsmtp2alice.tin.it [212.216.176.142]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A5F2D1B906 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 03:54:57 -0400 (AST) Received: from host253-31.pool80116.interbusiness.it (80.116.31.253) by vsmtp2.tin.it (7.0.019) (authenticated as silvanadimartino) id 4043D1B5000F79E1; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 08:54:50 +0100 From: Silvana Di Martino To: Lamar Owen , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 08:56:13 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.5 References: <200403060855.12265.lowen@pari.edu> In-Reply-To: <200403060855.12265.lowen@pari.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Message-Id: <200403061721.10497.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/98 X-Sequence-Number: 12667 Alle 13:55, sabato 6 marzo 2004, Lamar Owen ha scritto: > On Friday 05 March 2004 03:34 pm, scott.marlowe wrote: > > Sorry, but that's the wrong answer. Once someone has root on a unix box > > her can do ANYTHING he wants. and he can cover his tracks. > > This is what things like the capabilities system and SELinux are designed > to prevent in the Linux world. As Fedora Core 2 will ship with SELinux > installed and enabled, it will become much more difficult for someone to > randomly get root and do damage. It is quite simple with SELinux to > prevent any of the attacks you mentioned. Root is no longer root. Things > on an SELinux system, or a system fully implementing the kernel > capabilities model, can indeed be locked away from root, at least in > network attached multiuser mode. This does, of course, make maintenance of > the data more difficult; one must be at the console in a special mode to do > full maintenance. But someone remotely cracking root no longer is the > threat they once were, when some system like SELinux is in use. A better, more structured architecture of permissions on Unix is a long-standing need. It looks like SELinux is offering a new and interesting approach to this problem. Regarding this topic I have a dream: the hyerarchical permission architecture of OS/400 (and many other IBM OSs for mainframe) ported to Linux. Just imagine this: you have a omnipotent "root" who can access the machine from the console only, a whole set of powerful, configurable administrators who can act from the net, each of them devoted to administer a specific part of the OS or of the File System, and finally a crowd of simple users, with configurable permissions. Nobody would have more power of what it actually need for his job, not even the root. Would not it be a better (safer and more manageable) world to live on? ----------------------------------------- Alessandro Bottoni and Silvana Di Martino alessandrobottoni@interfree.it silvanadimartino@tin.it