X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DD1ED1CAC7 for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 11:41:12 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 98377-03 for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 07:41:13 -0400 (AST) Received: from fep02-mail.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com (fep02-mail.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com [66.185.86.72]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCE96D1BABD for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 07:41:09 -0400 (AST) Received: from phlogiston.dydns.org ([65.49.121.67]) by fep02-mail.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com (InterMail vM.5.01.05.12 201-253-122-126-112-20020820) with ESMTP id <20040309114030.QGJO434741.fep02-mail.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com@phlogiston.dydns.org> for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 06:40:30 -0500 Received: by phlogiston.dydns.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 9B0663F3A; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 06:41:11 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 06:41:11 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: HIPAA Message-ID: <20040309114111.GA26751@phlogiston.dyndns.org> Mail-Followup-To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org References: <200403081024.06324.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <20040308140724.GB24861@phlogiston.dyndns.org> <200403081725.34306.listsubscriptions@oghma.on.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200403081725.34306.listsubscriptions@oghma.on.ca> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.4i X-Authentication-Info: Submitted using SMTP AUTH LOGIN at fep02-mail.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com from [65.49.121.67] using ID at Tue, 9 Mar 2004 06:40:29 -0500 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/143 X-Sequence-Number: 12712 On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 05:25:34PM -0500, Gorshkov wrote: > it never ceases to amaze me at how consistantly people underestimate the > information that can be taken from a datum - especially when aggrigated with > data from other sources. This is actually part of the argument for why you just shouldn't store or ask for a lot of stuff in the first place. Of course it's true that the little bit of data that you have can be aggregated with the little bit of data someone else has in case a dedicated attacker is trying to build up a full data set. But given that there are these data, nobody is actually going to be able to prevent such an attacker anyway. All you can do is limit your own liability in exposing data; and that means collecting as little (not as much) as you can, and then further attempting to protect the data you actually do collect. A -- Andrew Sullivan | ajs@crankycanuck.ca This work was visionary and imaginative, and goes to show that visionary and imaginative work need not end up well. --Dennis Ritchie