X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (av.hub.org [200.46.204.144]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90121D8C32 for ; Wed, 16 Nov 2005 17:16:18 -0400 (AST) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (av.hub.org [200.46.204.144]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 47475-06 for ; Wed, 16 Nov 2005 21:16:19 +0000 (GMT) X-Greylist: delayed 03:11:53.505517 by SQLgrey- Received: from svr2.postgresql.org (svr2.postgresql.org [65.19.161.25]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19D16D90E9 for ; Wed, 16 Nov 2005 16:55:09 -0400 (AST) Received: from mortis.over-yonder.net (adsl-157-21-134.jan.bellsouth.net [70.157.21.134]) by svr2.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64786F0BC4 for ; Wed, 16 Nov 2005 17:43:14 +0000 (GMT) Received: by mortis.over-yonder.net (Postfix, from userid 100) id 58E9A20FFA; Wed, 16 Nov 2005 11:43:10 -0600 (CST) Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2005 11:43:10 -0600 From: "Matthew D. Fuller" To: Tom Lane Cc: Wim Bertels , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: md5 collision generator Message-ID: <20051116174309.GK20846@over-yonder.net> References: <437B3358.8040007@khleuven.be> <5967.1132154949@sss.pgh.pa.us> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5967.1132154949@sss.pgh.pa.us> X-Editor: vi X-OS: FreeBSD User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i-fullermd.2 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at hub.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=0 required=5 tests=[none] X-Spam-Score: 0 X-Spam-Level: X-Archive-Number: 200511/220 X-Sequence-Number: 19593 On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:29:09AM -0500 I heard the voice of Tom Lane, and lo! it spake thus: > > The existence of this algorithm is disturbing, since it implies that > MD5 is weaker than people thought, It occurs to me that, controlling everything that would be poking into that part of the database, it would be possible to store the password with several DIFFERENT hash algorithms, which would save us in the future from any of them being easily crackable (or even ALL of them, unless you can somehow create a collision across them all simultaneously). It seems that even with 2 or 3 weak hashes, that might be safer long-term than with just 1 strong hash. I s'pose it would add a little cost to the connection-establishing process... -- Matthew Fuller (MF4839) | fullermd@over-yonder.net Systems/Network Administrator | http://www.over-yonder.net/~fullermd/ On the Internet, nobody can hear you scream.