X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.144]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9337F3A62AC for ; Fri, 28 Jan 2005 22:53:22 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (av.hub.org [200.46.204.144]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 14709-05 for ; Fri, 28 Jan 2005 22:53:10 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us (sss.pgh.pa.us [66.207.139.130]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E82F3A6017 for ; Fri, 28 Jan 2005 22:53:11 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sss2.sss.pgh.pa.us (tgl@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id j0SMrADc027057; Fri, 28 Jan 2005 17:53:10 -0500 (EST) To: Bruno Wolff III Cc: Victor Danilchenko , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Help with access control settings in pg_hba.conf -- In-reply-to: <20050127175733.GB23613@wolff.to> References: <20050127175733.GB23613@wolff.to> Comments: In-reply-to Bruno Wolff III message dated "Thu, 27 Jan 2005 11:57:33 -0600" Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2005 17:53:10 -0500 Message-ID: <27056.1106952790@sss.pgh.pa.us> From: Tom Lane X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at hub.org X-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.006 tagged_above=0 required=5 tests=AWL X-Spam-Level: X-Archive-Number: 200501/290 X-Sequence-Number: 16149 Bruno Wolff III writes: > Victor Danilchenko wrote: >> the solution was in disabling the 'result:encrypt' option >> (setting it to 'no') in the /etc/identd.conf file. > When you encrypt names for ident, the other host isn't supposed to be > able to figure out who is making the request. If the remote site has > a problem they can give the string back to the connecting site's admins > and then they can figure out who is causing problems. I have added a note to our SGML docs pointing out that this doesn't work. In one sense it *should* not work, by design, since the whole point of an encrypting ident server is to not let the remote side figure out the real name of its user. However, we already point out that [ident is] only appropriate for closed networks where each client machine is under tight control and where the database and system administrators operate in close contact. You could argue that in this scenario it is appropriate for the database to have a copy of the encryption key that the client's ident server is using, and then it would be just a small matter of programming to make PostgreSQL accept encrypted responses. I'm not sure it's worth the trouble though. One problem is that so far as I've been able to find, there is not a recognized standard for the encryption transformation, and so you might need different code for each ident server implementation you deal with. Also, at least some ident servers can be configured to deliver encrypted responses to some questioners and unencrypted responses to others --- so the simplest solution is to use one of those and configure it to give cleartext responses to your database server. regards, tom lane