Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1p6DOz-0004gj-4x for pgsql-admin@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 16 Dec 2022 16:17:37 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1p6DOx-0004TI-Sm for pgsql-admin@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 16 Dec 2022 16:17:35 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1p6DOx-0004T9-Hu for pgsql-admin@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 16 Dec 2022 16:17:35 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([66.207.139.130]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1p6DOv-0002sB-Gu for pgsql-admin@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 16 Dec 2022 16:17:35 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 2BGGHTd23682761; Fri, 16 Dec 2022 11:17:29 -0500 From: Tom Lane To: Magnus Hagander cc: Laurenz Albe , Daulat , pgsql-admin Subject: Re: Password complexities in Postgres v14.6 In-reply-to: References: <2192ed923b577ce4a8a90479c7ed1c97f7a6523d.camel@cybertec.at> <3675887.1671203806@sss.pgh.pa.us> Comments: In-reply-to Magnus Hagander message dated "Fri, 16 Dec 2022 16:41:39 +0100" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <3682759.1671207449.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 11:17:29 -0500 Message-ID: <3682760.1671207449@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk Magnus Hagander writes: > On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at 4:16 PM Tom Lane wrote: > You can fairly easily enforce password age limits in PG using the >> ALTER USER ... VALID UNTIL option. > The part about requiring repeated password changes is considered actively > harmful these days, so it's definitely obsolete. (Note that this is > different from the postgres setting for VALID UNTIL which is not about the > password being valid until, it's about the entire user being valid until > the specified time). No, VALID UNTIL only applies to the password; you can log in via non-password-based auth mechanisms regardless of that. (I agree that forced password rotations are also an obsolete security practice, but figured that one bit of push-back at a time was enough.) > And of course in either case a proper solution like using gssapi/kerberos > is the better choice. Yeah, migrating to something like that would be best practice. regards, tom lane