X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4823DD1D29C for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 13:53:04 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 15994-10 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 09:53:05 -0400 (AST) Received: from out009.verizon.net (out009pub.verizon.net [206.46.170.131]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD02BD1C9E8 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 09:53:00 -0400 (AST) Received: from spacemonkeylabs.com ([68.161.147.162]) by out009.verizon.net (InterMail vM.5.01.06.06 201-253-122-130-106-20030910) with ESMTP id <20040305135304.NNNF29216.out009.verizon.net@spacemonkeylabs.com> for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2004 07:53:04 -0600 Message-ID: <40488640.1040409@spacemonkeylabs.com> Date: Fri, 05 Mar 2004 08:53:04 -0500 From: Mitch Pirtle Organization: Spacemonkey Laboratories User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.6b) Gecko/20031205 Thunderbird/0.4 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) References: <200403050951.33230.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <40484403.70001@aldratech.com> <200403051245.10681.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <20040305121254.GK13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> In-Reply-To: <20040305121254.GK13042@nemesis.ox.icnet.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Authentication-Info: Submitted using SMTP AUTH at out009.verizon.net from [68.161.147.162] at Fri, 5 Mar 2004 07:53:03 -0600 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/42 X-Sequence-Number: 12612 Dave Ewart wrote: > If you find any 'automated' front-end to do this at the database-level, > rather than something like loopback at the filesystem level or at the > field level for specific fields, I think there would be a lot of > interest. But that is the problem, isn't it? Any 'automated' encryption/decryption will be just as useful to the would-be perpetrator of data theft. This is like having an automatic alarm system on your car that works for anyone that walks up to it. The same logic applies to encrypting the data in the database - somewhere on your server the application has to know how to decrypt it, and that means anyone that gains access to your server will have that ability also... I understand (and demand) requiring SSL connections for database clients, and MD5 hashing of passwords before storing in the database, but implementing two-way encryption of database data just doesn't make sense to me. -- Mitch