X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07FA3D1D8A5 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 13:25:45 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 45946-07 for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 09:25:46 -0400 (AST) Received: from out008.verizon.net (out008pub.verizon.net [206.46.170.108]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57BA1D1D88F for ; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 09:25:42 -0400 (AST) Received: from spacemonkeylabs.com ([68.161.147.162]) by out008.verizon.net (InterMail vM.5.01.06.06 201-253-122-130-106-20030910) with ESMTP id <20040307132545.URQT27801.out008.verizon.net@spacemonkeylabs.com>; Sun, 7 Mar 2004 07:25:45 -0600 Message-ID: <404B22DA.7010400@spacemonkeylabs.com> Date: Sun, 07 Mar 2004 08:25:46 -0500 From: Mitch Pirtle Organization: Spacemonkey Laboratories User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.6b) Gecko/20031205 Thunderbird/0.4 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Silvana Di Martino Cc: Lamar Owen , pgsql-admin@postgresql.org Subject: Re: OT: Database Encryption (now required by law in Italy) References: <200403060855.12265.lowen@pari.edu> <200403061721.10497.silvanadimartino@tin.it> In-Reply-To: <200403061721.10497.silvanadimartino@tin.it> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Authentication-Info: Submitted using SMTP AUTH at out008.verizon.net from [68.161.147.162] at Sun, 7 Mar 2004 07:25:44 -0600 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/102 X-Sequence-Number: 12671 Silvana Di Martino wrote: > Regarding this topic I have a dream: the hyerarchical permission architecture > of OS/400 (and many other IBM OSs for mainframe) ported to Linux. Just imagine > this: you have a omnipotent "root" who can access the machine from the > console only, a whole set of powerful, configurable administrators who can > act from the net, each of them devoted to administer a specific part of the > OS or of the File System, and finally a crowd of simple users, with > configurable permissions. Nobody would have more power of what it actually > need for his job, not even the root. Great, then all of my linux users, thanks to the administrators in their physical presence, would get an account with SECADM privileges. (rimshot)