X-Original-To: pgsql-admin-postgresql.org@localhost.postgresql.org Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.2]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8AB4D1B9AF for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 00:51:56 +0000 (GMT) Received: from svr1.postgresql.org ([200.46.204.71]) by localhost (neptune.hub.org [200.46.204.2]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 66787-02 for ; Mon, 8 Mar 2004 20:51:58 -0400 (AST) Received: from news.hub.org (news.hub.org [200.46.204.72]) by svr1.postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D902CD1B53C for ; Mon, 8 Mar 2004 20:51:54 -0400 (AST) Received: from news.hub.org (news.hub.org [200.46.204.72]) by news.hub.org (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id i290ps1Y089073 for ; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 00:51:54 GMT (envelope-from news@news.hub.org) Received: (from news@localhost) by news.hub.org (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id i290oM6F088865 for pgsql-admin@postgresql.org; Tue, 9 Mar 2004 00:50:22 GMT From: Christopher Browne X-Newsgroups: comp.databases.postgresql.admin Subject: Re: HIPAA Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 18:51:56 -0500 Organization: cbbrowne Computing Inc Lines: 61 Message-ID: References: <200403081024.06324.silvanadimartino@tin.it> <20040308140724.GB24861@phlogiston.dyndns.org> <200403081725.34306.listsubscriptions@oghma.on.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Complaints-To: usenet@news.hub.org X-message-flag: Outlook is rather hackable, isn't it? X-Home-Page: http://www.cbbrowne.com/info/ X-Affero: http://svcs.affero.net/rm.php?r=cbbrowne User-Agent: Gnus/5.1006 (Gnus v5.10.6) XEmacs/21.4 (Security Through Obscurity, linux) Cancel-Lock: sha1:qNfBvS0kQr22/H4+D+qTSuXA0L0= To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at postgresql.org X-Archive-Number: 200403/154 X-Sequence-Number: 12723 Martha Stewart called it a Good Thing when listsubscriptions@oghma.on.ca (Gorshkov) wrote: > On March 8, 2004 09:07, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >> On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 12:07:23PM +0000, Silvana Di Martino wrote: >> > This seems to give to this "db encryption" issue the status of >> > "global relevance" that would deserve a more systematic >> > approach. I mean: no homegrown solutions - rather have the >> > community to develop a specific, standard extension of PostgreSQL >> > and put it into the distro. >> >> Just to throw another wrench into the works, you might want to >> think about some of the observations on what data you _really_ need >> that are in Peter Wayner's _Translucent Databases_ (Flyzone Press, >> 2002. ISBN 0-9675844-1-8). Many of the techniques are not >> particularly novel, but the discussion in the beginning about >> deciding just which data you _really_ need is, I think, very >> helpful. There's a tendency to collect data just because one can, >> and the new data protection laws are an attempt to find a techno >> fix to the problem. (I still like it that someone is spending some >> time on improving the crypto stuff, though.) >> >> A > > Many, many moons ago when I was young and stupid, I was in an > intelligence trade in the Cdn Navy - COMINT/SIGINT. > > it never ceases to amaze me at how consistantly people underestimate > the information that can be taken from a datum - especially when > aggrigated with data from other sources. I'd like to think you misspelled "aggravated" there :-) The US situation of SSN numbers being widely used as personal identifiers has been quite spectacularly disastrous for personal security. My credit union finally "saw the light" a couple of years ago, and decided to use their own randomly generated account IDs; I gather that many (most?) US companies have been taking the same strategy with employee and customer account numbers. For different organizations to use different keys is not a total panacea, but the lack of uniqueness has been pretty harmful. Wayner's book is certainly pretty good on the subject; it may not be a NIST/FIPS/ISO standard, but it certainly presents the security issues coherently. What is pretty clear is that this kind of application requires that there be a use of data encryption that is controlled _outside_ the database layer. There may be attempts made to sell the notion that the Right Solution requires using some particular product, such as Trusted Oracle; you can expect that to be pressed by vendors that have products they want to push. Unfortunately, this may well worsen security, by putting trust in a layer that cannot provide security. -- let name="cbbrowne" and tld="cbbrowne.com" in name ^ "@" ^ tld;; http://cbbrowne.com/info/rdbms.html "I think we might have been better off with a slide rule." -- Zaphod Beeblebrox