Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1wGHgQ-0064GV-2M for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:39:07 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1wGHgP-006qJk-2M for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:39:05 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1wGHgP-006qG3-1V for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:39:05 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([68.162.161.243]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.98.2) (envelope-from ) id 1wGHgI-00000002q2O-0N95 for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:39:00 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 63OEcsPJ1612211; Fri, 24 Apr 2026 10:38:54 -0400 From: Tom Lane To: Daniel Gustafsson cc: Michael Paquier , ansh01072001@gmail.com, pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org Subject: Re: BUG #19457: RE: pgp_sym_encrypt silently accepts non-FIPS ciphers (bf, cast5, 3des) when OpenSSL is in FIPS mod In-reply-to: <99F0B98C-2276-4C01-B553-BDD0806CAEEF@yesql.se> References: <19457-4bab15c17aea36c7@postgresql.org> <3A2299BC-1684-4CEB-BD65-1DEBFB446F24@yesql.se> <99F0B98C-2276-4C01-B553-BDD0806CAEEF@yesql.se> Comments: In-reply-to Daniel Gustafsson message dated "Fri, 24 Apr 2026 10:11:04 +0200" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <1612209.1777041534.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 10:38:54 -0400 Message-ID: <1612210.1777041534@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk Daniel Gustafsson writes: >> On 24 Apr 2026, at 06:20, Michael Paquier wrote: >> I am interesting in getting that fixed for the next point release, so >> I have given it a try, finishing with the attached. This would cause >> pgp_sym_encrypt() and pgp_sym_decrypt() to complain when the builtin >> mode is disabled, making things more consistent with the surroundings. > I'm not convinced this is material for a minor release, the feature work= s as > documented and it was never documented to cover PGP. Re-reading the thr= ead PGP > was never discussed, and while that admittedly seem like an oversight do= ing > this in a minor release will alter documented behaviour which is general= ly not > what we want to do. I sympathize with that argument, but ... people who are running in FIPS mode are probably doing so because they have contractual or legal obligations to meet that standard. A person who could be in hot water if they are accidentally running disallowed crypto would see this as a dangerous bug. A person who does not care should not be using FIPS mode. regards, tom lane