Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1uIABl-00GulH-0P for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Thu, 22 May 2025 17:58:41 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1uIABj-006CxE-JE for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Thu, 22 May 2025 17:58:39 +0000 Received: from makus.postgresql.org ([2001:4800:3e1:1::229]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1uIABj-006Cx5-B3 for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Thu, 22 May 2025 17:58:39 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([68.162.161.243]) by makus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1uIABg-000LdO-2J for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Thu, 22 May 2025 17:58:38 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 54MHwX7X1647591; Thu, 22 May 2025 13:58:33 -0400 From: Tom Lane To: Jacob Champion cc: Chris Gooch , pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org Subject: Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups In-reply-to: References: <1529314.1747928806@sss.pgh.pa.us> <1536692.1747933034@sss.pgh.pa.us> Comments: In-reply-to Jacob Champion message dated "Thu, 22 May 2025 10:11:53 -0700" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-ID: <1647589.1747936713.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 13:58:33 -0400 Message-ID: <1647590.1747936713@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk Jacob Champion writes: > On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 9:57 AM Tom Lane wrote: >> I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a >> little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough? > Microsoft docs [1] seem to imply that there are still a bunch of > existing problems if you try to go much higher, though it is possible > to do so with registry tweaks. Looks like they default to 48k. > Maybe we should consider making the max incoming ticket size > configurable, so users that really need a bigger one can deal with the > DoS risk without it affecting everyone else. (A limit on outgoing > tickets probably doesn't make too much sense; I imagine you're going > to use the ticket that GSSAPI hands you, no matter how big it is, > because it's not as if you have a choice.) Yeah, but we don't want to change the packet size used after the initial exchange, because that would create compatibility issues in cases that aren't failing today. I didn't look at the code to see if we can easily use a different buffer size during the authentication exchange. If we can, I'd be inclined to goose it up to 128K or so. Given Chris' point that should be plenty, so I don't feel a need to expose a knob. regards, tom lane