Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1tt6jU-008hGr-9H for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 14 Mar 2025 15:13:56 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1tt6jS-009sH7-Iy for pgsql-bugs@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 14 Mar 2025 15:13:54 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1tt6jS-009sGy-AZ for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 14 Mar 2025 15:13:54 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([68.162.161.243]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1tt6jO-002r7K-0h for pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 14 Mar 2025 15:13:53 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 52EFDnqS3074066; Fri, 14 Mar 2025 11:13:49 -0400 From: Tom Lane To: Viktor Holmberg cc: Daniel Gustafsson , pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org Subject: Re: ISN extension - wrong volatility level for isn_weak() function In-reply-to: References: <790bc1f9-74dc-4b50-94d2-8147315b1556@Spark> <51C655A4-46FB-4A40-BAE5-26A76B31D3EE@yesql.se> <3052531.1741961784@sss.pgh.pa.us> Comments: In-reply-to Viktor Holmberg message dated "Fri, 14 Mar 2025 14:28:01 -0000" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-ID: <3074064.1741965229.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 11:13:49 -0400 Message-ID: <3074065.1741965229@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk Viktor Holmberg writes: > I haven=E2=80=99t checked the source code, but yes the isn_weak feature = has some footgun potential. As it doesn=E2=80=99t respect transactions, bu= t rather sets a flag on session level, it=E2=80=99s easy for the =E2=80=9C= isn weakness=E2=80=9D to leak out into a connection pool. Yeah, really that ought to be a GUC I should think. There isn't anything well-designed about it ... I found some prior discussion here: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/C12AE0A2A752416C79F3EE81%40teje but we don't seem to have pulled the trigger on changing anything. regards, tom lane