Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cHFRy-00071S-MJ for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 14 Dec 2016 19:42:50 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with smtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cHFRy-0000Vx-1e for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 14 Dec 2016 19:42:50 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cHFRw-0000Un-Mp for pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org; Wed, 14 Dec 2016 19:42:48 +0000 Received: from tamriel.snowman.net ([72.66.115.51]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1cHFRt-0001Y1-6B for pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org; Wed, 14 Dec 2016 19:42:47 +0000 Received: by tamriel.snowman.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 4007A5F7A6; Wed, 14 Dec 2016 14:41:41 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 14:41:41 -0500 From: Stephen Frost To: Heikki Linnakangas Cc: Bruce Momjian , Magnus Hagander , Michael Paquier , Robert Haas , Andres Freund , Peter Eisentraut , David Steele , Tom Lane , David Fetter , Alvaro Herrera , Julian Markwort , PostgreSQL mailing lists , Valery Popov Subject: Re: pg_authid.rolpassword format (was Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol) Message-ID: <20161214194141.GU23417@tamriel.snowman.net> References: <21eecdb8-365b-8347-1ae2-5278d1fe798c@iki.fi> <762f4875-a87e-cf0b-c06b-b357294d8be1@iki.fi> <2d07165c-1793-e243-a2a9-e45b624c7580@iki.fi> <20161214181205.GB23459@momjian.us> <1D2394E9-B6F3-4EBB-B1CE-F84FCE49AEAE@iki.fi> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="WSf/+y6apGpKq+5a" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1D2394E9-B6F3-4EBB-B1CE-F84FCE49AEAE@iki.fi> X-Editor: Vim http://www.vim.org/ X-Info: http://www.snowman.net X-Operating-System: Linux/3.13.0-91-generic (x86_64) X-Uptime: 14:37:39 up 158 days, 21:01, 31 users, load average: 0.27, 0.18, 0.16 User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Pg-Spam-Score: -5.0 (-----) List-Archive: List-Help: List-ID: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Mailing-List: pgsql-hackers Precedence: bulk Sender: pgsql-hackers-owner@postgresql.org --WSf/+y6apGpKq+5a Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable * Heikki Linnakangas (hlinnaka@iki.fi) wrote: > On 14 December 2016 20:12:05 EET, Bruce Momjian wrote: > >On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 11:27:15AM +0100, Magnus Hagander wrote: > >> I would so like to just drop support for plain passwords completely > >:) But > >> there's a backwards compatibility issue to think about of course. > >>=20 > >> But -- is there any actual usecase for them anymore? > > > >I thought we recommended 'password' for SSL connections because if you > >use MD5 passwords the password text layout is known and that simplifies > >cryptanalysis. >=20 > No, that makes no sense. And whether you use 'password' or 'md5' authenti= cation is a different question than whether you store passwords in plaintex= t or as md5 hashes. Magnus was asking whether it ever makes sense to *store= * passwords in plaintext. Right. > Since you brought it up, there is a legitimate argument to be made that '= password' authentication is more secure than 'md5', when SSL is used. Namel= y, if an attacker can acquire contents of pg_authid e.g. by stealing a back= up tape, with 'md5' authentication he can log in as any user, using just th= e stolen hashes. But with 'password', he needs to reverse the hash first. I= t's not a great difference, but it's something. Tunnelled passwords which are stored as hashes is also well understood and comparable to SSH with passwords in /etc/passwd. Storing plaintext passwords has been bad form for just about forever and I wouldn't be sad to see our support of it go. At the least, as was discussed somewhere, but I'm not sure where it ended up, we should give administrators the ability to control what ways a password can be stored. In particular, once a user has migrated all of their users to SCRAM, they should be able to say "don't let new passwords be in any format other than SCRAM-SHA-256". Thanks! 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