Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1ntI2P-0007Bf-Rq for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Tue, 24 May 2022 00:04:37 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1ntI2M-0003Fq-RK for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Tue, 24 May 2022 00:04:34 +0000 Received: from makus.postgresql.org ([2001:4800:3e1:1::229]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1ntI2M-0003Fg-63 for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Tue, 24 May 2022 00:04:34 +0000 Received: from mail-pl1-x62e.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4864:20::62e]) by makus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1ntI2J-00074E-PZ for pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org; Tue, 24 May 2022 00:04:33 +0000 Received: by mail-pl1-x62e.google.com with SMTP id n8so14467219plh.1 for ; Mon, 23 May 2022 17:04:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=1BDdpyptUyKJJwwbuGByp1udwFqFAlNSq3Ume1PJJ3k=; b=Ec7HqG7XtpQ/+e8nOdZx0rs/74Bhbi9S8sT66EMPXAPP4i4RMSpVt7lOadSevrCw8H B1sRl6EUJeoN6Wx6GjQvfb+0Zen356JvvIeVdndpowX0LTBsvj3IzcyRXzDP5B6IWsdz fnnWwa0AzuK0wREHAEjHG3VjJoQrV5SXK1SAh9S9hucoG0yd8Ip4zWidwBoOA/GOGGH0 UZ0ME3ruLAGtvplID9VK/8L0wN+UkwsbnrP6vjU2Q3Ua6P2Yxt0y1X65tH88Xuv/y1s3 kGqlJyaaK1WZmdjiEmCjbH2opXSRByRpOeUbgL7nWmw+9thHewfGiBDPbtrav0LeIpIp tSgQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=1BDdpyptUyKJJwwbuGByp1udwFqFAlNSq3Ume1PJJ3k=; b=pnfMNUcDkbQ6F89yEpq0ThO7MhK9fStb/d201EY3kF3GaCgBsqIbeGVlZWIYtbFtvy Y+rvQwTTycX8CqB4qIdIWmYXrTVy+j5BKascICihXtQeZveRpgdZmnanotYNUfTbI+/K 3HrPdqBsTeaMsdUtL2K/Fv/Jdg+wAwMhlKR+l6ujs1sn1nYr0Xdd2irRrmT0geTDjv1M sR9mEAGwIx64Wl62pExUoU8IOiJZCAMiqVhkTgB5hskClpnctUbGryvhBnVZtUgH+Iy/ 4Y+ltafOubOHsgCG/Dp8YfcEee5xbdqYSfojzqJjSqADLX2g1vQHSItdy4u0GFTQbJIA aNBw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530lCUERse7OTmhcwdWiT57ROwZTTOmWtkfH1ohvbDriJ+kpAcOU /x/d6jFhFRflc2pt5yYcsko= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz7+BEi4LSaEGav8IKrkMDoROpHhsq+Bq6o2wpQPnjvaBn9dVxD9Eej5t21Tl2tB/1y09q0yA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:a614:b0:1df:8aec:cc71 with SMTP id c20-20020a17090aa61400b001df8aeccc71mr1572567pjq.82.1653350670076; Mon, 23 May 2022 17:04:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nathanxps13 ([50.54.155.70]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id rv9-20020a17090b2c0900b001d97f7fca06sm272574pjb.24.2022.05.23.17.04.28 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 23 May 2022 17:04:29 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 17:04:27 -0700 From: Nathan Bossart To: Stephen Frost Cc: Tom Lane , Robert Haas , "pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org" Subject: Re: allow building trusted languages without the untrusted versions Message-ID: <20220524000427.GA1186400@nathanxps13> References: <20220520225619.GA876272@nathanxps13> <571753.1653092411@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20220523165403.GC938919@nathanxps13> <1290329.1653326228@sss.pgh.pa.us> <1333860.1653338790@sss.pgh.pa.us> <1354561.1653345768@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20220523230903.GP9030@tamriel.snowman.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220523230903.GP9030@tamriel.snowman.net> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 07:09:03PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote: > Instead, I'd argue that we should be continuing to work in the direction > of splitting up what can only be done by a superuser today using > predefined roles and other methods along those lines. How that lines up > with this latest ask around untrusted languages is something I'm not > exactly sure about, but a magic configure option that is > "--don't-allow-what-AWS-doesn't-want-to-allow" certainly doesn't seem > like it's going in the right direction (and, no, not every cloud > provider is going to want the exact same thing when it comes to whatever > this option is that we're talking about, so we'd end up having to have > configure options for each if we start going down this road...). I guess I'd like to do both. I agree with continuing the work with predefined roles, etc., but I also think there is value in being able to compile out things that allow arbitrary disk/network access. My intent with this thread is the latter, and I'm trying to tackle this in a way that is generically useful even beyond the cloud provider use case. -- Nathan Bossart Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com