Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([2a02:16a8:dc51::56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1g7kzX-0000dC-Kt for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 17:31:19 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1g7kzV-0003Em-AV for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 17:31:17 +0000 Received: from makus.postgresql.org ([2001:4800:1501:1::229]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1g7kzU-0003EX-Sw for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 17:31:17 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([66.207.139.130]) by makus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1g7kzS-00072r-Ey for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 17:31:15 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id w93HV9KY002133; Wed, 3 Oct 2018 13:31:09 -0400 From: Tom Lane To: Andres Freund cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org, Thomas Munro , Andrew Gierth , Alexander Kuzmenkov Subject: Re: Performance improvements for src/port/snprintf.c In-reply-to: <20181003170043.thdyezozi343dkuc@alap3.anarazel.de> References: <6FEC34CD-B8C0-44E2-8D1F-2320568BDC78@anarazel.de> <30551.1538517271@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20181003060936.zul7mfkcu5w7rotg@alap3.anarazel.de> <25583.1538569214@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20181003155207.b3lqmovuv2c5c4id@alap3.anarazel.de> <26510.1538582852@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20181003161454.ozeioucsimjg5g6m@alap3.anarazel.de> <27041.1538583733@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20181003163717.oycshpp2hnctvtfj@alap3.anarazel.de> <28321.1538585692@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20181003170043.thdyezozi343dkuc@alap3.anarazel.de> Comments: In-reply-to Andres Freund message dated "Wed, 03 Oct 2018 10:00:43 -0700" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <2131.1538587869.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:31:09 -0400 Message-ID: <2132.1538587869@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Precedence: bulk Andres Freund writes: > On 2018-10-03 12:54:52 -0400, Tom Lane wrote: >> (1) The need to use sprintf for portability means that we need very >> tight constraints on the precision spec *and* the buffer size *and* >> the format type (%f pretty much destroys certainty about how long the >> output string is). So this isn't going to be general purpose code. >> I think just writing it into float[48]out is sufficient. > Well, the numbers suggest it's also useful to do so from snprintf - it's > not that rare that we output floating point numbers from semi > performance critical code, even leaving aside float[48]out. So I'm not > convinced that we shouldn't do this from within snprintf.c too. Now we > could open-code it twice, but i'm not sure I see the point. I do not see the point of messing with snprintf.c here. I doubt that strfromd is faster than the existing sprintf call (because the latter can use ".*" instead of serializing and deserializing the precision). Even if it is, I do not want to expose an attractive-nuisance API in a header, and I think this would be exactly that. > If we just define the API as having to guarantee there's enough space > for the output format, I think it'll work well enough for now? No, because that's a recipe for buffer-overflow bugs. It's *hard* to be sure the buffer is big enough, and easy to make breakable assumptions. > snprintf.c already assumes everything floating point can be output in > 1024 chars, no? Indeed, and it's got hacks like a forced limit to precision 350 in order to make that safe. I don't want to be repeating the reasoning in fmtfloat() in a bunch of other places. regards, tom lane