Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1joHyV-000373-CI for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 02:50:51 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1joHyS-0006tv-4H for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 02:50:48 +0000 Received: from makus.postgresql.org ([2001:4800:3e1:1::229]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1joHyR-0006to-TM for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 02:50:47 +0000 Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us ([66.207.139.130]) by makus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1joHyO-0006Fu-DX for pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 02:50:46 +0000 Received: from sss1.sss.pgh.pa.us (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 05P2odVJ2244434; Wed, 24 Jun 2020 22:50:39 -0400 From: Tom Lane To: Michael Paquier cc: Daniel Gustafsson , Peter Eisentraut , pgsql-hackers Subject: Re: should libpq also require TLSv1.2 by default? In-reply-to: <20200625015026.GE130132@paquier.xyz> References: <4FBC50DB-599A-42AA-90C8-3051E3A748BB@yesql.se> <64437c39-c5fb-d799-f3d3-b638e34c1dd2@2ndquadrant.com> <003BDF1F-FC7A-4901-BBC0-33A44FE07A89@yesql.se> <20200625015026.GE130132@paquier.xyz> Comments: In-reply-to Michael Paquier message dated "Thu, 25 Jun 2020 10:50:26 +0900" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <2244432.1593053439.1@sss.pgh.pa.us> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 22:50:39 -0400 Message-ID: <2244433.1593053439@sss.pgh.pa.us> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Precedence: bulk Michael Paquier writes: > On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 12:30:03AM +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: >> As mentioned elsewhere in the thread, maybe this is also something whic= h can be >> done more easily if we improve the error reporting? Right now it's fai= rly >> cryptic IMO. > This part may be tricky to get right I think, because the error comes > directly from OpenSSL when negotiating the protocol used between the > client and the server, like "no protocols available" or such. Can we do something comparable to the backend's HINT protocol, where we add on a comment that's only mostly-likely to be right? regards, tom lane