Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kkznE-0004lE-1y for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 01:21:52 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kkznA-0006qD-VY for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 01:21:48 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kkznA-0006q6-OO for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 01:21:48 +0000 Received: from oss.nttdata.com ([49.212.34.109]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kkzn2-0004L6-O4 for pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 01:21:47 +0000 Received: from hnk.local (p1295030-ipngn4902funabasi.chiba.ocn.ne.jp [153.166.85.30]) by oss.nttdata.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CB9A9623E9; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 10:21:35 +0900 (JST) X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.102.3 at oss.nttdata.com Subject: Re: Add Information during standby recovery conflicts To: Masahiko Sawada Cc: "Drouvot, Bertrand" , Alvaro Herrera , Masahiko Sawada , Kyotaro Horiguchi , PostgreSQL-development References: <20201130182528.GA1854@alvherre.pgsql> <594f4419-62aa-c272-ef7d-4287e5c6b654@amazon.com> From: Fujii Masao Message-ID: <627f702d-a04c-b72b-b94f-214f448e2935@oss.nttdata.com> Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 10:21:35 +0900 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Precedence: bulk On 2020/12/04 9:28, Masahiko Sawada wrote: > On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 2:54 AM Fujii Masao wrote: >> >> >> >> On 2020/12/01 17:29, Drouvot, Bertrand wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> On 12/1/20 12:35 AM, Masahiko Sawada wrote: >>>> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 3:25 AM Alvaro Herrera wrote: >>>>> On 2020-Dec-01, Fujii Masao wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> + if (proc) >>>>>> + { >>>>>> + if (nprocs == 0) >>>>>> + appendStringInfo(&buf, "%d", proc->pid); >>>>>> + else >>>>>> + appendStringInfo(&buf, ", %d", proc->pid); >>>>>> + >>>>>> + nprocs++; >>>>>> >>>>>> What happens if all the backends in wait_list have gone? In other words, >>>>>> how should we handle the case where nprocs == 0 (i.e., nprocs has not been >>>>>> incrmented at all)? This would very rarely happen, but can happen. >>>>>> In this case, since buf.data is empty, at least there seems no need to log >>>>>> the list of conflicting processes in detail message. >>>>> Yes, I noticed this too; this can be simplified by changing the >>>>> condition in the ereport() call to be "nprocs > 0" (rather than >>>>> wait_list being null), otherwise not print the errdetail. (You could >>>>> test buf.data or buf.len instead, but that seems uglier to me.) >>>> +1 >>>> >>>> Maybe we can also improve the comment of this function from: >>>> >>>> + * This function also reports the details about the conflicting >>>> + * process ids if *wait_list is not NULL. >>>> >>>> to " This function also reports the details about the conflicting >>>> process ids if exist" or something. >>>> >>> Thank you all for the review/remarks. >>> >>> They have been addressed in the new attached patch version. >> >> Thanks for updating the patch! I read through the patch again >> and applied the following chages to it. Attached is the updated >> version of the patch. Could you review this version? If there is >> no issue in it, I'm thinking to commit this version. > > Thank you for updating the patch! I have one question. > >> >> + timeouts[cnt].id = STANDBY_TIMEOUT; >> + timeouts[cnt].type = TMPARAM_AFTER; >> + timeouts[cnt].delay_ms = DeadlockTimeout; >> >> Maybe STANDBY_TIMEOUT should be STANDBY_DEADLOCK_TIMEOUT here? >> I changed the code that way. > > As the comment of ResolveRecoveryConflictWithLock() says the > following, a deadlock is detected by the ordinary backend process: > > * Deadlocks involving the Startup process and an ordinary backend proces > * will be detected by the deadlock detector within the ordinary backend. > > If we use STANDBY_DEADLOCK_TIMEOUT, > SendRecoveryConflictWithBufferPin() will be called after > DeadlockTimeout passed, but I think it's not necessary for the startup > process in this case. Thanks for pointing this! You are right. > If we want to just wake up the startup process > maybe we can use STANDBY_TIMEOUT here? When STANDBY_TIMEOUT happens, a request to release conflicting buffer pins is sent. Right? If so, we should not also use STANDBY_TIMEOUT there? Or, first of all, we don't need to enable the deadlock timer at all? Since what we'd like to do is to wake up after deadlock_timeout passes, we can do that by changing ProcWaitForSignal() so that it can accept the timeout and giving the deadlock_timeout to it. If we do this, maybe we can get rid of STANDBY_LOCK_TIMEOUT from ResolveRecoveryConflictWithLock(). Thought? Regards, -- Fujii Masao Advanced Computing Technology Center Research and Development Headquarters NTT DATA CORPORATION