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help / color / mirror / Atom feedFrom: Robert Haas <[email protected]>
To: Jacob Champion <[email protected]>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Paquier <[email protected]>
Cc: Postgres hackers <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 13:35:12 -0400
Message-ID: <CA+TgmobR1R8q-rT06oWdLw_Kp_i67Uey9b+rWVrrpCJVSDNBFQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
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On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 12:28 PM Jacob Champion
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 9:17 AM Robert Haas <[email protected]> wrote:
> > It is difficult to imagine a world in which we have both requiredirect
> > and forcedirect and people are not confused.
>
> Yeah... Any thoughts on a better scheme? require_auth was meant to
> lock down overly general authentication; maybe a require_proto or
> something could do the same for the transport?
I don't understand the difference between the two sets of semantics
myself, so I'm not in a good position to comment.
> I hate that we have so many options that most people don't need but
> take precedence, especially when they're based on the existence of
> magic third-party environmental cues (e.g. Kerberos caches). And it
> was nice that we got sslrootcert=system to turn on strong security and
> reject nonsensical combinations. If someone sets `requiredirect` and
> leaves the default sslmode, or chooses a weaker one... Is that really
> useful to someone?
Maybe I'm missing something here, but why doesn't sslnegotiation
override sslmode completely? Or alternatively, why not remove
sslnegotiation entirely and just have more sslmode values? I mean
maybe this shouldn't happen categorically, but if I say I want to
require a direct SSL connection, to me that implies that I don't want
an indirect SSL connection, and I really don't want a non-SSL
connection.
I think it's pretty questionable in 2024 whether sslmode=allow and
sslmode=prefer make any sense at all. I don't think it would be crazy
to remove them entirely. But I certainly don't think that they should
be allowed to bleed into the behavior of new, higher-security
configurations. Surely if I say I want direct SSL, it's that or
nothing, right?
--
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules
In-Reply-To: <CA+TgmobR1R8q-rT06oWdLw_Kp_i67Uey9b+rWVrrpCJVSDNBFQ@mail.gmail.com>
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