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From: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 09:28:16 -0700
Message-ID: <CAOYmi+k3x-aKiVzyLfzdxFdmcBmVD8UvcwfB075BkNqyA1aa9w@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Direct SSL connection with ALPN and HBA rules
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>, 
	Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>
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On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 9:17=E2=80=AFAM Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>=
 wrote:
>
> It is difficult to imagine a world in which we have both requiredirect
> and forcedirect and people are not confused.

Yeah... Any thoughts on a better scheme? require_auth was meant to
lock down overly general authentication; maybe a require_proto or
something could do the same for the transport?

I hate that we have so many options that most people don't need but
take precedence, especially when they're based on the existence of
magic third-party environmental cues (e.g. Kerberos caches). And it
was nice that we got sslrootcert=3Dsystem to turn on strong security and
reject nonsensical combinations. If someone sets `requiredirect` and
leaves the default sslmode, or chooses a weaker one... Is that really
useful to someone?

--Jacob