Received: from malur.postgresql.org ([217.196.149.56]) by arkaria.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nPQO0-0005p9-Tb for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 02 Mar 2022 14:55:28 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=malur.postgresql.org) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nPQNz-0003zg-LZ for pgsql-hackers@arkaria.postgresql.org; Wed, 02 Mar 2022 14:55:27 +0000 Received: from magus.postgresql.org ([2a02:c0:301:0:ffff::29]) by malur.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nPQNz-0003zR-Bq for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Wed, 02 Mar 2022 14:55:27 +0000 Received: from momjian.us ([72.94.173.45]) by magus.postgresql.org with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nPQNw-0003Je-QN for pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org; Wed, 02 Mar 2022 14:55:27 +0000 Received: from bruce by momjian.us with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nPQNn-004vk0-Ky; Wed, 02 Mar 2022 09:55:15 -0500 Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 09:55:15 -0500 From: Bruce Momjian To: Stephen Frost Cc: Michael Paquier , Tom Lane , Jeff Davis , samay sharma , pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org Subject: Re: Proposal: Support custom authentication methods using hooks Message-ID: References: <54dc198b56a87e31e9625405383f04a8c6589b8b.camel@j-davis.com> <1905579.1645810764@sss.pgh.pa.us> <2718414dc095b716e59e126c03af343997d14c7b.camel@j-davis.com> <1980351.1645816239@sss.pgh.pa.us> <9004b18218eae293f1ee888e49d13d8a6b02810d.camel@j-davis.com> <20220228204634.GM10577@tamriel.snowman.net> <2738622.1646083128@sss.pgh.pa.us> <20220228214255.GO10577@tamriel.snowman.net> <20220301133119.GR10577@tamriel.snowman.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220301133119.GR10577@tamriel.snowman.net> List-Id: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Post: List-Owner: List-Archive: Archived-At: Precedence: bulk On Tue, Mar 1, 2022 at 08:31:19AM -0500, Stephen Frost wrote: > > The last time I played with this area is the recent error handling > > improvement with cryptohashes but MD5 has actually helped here in > > detecting the problem as a patched OpenSSL would complain if trying to > > use MD5 as hash function when FIPS is enabled. > > Having to continue to deal with md5 as an algorithm when it's known to > be notably less secure and so much so that organizations essentially ban > its use for exactly what we're using it for, in fact, another reason to Really? I thought it was publicly-visible MD5 hashes that were the biggest problem. Our 32-bit salt during the connection is a problem, of course. > remove it, not a reason to keep it. Better code coverage testing of > error paths is the answer to making sure that our error handling behaves > properly. What is the logic to removing md5 but keeping 'password'? -- Bruce Momjian https://momjian.us EDB https://enterprisedb.com If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.