Received: from sss.pgh.pa.us (sss.pgh.pa.us [209.114.132.154]) by hub.org (8.10.1/8.10.1) with ESMTP id e99GlaJ83033 for ; Mon, 9 Oct 2000 12:47:36 -0400 (EDT) Received: from sss2.sss.pgh.pa.us (tgl@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sss.pgh.pa.us (8.11.0/8.11.0) with ESMTP id e99GjbB25672; Mon, 9 Oct 2000 12:45:37 -0400 (EDT) To: Peter Eisentraut cc: Tom Samplonius , Cedar Cox , "George P. Esperanza" , pgsql-interfaces@postgresql.org Subject: Re: ODBC problem In-reply-to: References: Comments: In-reply-to Peter Eisentraut message dated "Mon, 09 Oct 2000 18:32:10 +0200" Date: Mon, 09 Oct 2000 12:45:36 -0400 Message-ID: <25669.971109936@sss.pgh.pa.us> From: Tom Lane X-Archive-Number: 200010/45 Peter Eisentraut writes: > Tom Samplonius writes: >> Except for the fact that crypt provides little if no security increase. >> Even though only a crypted password is sent over the wire, that crypted >> password can still be captured off the wire and replayed to get access. > Only if you happen to get the same salt from the server every time, which > is rather unlikely. However, the standard crypt algorithm only has a small number of distinct salt values, so an attacker who's sniffed one login transaction can connect repeatedly until challenged with the same salt he saw used before. We have talked about adding a higher-security login protocol --- you can find past threads about this in the pghackers archive. IIRC a fairly complete design was worked out, but no one's got round to implementing it yet. There might still have been some unresolved objections, too. regards, tom lane