Received: from localhost (postgresql.org [64.49.215.8]) by postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46F0C475E24 for ; Tue, 31 Dec 2002 19:40:32 -0500 (EST) Received: from news.hub.org (news.hub.org [64.49.215.80]) by postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D06CE475D0D for ; Tue, 31 Dec 2002 19:40:31 -0500 (EST) Received: by news.hub.org (Postfix, from userid 8) id BE45C43A74A; Tue, 31 Dec 2002 19:40:31 -0500 (EST) From: ljb X-Newsgroups: comp.databases.postgresql.interfaces Subject: Is PQfn() insecure or not? Date: Wed, 1 Jan 2003 00:40:31 +0000 (UTC) Organization: Hub.Org Networking Services (http://www.hub.org) Lines: 10 Message-ID: X-Complaints-To: usenet@news.hub.org X-No-Archive: yes User-Agent: slrn/0.9.7.3 (Linux) To: pgsql-interfaces@postgresql.org X-Virus-Scanned: by AMaViS new-20020517 X-Archive-Number: 200212/87 X-Sequence-Number: 3500 "Programmer's Guide, Client Interfaces, libpq, The Fast-Path Interface" describes PQfn() and has this alarming remark: "This is a trapdoor into system internals and can be a potential security hole." Sure this isn't true. PQfn() just lets a frontend call a function which is also accessible (if maybe not useful) via a SELECT statement, correct? If I'm right, we should remove the scary language from the documentation. If on the other hand PQfn() is a security hole, could someone post an exploit?