Received: from localhost (unknown [200.46.204.183]) by postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FA32650111 for ; Tue, 8 Jul 2008 16:12:51 -0300 (ADT) Received: from postgresql.org ([200.46.204.86]) by localhost (mx1.hub.org [200.46.204.183]) (amavisd-maia, port 10024) with ESMTP id 93366-10 for ; Tue, 8 Jul 2008 16:12:43 -0300 (ADT) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from master.phlo.org (master.phlo.org [213.147.174.89]) by postgresql.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A7D264FFDC for ; Tue, 8 Jul 2008 16:12:43 -0300 (ADT) Received: (qmail 9712 invoked by uid 0); 8 Jul 2008 19:12:41 -0000 Received: from gollum.hlw.co.at (HELO phlook.local) (fgp@[213.147.176.20]) (envelope-sender ) by imap.phlo.org (qmail-ldap-1.03) with SMTP for ; 8 Jul 2008 19:12:41 -0000 Message-ID: <4873BC28.3070507@phlo.org> Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2008 21:12:40 +0200 From: "Florian G. Pflug" User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (Macintosh/20080421) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Josh Berkus CC: pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org, Tom Lane , Andrew Dunstan , Robert Treat , Garick Hamlin , pgsql-patches@postgresql.org Subject: Re: [PATCHES] Solaris ident authentication using unix domain sockets References: <20080703165936.E80B312A5FFF@mx2.hub.org> <4870001C.6060402@dunslane.net> <23040.1215319905@sss.pgh.pa.us> <200807080935.33186.josh@agliodbs.com> In-Reply-To: <200807080935.33186.josh@agliodbs.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Virus-Scanned: Maia Mailguard 1.0.1 X-Archive-Number: 200807/427 X-Sequence-Number: 120687 Josh Berkus wrote: > Tom, > >> Indeed. If the Solaris folk feel that getupeercred() is insecure, >> they had better explain why their kernel is that broken. This is >> entirely unrelated to the known shortcomings of the "ident" IP >> protocol. > > The Solaris security & kernel folks do, actually. However, there's > no question that TRUST is inherently insecure, and that's what people > are going to use if they can't get IDENT to work. I'd be *very* interested in how they come to that assessment. I'd have thought that the only alternative to getpeereid/getupeercred is password-based or certificate-based authenticated - which seem *less* secure because a) they also rely on the client having the correct uid or gid (to read the password/private key), plus b) the risk of the password/private key getting into the wrong hands. How is that sort of authenticated handled by services shipping with solaris? regards, Florian Pflug, hoping to be enlightened beyond his limited posix-ish view of the world...