To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@crankycanuck.ca>
cc: pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org
Subject: Re: function body actors (was: [PERFORM] viewing source code) 
In-reply-to: <20071221162441.GH10918@crankycanuck.ca> 
References: <b42b73150712202109u26d05d01q4f1b8be8d29f763c@mail.gmail.com>
	<20071221162441.GH10918@crankycanuck.ca>
Comments: In-reply-to Andrew Sullivan <ajs@crankycanuck.ca>
	message dated "Fri, 21 Dec 2007 11:24:41 -0500"
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2007 11:47:43 -0500
Message-ID: <6533.1198255663@sss.pgh.pa.us>
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@crankycanuck.ca> writes:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2007 at 12:09:28AM -0500, Merlin Moncure wrote:
>> Maybe a key management solution isn't required.

> I like this idea much better, because the same basic mechanism can be used
> for more than one thing, and it doesn't build in a system that is
> fundamentally weak.  Of course, you _can_ build a weak system this way, but
> there's an important difference between building a fundamentally weak system
> and making weak systems possible.

I find myself unconvinced by this argument.  The main problem is: how
do we know that it's possible to build a strong system atop this
mechanism?  Just leaving it to non-security-savvy users seems to me
to be a great way to guarantee a lot of weak systems in the field.
ISTM our minimum responsibility would be to design and document how
to build a strong protection system using the feature ... and at that
point why not build it in?

I've certainly got no objection to making a mechanism that can be used
for more than one purpose; but not offering a complete security solution
is abdicating our responsibility.

			regards, tom lane