From: aaron-congo (@aaron-congo) <noreply+aaron-congo@github.com>
To: aws/aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper <noreply+aws-aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper@github.com>
Subject: Re: [aws/aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper] PR #2244: docs: kms least privilege
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:10:25 +0000
Message-ID: <gh-aws-aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper-2244-rc4592311059@github.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <gh-aws-aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper-2244@github.com>
References: <gh-aws-aws-advanced-jdbc-wrapper-2244@github.com>
(on docs/using-the-jdbc-driver/using-plugins/UsingTheKmsEncryptionPlugin.md:890)
On MySQL the triggers and routines run as their `DEFINER`, the admin account, so every write to an encrypted table depends on that account staying in place. The previous paragraph tells readers to treat the admin credential as deployment-only, so it's easy to clean it up afterwards. If someone drops `app_admin`, or cuts its grants back to the minimum after setup, every `INSERT` / `UPDATE` on an encrypted table fails.
Could we add a warning, for example: "Do not drop the definer account or revoke its `SELECT` on the metadata tables while the triggers exist. To retire it, recreate the routines and triggers under another definer first. Locking the account (`ACCOUNT LOCK`) only blocks logins and is safe."