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From: Wim Bertels <wim.bertels@khleuven.be>
To: Bruno Wolff III <bruno@wolff.to>
Cc: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org
Subject: Re: brute force attacking the password
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2005 13:03:44 +0200
Message-ID: <42678890.3020109@khleuven.be> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050420152044.GB512@wolff.to>
References: <200504182027.j3IKRtV09046@candle.pha.pa.us>
	<42651CFF.1020703@khleuven.be>
	<20050419203727.GA18200@wolff.to>
	<200504192254.41977.wim.bertels@khleuven.be>
	<20050420152044.GB512@wolff.to>

Bruno Wolff III schreef:

>On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 22:54:32 +0200,
>  Wim Bertels <wim.bertels@khleuven.be> wrote:
>  
>
>>not an easy problem: it always seems to end up in DoS vs Brute Force Cracking.
>>So the only good and simple solution i can think of: use the best possible  
>>password encrytion (or sufficient, a statistically zero chance when trying as 
>>much connections -to brute force crack the password- as possible for a 
>>significant amount of time.)
>>    
>>
>
>Maybe you can use client side certificates. Those will be from a large
>enough space that guessing shouldn't be a problem. You should be able to
>make that work with PAM.
>  
>
indeed.

since brute force attacks are quit traceable (targetting one and the 
same user eg..),
one could a script to check:
- the percentage of failed logins/user, depending on the percentage (eg 
75% or more failed, this should be configurable), these events should be 
reporteg in security.log file under the postgres log directory, or 
mailed to user (inetd...)
- if there are more than eg 10 (this should be configurable) failed 
consecutive logins/user, this should again be reported.

if i have time: maybe a quick perl script using the postgres.log file 
with sufficient logging to obtain these facts?

so: possible implementation so far:
1. choose the possible crypting for the password
2. implement someway the above checking (% failed logins/user + < failed 
login/user)
3. using client side certificates with pam, pam_ldap (not sure how to 
set this up right know, a certificate/user (having many users, not all 
specialists,..., how to make this work a user-acceptible way..); or just 
a few (or 1) client side certificates that can be used by many users 
(sounds more easy, accessible to set up for the users)





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  To: pgsql-admin@postgresql.org
  Cc: wim.bertels@khleuven.be, bruno@wolff.to
  Subject: Re: brute force attacking the password
  In-Reply-To: <42678890.3020109@khleuven.be>
  References: <200504182027.j3IKRtV09046@candle.pha.pa.us> <42651CFF.1020703@khleuven.be> <20050419203727.GA18200@wolff.to> <200504192254.41977.wim.bertels@khleuven.be> <20050420152044.GB512@wolff.to> <42678890.3020109@khleuven.be>

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