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pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
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* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL9_6_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/046c2c846b741a12e7fd61d8d86bf324a20e3dfc

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL_12_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/d1bd26740a62b979e9aacb6507593946a402e39c

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL_14_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/9d5a76b8d18d6584341f754090c3007a54215f45

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL_11_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/9394fb828998b4e71e4ef95eac6b80acac742835

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL_13_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/e92ed93e8eb76ee0701b42d4f0ce94e6af3fc741

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
REL_10_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/9ae0f1112954989e955b4b29e4580216eccfcee4

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
@ 2021-11-08 16:15  Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data
from the client socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested
during startup, any additional data received with the initial
request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as
already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed.
Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the
TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of
a supposedly encryption-protected database session.

This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server,
although that would only work if the server did not demand any
authentication data.  (However, a server relying on SSL certificate
authentication might well not do so.)

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23214

Branch
------
master

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/28e24125541545483093819efae9bca603441951

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c          | 12 ++++++++++++
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/include/libpq/libpq.h           |  1 +
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread


end of thread, other threads:[~2021-11-08 16:15 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox mbox.gz follow: Atom feed)
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2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>

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