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pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh 7+ messages / 1 participants [nested] [flat]
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL_13_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/844b3169204c28cd086c1b4fae4a2cbdd0540640 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ master Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL_14_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/30547d7913098502cdc93c06f77c3629af51b24c Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL_10_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/e65d9c8cd15a86207f1da387a9c917c93c14ea11 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL9_6_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/d83cdfdca9d918bbbd6bb209139b94c954da7228 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL_12_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/36bb95ef2b5fdefaa99afbd859889a360e3c7763 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh @ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222 Branch ------ REL_11_STABLE Details ------- https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/a021a1d2aeba8ce3391f56a070f01db00468da27 Modified Files -------------- doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) ^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-11-08 16:15 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox mbox.gz follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> 2021-11-08 16:15 pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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