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pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
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* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
master

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL_14_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/30547d7913098502cdc93c06f77c3629af51b24c

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL_13_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/844b3169204c28cd086c1b4fae4a2cbdd0540640

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL_12_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/36bb95ef2b5fdefaa99afbd859889a360e3c7763

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL_11_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/a021a1d2aeba8ce3391f56a070f01db00468da27

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 14 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL_10_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/e65d9c8cd15a86207f1da387a9c917c93c14ea11

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 14 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread

* pgsql: libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handsh
@ 2021-11-08 16:15 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread

From: Tom Lane @ 2021-11-08 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: pgsql-committers@lists.postgresql.org

libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.

libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket.  When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed.  Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.

This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds.  A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session.  That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.

To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.

Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.

Security: CVE-2021-23222

Branch
------
REL9_6_STABLE

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/d83cdfdca9d918bbbd6bb209139b94c954da7228

Modified Files
--------------
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml        | 14 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)



^ permalink  raw  reply  [nested|flat] 7+ messages in thread


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