From: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
To: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Cc: pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Subject: Re: allow building trusted languages without the untrusted versions
Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 13:49:40 -0400
Message-ID: <20220525174940.GQ9030@tamriel.snowman.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220524205841.GA1254661@nathanxps13>
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<20220524205841.GA1254661@nathanxps13>
Greetings,
* Nathan Bossart (nathandbossart@gmail.com) wrote:
> I guess I'd ask again whether we can do both... We've got predefined roles
> like pg_execute_server_program that allow access to COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM,
> but I have no way to categorically disable that Ń•ort of thing if I wanted
> to really lock things down, even for superusers. I'm not suggesting that
> every predefined role needs a corresponding configure option, but basic
> things like arbitrary disk/network/program access seem like reasonable
> proposals.
Locking things down "even for superuser" is something we've very
explicitly said we're not going to try and do. Even with v1 functions,
the ability to hack around with pg_proc strikes me as almost certainly
going to provide a way for someone to gain enough control of execution
to be able to 'break out', not to mention obvious other things like
ALTER SYSTEM to change archive_command to run whatever shell commands an
attacker with superuser wants to..
> I have about 50% of a generic --disable-disk-access patch coded up which
> I'll share soon to help inform the discussion.
Do you disable the ability of superusers to use ALTER SYSTEM with this?
I really don't think this is going to be anywhere near as
straight-forward as it might appear to be to prevent a superuser from
being able to break out of PG. Instead, we should be moving in the
direction of making it so that there doesn't need to be a superuser
that's ever logged into except under serious emergency situations where
the system is built to require multi-person access to do so.
Thanks,
Stephen
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To: pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org
Cc: sfrost@snowman.net, nathandbossart@gmail.com, robertmhaas@gmail.com, tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us
Subject: Re: allow building trusted languages without the untrusted versions
In-Reply-To: <20220525174940.GQ9030@tamriel.snowman.net>
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