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* Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
@ 2020-05-15 20:46 Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-05-15 20:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
The attached patch implements NSS (Network Security Services) [0] with the
required NSPR runtime [1] as a TLS backend for PostgreSQL.
While all sslmodes are implemented and work for the most part, the patch is
*not* ready yet but I wanted to show progress early so that anyone interested
in this can help out with testing and maybe even hacking.
Why NSS? Well. It shares no lineage with OpenSSL making it not just an
alternative by fork but a 100% alternative. It's also actively maintained, is
readily available on many platforms where PostgreSQL is popular and has a FIPS
mode which doesn't require an EOL'd library. And finally, I was asked nicely
with the promise of a free beverage, an incentive as good as any.
Differences with OpenSSL
------------------------
NSS does not use certificates and keys on the filesystem, it instead uses a
certificate database in which all certificates, keys and CRL's are loaded. A
set of tools are provided to work with the database, like: certutil, crlutil,
pk12util etc. We could support plain PEM files as well, and load them into a
database ourselves but so far I've opted for just using what is already in the
database.
This does mean that new GUCs are needed to identify the database. I've mostly
repurposed the existing ones for cert/key/crl, but had to invent a new one for
the database. Maybe there should be an entirely new set? This needs to be
discussed with not only NSS in mind but for additional as-of-yet unknown
backends we might get (SChannel comes to mind).
NSS also supports partial chain validation per default (as do many other TLS
libraries) where OpenSSL does not. I haven't done anything about that just
yet, thus there is a failing test as a reminder to address it.
The documentation of NSS/NSPR is unfortunately quite poor and often times
outdated or simply nonexisting. Cloning the repo and reading the source code
is the only option for parts of the API.
Featurewise there might be other things we can make use of in NSS which doesn't
exist in OpenSSL, but for now I've tried to keep them aligned.
Known Bugs and Limitations (in this version of the patch)
---------------------------------------------------------
The frontend doesn't attempt to verify whether the specified CRL exists in the
database or not. This can be done with pretty much the same code as in the
backend, except that we don't have the client side certificate loaded so we
either need to read it back from the database, or parse a list of all CRLs
(which would save us from having the cert in local memory which generally is a
good thing to avoid).
pgtls_read is calling PR_Recv which works fine for communicating with an NSS
backend cluster, but hangs waiting for IO when communicating with an OpenSSL
backend cluster. Using PR_Read reverses the situation. This is probably a
simple bug but I haven't had time to track it down yet. The below shifts
between the two for debugging.
- nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ nread = PR_Read(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
Passphrase handling in the backend is broken, more on that under TODO.
There are a few failing tests and a few skipped ones for now, but the majority
of the tests pass.
Testing
-------
In order for the TAP framework to be able to handle backends with different
characteristics I've broken up SSLServer.pm into a set of modules:
SSL::Server
SSL::Backend::NSS
SSL::Backend::OpenSSL
The SSL tests import SSL::Server which in turn imports the appropriate backend
module in order to perform backend specific setup tasks. The backend used
should be transparent for the TAP code when it comes to switching server certs
etc.
So far I've used foo|bar in the matching regex to provide alternative output,
and SKIP blocks for tests that don't apply. There might be neater ways to
achieve this, but I was trying to avoid having separate test files for the
different backends.
The certificate databases can be created with a new nssfiles make target in
src/test/ssl, which use the existing files (and also depend on OpenSSL which I
don't think is a problematic dependency for development environments). To keep
it simple I've named the certificates in the NSS database after the filenames,
this isn't really NSS best-practices but it makes for an easier time reading
the tests IMO.
If this direction is of interest, extracting into to a separate patch for just
setting up the modules and implementing OpenSSL without a new backend is
probably the next step.
TODO
----
This patch is a work in progress, and there is work left to do, below is a dump
of what is left to fix before this can be considered a full implementation for
review. Most of these items have more documentation in the code comments.
* The split between init and open needs to be revisited, especially in frontend
where we have a bit more freedom. It remains to be seen if we can do better in
the backend part.
* Documentation, it's currently not even started
* Windows support. I've hacked mostly using Debian and have tested versions of
the patch on macOS, but not Windows so far.
* Figure out how to handle cipher configuration. Getting a set of ciphers that
result in a useable socket isn't as easy as with OpenSSL, and policies seem
much more preferred. At the very least this needs to be solidly documented.
* The rules in src/test/ssl/Makefile for generating certificate databases can
probably be generalized into a smaller set of rules based on wildcards.
* The password callback on server-side won't be invoked at server start due to
init happening in be_tls_open, so something needs to be figured out there.
Maybe attempt to open the database with a throw-away context in init just to
invoke the password callback?
* Identify code duplicated between frontend and backend and try to generalize.
* Make sure the handling the error codes correctly in the certificate and auth
callbacks to properly handle self-signed certs etc.
* Tidy up the tests which are partially hardwired for NSS now to make sure
there are no regressions for OpenSSL.
* All the code using OpenSSL which isn't the libpq communications parts, like
pgcrypto, strong_random, sha2, SCRAM et.al
* Review language in code comments and run pgindent et.al
* Settle on a minimum required version. I've been using NSS 3.42 and NSPR 4.20
simply since they were the packages Debian wanted to install for me, but I'm
quite convinced that we can go a bit lower (featurewise we can go much lower
but there are bugfixes in recent versions that we might want to include).
Anything lower than a version supporting TLSv1.3 seems like an obvious no-no.
I'd be surprised if this is all, but that's at least a start. There isn't
really a playbook on how to add a new TLS backend, but I'm hoping to be able to
summarize the required bits and pieces in README.SSL once this is a bit closer
to completion.
My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
works (and doesn't work).
The 0001 patch contains the full NSS support, and 0002 is a fix for the pgstat
abstraction which IMO leaks backend implementation details. This needs to go
on it's own thread, but since 0001 fails without it I've included it here for
simplicity sake for now.
cheers ./daniel
[0] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend.patch (129.9K, ../../FAB21FC8-0F62-434F-AA78-6BD9336D630A@yesql.se/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 8be8a796e941c5483a149ca4fe0345d24461b57c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 10:48:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] WIP: Support libnss for as TLS backend
---
configure | 235 +++-
configure.in | 30 +
src/Makefile.global.in | 1 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1024 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 6 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 960 ++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 157 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 199 ++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 72 ++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 98 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 60 +-
24 files changed, 2934 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (82%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 6f219d9163..694f77d0cb 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -798,6 +799,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -856,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -935,6 +938,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1191,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1337,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1490,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1558,6 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8009,6 +8024,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12083,6 +12133,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto... " >&6; }
@@ -12341,6 +12394,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13243,6 +13447,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14588,7 +14811,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14634,7 +14857,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14658,7 +14881,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14703,7 +14926,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14727,7 +14950,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index f9f9b320f2..65743a36d2 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -854,6 +854,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1203,6 +1212,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, CRYPTO_new_ex_data, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'crypto' is required for OpenSSL])])
@@ -1225,6 +1237,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1400,6 +1425,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..1f1706c4d0 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f746e0016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1024 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ enum {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will make
+ * the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE, if env
+ * vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be passed
+ * instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5
+ * seconds, so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100
+ * seconds and 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = { PW_NONE, 0 }; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */);
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database.
+ * If the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on
+ * the system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory
+ * but is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this
+ * can be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562
+ * For the server side we wont allow this to fail however, as we require
+ * the certificate and key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites, set
+ * the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers
+ * which can be set and still end up with a working socket is woefully
+ * underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS
+ * actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet),
+ * so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using the policies works,
+ * but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers, *c, *b;
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok_r(ciphers, sep, &b); c; c = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &b))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that
+ * we can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that
+ * we have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value zero,
+ * so we use this to signal the caller that the highest useful version
+ * should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS without
+ * support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 2f3e0a70e0..080699761f 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4252,7 +4252,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4310,6 +4314,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_MASTER,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4338,8 +4354,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a0e9cb453
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..fc2f16d847 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ //void *ssl;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index c199cd46d2..dba1443758 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -889,6 +889,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 8f3ec6bde1..2a5b59b998 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index d5da6dce1e..91a6dccc37 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,12 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+#if defined(USE_NSS)
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+#endif
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b707c0f8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,960 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can still
+ * attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ //status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to be
+ * compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access information
+ * on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch(channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in retrying
+ * as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index ea13f5afb8..e9bf5b5055 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook(PQsslKeyPassHook_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss)(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..53602dc1a6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ char *cert_database;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 06e37d5269..968d7c4b85 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,27 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +59,9 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +89,11 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +107,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -des -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +186,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +214,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -112,6 +239,13 @@ ssl/client-encrypted-der.key: ssl/client.key
ssl/both-cas-1.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# The same, but the certs are in different order
ssl/both-cas-2.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
@@ -127,19 +261,41 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client+client_ca.crt__client.key -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl.der: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl.der: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl.der: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -154,6 +310,7 @@ sslfiles-clean:
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index a454bb0274..53914b0ad3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,30 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -70,32 +53,27 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo=secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -147,44 +125,44 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
@@ -193,36 +171,42 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
"cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+# How about import the both-file into a database?
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases ", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"CRL belonging to a different CA");
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -235,14 +219,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -260,12 +244,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -273,7 +257,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -283,12 +267,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -297,7 +281,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -310,14 +294,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -326,7 +310,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -338,11 +322,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/nss/server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -363,21 +347,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -388,7 +372,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -400,36 +384,47 @@ test_connect_fails(
# correct client cert in unencrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in encrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -469,18 +464,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,CN=ssltestuser,1,\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -492,15 +488,18 @@ SKIP:
# client cert belonging to another user
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert");
@@ -508,17 +507,17 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full succeeds with matching username and Common Name"
);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
qr/FATAL/,
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full fails with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
@@ -527,24 +526,22 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, when username doesn't match Common Name
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-ca succeeds with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=client+client_ca.crt__client.key",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=client.crt__client.key",
qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index ee6e26d732..d7b7c67d7a 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..987e5b3cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use Exporter qw(import);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(
+ get_new_backend
+ set_server_cert
+);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'NSS'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ # "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n" .
+
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$cert_nickname'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file=''\n" .
+ "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1fd1db2a8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+our @EXPORT = qw(
+ get_new_backend
+);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'OpenSSL'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 82%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..02849f4b8a 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,16 +24,35 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_backend set_server_cert);
+ $backend = get_new_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_backend set_server_cert);
+ $backend = get_new_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
+
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -161,6 +187,16 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +204,16 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n";
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] 0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic.patch (1.2K, ../../FAB21FC8-0F62-434F-AA78-6BD9336D630A@yesql.se/3-0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic.patch)
download | inline diff:
From fba2564e8881d5c138bd49f44f7ed2cdfe69c21a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 07:38:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Make pg_stat_ssl reporting backend agnostic
Inspecting Port->ssl for an indication on whether the connection is
using TLS or not is tied to the fact that the current implementation
is using a variable named ssl. Making this a requirement for all TLS
backend implementations seems restricting since there in actual var
tracking the status, ssl_in_use. Switch to inspecting this variable
instead.
---
src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
index 5fc35ded19..bc8ebab7d2 100644
--- a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
@@ -2993,7 +2993,7 @@ pgstat_bestart(void)
MemSet(&lbeentry.st_clientaddr, 0, sizeof(lbeentry.st_clientaddr));
#ifdef USE_SSL
- if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl != NULL)
+ if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
{
lbeentry.st_ssl = true;
lsslstatus.ssl_bits = be_tls_get_cipher_bits(MyProcPort);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-06-25 15:39 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-06-25 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 15 May 2020, at 22:46, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> The 0001 patch contains the full NSS support, and 0002 is a fix for the pgstat
> abstraction which IMO leaks backend implementation details. This needs to go
> on it's own thread, but since 0001 fails without it I've included it here for
> simplicity sake for now.
The attached 0001 and 0002 are the same patchseries as before, but with the
OpenSSL test module fixed and a rebase on top of the current master.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic-v2.patch (1.2K, ../../C066809B-0D9C-4262-A7B4-1CB45450C0E9@yesql.se/2-0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic-v2.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3642ad3ebcd959f6a1560516369b5a87ebcd214f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 17:31:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Make pg_stat_ssl reporting backend agnostic v2
Inspecting Port->ssl for an indication on whether the connection is
using TLS or not is tied to the fact that the current implementation
is using a variable named ssl. Making this a requirement for all TLS
backend implementations seems restricting since there in actual var
tracking the status, ssl_in_use. Switch to inspecting this variable
instead.
---
src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
index c022597bc0..edfa774ee4 100644
--- a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
@@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ pgstat_bestart(void)
MemSet(&lbeentry.st_clientaddr, 0, sizeof(lbeentry.st_clientaddr));
#ifdef USE_SSL
- if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl != NULL)
+ if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
{
lbeentry.st_ssl = true;
lsslstatus.ssl_bits = be_tls_get_cipher_bits(MyProcPort);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v2.patch (130.1K, ../../C066809B-0D9C-4262-A7B4-1CB45450C0E9@yesql.se/3-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v2.patch)
download | inline diff:
From ceec1b744171d4760de7cb0336a7d78a13dbbf6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 17:31:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] WIP: Support libnss for as TLS backend v2
---
configure | 235 +++-
configure.in | 30 +
src/Makefile.global.in | 1 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1026 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 6 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 960 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 157 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 201 ++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 65 ++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 97 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 60 +-
24 files changed, 2930 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (82%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 2feff37fe3..3f6520ae34 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -798,6 +799,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -856,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -935,6 +938,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1191,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1337,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1490,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1558,6 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8009,6 +8024,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12083,6 +12133,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto... " >&6; }
@@ -12341,6 +12394,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13243,6 +13447,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14588,7 +14811,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14634,7 +14857,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14658,7 +14881,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14703,7 +14926,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14727,7 +14950,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 0188c6ff07..afa90f7fbc 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -854,6 +854,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1203,6 +1212,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, CRYPTO_new_ex_data, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'crypto' is required for OpenSSL])])
@@ -1225,6 +1237,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1400,6 +1425,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..1f1706c4d0 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abb0b27d18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will make
+ * the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE, if env
+ * vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be passed
+ * instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5
+ * seconds, so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100
+ * seconds and 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = { PW_NONE, 0 }; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */);
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database.
+ * If the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on
+ * the system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory
+ * but is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this
+ * can be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562
+ * For the server side we wont allow this to fail however, as we require
+ * the certificate and key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites, set
+ * the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers
+ * which can be set and still end up with a working socket is woefully
+ * underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS
+ * actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet),
+ * so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using the policies works,
+ * but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers, *c, *b;
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok_r(ciphers, sep, &b); c; c = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &b))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that
+ * we can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that
+ * we have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value zero,
+ * so we use this to signal the caller that the highest useful version
+ * should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS without
+ * support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 75fc6f11d6..6153745f07 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4233,7 +4233,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4291,6 +4295,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_MASTER,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4319,8 +4335,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a0e9cb453
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..fc2f16d847 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ //void *ssl;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index c199cd46d2..dba1443758 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -889,6 +889,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 8f3ec6bde1..2a5b59b998 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 2c87b34028..848132976c 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,12 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+#if defined(USE_NSS)
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+#endif
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b707c0f8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,960 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can still
+ * attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ //status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to be
+ * compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access information
+ * on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch(channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in retrying
+ * as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..1fc7e43cfd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss)(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..53602dc1a6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ char *cert_database;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..bb54939ead 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,27 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +59,9 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +89,11 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +107,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +186,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +214,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -112,6 +239,13 @@ ssl/client-encrypted-der.key: ssl/client.key
ssl/both-cas-1.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# The same, but the certs are in different order
ssl/both-cas-2.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
@@ -127,19 +261,41 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client+client_ca.crt__client.key -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl.der: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl.der: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl.der: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -154,6 +310,7 @@ sslfiles-clean:
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index a454bb0274..dbbe94a645 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,30 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -70,32 +53,27 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo=secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -147,44 +125,44 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
@@ -193,36 +171,42 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
"cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+# How about import the both-file into a database?
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases ", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"CRL belonging to a different CA");
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -235,14 +219,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -260,12 +244,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -273,7 +257,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -283,12 +267,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -297,7 +281,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -310,14 +294,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -326,7 +310,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -338,11 +322,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/nss/server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -363,21 +347,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -388,7 +372,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -400,36 +384,47 @@ test_connect_fails(
# correct client cert in unencrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in encrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -469,18 +464,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,CN=ssltestuser,1,\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -492,15 +488,18 @@ SKIP:
# client cert belonging to another user
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert");
@@ -508,17 +507,17 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full succeeds with matching username and Common Name"
);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
qr/FATAL/,
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full fails with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
@@ -527,24 +526,22 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, when username doesn't match Common Name
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-ca succeeds with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=client+client_ca.crt__client.key",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=client.crt__client.key",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index ee6e26d732..2546c4bb6a 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b44831739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'NSS'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$cert_nickname'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file=''\n" .
+ "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..757342d748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'OpenSSL'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 82%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..9208946279 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,15 +24,34 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -161,6 +187,16 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +204,16 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n";
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-03 11:51 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-07-03 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 25 Jun 2020, at 17:39, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> On 15 May 2020, at 22:46, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> The 0001 patch contains the full NSS support, and 0002 is a fix for the pgstat
>> abstraction which IMO leaks backend implementation details. This needs to go
>> on it's own thread, but since 0001 fails without it I've included it here for
>> simplicity sake for now.
>
> The attached 0001 and 0002 are the same patchseries as before, but with the
> OpenSSL test module fixed and a rebase on top of the current master.
Another rebase to resolve conflicts with the recent fixes in the SSL tests, as
well as some minor cleanup.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic-v3.patch (1.2K, ../../B0C862B8-198D-453E-8E10-2A18CE2B9B3A@yesql.se/2-0002-Make-pg_stat_ssl-reporting-backend-agnostic-v3.patch)
download | inline diff:
From b2c489f9715d647f709ddcb888ec1d64c231ddca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 13:42:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Make pg_stat_ssl reporting backend agnostic v3
Inspecting Port->ssl for an indication on whether the connection is
using TLS or not is tied to the fact that the current implementation
is using a variable named ssl. Making this a requirement for all TLS
backend implementations seems restricting since there in actual var
tracking the status, ssl_in_use. Switch to inspecting this variable
instead.
---
src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
index c022597bc0..edfa774ee4 100644
--- a/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/pgstat.c
@@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ pgstat_bestart(void)
MemSet(&lbeentry.st_clientaddr, 0, sizeof(lbeentry.st_clientaddr));
#ifdef USE_SSL
- if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl != NULL)
+ if (MyProcPort && MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
{
lbeentry.st_ssl = true;
lsslstatus.ssl_bits = be_tls_get_cipher_bits(MyProcPort);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v3.patch (130.3K, ../../B0C862B8-198D-453E-8E10-2A18CE2B9B3A@yesql.se/3-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v3.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 20531c638da852348c629f2e2d2f6fbb2014f2c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 13:34:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] WIP: Support libnss for as TLS backend v3
---
configure | 235 +++-
configure.in | 30 +
src/Makefile.global.in | 1 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1026 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 6 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 959 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 157 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 203 ++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 65 ++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 102 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 60 +-
24 files changed, 2934 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (82%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 2feff37fe3..3f6520ae34 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -798,6 +799,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -856,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -935,6 +938,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1191,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1337,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1490,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1558,6 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8009,6 +8024,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12083,6 +12133,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto... " >&6; }
@@ -12341,6 +12394,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13243,6 +13447,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14588,7 +14811,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14634,7 +14857,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14658,7 +14881,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14703,7 +14926,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14727,7 +14950,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 0188c6ff07..afa90f7fbc 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -854,6 +854,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1203,6 +1212,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, CRYPTO_new_ex_data, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'crypto' is required for OpenSSL])])
@@ -1225,6 +1237,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1400,6 +1425,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..1f1706c4d0 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07df6c2752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will make
+ * the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE, if env
+ * vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be passed
+ * instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5
+ * seconds, so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100
+ * seconds and 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = { PW_NONE, 0 }; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */);
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database.
+ * If the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on
+ * the system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory
+ * but is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this
+ * can be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562
+ * For the server side we wont allow this to fail however, as we require
+ * the certificate and key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites, set
+ * the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers
+ * which can be set and still end up with a working socket is woefully
+ * underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS
+ * actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet),
+ * so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using the policies works,
+ * but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers, *c, *b;
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok_r(ciphers, sep, &b); c; c = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &b))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that
+ * we can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that
+ * we have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value zero,
+ * so we use this to signal the caller that the highest useful version
+ * should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS without
+ * support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 75fc6f11d6..6153745f07 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4233,7 +4233,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4291,6 +4295,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_MASTER,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4319,8 +4335,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38249314d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..fc2f16d847 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ //void *ssl;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index c199cd46d2..dba1443758 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -889,6 +889,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 8f3ec6bde1..2a5b59b998 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 27c9bb46ee..8dd1eb9e5c 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,12 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+#if defined(USE_NSS)
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+#endif
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..863c58f20b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,959 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can still
+ * attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ //status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to be
+ * compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access information
+ * on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch(channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in retrying
+ * as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..1fc7e43cfd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss)(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..53602dc1a6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ char *cert_database;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..aa68b4175c 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,27 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +59,9 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +89,11 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +107,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +186,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +214,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -112,6 +239,13 @@ ssl/client-encrypted-der.key: ssl/client.key
ssl/both-cas-1.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# The same, but the certs are in different order
ssl/both-cas-2.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
@@ -127,19 +261,41 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client+client_ca.crt__client.key -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt__client.key -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl.der: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl.der: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl.der: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl.der: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -154,6 +310,7 @@ sslfiles-clean:
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index c0680f39d6..dbbe94a645 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,27 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo=secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,44 +125,44 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
@@ -195,36 +171,42 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
"cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+# How about import the both-file into a database?
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases ", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"CRL belonging to a different CA");
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +219,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +244,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +257,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +267,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +281,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +294,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +310,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +322,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/nss/server.crl.der cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +347,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +372,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -402,36 +384,47 @@ test_connect_fails(
# correct client cert in unencrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in encrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +464,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,CN=ssltestuser,1,\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -494,15 +488,18 @@ SKIP:
# client cert belonging to another user
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert");
@@ -510,17 +507,17 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full succeeds with matching username and Common Name"
);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=anotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
qr/FATAL/,
"auth_option clientcert=verify-full fails with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
@@ -529,24 +526,22 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, when username doesn't match Common Name
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "user=yetanotheruser sslcert=client.crt__client.key sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
"auth_option clientcert=verify-ca succeeds with mismatching username and Common Name"
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=client+client_ca.crt__client.key",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=client.crt__client.key",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a1ab911988..d83bc8658b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b44831739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'NSS'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$cert_nickname'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file=''\n" .
+ "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d53289196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'OpenSSL'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 82%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..8e970833b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,15 +24,34 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -161,6 +187,16 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +204,16 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n";
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-10 05:10 ` Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 09:26 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Munro @ 2020-07-10 05:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 11:51 PM Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> > On 25 Jun 2020, at 17:39, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> >> On 15 May 2020, at 22:46, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> >> The 0001 patch contains the full NSS support, and 0002 is a fix for the pgstat
> >> abstraction which IMO leaks backend implementation details. This needs to go
> >> on it's own thread, but since 0001 fails without it I've included it here for
> >> simplicity sake for now.
> >
> > The attached 0001 and 0002 are the same patchseries as before, but with the
> > OpenSSL test module fixed and a rebase on top of the current master.
>
> Another rebase to resolve conflicts with the recent fixes in the SSL tests, as
> well as some minor cleanup.
Hi Daniel,
Thanks for blazing the trail for other implementations to coexist in
the tree. I see that cURL (another project Daniel works on)
supports a lot of TLS implementations[1]. I recognise 4 other library
names from that table as having appeared on this mailing list as
candidates for PostgreSQL support complete with WIP patches, including
another one from you (Apple Secure Transport). I don't have strong
views on how many and which libraries we should support, but I was
curious how many packages depend on libss1.1, libgnutls30 and libnss3
in the Debian package repos in my sources.list, and I came up with
OpenSSL = 820, GnuTLS = 342, and NSS = 87.
I guess Solution.pm needs at least USE_NSS => undef for this not to
break the build on Windows.
Obviously cfbot is useless for testing this code, since its build
script does --with-openssl and you need --with-nss, but it still shows
us one thing: with your patch, a --with-openssl build is apparently
broken:
/001_ssltests.pl .. 1/93 Bailout called. Further testing stopped:
system pg_ctl failed
There are some weird configure-related hunks in the patch:
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
...[more stuff like that]...
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
I see the same when I use Debian's autoconf, but not FreeBSD's or
MacPorts', despite all being version 2.69. That seems to be due to
non-upstreamed changes added by the Debian maintainers (I see the
off_t thing mentioned in /usr/share/doc/autoconf/changelog.Debian.gz).
I think you need to build a stock autoconf 2.69 or run autoconf on a
non-Debian system.
I installed libnss3-dev on my Debian box and then configure had
trouble locating and understanding <ssl.h>, until I added
--with-includes=/usr/include/nss:/usr/include/nspr. I suspect this is
supposed to be done with pkg-config nss --cflags somewhere in
configure (or alternatively nss-config --cflags, nspr-config --cflags,
I don't know, but we're using pkg-config for other stuff).
I installed the Debian package libnss3-tools (for certutil) and then,
in src/test/ssl, I ran make nssfiles (I guess that should be
automatic?), and make check, and I got this far:
Test Summary Report
-------------------
t/001_ssltests.pl (Wstat: 3584 Tests: 93 Failed: 14)
Failed tests: 14, 16, 18-20, 24, 27-28, 54-55, 78-80
91
Non-zero exit status: 14
You mentioned some were failing in this WIP -- are those results you expect?
[1] https://curl.haxx.se/docs/ssl-compared.html
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
@ 2020-07-11 22:03 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-07-11 22:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 10 Jul 2020, at 07:10, Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 11:51 PM Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>>> On 25 Jun 2020, at 17:39, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>>>> On 15 May 2020, at 22:46, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>>>> The 0001 patch contains the full NSS support, and 0002 is a fix for the pgstat
>>>> abstraction which IMO leaks backend implementation details. This needs to go
>>>> on it's own thread, but since 0001 fails without it I've included it here for
>>>> simplicity sake for now.
>>>
>>> The attached 0001 and 0002 are the same patchseries as before, but with the
>>> OpenSSL test module fixed and a rebase on top of the current master.
>>
>> Another rebase to resolve conflicts with the recent fixes in the SSL tests, as
>> well as some minor cleanup.
>
> Hi Daniel,
>
> Thanks for blazing the trail for other implementations to coexist in
> the tree. I see that cURL (another project Daniel works on)
> supports a lot of TLS implementations[1].
The list on that URL is also just a selection, the total count is 10 (not
counting OpenSSL forks) IIRC, after axing support for a few lately. OpenSSL
clearly has a large mindshare but the gist of it is that there exist quite a
few alternatives each with their own strengths.
> I recognise 4 other library
> names from that table as having appeared on this mailing list as
> candidates for PostgreSQL support complete with WIP patches, including
> another one from you (Apple Secure Transport). I don't have strong
> views on how many and which libraries we should support,
I think it's key to keep in mind *why* it's relevant to provide options in the
first place, after all, as they must be 100% interoperable one can easily argue
for a single one being enough. We need to to look at what they offer users on
top of just a TLS connection, like: managed certificate storage like for
example macOS Keychains, FIPS certification, good platform availability and/or
OS integration etc. If all a library offers is "not being OpenSSL" then it's
not clear that we're adding much value by spending the cycles to support it.
My personal opinion is that we should keep it pretty limited, not least to
lessen the burden of testing and during feature development. Supporting a new
library comes with requirements on both the CFBot as well as the buildfarm, not
to mention on developers who dabble in that area of the code. The goal should
IMHO be to make it trivial for every postgres installation to use TLS
regardless of platform and experience level with the person installing it.
The situation is a bit different for curl where we have as a goal to provide
enough alternatives such that every platform can have a libcurl/curl more or
less regardless of what it contains. As a consequence, we have around 80 CI
jobs to test each pull request to provide ample coverage. Being a kitchen-
sink is really hard work.
> but I was
> curious how many packages depend on libss1.1, libgnutls30 and libnss3
> in the Debian package repos in my sources.list, and I came up with
> OpenSSL = 820, GnuTLS = 342, and NSS = 87.
I don't see a lot of excitement over GnuTLS lately, but Debian shipping it due
to (I believe) licensing concerns with OpenSSL does help it along. In my
experience, platforms with GnuTLS easily available also have OpenSSL easily
available.
> I guess Solution.pm needs at least USE_NSS => undef for this not to
> break the build on Windows.
Thanks, I'll fix (I admittedly haven't tried this at all on Windows yet).
> Obviously cfbot is useless for testing this code, since its build
> script does --with-openssl and you need --with-nss,
Right, this is a CFBot problem with any patch that require specific autoconf
flags to be excercised. I wonder if we can make something when we do CF app
integration which can inject flags to a Travis pipeline in a safe manner?
> but it still shows
> us one thing: with your patch, a --with-openssl build is apparently
> broken:
>
> /001_ssltests.pl .. 1/93 Bailout called. Further testing stopped:
> system pg_ctl failed
Humm .. I hate to say "it worked on my machine" but it did, but my TLS
environment is hardly standard. Sorry for posting breakage, most likely this
is a bug in the new test module structure that the patch introduce in order to
support multiple backends for src/tests/ssl. I'll fix.
> There are some weird configure-related hunks in the patch:
>
> + -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
> ...[more stuff like that]...
>
> -#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
> +#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
>
> I see the same when I use Debian's autoconf, but not FreeBSD's or
> MacPorts', despite all being version 2.69. That seems to be due to
> non-upstreamed changes added by the Debian maintainers (I see the
> off_t thing mentioned in /usr/share/doc/autoconf/changelog.Debian.gz).
> I think you need to build a stock autoconf 2.69 or run autoconf on a
> non-Debian system.
Sigh, yes that's a Debianism that slipped through, again sorry about that.
> I installed libnss3-dev on my Debian box and then configure had
> trouble locating and understanding <ssl.h>, until I added
> --with-includes=/usr/include/nss:/usr/include/nspr. I suspect this is
> supposed to be done with pkg-config nss --cflags somewhere in
> configure (or alternatively nss-config --cflags, nspr-config --cflags,
> I don't know, but we're using pkg-config for other stuff).
Yeah, that's a good point, I should fix that. Having a metric ton of TLS
libraries in various versions around in my environment I've been Stockholm
Syndromed to --with-includes to the point where I didn't even think to run
without it. It should clearly be as easy to use as OpenSSL wrt autoconf.
> I installed the Debian package libnss3-tools (for certutil) and then,
> in src/test/ssl, I ran make nssfiles (I guess that should be
> automatic?)
Yes, it needs to run automatically for NSS builds on make check.
> , and make check, and I got this far:
>
> Test Summary Report
> -------------------
> t/001_ssltests.pl (Wstat: 3584 Tests: 93 Failed: 14)
> Failed tests: 14, 16, 18-20, 24, 27-28, 54-55, 78-80
> 91
> Non-zero exit status: 14
>
> You mentioned some were failing in this WIP -- are those results you expect?
I'm not on my dev box at the moment, and I don't remember off the cuff, but
that sounds higher than I remember. I wonder if I fat-fingered the regexes in
the last version?
Thanks for taking a look at the patch, I'll fix up the reported issues Monday
at the latest.
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-15 22:16 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-07-15 22:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 12 Jul 2020, at 00:03, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> Thanks for taking a look at the patch, I'll fix up the reported issues Monday
> at the latest.
A bit of life intervened, but attached is a new version of the patch which
should work for OpenSSL builds, and have the other issues addressed as well. I
took the opportunity to clean up the NSS tests to be more like the OpenSSL ones
to lessen the impact on the TAP testcases. On my Debian box, using the
standard NSS and NSPR packages, I get 6 failures which are essentially all
around CRL handling. I'm going to circle back and look at what is missing there.
This version also removes the required patch for statistics reporting as that
has been committed in 6a5c750f3f72899f4f982f921d5bf5665f55651e.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v4.patch (126.7K, ../../383EE7EE-ADEE-4C48-8E7B-28B361E5EA3B@yesql.se/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v4.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 85115b59e7877285ad00837fe96c09a2f1060093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 13:34:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] WIP: Support libnss for as TLS backend v4
---
configure | 211 ++++
configure.in | 30 +
src/Makefile.global.in | 1 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1026 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 959 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 161 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 200 ++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 65 ++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 64 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 5 +
25 files changed, 2930 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (81%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 9907637e31..a799f125ca 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8100,6 +8103,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,6 +12212,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for CRYPTO_new_ex_data in -lcrypto... " >&6; }
@@ -12432,6 +12473,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13334,6 +13526,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 2e05ce2e4d..f6bc04910b 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -856,6 +856,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,6 +1214,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
if test "$PORTNAME" != "win32"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, CRYPTO_new_ex_data, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'crypto' is required for OpenSSL])])
@@ -1227,6 +1239,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1402,6 +1427,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..1f1706c4d0 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07df6c2752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1026 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will make
+ * the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE, if env
+ * vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be passed
+ * instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5
+ * seconds, so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100
+ * seconds and 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = { PW_NONE, 0 }; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */);
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database.
+ * If the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on
+ * the system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory
+ * but is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this
+ * can be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562
+ * For the server side we wont allow this to fail however, as we require
+ * the certificate and key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites, set
+ * the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers
+ * which can be set and still end up with a working socket is woefully
+ * underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS
+ * actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet),
+ * so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using the policies works,
+ * but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers, *c, *b;
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok_r(ciphers, sep, &b); c; c = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &b))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */);
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that
+ * we can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that
+ * we have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch(v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value zero,
+ * so we use this to signal the caller that the highest useful version
+ * should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS without
+ * support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 031ca0327f..ac11db7575 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4233,7 +4233,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4291,6 +4295,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4319,8 +4335,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..38249314d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..fc2f16d847 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ //void *ssl;
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index c199cd46d2..dba1443758 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -889,6 +889,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 8f3ec6bde1..2a5b59b998 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 7bee9dd201..2814eb8ddd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..863c58f20b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,959 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+# if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+# error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+# endif
+#else
+# define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc*) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init is
+ * no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled library
+ * would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has been to
+ * introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to pass to
+ * NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS 3.12, but
+ * the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal values
+ * in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using NSS_Init
+ * initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure calls so
+ * the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some details on
+ * these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can still
+ * attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ //status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which copes
+ * with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to be
+ * compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access information
+ * on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch(channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in retrying
+ * as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..1fc7e43cfd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss)(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_type_nss hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..b54e4f91f8 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,27 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +59,9 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +89,11 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +107,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +186,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +214,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -112,6 +239,13 @@ ssl/client-encrypted-der.key: ssl/client.key
ssl/both-cas-1.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+ssl/nss/both-cas-1.crt.db: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
# The same, but the certs are in different order
ssl/both-cas-2.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/server_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
@@ -127,19 +261,41 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +307,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..ece4a5b295 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,27 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca', 'server-password',
+ 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,44 +125,51 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
@@ -195,36 +178,42 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
"cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+# How about import the both-file into a database?
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases ", 1 if ($nss);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"CRL belonging to a different CA");
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +226,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +251,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +264,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +274,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +288,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +301,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +317,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +329,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +354,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +379,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +395,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
# correct client cert in encrypted DER
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
);
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ command_like(
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +496,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +514,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +540,15 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 01231f8ba0..4ea81fdbcf 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d13b3922c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'NSS'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file=''\n" .
+ "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b089d2b6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = {
+ _library => 'OpenSSL'
+ };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf = "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n" .
+ "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n" .
+ "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 81%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..8860dda8e3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,15 +24,34 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -158,9 +184,22 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +207,17 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index a13ca6e02e..112e30c803 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -529,6 +530,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-20 13:35 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-21 20:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-17 01:02 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-07-20 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 16 Jul 2020, at 00:16, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> On 12 Jul 2020, at 00:03, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for taking a look at the patch, I'll fix up the reported issues Monday
>> at the latest.
>
> A bit of life intervened, but attached is a new version of the patch which
> should work for OpenSSL builds, and have the other issues addressed as well. I
> took the opportunity to clean up the NSS tests to be more like the OpenSSL ones
> to lessen the impact on the TAP testcases. On my Debian box, using the
> standard NSS and NSPR packages, I get 6 failures which are essentially all
> around CRL handling. I'm going to circle back and look at what is missing there.
Taking a look at this, the issue was that I had fat-fingered the Makefile rules
for generating the NSS databases. This is admittedly very messy at this point,
partly due to trying to mimick OpenSSL filepaths/names to minimize the impact
on tests and to keep OpenSSL/NSS tests as "optically" equivalent as I could.
With this, I have one failing test ("intermediate client certificate is
provided by client") which I've left failing since I believe the case should be
supported by NSS. The issue is most likely that I havent figured out the right
certinfo incantation to make it so (Mozilla hasn't strained themselves when
writing documentation for this toolchain, or any part of NSS for that matter).
The failing test when running with OpenSSL also remains, the issue is that the
very first test for incorrect key passphrase fails, even though the server is
behaving exactly as it should. Something in the test suite hackery breaks for
that test but I've been unable to pin down what it is, any help on would be
greatly appreciated.
This version adds support for sslinfo on NSS for most the functions. In the
process I realized that sslinfo never got the memo about SSL support being
abstracted behind an API, so I went and did that as well. This part of the
patch should perhaps be broken out into a separate patch/thread in case it's
deemed interesting regardless of the evetual conclusion on this patch. Doing
this removed a bit of duplication with the backend code, and some errorhandling
moved to be-secure-openssl.c (originally added in d94c36a45ab45). As the
original commit message states, they're mostly code hygiene with belts and
suspenders, but if we deemed them valuable enough for a contrib module ISTM
they should go into the backend as well. Adding a testcase for sslinfo is a
TODO.
Support pg_strong_random, sha2 and pgcrypto has been started, but it's less
trivial as NSS/NSPR requires a lot more initialization and state than OpenSSL,
so it needs a bit more thought.
I've also done a rebase over todays HEAD, a pgindent pass and some cleanup here
and there.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v5.patch (139.4K, ../../054312F2-4D32-4ED9-A6A9-CA05221858CF@yesql.se/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v5.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 06eeeaffdf934174acdbbfa7a536fb5d68648363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 15:27:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] WIP: Support libnss for as TLS backend v5
---
configure | 211 ++++
configure.in | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1032 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 962 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 172 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 278 ++---
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 64 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 5 +
30 files changed, 3109 insertions(+), 243 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (81%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cb8fbe1051..8b7d98c2ab 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8100,6 +8103,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,6 +12212,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12436,6 +12477,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13338,6 +13530,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index e91e49a579..35abe629bf 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -856,6 +856,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,6 +1214,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1230,6 +1242,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1405,6 +1430,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 1846d415b6..cef7bf7f61 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index c237d4ba95..d15a206d2d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g. TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..2f25c51c6c 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2831fb16ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1032 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = {PW_NONE, 0}; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c,
+ *b;
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok_r(ciphers, sep, &b); c; c = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &b))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 6f603cbbe8..78e1ed5b8b 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4250,7 +4250,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4308,6 +4312,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4336,8 +4352,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..6211510fab 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 73aa618166..8044e1e17f 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 45b6a45789..3ead0ac546 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 7bee9dd201..2814eb8ddd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23969ade8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,962 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..fe265e2dbd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +205,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +233,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +273,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +318,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..c27313f86d 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,28 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1
+ if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,82 +126,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +365,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +406,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +482,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +507,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +525,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +551,18 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 01231f8ba0..4ea81fdbcf 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 81%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..f6b9711bcd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,15 +24,34 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -158,9 +184,22 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +207,17 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 023da62382..8856750856 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-21 20:16 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-29 01:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-01-21 20:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 15:35 +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> With this, I have one failing test ("intermediate client certificate is
> provided by client") which I've left failing since I believe the case should be
> supported by NSS. The issue is most likely that I havent figured out the right
> certinfo incantation to make it so (Mozilla hasn't strained themselves when
> writing documentation for this toolchain, or any part of NSS for that matter).
I think we're missing a counterpart to this piece of the OpenSSL
implementation, in be_tls_init():
if (ssl_ca_file[0])
{
...
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(context, root_cert_list);
}
I think the NSS equivalent to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() is probably
SSL_SetTrustAnchors() (which isn't called out in the online NSS docs,
as far as I can see).
What I'm less sure of is how we want the NSS counterpart to ssl_ca_file
to behave. The OpenSSL implementation allows a list of CA names to be
sent. Should the NSS side take a list of CA cert nicknames? a list of
Subjects? something else?
mod_nss for httpd had a proposed feature [1] to do this that
unfortunately withered on the vine, and Google returns ~500 results for
"SSL_SetTrustAnchors", so I'm unaware of any prior art in the wild...
--Jacob
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=719401
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-21 20:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-01-29 01:06 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-01-29 01:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Thu, 2021-01-21 at 20:16 +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> I think we're missing a counterpart to this piece of the OpenSSL
> implementation, in be_tls_init():
Never mind. Using SSL_SetTrustAnchor is something we could potentially
do if we wanted to further limit the CAs that are actually sent to the
client, but it shouldn't be necessary to get the tests to pass.
I now think that it's just a matter of making sure that the "server-cn-
only" DB has the root_ca.crt included, so that it can correctly
validate the client certificate. Incidentally I think this should also
fix the remaining failing SCRAM test. I'll try to get a patch out
tomorrow, if adding the root CA doesn't invalidate some other test
logic.
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-17 01:02 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-17 21:19 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-17 01:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 15:35 +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> This version adds support for sslinfo on NSS for most the functions.
I've poked around to see what can be done about the
unimplemented ssl_client_dn_field/ssl_issuer_field functions. There's a
nasty soup of specs to wade around in, and it's not really clear to me
which ones take precedence since they're mostly centered on LDAP.
My take on it is that OpenSSL has done its own thing here, with almost-
based-on-a-spec-but-not-quite semantics. NSS has no equivalents to many
of the field names that OpenSSL supports (e.g. "commonName"). Likewise,
OpenSSL doesn't support case-insensitivity (e.g. "cn" in addition to
"CN") as many of the relevant RFCs require. They do both support
dotted-decimal representations, so we could theoretically get feature
parity there without a huge amount of work.
For the few attributes that NSS has a public API for retrieving:
- common name
- country
- locality
- state
- organization
- domain component
- org. unit
- DN qualifier
- uid
- email address(es?)
we could hardcode the list of OpenSSL-compatible names, and just
translate manually in sslinfo. Then leave the rest up to dotted-decimal
OIDs.
Would that be desirable, or do we want this interface to be something
more generally compatible with (some as-of-yet unspecified) spec?
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 01:02 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-17 21:19 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 22:02 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-17 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 17 Feb 2021, at 02:02, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-07-20 at 15:35 +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> This version adds support for sslinfo on NSS for most the functions.
>
> I've poked around to see what can be done about the
> unimplemented ssl_client_dn_field/ssl_issuer_field functions. There's a
> nasty soup of specs to wade around in, and it's not really clear to me
> which ones take precedence since they're mostly centered on LDAP.
Thanks for digging!
> we could hardcode the list of OpenSSL-compatible names, and just
> translate manually in sslinfo. Then leave the rest up to dotted-decimal
> OIDs.
>
> Would that be desirable, or do we want this interface to be something
> more generally compatible with (some as-of-yet unspecified) spec?
Regardless of approach taken I think this sounds like something that should be
tackled in a follow-up patch if the NSS patch is merged - and probably only as
a follow-up to a patch that adds test coverage to sslinfo. From the sounds of
things me may not be able to guarantee stability across OpenSSL versions as it
is right now?
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 01:02 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-17 21:19 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-17 22:02 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-17 22:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Wed, 2021-02-17 at 22:19 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> > On 17 Feb 2021, at 02:02, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> > Would that be desirable, or do we want this interface to be something
> > more generally compatible with (some as-of-yet unspecified) spec?
>
> Regardless of approach taken I think this sounds like something that should be
> tackled in a follow-up patch if the NSS patch is merged - and probably only as
> a follow-up to a patch that adds test coverage to sslinfo.
Sounds good, and +1 to adding coverage at the same time.
> From the sounds of
> things me may not be able to guarantee stability across OpenSSL versions as it
> is right now?
Yeah. I was going to write that OpenSSL would be unlikely to change
these once they're added for the first time, but after checking GitHub
it looks like they have done so recently [1], as part of a patch
release no less.
--Jacob
[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10029
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
@ 2020-07-15 09:26 ` Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
1 sibling, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Munro @ 2020-07-15 09:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 5:10 PM Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com> wrote:
> -#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
> +#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
>
> I see the same when I use Debian's autoconf, but not FreeBSD's or
> MacPorts', despite all being version 2.69. That seems to be due to
> non-upstreamed changes added by the Debian maintainers (I see the
> off_t thing mentioned in /usr/share/doc/autoconf/changelog.Debian.gz).
By the way, Dagfinn mentioned that these changes were in fact
upstreamed, and happened to be beta-released today[1], and are due out
in ~3 months as 2.70. That'll be something for us to coordinate a bit
further down the road.
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/autoconf/2020-07/msg00006.html
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-15 18:35 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Dunstan @ 2020-07-15 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 5/15/20 4:46 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>
> My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
> if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
> works (and doesn't work).
I'll be happy to help, particularly with Windows support and with some
of the callback stuff I've had a hand in.
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan https://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
@ 2020-07-15 22:18 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-07-15 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 15 Jul 2020, at 20:35, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>
> On 5/15/20 4:46 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>
>> My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
>> if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
>> works (and doesn't work).
>
> I'll be happy to help, particularly with Windows support and with some
> of the callback stuff I've had a hand in.
That would be fantastic, thanks! The password callback handling is still a
TODO so feel free to take a stab at that since you have a lot of context on
there.
For Windows, I've include USE_NSS in Solution.pm as Thomas pointed out in this
thread, but that was done blind as I've done no testing on Windows yet.
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-07-31 20:44 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Dunstan @ 2020-07-31 20:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 7/15/20 6:18 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> On 15 Jul 2020, at 20:35, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 5/15/20 4:46 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>> My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
>>> if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
>>> works (and doesn't work).
>> I'll be happy to help, particularly with Windows support and with some
>> of the callback stuff I've had a hand in.
> That would be fantastic, thanks! The password callback handling is still a
> TODO so feel free to take a stab at that since you have a lot of context on
> there.
>
> For Windows, I've include USE_NSS in Solution.pm as Thomas pointed out in this
> thread, but that was done blind as I've done no testing on Windows yet.
>
OK, here is an update of your patch that compiles and runs against NSS
under Windows (VS2019).
In addition to some work that was missing in src/tools/msvc, I had to
make a few adjustments, including:
* strtok_r() isn't available on Windows. We don't use it elsewhere in
the postgres code, and it seemed unnecessary to have reentrant calls
here, so I just replaced it with equivalent strtok() calls.
* We were missing an NSS implementation of
pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(). I supplied a
dummy that's enough to get it building cleanly, but that needs to be
filled in properly.
There is still plenty of work to go, but this seemed a sufficient
milestone to report progress on.
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan https://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
Attachments:
[text/x-patch] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v6.patch (144.0K, ../../b36484f9-8632-8f92-7381-efa96e87882b@2ndQuadrant.com/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v6.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4da394fb8cb7d65f3bfe8fa244e347a1323d14e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 19:40:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] WIP Support libnss as TLS backend v6
---
configure | 211 +++++
configure.ac | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++--
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1032 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 ++++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 975 +++++++++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 172 +++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 278 +++----
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 ++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 +++
src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm | 64 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
34 files changed, 3168 insertions(+), 250 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cb8fbe1051..8b7d98c2ab 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8100,6 +8103,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,6 +12212,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12436,6 +12477,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13338,6 +13530,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index eb2c731b58..23c07cabce 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -856,6 +856,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,6 +1214,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1230,6 +1242,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1405,6 +1430,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 1846d415b6..cef7bf7f61 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index c237d4ba95..d15a206d2d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g. TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..2f25c51c6c 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00ae054920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1032 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = {PW_NONE, 0}; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index de87ad6ef7..33c3eebf48 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..6211510fab 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 7bee9dd201..2814eb8ddd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6401949136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 3311fd7a5b..b6c92ece11 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -448,7 +451,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..fe265e2dbd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +205,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +233,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +273,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +318,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..c27313f86d 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,28 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1
+ if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,82 +126,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +365,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +406,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +482,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +507,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +525,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +551,18 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 01231f8ba0..4ea81fdbcf 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..f6b9711bcd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
@@ -24,15 +24,34 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
@@ -145,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -158,9 +184,22 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub switch_server_cert
@@ -168,14 +207,17 @@ sub switch_server_cert
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index b6d0cfd39b..c53c59229e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 20da7985c1..818a1922f3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.27.0.windows.1
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
@ 2020-08-03 16:46 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Dunstan @ 2020-08-03 16:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 7/31/20 4:44 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
> On 7/15/20 6:18 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>> On 15 Jul 2020, at 20:35, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 5/15/20 4:46 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>>> My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
>>>> if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
>>>> works (and doesn't work).
>>> I'll be happy to help, particularly with Windows support and with some
>>> of the callback stuff I've had a hand in.
>> That would be fantastic, thanks! The password callback handling is still a
>> TODO so feel free to take a stab at that since you have a lot of context on
>> there.
>>
>> For Windows, I've include USE_NSS in Solution.pm as Thomas pointed out in this
>> thread, but that was done blind as I've done no testing on Windows yet.
>>
>
> OK, here is an update of your patch that compiles and runs against NSS
> under Windows (VS2019).
>
>
> In addition to some work that was missing in src/tools/msvc, I had to
> make a few adjustments, including:
>
>
> * strtok_r() isn't available on Windows. We don't use it elsewhere in
> the postgres code, and it seemed unnecessary to have reentrant calls
> here, so I just replaced it with equivalent strtok() calls.
> * We were missing an NSS implementation of
> pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(). I supplied a
> dummy that's enough to get it building cleanly, but that needs to be
> filled in properly.
>
>
> There is still plenty of work to go, but this seemed a sufficient
> milestone to report progress on.
>
>
OK, this version contains pre-generated nss files, and passes a full
buildfarm run including the ssl test module, with both openssl and NSS.
That should keep the cfbot happy :-)
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan https://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
Attachments:
[text/x-patch] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v7.patch (395.5K, ../../ff2319f2-0f3d-b79e-73a4-bbfdffdc887c@2ndQuadrant.com/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v7.patch)
download | inline diff:
From fd8f8b3a31018d7f39662d92d454a606e4ef0005 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 12:32:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] WIP Support libnss for as TLS backend v7
---
configure | 211 ++++
configure.ac | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1032 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 975 ++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 172 +++
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
...ient.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass | 1 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3349 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3325 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3109 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3181 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3213 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 289 ++---
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
101 files changed, 3276 insertions(+), 257 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cb8fbe1051..8b7d98c2ab 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8100,6 +8103,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,6 +12212,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12436,6 +12477,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13338,6 +13530,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index eb2c731b58..23c07cabce 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -856,6 +856,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,6 +1214,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1230,6 +1242,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1405,6 +1430,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 1846d415b6..cef7bf7f61 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 90db550b92..961cb56358 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8898,7 +8898,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index c237d4ba95..d15a206d2d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g. TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..2f25c51c6c 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00ae054920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1032 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = {PW_NONE, 0}; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index de87ad6ef7..33c3eebf48 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..6211510fab 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 7bee9dd201..2814eb8ddd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6401949136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 3311fd7a5b..b6c92ece11 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -448,7 +451,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..fe265e2dbd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +205,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +233,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +273,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +318,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e541cdfc9c6da2ce489ad74bc2f32e25028361d
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new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfffe92b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..940af9f2967aeb1d3be1c41db6cb2d1e21c757ba
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67ce598fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ab711880535eb3cec99c033365797487765f042
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl
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GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ac5759692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+dUmmyP^#+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a50e21d0e379f2b24547cf52127b06329c6bd67
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..190f880c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96ef52b347114a4403c97567215841487f8d9d29
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f0a9ff5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba13f0cafff3a3d64ab5c1b26e98033614e71fcb
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..212e72edeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55494e66c0b0aae452fa1e58ff6daa0ee72341f1
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdbedc732b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
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+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..faf4480a51f08ed862464fc42753d1002c886912
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..391fefa234b49726959a94205089a04167c44fb7
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d04ea23ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
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+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1bef7b32e1a48253dcded78d36eb0a22062511fb
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..633f26005c9734b998e0ec8ec699cc1c0164be48
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e34f7d8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6dcb06f709163abaa8ff8779475330009cb10925
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..572042e848fb394849dfc9a4aae5f811603ca074
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b54121fc4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d345a098f4488bc747deaa0ef788d7168beb7c7
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ea3e8b64630be9ffe7463c1713556679c180e77
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdd10448f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a6b23bb14fe20ca32e9b1055a9c783e9ef63ca7
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e4d3f5fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d2d3e5bd060df6e7b5fe4f574a14ba91389dad9
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..142748c1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e740fd73e936386e125ee24cca039e79dcc932be
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d08f78285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78691fd862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c35fcdabc7a2a7859bc541547a557ddb7b5cfee0
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a6ad1bb869b043715aca18b25791da12403a6be8
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3431d1549ef5c2c073e938de6b106f535747b9a7
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5e90c7000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66d43f59a56e3ac78870738b91363408252785e9
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82255d3f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95616f580e4361c493962ca84bee51baacaf7dbb
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7493954711430fd0967475631b9380d8399e9ce2
GIT binary patch
literal 36864
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b81ced09e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..00530d98af 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,28 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,82 +126,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +365,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +406,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +482,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +507,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +525,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +551,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 01231f8ba0..4ea81fdbcf 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..679969902e 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,19 +24,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -145,12 +165,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -158,26 +185,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index b6d0cfd39b..c53c59229e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 20da7985c1..818a1922f3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.25.4
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
@ 2020-08-03 19:18 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Dunstan @ 2020-08-03 19:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 8/3/20 12:46 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
> On 7/31/20 4:44 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>> On 7/15/20 6:18 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>>> On 15 Jul 2020, at 20:35, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 5/15/20 4:46 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>>>> My plan is to keep hacking at this to have it reviewable for the 14 cycle, so
>>>>> if anyone has an interest in NSS, then I would love to hear feedback on how it
>>>>> works (and doesn't work).
>>>> I'll be happy to help, particularly with Windows support and with some
>>>> of the callback stuff I've had a hand in.
>>> That would be fantastic, thanks! The password callback handling is still a
>>> TODO so feel free to take a stab at that since you have a lot of context on
>>> there.
>>>
>>> For Windows, I've include USE_NSS in Solution.pm as Thomas pointed out in this
>>> thread, but that was done blind as I've done no testing on Windows yet.
>>>
>> OK, here is an update of your patch that compiles and runs against NSS
>> under Windows (VS2019).
>>
>>
>> In addition to some work that was missing in src/tools/msvc, I had to
>> make a few adjustments, including:
>>
>>
>> * strtok_r() isn't available on Windows. We don't use it elsewhere in
>> the postgres code, and it seemed unnecessary to have reentrant calls
>> here, so I just replaced it with equivalent strtok() calls.
>> * We were missing an NSS implementation of
>> pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(). I supplied a
>> dummy that's enough to get it building cleanly, but that needs to be
>> filled in properly.
>>
>>
>> There is still plenty of work to go, but this seemed a sufficient
>> milestone to report progress on.
>>
>>
>
> OK, this version contains pre-generated nss files, and passes a full
> buildfarm run including the ssl test module, with both openssl and NSS.
> That should keep the cfbot happy :-)
>
>
rebased on current master.
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan https://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
Attachments:
[text/x-patch] 0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v8.patch (395.5K, ../../e3ad96e8-7d2d-6c3d-39c9-fc1fa47a30f0@2ndQuadrant.com/2-0001-WIP-Support-libnss-for-as-TLS-backend-v8.patch)
download | inline diff:
From eadce6d33f6406798494a35f4997f49ace5e4cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 12:32:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] WIP Support libnss for as TLS backend v8
---
configure | 211 ++++
configure.ac | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1032 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 975 ++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 172 +++
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
...ient.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass | 1 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3349 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3325 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3109 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3181 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3213 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 289 ++---
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
101 files changed, 3276 insertions(+), 257 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cb8fbe1051..8b7d98c2ab 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8100,6 +8103,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,6 +12212,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12436,6 +12477,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13338,6 +13530,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index eb2c731b58..23c07cabce 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -856,6 +856,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,6 +1214,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1230,6 +1242,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1405,6 +1430,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 1846d415b6..cef7bf7f61 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 90db550b92..961cb56358 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8898,7 +8898,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index c237d4ba95..d15a206d2d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g. TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using OpenSSL.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a6265b3a0..2f25c51c6c 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 02b6c3f127..8f4197d002 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00ae054920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1032 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = {PW_NONE, 0}; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index de87ad6ef7..33c3eebf48 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 179ebaa104..6211510fab 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index d4919970f8..97821fb39b 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 7bee9dd201..2814eb8ddd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6401949136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* TODO: implement me .. */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged
+ * warning somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build,
+ * but the color of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 3311fd7a5b..b6c92ece11 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -448,7 +451,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..fe265e2dbd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +205,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +233,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +273,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +318,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfffe92b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..940af9f2967aeb1d3be1c41db6cb2d1e21c757ba
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78bd1528d61535531d652ea1fae1e1a0b749d696
GIT binary patch
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new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67ce598fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ab711880535eb3cec99c033365797487765f042
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ac5759692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+dUmmyP^#+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3884ab59f5568f08e5c65bd753fe7a24c4bb2ae7
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..190f880c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96ef52b347114a4403c97567215841487f8d9d29
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f0a9ff5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba13f0cafff3a3d64ab5c1b26e98033614e71fcb
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..212e72edeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdbedc732b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..faf4480a51f08ed862464fc42753d1002c886912
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..391fefa234b49726959a94205089a04167c44fb7
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d04ea23ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
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+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1bef7b32e1a48253dcded78d36eb0a22062511fb
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..633f26005c9734b998e0ec8ec699cc1c0164be48
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e34f7d8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6dcb06f709163abaa8ff8779475330009cb10925
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new file mode 100644
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b54121fc4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d345a098f4488bc747deaa0ef788d7168beb7c7
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ea3e8b64630be9ffe7463c1713556679c180e77
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdd10448f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a6b23bb14fe20ca32e9b1055a9c783e9ef63ca7
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e4d3f5fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d2d3e5bd060df6e7b5fe4f574a14ba91389dad9
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4db1426c3a88f0bd27dd3dd1593038e228c82540
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..142748c1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..052a8847cb8f8feef763a7220540f540d8016f69
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e740fd73e936386e125ee24cca039e79dcc932be
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d08f78285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ed37c04dafbbb1e34561794ae0f876e0688c115
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e66a9a26ae087c879a16a4d666c9ac970fe3de48
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78691fd862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c35fcdabc7a2a7859bc541547a557ddb7b5cfee0
GIT binary patch
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new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2118ea3a456ae43f7537af0d83c3cfe04959e6dc
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5e90c7000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66d43f59a56e3ac78870738b91363408252785e9
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82255d3f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7493954711430fd0967475631b9380d8399e9ce2
GIT binary patch
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b81ced09e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..00530d98af 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,28 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,82 +126,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +365,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +406,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +482,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +507,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +525,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +551,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 01231f8ba0..4ea81fdbcf 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 1e392b8fbf..679969902e 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -24,19 +24,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -145,12 +165,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -158,26 +185,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index b6d0cfd39b..c53c59229e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 20da7985c1..818a1922f3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.25.4
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
@ 2020-08-04 21:42 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-08-04 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 3 Aug 2020, at 21:18, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> On 8/3/20 12:46 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>> On 7/31/20 4:44 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>>> OK, here is an update of your patch that compiles and runs against NSS
>>> under Windows (VS2019).
Out of curiosity since I'm not familiar with Windows, how hard/easy is it to
install NSS for the purpose of a) hacking on postgres+NSS and b) using postgres
with NSS as the backend?
>>> * strtok_r() isn't available on Windows. We don't use it elsewhere in
>>> the postgres code, and it seemed unnecessary to have reentrant calls
>>> here, so I just replaced it with equivalent strtok() calls.
Fair enough, that makes sense.
>>> * We were missing an NSS implementation of
>>> pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(). I supplied a
>>> dummy that's enough to get it building cleanly, but that needs to be
>>> filled in properly.
Interesting, not sure how I could've missed that one.
>> OK, this version contains pre-generated nss files, and passes a full
>> buildfarm run including the ssl test module, with both openssl and NSS.
>> That should keep the cfbot happy :-)
Exciting, thanks a lot for helping out on this! I've started to look at the
required documentation changes during vacation, will hopefully be able to post
something soon.
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-08-05 20:38 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Dunstan @ 2020-08-05 20:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 8/4/20 5:42 PM, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> On 3 Aug 2020, at 21:18, Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
>> On 8/3/20 12:46 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>>> On 7/31/20 4:44 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>>>> OK, here is an update of your patch that compiles and runs against NSS
>>>> under Windows (VS2019).
> Out of curiosity since I'm not familiar with Windows, how hard/easy is it to
> install NSS for the purpose of a) hacking on postgres+NSS and b) using postgres
> with NSS as the backend?
I've laid out the process at
https://www.2ndquadrant.com/en/blog/nss-on-windows-for-postgresql-development/
>>> OK, this version contains pre-generated nss files, and passes a full
>>> buildfarm run including the ssl test module, with both openssl and NSS.
>>> That should keep the cfbot happy :-)
> Exciting, thanks a lot for helping out on this! I've started to look at the
> required documentation changes during vacation, will hopefully be able to post
> something soon.
>
Good. Having got the tests running cleanly on Linux, I'm now going back
to work on that for Windows.
After that I'll look at the hook/callback stuff.
cheers
andrew
--
Andrew Dunstan https://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
@ 2020-09-17 07:41 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2020-09-17 07:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; +Cc: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 10:23:34AM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote:
> Adding a <productname> markup around OpenSSL in the docs makes things
> consistent. +1.
I have looked at 0001, and applied it after fixing the line length
(thanks for not doing it to ease my lookup), and I found one extra
place in need of fix. Patch 0002 is failing to apply.
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../20200917074134.GX2873@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2020-09-17 09:41 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-09-17 09:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 17 Sep 2020, at 09:41, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 10:23:34AM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote:
>> Adding a <productname> markup around OpenSSL in the docs makes things
>> consistent. +1.
>
> I have looked at 0001, and applied it after fixing the line length
> (thanks for not doing it to ease my lookup), and I found one extra
> place in need of fix.
Thanks!
> Patch 0002 is failing to apply.
Attached is a v10 rebased to apply on top of HEAD.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v10.patch (397.0K, ../../BAD11CCA-E712-4906-8A27-94C2AA0E696E@yesql.se/2-0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v10.patch)
download | inline diff:
From b397b75d49db00ef58e0cc4a3a456aa7d68d06fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2020 01:24:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v10
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan
---
configure | 211 ++++
configure.ac | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 21 +-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 25 +-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1038 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 9 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 984 ++++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 172 +++
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
...ient.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass | 1 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3149 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl | Bin 0 -> 393 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3349 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3325 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3109 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3197 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3181 bytes
.../cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../key4.db | Bin 0 -> 45056 bytes
.../pkcs11.txt | 5 +
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx | Bin 0 -> 3213 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl | Bin 0 -> 418 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db | Bin 0 -> 28672 bytes
src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db | Bin 0 -> 36864 bytes
.../ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt | 5 +
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 289 ++---
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
106 files changed, 3479 insertions(+), 266 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 19a3cd09a0..55ba9526df 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -857,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1559,6 +1561,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8106,6 +8109,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12180,6 +12218,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12442,6 +12483,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13344,6 +13536,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6b9d0487a8..970bebb24a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -861,6 +861,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1210,6 +1219,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1235,6 +1247,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1410,6 +1435,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index c8d2a16273..57fa998526 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 84bc0ee381..c3693283d2 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8919,7 +8919,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 2c75876e32..3859fb39f1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index b585f22408..60cd6ff8de 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -969,6 +969,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -985,6 +1010,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index b50391caee..cd8e170938 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2497,9 +2497,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2526,6 +2531,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7958,6 +7967,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7984,6 +7998,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index f584231935..bfc8218c7b 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2377,7 +2400,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2424,6 +2447,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2551,6 +2582,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index e16f61b41d..253bb697af 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g., TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..8946fa696a 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 36565df4fc..ea6d97585e 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe6540852b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1038 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reasone, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static char *
+ssl_passphrase_callback(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return pstrdup("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ secuPWData pwdata = {PW_NONE, 0}; /* TODO: This is a bogus callback */
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ *
+ * TODO: Figure this out - do note that we are setting another password
+ * callback below for cert/key as well. Need to make sense of all these.
+ */
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(ssl_passphrase_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!server_cert)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /* TODO: set the postgres password callback param as callback function */
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, &pwdata /* password callback */ );
+ if (!private_key)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 596bcb7b84..ce6200c851 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..f11ddd6b2e 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..ef5f105afc 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 724076a310..0acf521624 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..778393fc3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,984 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header fils, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 3311fd7a5b..b6c92ece11 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -448,7 +451,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..fe265e2dbd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,74 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +205,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +233,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +273,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +318,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e8d1510529438b26c31e0880163aa391bd1870d0
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..44e6fcf5307a8b2e6cbf9878b157d7cb3e3a3f25
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfffe92b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4472d88ab737eb98c25d0e5fdc5124533529089d
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3cbd561f8a1ebf20905080adb814e79588c7ef49
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a094273f3761c4c1ecc6a59b28f1147d13b7736
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67ce598fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ddd9ff2823a5625b32e538ae91d029df841bfeb
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crl
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db.pass
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ac5759692
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..190f880c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c8ec171304048a2a1c7aa14965b30cb7bea2ec8
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/key4.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f0a9ff5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c5f5bb3e5ce60d158e87d7b9b114f29991a7d32
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..710f74aae2716883ec8e8bc4f8490b5f37063abd
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13d47f000664f2003064ae9110f2f5a07013494d
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..212e72edeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client.crl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d345a098f4488bc747deaa0ef788d7168beb7c7
GIT binary patch
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..480e281015f26cae72cf86ba29e62a4fac1288bf
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65f7eb7f0b7bf0b581fab253b06484fe09083650
GIT binary patch
literal 36864
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdbedc732b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cdec09a0dbe8b127c8725dc180b281a355da3530
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7704c2b80a3a607f026118c205c48afbb98bfe8
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d04ea23ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
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+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..433b1b91c6a7891f52cdcd3f87655486798c5b99
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..065152e027a94fc9ba48159ed8cfa0fc22a131c9
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e34f7d8ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dba82085f965c11ae464328fb65e8017f3b8199a
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..de0f7b37cc0bb1e6b656089aea58a8916d64b3f1
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b54121fc4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/root.crl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d345a098f4488bc747deaa0ef788d7168beb7c7
GIT binary patch
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6bccb020a17e1825bfc26b0de2213c63422bfe8c
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d3a91e75b37e4fc925ee9cdf4053fe8fbd9a7ef
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdd10448f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b75c8b1df5d958af6e508211fd2f29534fff4d21
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e4d3f5fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0f30f7506ed349ff8119b5029a8818cbb04b01e
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..142748c1c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba5bdfaeda2e17f36e42fe551cce074910c12a62
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/cert9.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d08f78285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f90123e979d9373e3057b4cc47ee276b1ed4304a
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/cert9.db
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78691fd862
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3db5c17f9c65ee8e38b435307569945f5230eef0
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-password.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..973ffd13c772f74dc2fcdbed87274f78fdbbbffe
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/cert9.db
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5e90c7000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..52fd4217213867aa1dcdd8d0bbe428dbc54c7b7f
GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/cert9.db
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new file mode 100644
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GIT binary patch
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diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82255d3f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d0fee97935a0513dbaa0979b6754b885a6a7c71
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..769196dda6dfffeb4141ec007d6e276d3afb5e84
GIT binary patch
literal 418
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/cert9.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c8a303d1121dc443d26281cf1c9d688ff3613ea
GIT binary patch
literal 28672
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literal 0
HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/key4.db
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7724801ab7b783dee9780314a10c797f4b0bc203
GIT binary patch
literal 36864
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HcmV?d00001
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b81ced09e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db/pkcs11.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+library=
+name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
+parameters=configdir='sql:ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db' certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription=''
+NSS=Flags=internal,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[ECC,RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
+
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..00530d98af 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,15 +4,22 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
else
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +53,28 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
-
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 1
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -149,82 +126,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +340,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +365,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +406,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +482,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +507,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +525,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +551,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..b50659e568 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..1261d21861 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index b6d0cfd39b..c53c59229e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 89e1b39036..f141801478 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-09-29 05:59 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2020-09-29 05:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 11:41:28AM +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> Attached is a v10 rebased to apply on top of HEAD.
I am afraid that this needs a new rebase. The patch is failing to
apply, per the CF bot. :/
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../20200929055939.GF7117@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2020-09-29 07:52 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-09-29 07:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 29 Sep 2020, at 07:59, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 11:41:28AM +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> Attached is a v10 rebased to apply on top of HEAD.
>
> I am afraid that this needs a new rebase. The patch is failing to
> apply, per the CF bot. :/
It's failing on binary diffs due to the NSS certificate databases being
included to make hacking on the patch easier:
File src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl: git binary diffs are not supported.
This is a limitation of the CFBot patch tester, the text portions of the patch
still applies with a tiny but of fuzz.
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-10-02 20:01 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-10-02 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 29 Sep 2020, at 09:52, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> On 29 Sep 2020, at 07:59, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 11:41:28AM +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>> Attached is a v10 rebased to apply on top of HEAD.
>>
>> I am afraid that this needs a new rebase. The patch is failing to
>> apply, per the CF bot. :/
>
> It's failing on binary diffs due to the NSS certificate databases being
> included to make hacking on the patch easier:
>
> File src/test/ssl/ssl/nss/server.crl: git binary diffs are not supported.
>
> This is a limitation of the CFBot patch tester, the text portions of the patch
> still applies with a tiny but of fuzz.
Attached is a new version which doesn't contain the NSS certificate databases
to keep the CFBot happy.
It also implements server-side passphrase callbacks as well as re-enables the
tests for those. The callback works a bit differently from the OpenSSL one as
it must run in the forked process, so it can't run on server reload. There's
also no default fallback reading from a TTY like in OpenSSL, so if no callback
it set the always-failing dummy is set.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v11.patch (167.5K, ../../411593A7-E037-474D-BFD7-D3D6683C1D46@yesql.se/2-0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v11.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 60daa84e584988121c7a1157a6a8453a9d828057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:55:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v11
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan
---
configure | 211 +++
configure.ac | 30 +
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 +-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1170 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 ++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 13 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 984 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 176 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 326 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
40 files changed, 3575 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 19a3cd09a0..55ba9526df 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -857,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1559,6 +1561,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8106,6 +8109,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12180,6 +12218,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12442,6 +12483,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13344,6 +13536,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 6b9d0487a8..970bebb24a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -861,6 +861,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1210,6 +1219,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1235,6 +1247,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1410,6 +1435,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..d0b01cb2cc 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 10e23d02ed..e580a2369a 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 06405f359c..a2196e3c17 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index b585f22408..60cd6ff8de 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -969,6 +969,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -985,6 +1010,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 3315f1dd05..8b738bc412 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2474,6 +2474,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2497,9 +2499,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2526,6 +2533,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7958,6 +7969,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7984,6 +8000,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index f975406acd..99f27b7ed9 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2377,7 +2400,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2424,6 +2447,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2551,6 +2582,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index e16f61b41d..253bb697af 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g., TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..8946fa696a 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 36565df4fc..ea6d97585e 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b05906514a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1170 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <prmem.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ enum
+ {
+ PW_NONE = 0,
+ PW_FROMFILE = 1,
+ PW_PLAINTEXT = 2,
+ PW_EXTERNAL = 3
+ } source;
+ char *data;
+} secuPWData;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might
+ * as well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 596bcb7b84..ce6200c851 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..b68ef64ec9 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..ef5f105afc 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index af27fee6b5..31a3377904 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbc7e03697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,984 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 3311fd7a5b..b6c92ece11 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -448,7 +451,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..4af971ef77 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +209,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +237,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +277,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +322,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..ff9c8ae3f3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..b50659e568 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..1261d21861 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index b6d0cfd39b..c53c59229e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 89e1b39036..f141801478 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-10-20 12:24 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-10-20 12:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
The attached v12 adds support for pgcrypto as well as pg_strong_random, which I
believe completes the required subsystems where we have OpenSSL support today.
I opted for not adding code to handle the internal shaXXX implementations until
the dust settles around the proposal to change the API there.
Blowfish is not supported by NSS AFAICT, even though the cipher mechanism is
defined, so the internal implementation is used there instead. CAST5 is
supported, but segfaults inside NSS on most inputs so support for that is not
included for now.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v12.patch (197.8K, ../../B1ADEE76-3E33-4E9D-B830-3AA89B1C42D2@yesql.se/2-0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v12.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0cb0e6a0ce9adb18bc9d212bd03e4e09fa452972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 18:44:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v12
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan
---
configure | 223 +++-
configure.ac | 39 +-
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 5 +
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 +++++++++++
contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/px.c | 1 +
contrib/pgcrypto/px.h | 1 +
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 +-
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1158 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 ++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 13 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 6 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 984 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 37 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 176 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 326 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
47 files changed, 4430 insertions(+), 284 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 071d050ef0..e166c4cca6 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -857,6 +858,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1559,6 +1561,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8106,6 +8109,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12180,6 +12218,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12442,6 +12483,157 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13344,6 +13536,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18272,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
@@ -18107,6 +18320,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18116,7 +18335,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index e9ce611d23..255513a006 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -861,6 +861,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1210,6 +1219,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1235,6 +1247,19 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
+ LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ LDFLAGS="$CLEANLDFLAGS"
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1410,6 +1435,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2188,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
@@ -2179,13 +2211,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..d0b01cb2cc 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..6c69ee5a6b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,16 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_nss)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_nss)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0885cd221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <hasht.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <sechash.h>
+#include <secoid.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publically accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
index ed96e4ce53..5ebe213406 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ gen_ossl_encrypt(PX_Cipher *c, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen,
}
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(od->evp_ctx, res, &outlen, data, dlen))
- return PXE_ERR_GENERIC;
+ return PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
index 6a4681dae9..a243f575d3 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const struct error_desc px_err_list[] = {
{PXE_MCRYPT_INTERNAL, "mcrypt internal error"},
{PXE_NO_RANDOM, "Failed to generate strong random bits"},
{PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED, "Decryption failed"},
+ {PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED, "Encryption failed"},
{PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA, "Wrong key or corrupt data"},
{PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_ARMOR, "Corrupt ascii-armor"},
{PXE_PGP_UNSUPPORTED_COMPR, "Unsupported compression algorithm"},
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
index 5487923edb..17d6f22498 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#define PXE_MCRYPT_INTERNAL -16
#define PXE_NO_RANDOM -17
#define PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED -18
+#define PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED -19
#define PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA -100
#define PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_ARMOR -101
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index f043433e31..f7ae3b1be1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 3ac588dfb5..c867b87900 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -969,6 +969,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -985,6 +1010,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index de60281fcb..c127309d76 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..fe7e305b75 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index e16f61b41d..253bb697af 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g., TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..8946fa696a 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 36565df4fc..ea6d97585e 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3072717e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1158 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <prmem.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <secder.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy. TODO: while this code works, the set of
+ * ciphers which can be set and still end up with a working socket is
+ * woefully underdocumented for anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code
+ * for TLS actually calls ssl3 functions under the hood for
+ * SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this is helpful or not. Using
+ * the policies works, but may be too coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, we use the domestic policy
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port, ERROR);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might
+ * as well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(loglevel,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ char error[128];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
+ ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+ if (ret)
+ return pstrdup(error);
+
+ return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index a62d64eaa4..050f673c68 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74298c8bb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..b68ef64ec9 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,12 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..ef5f105afc 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index b0ca37c2ed..a15a89c50c 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbc7e03697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,984 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
+ * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
+ * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
+ * file, and was added in 1998:
+ *
+ * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
+ * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
+ * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
+ * the new definitions.
+ *
+ * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
+ * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
+ * the only way around it.
+ */
+#define PROTYPES_H
+#include <nspr.h>
+#undef PROTYPES_H
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <pk11func.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <prinit.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ err);
+ free(err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ /* status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "trust"); */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"), ca_trust_name, err);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
+ * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
+ * the ongoing connection.
+ */
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
+ * a single implementation instead.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return strdup(error);
+
+ return strdup("unknown TLS error");
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), server_cert,
+ checksig, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (server_hostname)
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..dd6ee15c5a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 14e8382cd8..bac541078a 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,20 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -158,6 +172,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index efb206aa75..d18f5a083b 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..4af971ef77 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +209,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +237,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +277,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +322,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..ff9c8ae3f3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..b50659e568 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..1261d21861 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..d6aefbfcbf 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-10-20 19:15 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Andres Freund @ 2020-10-20 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
Hi,
On 2020-10-20 14:24:24 +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> From 0cb0e6a0ce9adb18bc9d212bd03e4e09fa452972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
> Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 18:44:28 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v12
> ---
> configure | 223 +++-
> configure.ac | 39 +-
> contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
> contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 5 +
> contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 +++++++++++
> contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c | 2 +-
> contrib/pgcrypto/px.c | 1 +
> contrib/pgcrypto/px.h | 1 +
Personally I'd like to see this patch broken up a bit - it's quite
large. Several of the changes could easily be committed separately, no?
> if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
> + if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
> + AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
> + fi
Based on a quick look there's no similar error check for the msvc
build. Should there be?
>
> +if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
> + if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
> + AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
> + fi
Isn't this a repetition of the earlier check?
> + CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
> + # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
> + LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
Shouldn't this use nss-config or such?
> +if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
> + AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
> + AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
> +fi
Hm. For me, on debian, these headers are not directly in the default
include search path, but would be as nss/ssl.h. I don't see you adding
nss/ to CFLAGS anywhere? How does this work currently?
I think it'd also be better if we could include these files as nss/ssl.h
etc - ssl.h is a name way too likely to conflict imo.
> +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1158 @@
> +/*
> + * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
> + * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
> + */
> +#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
> +#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
Most compilers/preprocessors don't warn about redefinitions when they
would result in the same value (IIRC we have some cases of redefinitions
in tree even). Does nspr's differ?
> +/*
> + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
> + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
> + * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
> + * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
> + * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
> + * file, and was added in 1998:
> + *
> + * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
> + * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
> + * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
> + * the new definitions.
> + *
> + * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
> + * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
> + * the only way around it.
> + */
> +#define PROTYPES_H
> +#include <nspr.h>
> +#undef PROTYPES_H
Yuck :(.
> +int
> +be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
> +{
> + SECStatus status;
> + SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
> +
> + /*
> + * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
Hm. Do we necessarily want that? Session resumption is not exactly
unproblematic... Or does this do something else?
> + * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
> + * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
> + * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
> + * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
> + * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
> + * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
> + * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
> + * passed instead.
> + */
Does this stuff work on windows / EXEC_BACKEND?
> + * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
> + * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
> + * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
> + * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
> + * released sometime in 1998.
> + */
> + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_Init
says that currently all parameters are ignored?
> + /*
> + * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
> + * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
> + * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
> + * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
> + * it.
> + */
> + pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
> + if (!pr_fd)
> + ereport(ERROR,
> + (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
I don't see the comment you're referring to?
> + /*
> + * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
> + * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
> + * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
> + * copes with IPv6 as well.
> + */
> + model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
> + if (!model)
> + ereport(ERROR,
> + (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
> +
> + /*
> + * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
> + * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
> + * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
> + * of silent downgrades.
> + */
> + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
> + if (!model)
> + ereport(ERROR,
> + (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
It's confusing that these functions do not actually reference the socket
via some handle :(. What does opening a socket do here?
> + /*
> + * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
*ciphers?
> +
> + port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
> + if (!port->pr_fd)
> + ereport(ERROR,
> + (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
> +
> + PR_Close(model);
A comment explaining why we first import a NULL into the model, and then
release the model, and import the real fd would be good.
> +ssize_t
> +be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
> +{
> + ssize_t n_read;
> + PRErrorCode err;
> +
> + n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
> +
> + if (n_read < 0)
> + {
> + err = PR_GetError();
Yay, more thread global state :(.
> + /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
> + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
> + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
> + else
> + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
Don't we need to handle failed connections somewhere here? secure_read()
won't know about PR_GetError() etc? How would SSL errors be signalled
upwards here?
Also, as you XXX, it's not clear to me that your mapping would always
result in waiting for the right event? A tls write could e.g. very well
require receiving data etc?
> + /*
> + * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
> + * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
> + * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
> + * on the PG side.
> + */
> + password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
> + if (!password)
> + ereport(ERROR,
> + (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
> + errmsg("out of memory")));
>
> + strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
> + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
> +
In case of error you're not bzero'ing out the password!
Separately, I wonder if we should introduce a function for throwing OOM
errors - which then e.g. could print the memory context stats in those
places too...
> +static SECStatus
> +pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
> +{
> + SECStatus status;
> + Port *port = (Port *) arg;
> + CERTCertificate *cert;
> + char *peer_cn;
> + int len;
> +
> + status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
> + if (status == SECSuccess)
> + {
> + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
> + len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
> + peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
> + if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
> + strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
> + else
> + strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
> + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
> +
> + port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
> + port->peer_cert_valid = true;
Hm. We either should have something similar to
/*
* Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent
* attacks like CVE-2009-4034.
*/
if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
{
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
pfree(peer_cn);
return -1;
}
here, or a comment explaining why not.
Also, what's up with the CN= bit? Why is that needed here, but not for
openssl?
> +static PRFileDesc *
> +init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
> +{
> + const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
> + PRFileDesc *layer;
> +
> + /*
> + * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
> + * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
> + * have a complete layer specification.
> + */
> + default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
> + memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
> +
> + pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
> + pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
> +
> + /*
> + * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
> + * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
> + * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
> + * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
> + */
> + pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
Seems like it might not be a bad idea to append Server or something?
> +
> + /*
> + * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
> + * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
> + * callbacks.
> + */
> + layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
> + if (!layer)
> + {
> + ereport(loglevel,
> + (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
> + return NULL;
> + }
Why is this accepting a variable log level? The only caller passes ERROR?
> +/*
> + * pg_SSLerrmessage
> + * Create and return a human readable error message given
> + * the specified error code
> + *
> + * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
> + * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
> + * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
> + */
> +static char *
> +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
> +{
> + char error[128];
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
> + ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
> + PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
> + PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
> + if (ret)
> + return pstrdup(error);
> + return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
> +}
Why not use psrintf() here?
> +++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> +/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + *
> + * pg_nss.h
> + * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
> + *
> + * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
> + *
> + * IDENTIFICATION
> + * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
> + *
> + *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + */
> +#ifndef PG_NSS_H
> +#define PG_NSS_H
> +
> +#ifdef USE_NSS
> +
> +#include <sslproto.h>
> +
> +PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
> +
> +typedef struct
> +{
> + const char *name;
> + PRUint16 number;
> +} NSSCiphers;
> +
> +#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
> +
> +/*
> + * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
> + * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
> + * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
> + * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
> + */
> +static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
> +
> + {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
Hm. Is this whole business of defining array constants in a header just
done to avoid having a .c file that needs to be compiled both in
frontend and backend code?
> +/*
> + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
> + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
> + * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
> + * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
> + * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
> + * file, and was added in 1998:
> + *
> + * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
> + * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
> + * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
> + * the new definitions.
> + *
> + * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
> + * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
> + * the only way around it.
> + */
There's a lot of duplicated comments here. Could we move either of the
files to reference the other for longer ones?
> +/*
> + * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
> + * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
> + * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
> + *
> + * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
> + * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
> + * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
> + * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
> + *
> + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
> + *
> + * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
> + * private we declare it here rather than including it.
> + */
> +NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
Ugh. This is really the way to do this? How do other applications deal
with this problem?
> +#if defined(WIN32)
> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
> +#elif defined(__darwin__)
> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
> +#else
> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
> +#endif
There's really no pre-existing handling for this in nss???
> + /*
> + * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
> + * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
> + * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
> + * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
> + * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
> + * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
> + * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
> + * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
> + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
> + *
> + * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
> + * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
> + * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
> + * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
> + * details on these.
> + *
> + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
> +
> + if (!nss_context)
> + {
> + char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
> +
> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
> + libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
> + conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
> + err);
> + free(err);
> + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Configure cipher policy.
> + */
> + status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
Why is "domestic" the right thing here?
> +
> + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
Is it actually OK to do stuff like this when other users of NSS might be
present? That's obviously more likely in the libpq case, compared to the
backend case (where it's also possible, of course). What prevents us
from overriding another user's callback?
> +ssize_t
> +pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
> +{
> + PRInt32 nread;
> + PRErrorCode status;
> + int read_errno = 0;
> +
> + nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
> +
> + /*
> + * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
> + * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
> + * the ongoing connection.
> + */
> + if (nread == 0)
> + {
> + read_errno = ECONNRESET;
> + return -1;
> + }
It's a bit confusing to talk about blocking when the socket presumably
is in non-blocking mode, and you're also asking to never wait?
> + if (nread == -1)
> + {
> + status = PR_GetError();
> +
> + switch (status)
> + {
> + case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
> + read_errno = EINTR;
> + break;
Uh, isn't this going to cause a busy-loop by the caller? EINTR isn't the
same as EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK?
> + case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
> + break;
What does this mean? We'll return with a 0 errno here, right? When is
this case reachable?
E.g. the comment in fe-misc.c:
/* pqsecure_read set the error message for us */
for this case doesn't seem to be fulfilled by this.
> +/*
> + * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
> + *
> + * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
> + */
> +int
> +pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
> + int *names_examined,
> + char **first_name)
> +{
> + return 1;
> +}
Uh, huh? Certainly doesn't verify anything...
> +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
> +/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
> +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
> +
> +/*
> + * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
> + * a single implementation instead.
> + */
> +static char *
> +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
> +{
> + const char *error;
> +
> + error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
> + if (error)
> + return strdup(error);
> +
> + return strdup("unknown TLS error");
> +}
Btw, why does this need to duplicate strings, instead of returning a
const char*?
Greetings,
Andres Freund
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
@ 2020-10-27 20:07 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-10-28 06:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2021-01-13 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 3 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-10-27 20:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 20 Oct 2020, at 21:15, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>
> Hi,
Thanks for your review, much appreciated!
> On 2020-10-20 14:24:24 +0200, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> From 0cb0e6a0ce9adb18bc9d212bd03e4e09fa452972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
>> Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 18:44:28 +0200
>> Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v12
>> ---
>> configure | 223 +++-
>> configure.ac | 39 +-
>> contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
>> contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 5 +
>> contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 +++++++++++
>> contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c | 2 +-
>> contrib/pgcrypto/px.c | 1 +
>> contrib/pgcrypto/px.h | 1 +
>
> Personally I'd like to see this patch broken up a bit - it's quite
> large. Several of the changes could easily be committed separately, no?
Not sure how much of this makes sense committed separately (unless separately
means in quick succession), but it could certainly be broken up for the sake of
making review easier. I will take a stab at that, but in a follow-up email as
I would like the split to be a version just doing the split and not also
introducing/fixing things.
>> if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
>> + if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
>> + AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
>> + fi
>
> Based on a quick look there's no similar error check for the msvc
> build. Should there be?
Thats a good question. When embarking on this is seemed quite natural to me
that it should be, but now I'm not so sure. Maybe there should be a
--with-openssl-preferred like how we handle readline/libedit or just allow
multiple and let the last one win? Do you have any input on what would make
sense?
The only thing I think makes no sense is to allow multiple ones at the same
time given the current autoconf switches, even if it would just be to pick say
pg_strong_random from one and libpq TLS from another.
>> +if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
>> + if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
>> + AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
>> + fi
>
> Isn't this a repetition of the earlier check?
It is, and it we want to keep such a check it should be broken out into a
separate step performed before all library specific checks IMO.
>> + CLEANLDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
>> + # TODO: document this set of LDFLAGS
>> + LDFLAGS="-lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -lplds4 -lplc4 -lnspr4 $LDFLAGS"
>
> Shouldn't this use nss-config or such?
Indeed it should, where available. I've added rudimentary support for that
without a fallback as of now.
>> +if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
>> + AC_CHECK_HEADER(ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
>> + AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss.h> is required for NSS])])
>> +fi
>
> Hm. For me, on debian, these headers are not directly in the default
> include search path, but would be as nss/ssl.h. I don't see you adding
> nss/ to CFLAGS anywhere? How does this work currently?
I had Stockholm-syndromed myself into passing --with-includes and hadn't really
realized. Sometimes the obvious is too obvious in a 4000+ LOC patch.
> I think it'd also be better if we could include these files as nss/ssl.h
> etc - ssl.h is a name way too likely to conflict imo.
I've changed this to be nss/ssl.h and nspr/nspr.h etc, but the include path
will still need the direct path to the headers (from autoconf) since nss.h
includes NSPR headers as #include <nspr.h> and so on.
>> +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,1158 @@
>> +/*
>> + * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
>> + * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
>> + */
>> +#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
>> +#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
>
> Most compilers/preprocessors don't warn about redefinitions when they
> would result in the same value (IIRC we have some cases of redefinitions
> in tree even). Does nspr's differ?
GCC 8.3 in my Debian installation throws the below warning:
In file included from /usr/include/nspr/prtypes.h:26,
from /usr/include/nspr/pratom.h:14,
from /usr/include/nspr/nspr.h:9,
from be-secure-nss.c:45:
/usr/include/nspr/prcpucfg.h:1143: warning: "BITS_PER_BYTE" redefined
#define BITS_PER_BYTE PR_BITS_PER_BYTE
In file included from ../../../src/include/c.h:55,
from ../../../src/include/postgres.h:46,
from be-secure-nss.c:16:
../../../src/include/pg_config_manual.h:115: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define BITS_PER_BYTE 8
PR_BITS_PER_BYTE is defined per platform in pr/include/md/_<platform>.cfg and
is as expected 8. I assume it's that indirection which cause the warning?
>> +/*
>> + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
>> + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
>> + * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
>> + * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
>> + * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
>> + * file, and was added in 1998:
>> + *
>> + * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
>> + * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
>> + * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
>> + * the new definitions.
>> + *
>> + * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
>> + * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
>> + * the only way around it.
>> + */
>> +#define PROTYPES_H
>> +#include <nspr.h>
>> +#undef PROTYPES_H
>
> Yuck :(.
Thats not an understatement. Taking another dive into the NSPR code I did
however find a proper way to deal with this. Defining NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT stops
NSPR from using the files in obsolete/. So fixed, yay!
>> +int
>> +be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
>> +{
>> + SECStatus status;
>> + SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
>
> Hm. Do we necessarily want that? Session resumption is not exactly
> unproblematic... Or does this do something else?
From my reading of the docs, and experience with the code, a server application
must set up a connection cache in order to accept connections. Not entirely
sure, and the docs aren't terribly clear for non SSLv2/v3 environments (it
seems to only cache for SSLv2/3 and not TLSv+) but it seems like it may have
other uses internally. I will hunt down some more information on the NSS
mailing list.
>> + * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
>> + * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
>> + * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
>> + * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
>> + * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
>> + * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
>> + * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
>> + * passed instead.
>> + */
>
> Does this stuff work on windows
According to the documentation it does, and Andrew had this working on Windows
in an earlier version of the patch. I need to get a proper Windows env for
testing/dev up and running as mine has bitrotted to nothingness.
> / EXEC_BACKEND?
That's a good point, maybe we need to do a SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache
rather than the MP version for EXEC_BACKEND? Not sure.
>> + * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
>> + * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
>> + * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
>> + * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
>> + * released sometime in 1998.
>> + */
>> + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
>
> https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_Init
> says that currently all parameters are ignored?
Right, my comment didn't reflect that they're all dead these days, only that
one of them has been unused since RUN DMC topped the charts with "It's like
that". Comment updated.
>> + /*
>> + * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
>> + * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
>> + * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
>> + * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
>> + * it.
>> + */
>> + pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
>> + if (!pr_fd)
>> + ereport(ERROR,
>> + (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
>
> I don't see the comment you're referring to?
It's referring to the comment discussing PR_ImportTCPSocket being a private API
call, yet still used by everyone (which is also discussed later in this review).
>> + /*
>> + * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
>> + * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
>> + * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
>> + * copes with IPv6 as well.
>> + */
>> + model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
>> + if (!model)
>> + ereport(ERROR,
>> + (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
>> + * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
>> + * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
>> + * of silent downgrades.
>> + */
>> + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
>> + if (!model)
>> + ereport(ERROR,
>> + (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
>
> It's confusing that these functions do not actually reference the socket
> via some handle :(. What does opening a socket do here?
This specific call converts the socket from a plain NSPR socket to an SSL/TLS
capable socket which NSS will work with. This is a required step for
"activating" NSS on the socket.
>> + /*
>> + * Configure the allowed cipher. If there are no user preferred suites,
>
> *ciphers?
Yes, fixed.
>> +
>> + port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
>> + if (!port->pr_fd)
>> + ereport(ERROR,
>> + (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
>> +
>> + PR_Close(model);
>
> A comment explaining why we first import a NULL into the model, and then
> release the model, and import the real fd would be good.
I've added a small comment to explain how the model is a configuration template
for the actual socket. This part of NSS/NSPR is a bit overcomplicated for how
we have connections, it's more geared towards having many open sockets in the
same process.
>> +ssize_t
>> +be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
>> +{
>> + ssize_t n_read;
>> + PRErrorCode err;
>> +
>> + n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
>> +
>> + if (n_read < 0)
>> + {
>> + err = PR_GetError();
>
> Yay, more thread global state :(.
Sorry about that.
>> + /* XXX: This logic seems potentially bogus? */
>> + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
>> + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
>> + else
>> + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
>
> Don't we need to handle failed connections somewhere here? secure_read()
> won't know about PR_GetError() etc? How would SSL errors be signalled
> upwards here?
>
> Also, as you XXX, it's not clear to me that your mapping would always
> result in waiting for the right event? A tls write could e.g. very well
> require receiving data etc?
Fixed, but there might be more to be done here.
>> + /*
>> + * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
>> + * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
>> + * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
>> + * on the PG side.
>> + */
>> + password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
>> + if (!password)
>> + ereport(ERROR,
>> + (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
>> + errmsg("out of memory")));
>>
>> + strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
>> + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
>> +
>
> In case of error you're not bzero'ing out the password!
Fixed.
> Separately, I wonder if we should introduce a function for throwing OOM
> errors - which then e.g. could print the memory context stats in those
> places too...
+1. I'd be happy to review such a patch.
>> +static SECStatus
>> +pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
>> +{
>> + SECStatus status;
>> + Port *port = (Port *) arg;
>> + CERTCertificate *cert;
>> + char *peer_cn;
>> + int len;
>> +
>> + status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
>> + if (status == SECSuccess)
>> + {
>> + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
>> + len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
>> + peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
>> + if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
>> + strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
>> + else
>> + strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
>> + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
>> +
>> + port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
>> + port->peer_cert_valid = true;
>
> Hm. We either should have something similar to
>
> /*
> * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent
> * attacks like CVE-2009-4034.
> */
> if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
> {
> ereport(COMMERROR,
> (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
> errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
> pfree(peer_cn);
> return -1;
> }
> here, or a comment explaining why not.
We should, but it's proving rather difficult as there is no equivalent API call
to get the string as well as the expected length of it.
> Also, what's up with the CN= bit? Why is that needed here, but not for
> openssl?
OpenSSL returns only the value portion, whereas NSS returns key=value so we
need to skip over the key= part.
>> +static PRFileDesc *
>> +init_iolayer(Port *port, int loglevel)
>> +{
>> + const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
>> + PRFileDesc *layer;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
>> + * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
>> + * have a complete layer specification.
>> + */
>> + default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
>> + memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
>> +
>> + pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
>> + pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
>> + * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
>> + * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
>> + * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
>> + */
>> + pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL");
>
> Seems like it might not be a bad idea to append Server or something?
Fixed.
>> + /*
>> + * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
>> + * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
>> + * callbacks.
>> + */
>> + layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
>> + if (!layer)
>> + {
>> + ereport(loglevel,
>> + (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
>> + return NULL;
>> + }
>
> Why is this accepting a variable log level? The only caller passes ERROR?
Good catch, that's a leftover from a previous version which no longer makes
sense. loglevel param removed.
>> +/*
>> + * pg_SSLerrmessage
>> + * Create and return a human readable error message given
>> + * the specified error code
>> + *
>> + * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
>> + * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
>> + * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
>> + */
>> +static char *
>> +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
>> +{
>> + char error[128];
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + /* TODO: this should perhaps use a StringInfo instead.. */
>> + ret = pg_snprintf(error, sizeof(error), "%s (%s)",
>> + PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
>> + PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
>> + if (ret)
>> + return pstrdup(error);
>
>> + return pstrdup(_("unknown TLS error"));
>> +}
>
> Why not use psrintf() here?
Thats a good question to which I don't have a good answer. Changed to doing
just that.
>> +++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
>> +/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> + *
>> + * pg_nss.h
>> + * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
>> + *
>> + * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
>> + *
>> + * IDENTIFICATION
>> + * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
>> + *
>> + *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> + */
>> +#ifndef PG_NSS_H
>> +#define PG_NSS_H
>> +
>> +#ifdef USE_NSS
>> +
>> +#include <sslproto.h>
>> +
>> +PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
>> +
>> +typedef struct
>> +{
>> + const char *name;
>> + PRUint16 number;
>> +} NSSCiphers;
>> +
>> +#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
>> + * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
>> + * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
>> + * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
>> + */
>> +static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
>> +
>> + {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
>
> Hm. Is this whole business of defining array constants in a header just
> done to avoid having a .c file that needs to be compiled both in
> frontend and backend code?
That was the original motivation, but I guess I should just bit the bullet and
make it a .c compiled in both frontend and backend?
>> +/*
>> + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
>> + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
>> + * The definitions are however not actually used in NSPR at all, and are only
>> + * intended for what seems to be backwards compatibility for apps written
>> + * against old versions of NSPR. The following comment is in the referenced
>> + * file, and was added in 1998:
>> + *
>> + * This section typedefs the old 'native' types to the new PR<type>s.
>> + * These definitions are scheduled to be eliminated at the earliest
>> + * possible time. The NSPR API is implemented and documented using
>> + * the new definitions.
>> + *
>> + * As there is no opt-out from pulling in these typedefs, we define the guard
>> + * for the file to exclude it. This is incredibly ugly, but seems to be about
>> + * the only way around it.
>> + */
>
> There's a lot of duplicated comments here. Could we move either of the
> files to reference the other for longer ones?
I took a stab at this in the attached version. The code is perhaps over-
commented in parts but I tried to encode my understanding of NSS into the
comments where documentation is lacking, since I assume I'm not the only one
who is new to NSS. There might be a need to pare back to keep it focused in
case this patch goes futher.
>> +/*
>> + * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
>> + * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
>> + * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
>> + *
>> + * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
>> + * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
>> + * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
>> + * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
>> + *
>> + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
>> + *
>> + * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
>> + * private we declare it here rather than including it.
>> + */
>> +NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
>
> Ugh. This is really the way to do this? How do other applications deal
> with this problem?
They either #include <private/pprio.h> or they do it like this (or vendor NSPR
which makes calling private APIs less problematic). It sure is ugly, but there
is no alternative to using this function.
>> +#if defined(WIN32)
>> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
>> +#elif defined(__darwin__)
>> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
>> +#else
>> +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
>> +#endif
>
> There's really no pre-existing handling for this in nss???
NSS_Init does have more or less the above logic (see snippet below), but only
when there is a cert database defined.
/*
* The following code is an attempt to automagically find the external root
* module.
* Note: Keep the #if-defined chunks in order. HPUX must select before UNIX.
*/
static const char *dllname =
#if defined(XP_WIN32) || defined(XP_OS2)
"nssckbi.dll";
#elif defined(HPUX) && !defined(__ia64) /* HP-UX PA-RISC */
"libnssckbi.sl";
#elif defined(DARWIN)
"libnssckbi.dylib";
#elif defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_BEOS)
"libnssckbi.so";
#else
#error "Uh! Oh! I don't know about this platform."
#endif
In the NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB case there is no such handling of the libname provided
by NSS so we need to do that ourselves.
>> + /*
>> + * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
>> + * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
>> + * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
>> + * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
>> + * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
>> + * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
>> + * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
>> + * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
>> + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
>> + *
>> + * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
>> + * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
>> + * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
>> + * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
>> + * details on these.
>> + *
>> + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
>
>> +
>> + if (!nss_context)
>> + {
>> + char *err = pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError());
>> +
>> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
>> + libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
>> + conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
>> + err);
>> + free(err);
>> + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Configure cipher policy.
>> + */
>> + status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
>
> Why is "domestic" the right thing here?
Historically there are three cipher policies in NSS: Domestic, Export and
France. These would enable a set of ciphers based on US export restrictions
(domest/export) or French import restrictions. All ciphers would start
disabled and then the ciphers belonging to the chosen set would be enabled.
Long ago, that was however removed and they now all get enabled by calling
either of these three functions. NSS_SetDomesticPolicy enables all implemented
ciphers, and the other calls just call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy, I guess that API
was kept for backwards compatibility. The below bugzilla entry has a bit more
information on this:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=848384
That being said, the comment in the code did not reflect that, so I've reworded
it hoping it will be clearer now.
>> +
>> + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
>
> Is it actually OK to do stuff like this when other users of NSS might be
> present? That's obviously more likely in the libpq case, compared to the
> backend case (where it's also possible, of course). What prevents us
> from overriding another user's callback?
The password callback pointer is stored in a static variable in NSS (in the
file lib/pk11wrap/pk11auth.c).
>> +ssize_t
>> +pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
>> +{
>> + PRInt32 nread;
>> + PRErrorCode status;
>> + int read_errno = 0;
>> +
>> + nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. Zero
>> + * is returned for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within
>> + * the ongoing connection.
>> + */
>> + if (nread == 0)
>> + {
>> + read_errno = ECONNRESET;
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>
> It's a bit confusing to talk about blocking when the socket presumably
> is in non-blocking mode, and you're also asking to never wait?
Fair enough, I can agree that the wording isn't spot on. The socket is
non-blocking while PR_Recv can block (which is what we ask it not to). I've
reworded and moved the comment around to hopefully make it clearer.
>> + if (nread == -1)
>> + {
>> + status = PR_GetError();
>> +
>> + switch (status)
>> + {
>> + case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
>> + read_errno = EINTR;
>> + break;
>
> Uh, isn't this going to cause a busy-loop by the caller? EINTR isn't the
> same as EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK?
Right, that's clearly not right.
>> + case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
>> + break;
>
> What does this mean? We'll return with a 0 errno here, right? When is
> this case reachable?
It should, AFAICT, only be reachable when PR_Recv is used with a timeout which
we don't do. It mentioned somewhere that it had happened in no-wait calls due
to a bug, but I fail to find that reference now. Either way, I've removed it
to fall into the default error handling which now sets errno correctly as that
was a paddle short here.
> E.g. the comment in fe-misc.c:
> /* pqsecure_read set the error message for us */
> for this case doesn't seem to be fulfilled by this.
Fixed, I hope.
>> +/*
>> + * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
>> + *
>> + * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
>> + */
>> +int
>> +pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
>> + int *names_examined,
>> + char **first_name)
>> +{
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>
> Uh, huh? Certainly doesn't verify anything...
Doh, the verification was done as part of the cert validation callback and I
had missed moving it to the stub. Fixed and also expanded to closer match how
it's done in the OpenSSL implementation.
>> +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
>> +/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
>> +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * TODO: this a 99% copy of the same function in the backend, make these share
>> + * a single implementation instead.
>> + */
>> +static char *
>> +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
>> +{
>> + const char *error;
>> +
>> + error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
>> + if (error)
>> + return strdup(error);
>> +
>> + return strdup("unknown TLS error");
>> +}
>
> Btw, why does this need to duplicate strings, instead of returning a
> const char*?
No, it doesn't, and no longer does.
The attached includes fixes for the above mentioned issues (and a few small
other ones I stumbled across), hopefully without introducing too many new. As
mentioned, I'll perform the split into multiple patches in a separate version
which only performs a split to make it easier to diff the individual patchfile
versions.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] 0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v13.patch (202.6K, ../../907FA7D1-9BD9-464B-A6EC-DEEB53438D36@yesql.se/2-0001-Support-for-NSS-as-a-TLS-backend-v13.patch)
download | inline diff:
From ed0da4793cb211cced0cd8812c648fb63e066bb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 21:03:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Support for NSS as a TLS backend v13
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan
---
configure | 342 ++++-
configure.ac | 50 +-
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 5 +
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 +++++++++++
contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/px.c | 1 +
contrib/pgcrypto/px.h | 1 +
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 164 ++-
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 +-
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 14 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 10 +
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1175 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c | 16 +-
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 141 ++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 13 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 6 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 11 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1018 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 5 +
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 37 +
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 176 +++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 326 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 +
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 29 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
48 files changed, 4618 insertions(+), 286 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ace4ed5dec..412f40b58a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -711,6 +713,7 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_nss
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -857,6 +860,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_nss
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1559,6 +1563,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-nss build with NSS support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -8106,6 +8111,41 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with NSS support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with NSS support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-nss was given.
+if test "${with_nss+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_nss;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-nss option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_nss=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_nss" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_nss" >&6; }
+
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12180,6 +12220,9 @@ fi
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12442,6 +12485,274 @@ done
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously\"" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13344,6 +13655,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18391,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
@@ -18107,6 +18439,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18116,7 +18454,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b91c83fd0..86311946d0 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -861,6 +861,15 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
+#
+# LibNSS
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with NSS support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, nss, no, [build with NSS support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to build with NSS support. (--with-nss)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_nss])
+AC_SUBST(with_nss)
+
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1210,6 +1219,9 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1235,6 +1247,30 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([multiple SSL backends cannot be enabled simultaneously"])
+ fi
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
fi
@@ -1410,6 +1446,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_nss" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2199,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
@@ -2179,13 +2222,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..d0b01cb2cc 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..6c69ee5a6b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,16 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_nss)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_nss)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1291ed403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publically accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
index ed96e4ce53..5ebe213406 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ gen_ossl_encrypt(PX_Cipher *c, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen,
}
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(od->evp_ctx, res, &outlen, data, dlen))
- return PXE_ERR_GENERIC;
+ return PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
index 6a4681dae9..a243f575d3 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const struct error_desc px_err_list[] = {
{PXE_MCRYPT_INTERNAL, "mcrypt internal error"},
{PXE_NO_RANDOM, "Failed to generate strong random bits"},
{PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED, "Decryption failed"},
+ {PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED, "Encryption failed"},
{PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA, "Wrong key or corrupt data"},
{PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_ARMOR, "Corrupt ascii-armor"},
{PXE_PGP_UNSUPPORTED_COMPR, "Unsupported compression algorithm"},
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
index 5487923edb..17d6f22498 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#define PXE_MCRYPT_INTERNAL -16
#define PXE_NO_RANDOM -17
#define PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED -18
+#define PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED -19
#define PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA -100
#define PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_ARMOR -101
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 5ba3988e27..84bb2c65b8 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
-static Datum X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
/*
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -54,9 +57,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_version);
Datum
ssl_version(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *version;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ version = be_tls_get_version(MyProcPort);
+ if (version == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_version(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(version));
}
@@ -67,9 +77,16 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_cipher);
Datum
ssl_cipher(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (MyProcPort->ssl == NULL)
+ const char *cipher;
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(SSL_get_cipher(MyProcPort->ssl)));
+
+ cipher = be_tls_get_cipher(MyProcPort);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(cipher));
}
@@ -83,7 +100,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_cert_present);
Datum
ssl_client_cert_present(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer != NULL);
+ PG_RETURN_BOOL(MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid);
}
@@ -99,29 +116,26 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_serial);
Datum
ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ char decimal[NAMEDATALEN];
Datum result;
- Port *port = MyProcPort;
- X509 *peer = port->peer;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *b;
- char *decimal;
- if (!peer)
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_serial(MyProcPort, decimal, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*decimal)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(peer);
- b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
- decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
- BN_free(b);
result = DirectFunctionCall3(numeric_in,
CStringGetDatum(decimal),
ObjectIdGetDatum(0),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
- OPENSSL_free(decimal);
return result;
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -228,7 +242,7 @@ ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
text *fieldname = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
Datum result;
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
result = X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer), fieldname);
@@ -273,76 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/*
- * Equivalent of X509_NAME_oneline that respects encoding
- *
- * This function converts X509_NAME structure to the text variable
- * converting all textual data into current database encoding.
- *
- * Parameter: X509_NAME *name X509_NAME structure to be converted
- *
- * Returns: text datum which contains string representation of
- * X509_NAME
- */
-static Datum
-X509_NAME_to_text(X509_NAME *name)
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- BIO *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- int i,
- nid,
- count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
- ASN1_STRING *v;
- const char *field_name;
- size_t size;
- char nullterm;
- char *sp;
- char *dp;
- text *result;
-
- if (membuf == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
- errmsg("could not create OpenSSL BIO structure")));
-
- (void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
- v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
- field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
- if (field_name == NULL)
- ereport(ERROR,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
- errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
- BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
- ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
- ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
- | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
- }
-
- /* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
- nullterm = '\0';
- BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
- size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
- dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
- result = cstring_to_text(dp);
- if (dp != sp)
- pfree(dp);
- if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
- elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
- PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(result);
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
@@ -358,9 +319,17 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn);
Datum
ssl_client_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char subject[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(MyProcPort, subject, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*subject)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_subject_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(subject));
}
@@ -377,12 +346,21 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_dn);
Datum
ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
- if (!(MyProcPort->peer))
+ char issuer[NAMEDATALEN];
+
+ if (!MyProcPort->ssl_in_use || !MyProcPort->peer_cert_valid)
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+
+ be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(MyProcPort, issuer, NAMEDATALEN);
+
+ if (!*issuer)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
- return X509_NAME_to_text(X509_get_issuer_name(MyProcPort->peer));
+
+ PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(issuer));
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -516,3 +494,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index f043433e31..f7ae3b1be1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 9ce32fb39b..61d9082052 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..fe7e305b75 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index e16f61b41d..253bb697af 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
<listitem>
<para>
Returns the name of the protocol used for the SSL connection (e.g., TLSv1.0
- TLSv1.1, or TLSv1.2).
+ TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..8946fa696a 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_nss = @with_nss@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
@@ -232,6 +233,15 @@ CLANG = @CLANG@
BITCODE_CFLAGS = @BITCODE_CFLAGS@
BITCODE_CXXFLAGS = @BITCODE_CXXFLAGS@
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+with_ssl = yes
+else
+with_ssl = no
+endif
+
+
##########################################################################
#
# Programs and flags
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..191266a426 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_nss),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index d132c5cb48..d476101583 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b184be3d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here aswell in that we can
+ * error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this
+ * is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too coarsely
+ * grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigSecureServer(model, server_cert, private_key, kt_rsa);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure secure server: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might
+ * as well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the the
+ * peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
index 8b21ff4065..5962cffc0c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -1298,15 +1298,28 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
char *dp;
char *result;
+ if (membuf == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("failed to create BIO")));
+
(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not get NID for ASN1_OBJECT object")));
v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (!field_name)
field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+ if (field_name == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+ errmsg("could not convert NID %d to an ASN1_OBJECT structure", nid)));
BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
@@ -1322,7 +1335,8 @@ X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
result = pstrdup(dp);
if (dp != sp)
pfree(dp);
- BIO_free(membuf);
+ if (BIO_free(membuf) != 1)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not free OpenSSL BIO structure");
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 4c86fb6087..8821c60a34 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index a62d64eaa4..050f673c68 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9205f0fc3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..b68ef64ec9 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,12 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..7b396d04af 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,9 +45,13 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
@@ -57,6 +61,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-gssapi.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_nss), yes)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index b0ca37c2ed..a15a89c50c 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..395147f551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1018 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
+ * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
+ * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
+ * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
+ * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
+ * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+static bool has_password = false;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+ }
+ else
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to %s certificate database: %s"),
+ conn->cert_database ? "open" : "create",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ default:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..dd6ee15c5a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..12717ca720 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database;
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,10 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 14e8382cd8..33af92a60b 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,20 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -158,6 +172,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index 9774f534d9..a09c350939 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..4af971ef77 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_nss
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +31,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +64,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +95,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +126,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d $@ -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +209,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d $@ -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +237,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +277,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +322,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..ff9c8ae3f3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..b50659e568 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..1261d21861 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_nss} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..d6aefbfcbf 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -428,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-10-27 20:18 ` Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Heikki Linnakangas @ 2020-10-27 20:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; +Cc: Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On 27/10/2020 22:07, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> /*
> * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
> * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
> * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
> * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
> * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
> * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
> */
> static bool has_password = false;
This is set in PQssl_passwd_cb function, but never reset. That seems
wrong. The NSS database used in one connection might have a password,
while another one might not. Or have I completely misunderstood this?
- Heikki
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
@ 2020-11-04 13:09 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-11-04 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; +Cc: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 27 Oct 2020, at 21:18, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote:
>
> On 27/10/2020 22:07, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> /*
>> * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no API
>> * function for retrieving password status, so we simply flip this to true in
>> * case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only happen in case
>> * there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that there are calls
>> * which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the callbacks provided,
>> * so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
>> */
>> static bool has_password = false;
>
> This is set in PQssl_passwd_cb function, but never reset. That seems wrong. The NSS database used in one connection might have a password, while another one might not. Or have I completely misunderstood this?
(sorry for slow response). You are absolutely right, the has_password flag
must be tracked per connection in PGconn. The attached v17 implements this as
well a frontend bugfix which caused dropped connections and some smaller fixups
to make strings more translateable.
I've also included a WIP version of SCRAM channel binding in the attached
patch, it's currently failing to connect but someone here might spot the bug
before I do so I figured it's better to include it.
The 0005 patch is now, thanks to the sslinfo patch going in on master, only
containing NSS specific code.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v17-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (109.4K, ../../02260088-E0C9-49A2-ACD3-CE51D65A84E3@yesql.se/2-v17-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From c0179ee27513ef22b828680590d84149bca7c2d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v17 1/5] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
---
configure | 401 +++++-
configure.ac | 60 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1228 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1080 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 18 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3035 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ace4ed5dec..6287a0e2fe 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -711,7 +714,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -856,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -868,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -1558,7 +1561,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1572,6 +1574,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8075,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12148,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12466,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_VersionRangeSet in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_VersionRangeSet ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_SSL_VersionRangeSet" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13625,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13642,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18378,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b91c83fd0..706c9862e7 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1405,11 +1434,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2192,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index d132c5cb48..d476101583 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..755c7c5219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1228 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the connection cache for multi-processing application behavior.
+ * If we are in ServerStart then we initialize the cache. If the server is
+ * already started, we inherit the cache such that it can be used for
+ * connections. Calling SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache sets an environment
+ * variable which contains enough information for the forked child to know
+ * how to access it. Passing NULL to SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache will
+ * make the forked child look it up by the default name SSL_INHERITANCE,
+ * if env vars aren't inherited then the contents of the variable can be
+ * passed instead.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 and SSLv3 are disabled in this TLS backend, but when setting
+ * up the required session cache for NSS we still must supply timeout
+ * values for v2 and The minimum allowed value for both is 5 seconds,
+ * so opt for that in both cases (the defaults being 100 seconds and
+ * 24 hours).
+ *
+ * Passing NULL as the directory for the session cache will default to
+ * using /tmp on UNIX and \\temp on Windows. Deciding if we want to
+ * keep closer control on this directory is left as a TODO.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(MaxConnections, 5, 5, NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to set up TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(NULL);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here aswell in that we can
+ * error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this
+ * is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too coarsely
+ * grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ /* Set sha-256 as a default */
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pstrdup((char *) digest.data);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might
+ * as well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the the
+ * peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 3a78d2043e..eb1b028464 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index a62d64eaa4..050f673c68 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 25c55bd642..614f93af09 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
sha2_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26c767c391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..74f88b628e 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -282,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..e902f38c8e 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index e7781d010f..8188401659 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbddba8083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1080 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_strdup((char *) digest.data);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..dd6ee15c5a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..5d9326490a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,21 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that
+ * there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the
+ * callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -755,7 +771,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..29879b51af 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v17-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (49.5K, ../../02260088-E0C9-49A2-ACD3-CE51D65A84E3@yesql.se/3-v17-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 7e7a6356eb05ac03256d8f8cb5e93607e1bcd1e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v17 2/5] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 177 +++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 328 ++++++++++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 8 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 ++++-
10 files changed, 611 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index 14cde4f5ba..1b6876ca18 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index a6d2ffbf9e..6e6ca97d95 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..3e0ac72a06 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +63,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +94,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +125,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +208,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +236,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +276,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +321,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..b4d4483fb0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..dce18424ab 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,12 +11,16 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ plan skip_all => 'channel binding not supported with NSS';
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v17-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (4.1K, ../../02260088-E0C9-49A2-ACD3-CE51D65A84E3@yesql.se/4-v17-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 9d0a331d7f6aa5f9a07ca050a201a7c9170cde7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v17 3/5] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 8 +++++++-
configure.ac | 5 ++++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 6287a0e2fe..f78772bd42 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18426,6 +18426,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18435,7 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 706c9862e7..01c23356ab 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2215,13 +2215,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 31f808398c..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -896,6 +896,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 14e8382cd8..33af92a60b 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,20 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -158,6 +172,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v17-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (14.2K, ../../02260088-E0C9-49A2-ACD3-CE51D65A84E3@yesql.se/5-v17-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 40d18b8072cf278134f1478aec66a39cbef22201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v17 4/5] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index f043433e31..f7ae3b1be1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 9ce32fb39b..61d9082052 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..fe7e305b75 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v17-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../02260088-E0C9-49A2-ACD3-CE51D65A84E3@yesql.se/6-v17-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 358a594e87ac5cac67d7943832ef7f84459200b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v17 5/5] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..28b54d321b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1291ed403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publically accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 29879b51af..379f861a56 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -442,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -474,6 +479,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-11-06 20:37 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-06 20:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 4, 2020, at 5:09 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
> (sorry for slow response). You are absolutely right, the has_password flag
> must be tracked per connection in PGconn. The attached v17 implements this as
> well a frontend bugfix which caused dropped connections and some smaller fixups
> to make strings more translateable.
Some initial notes from building and testing on macOS Mojave. I'm working with
both a brew-packaged NSS/NSPR (which includes basic nss-/nspr-config) and a
hand-built NSS/NSPR (which does not).
1. In configure.ac:
> + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
> + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
> +
> + AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
Looks like SSL_VersionRangeSet is part of libssl3, not libnss3. So this fails
with the hand-built stack, where there is no nss-config to populate LDFLAGS. I
changed the function to NSS_InitContext and that seems to work nicely.
2. Among the things to eventually think about when it comes to configuring, it
looks like some platforms [1] install the headers under <nspr4/...> and
<nss3/...> instead of <nspr/...> and <nss/...>. It's unfortunate that the NSS
maintainers never chose an official installation layout.
3. I need two more `#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT` guards added in both
src/include/common/pg_nss.h
src/port/pg_strong_random.c
before the tree will compile for me. Both of those files include NSS headers.
4. be_tls_init() refuses to run correctly for me; I end up getting an NSPR
assertion that looks like
sslMutex_Init not implemented for multi-process applications !
With assertions disabled, this ends up showing a somewhat unhelpful
FATAL: unable to set up TLS connection cache: security library failure. (SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)
It looks like cross-process locking isn't actually enabled on macOS, which is a
long-standing bug in NSPR [2, 3]. So calls to SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache()
error out.
--Jacob
[1] https://github.com/erthink/ReOpenLDAP/issues/112
[2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=538680
[3] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1192500
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-06 23:11 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-11-06 23:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 6 Nov 2020, at 21:37, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> Some initial notes from building and testing on macOS Mojave. I'm working with
> both a brew-packaged NSS/NSPR (which includes basic nss-/nspr-config) and a
> hand-built NSS/NSPR (which does not).
Thanks for looking!
> 1. In configure.ac:
>
>> + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
>> + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
>> +
>> + AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, SSL_VersionRangeSet, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
>
> Looks like SSL_VersionRangeSet is part of libssl3, not libnss3. So this fails
> with the hand-built stack, where there is no nss-config to populate LDFLAGS. I
> changed the function to NSS_InitContext and that seems to work nicely.
Ah yes, fixed.
> 2. Among the things to eventually think about when it comes to configuring, it
> looks like some platforms [1] install the headers under <nspr4/...> and
> <nss3/...> instead of <nspr/...> and <nss/...>. It's unfortunate that the NSS
> maintainers never chose an official installation layout.
Yeah, maybe we need to start with the most common path and have fallbacks in
case not found?
> 3. I need two more `#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT` guards added in both
>
> src/include/common/pg_nss.h
> src/port/pg_strong_random.c
>
> before the tree will compile for me. Both of those files include NSS headers.
Odd that I was able to compile on Linux, but I've added these.
> 4. be_tls_init() refuses to run correctly for me; I end up getting an NSPR
> assertion that looks like
>
> sslMutex_Init not implemented for multi-process applications !
>
> With assertions disabled, this ends up showing a somewhat unhelpful
>
> FATAL: unable to set up TLS connection cache: security library failure. (SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE)
>
> It looks like cross-process locking isn't actually enabled on macOS, which is a
> long-standing bug in NSPR [2, 3]. So calls to SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache()
> error out.
Thats unfortunate since the session cache is required for a server application
backed by NSS. The attached switches to SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt
with which one can explicitly make the cache non-shared, which in turn backs
the mutexes with NSPR locks rather than the missing sem_init. Can you test
this version and see if that makes it work?
This version also contains a channel binding bug that Heikki pointed out off-
list (sadly not The bug) and a few very minor cleanups as well as a rebase to
handle the new pg_strong_random_init. Actually performing the context init
there is yet a TODO, but I wanted a version out that at all compiled.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v18-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (108.1K, ../../F16F003C-EAFB-4FCA-9880-3D5E2B428F78@yesql.se/2-v18-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0d9f8f0427880c489890bbef813bd012b9c438c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v18 1/5] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
---
configure | 401 +++++-
configure.ac | 60 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1193 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1081 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 18 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3001 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ace4ed5dec..d99ec29c6a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -711,7 +714,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -856,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -868,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -1558,7 +1561,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1572,6 +1574,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8075,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12148,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12466,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13625,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13642,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18378,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b91c83fd0..7b9f4b10a3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1405,11 +1434,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2192,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index d132c5cb48..d476101583 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..86ac400782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1193 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we wont allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here aswell in that we can
+ * error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if this
+ * is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too coarsely
+ * grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ /* Set sha-256 as a default */
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might
+ * as well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the the
+ * peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 3a78d2043e..eb1b028464 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index a62d64eaa4..050f673c68 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 25c55bd642..614f93af09 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
sha2_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..74f88b628e 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -282,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..e902f38c8e 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index e7781d010f..8188401659 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3090f37f5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1081 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv wont block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we dont want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..dd6ee15c5a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..5d9326490a 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,21 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is that
+ * there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't use the
+ * callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -755,7 +771,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..29879b51af 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index bc8904732f..ac11d9ab26 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1004,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v18-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (49.5K, ../../F16F003C-EAFB-4FCA-9880-3D5E2B428F78@yesql.se/3-v18-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0d4c82bf4824183ac88345c0005b9f96e1812780 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v18 2/5] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 177 +++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 328 ++++++++++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 8 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 ++++-
10 files changed, 611 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index 14cde4f5ba..1b6876ca18 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index a6d2ffbf9e..6e6ca97d95 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..3e0ac72a06 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimick the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +63,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +94,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +125,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +208,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +236,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +276,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +321,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..b4d4483fb0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesnt work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 20ab0d5b0b..dce18424ab 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,12 +11,16 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ plan skip_all => 'channel binding not supported with NSS';
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v18-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (4.4K, ../../F16F003C-EAFB-4FCA-9880-3D5E2B428F78@yesql.se/4-v18-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 811174d7304c6151ad5678d766f0c67c7a8a8a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v18 3/5] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 8 +++++++-
configure.ac | 5 ++++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index d99ec29c6a..c15f8953ee 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18426,6 +18426,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18435,7 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 7b9f4b10a3..01b0ff98b3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2215,13 +2215,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 31f808398c..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -896,6 +896,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 6d85f50b7c..ed7be98212 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -114,6 +129,8 @@ pg_strong_random_init(void)
#elif defined(USE_DEV_URANDOM)
/* no initialization needed for /dev/urandom */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ /* TODO: set up NSS context here */
#else
#error no source of random numbers configured
#endif
@@ -202,6 +219,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v18-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (14.2K, ../../F16F003C-EAFB-4FCA-9880-3D5E2B428F78@yesql.se/5-v18-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 84a4c02e323139da0adef3113f16bd36ac5d3364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v18 4/5] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index f043433e31..f7ae3b1be1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 9ce32fb39b..61d9082052 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..fe7e305b75 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The paramaters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v18-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../F16F003C-EAFB-4FCA-9880-3D5E2B428F78@yesql.se/6-v18-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 020e18ab567f11d41314659d8bbd9c34ff760c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v18 5/5] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..28b54d321b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1291ed403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publically accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 29879b51af..379f861a56 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -442,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -474,6 +479,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-11-10 20:11 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-10 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 6, 2020, at 3:11 PM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
> The attached switches to SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt
> with which one can explicitly make the cache non-shared, which in turn backs
> the mutexes with NSPR locks rather than the missing sem_init. Can you test
> this version and see if that makes it work?
Yep, I get much farther through the tests with that patch. I'm currently
diving into another assertion failure during socket disconnection:
Assertion failure: fd->secret == NULL, at prlayer.c:45
cURL has some ominously vague references to this [1], though I'm not
sure that we should work around it in the same way without knowing what
the cause is...
--Jacob
[1] https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/4d2f800/lib/vtls/nss.c#L1266
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-10 22:28 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-11-10 22:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 10 Nov 2020, at 21:11, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> On Nov 6, 2020, at 3:11 PM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>> The attached switches to SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt
>> with which one can explicitly make the cache non-shared, which in turn backs
>> the mutexes with NSPR locks rather than the missing sem_init. Can you test
>> this version and see if that makes it work?
>
> Yep, I get much farther through the tests with that patch.
Great, thanks for confirming.
> I'm currently
> diving into another assertion failure during socket disconnection:
>
> Assertion failure: fd->secret == NULL, at prlayer.c:45
>
> cURL has some ominously vague references to this [1], though I'm not
> sure that we should work around it in the same way without knowing what
> the cause is...
Digging through the archives from when this landed in curl, the assertion
failure was never fully identified back then but happened spuriously. Which
version of NSPR is this happening with?
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-11-11 18:17 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-11 18:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 10, 2020, at 2:28 PM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
> Digging through the archives from when this landed in curl, the assertion
> failure was never fully identified back then but happened spuriously. Which
> version of NSPR is this happening with?
This is NSPR 4.29, with debugging enabled. The fd that causes the
assertion is the custom layer that's added during be_tls_open_server(),
which connects a Port as the layer secret. It looks like NSPR is trying
to help surface potential memory leaks by asserting if the secret is
non-NULL at the time the stack is being closed.
In this case, it doesn't matter since the Port lifetime is managed
elsewhere, but it looks easy enough to add a custom close in the way
that cURL and the NSPR test programs [1] do. Sample patch attached,
which gets me to the end of the tests without any assertions. (Two
failures left on my machine.)
--Jacob
[1] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nspr/file/bf6620c143/pr/tests/nblayer.c#l354
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] patch (1.9K, ../../5C27CF6F-5BD3-4639-AAA6-73465595B6DF@vmware.com/2-patch)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-11 18:57 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-11 18:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 11, 2020, at 10:17 AM, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> (Two failures left on my machine.)
False alarm -- the stderr debugging I'd added in to track down the
assertion tripped up the "no stderr" tests. Zero failing tests now.
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-12 22:12 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-12 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 11, 2020, at 10:57 AM, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> False alarm -- the stderr debugging I'd added in to track down the
> assertion tripped up the "no stderr" tests. Zero failing tests now.
I took a look at the OpenSSL interop problems you mentioned upthread. I
don't see a hang like you did, but I do see a PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR during
connection.
I think pgtls_read() needs to treat PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR as if no bytes
were read, in order to satisfy its API. There was some discussion on
this upthread:
On Oct 27, 2020, at 1:07 PM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
> On 20 Oct 2020, at 21:15, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>>
>>> + case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
>>> + break;
>>
>> What does this mean? We'll return with a 0 errno here, right? When is
>> this case reachable?
>
> It should, AFAICT, only be reachable when PR_Recv is used with a timeout which
> we don't do. It mentioned somewhere that it had happened in no-wait calls due
> to a bug, but I fail to find that reference now. Either way, I've removed it
> to fall into the default error handling which now sets errno correctly as that
> was a paddle short here.
PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR is definitely returned in no-wait calls on my
machine. It doesn't look like the PR_Recv() API has a choice -- if
there's no data, it can't return a positive integer, and returning zero
means that the socket has been disconnected. So -1 with a timeout error
is the only option.
I'm not completely sure why this is exposed so easily with an OpenSSL
server -- I'm guessing the implementation slices up its packets
differently on the wire, causing a read event before NSS is able to
decrypt a full record -- but it's worth noting that this case also shows
up during NSS-to-NSS psql connections, when handling notifications at
the end of every query. PQconsumeInput() reports a hard failure with the
current implementation, but its return value is ignored by
PrintNotifications(). Otherwise this probably would have showed up
earlier.
(What's the best way to test this case? Are there lower-level tests for
the protocol/network layer somewhere that I'm missing?)
While patching this case, I also noticed that pgtls_read() doesn't call
SOCK_ERRNO_SET() for the disconnection case. That is also in the
attached patch.
--Jacob
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] nss-handle-timeouts-and-disconnections-in-pgtls_read.patch (2.0K, ../../FBA0C365-3B19-4E40-98F4-8B0064DB7127@vmware.com/2-nss-handle-timeouts-and-disconnections-in-pgtls_read.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4bc5dc61e8be490b013be5f9b3326faae2dc99c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 12:02:39 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] nss: handle timeouts and disconnections in pgtls_read
PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR was being treated as a hard error, but since we're
explicitly asking PR_Recv() not to wait, we want to treat it as "zero
bytes read" instead.
This case happens relatively often in psql, during PQconsumeInput() --
but the return value of PQconsumeInput() is being ignored during
notification handling, which masks the problem. This also seems to fix
interoperability with OpenSSL servers on my machine, possibly due to
differences in message fragmentation between the implementations?
Also ensure that SOCK_ERRNO_SET() is called in the disconnection case;
read_errno was being set but not used.
---
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
index 3090f37f5e..8fc8e138e2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -429,15 +429,19 @@ pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
if (nread == 0)
{
read_errno = ECONNRESET;
- return -1;
+ nread = -1;
}
-
- if (nread == -1)
+ else if (nread == -1)
{
status = PR_GetError();
switch (status)
{
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
break;
@@ -456,9 +460,12 @@ pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
break;
}
- printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
- libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
- pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
}
SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-13 12:14 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-11-13 12:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 12 Nov 2020, at 23:12, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Nov 11, 2020, at 10:57 AM, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>>
>> False alarm -- the stderr debugging I'd added in to track down the
>> assertion tripped up the "no stderr" tests. Zero failing tests now.
>
> I took a look at the OpenSSL interop problems you mentioned upthread.
Great, thanks!
> I don't see a hang like you did, but I do see a PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR during
> connection.
>
> I think pgtls_read() needs to treat PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR as if no bytes
> were read, in order to satisfy its API. There was some discussion on
> this upthread:
>
> On Oct 27, 2020, at 1:07 PM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>>
>> On 20 Oct 2020, at 21:15, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>>>
>>>> + case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
>>>> + break;
>>>
>>> What does this mean? We'll return with a 0 errno here, right? When is
>>> this case reachable?
>>
>> It should, AFAICT, only be reachable when PR_Recv is used with a timeout which
>> we don't do. It mentioned somewhere that it had happened in no-wait calls due
>> to a bug, but I fail to find that reference now. Either way, I've removed it
>> to fall into the default error handling which now sets errno correctly as that
>> was a paddle short here.
>
> PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR is definitely returned in no-wait calls on my
> machine. It doesn't look like the PR_Recv() API has a choice -- if
> there's no data, it can't return a positive integer, and returning zero
> means that the socket has been disconnected. So -1 with a timeout error
> is the only option.
Right, that makes sense.
> I'm not completely sure why this is exposed so easily with an OpenSSL
> server -- I'm guessing the implementation slices up its packets
> differently on the wire, causing a read event before NSS is able to
> decrypt a full record -- but it's worth noting that this case also shows
> up during NSS-to-NSS psql connections, when handling notifications at
> the end of every query. PQconsumeInput() reports a hard failure with the
> current implementation, but its return value is ignored by
> PrintNotifications(). Otherwise this probably would have showed up
> earlier.
Should there perhaps be an Assert there to catch those?
> (What's the best way to test this case? Are there lower-level tests for
> the protocol/network layer somewhere that I'm missing?)
Not AFAIK. Having been knee-deep now, do you have any ideas on how to
implement?
> While patching this case, I also noticed that pgtls_read() doesn't call
> SOCK_ERRNO_SET() for the disconnection case. That is also in the
> attached patch.
Ah yes, nice catch.
I've incorporated this patch as well as the previous patch for the assertion
failure on private callback data into the attached v19 patchset. I also did a
spellcheck and pgindent run on it for ease of review.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v19-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (108.6K, ../../7B5A88DF-863A-4B00-B841-0285C1FF70DF@yesql.se/2-v19-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 23f76c228f54c962a51d176d132207f0ad50e644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v19 1/5] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 401 +++++-
configure.ac | 60 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1207 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1089 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3025 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ace4ed5dec..d99ec29c6a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -711,7 +714,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -856,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -868,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -1558,7 +1561,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1572,6 +1574,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8075,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12148,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12466,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13625,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13642,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18378,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b91c83fd0..7b9f4b10a3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1405,11 +1434,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2192,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index d132c5cb48..d476101583 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e7540c4756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1207 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc * fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ /* Set sha-256 as a default */
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the the peer
+ * CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 3a78d2043e..eb1b028464 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index bb34630e8e..a1a36cb5e2 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 25c55bd642..614f93af09 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
sha2_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..74f88b628e 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -282,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..e902f38c8e 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index e7781d010f..8188401659 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..787bc140a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1089 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+
+ while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
+ digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've the the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..ff3b7c2aa6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..96d7f3f534 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -755,7 +773,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..29879b51af 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 17e480546c..be6df4758a 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1002,6 +1007,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v19-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (49.5K, ../../7B5A88DF-863A-4B00-B841-0285C1FF70DF@yesql.se/3-v19-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d6ac537d3d6e629d9ee5d9ec5ddc7534032195bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v19 2/5] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 177 +++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 328 ++++++++++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 8 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 ++++-
10 files changed, 611 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index 14cde4f5ba..1b6876ca18 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index a6d2ffbf9e..6e6ca97d95 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..21a654b8a9 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +63,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +94,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +125,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +208,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +236,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +276,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +321,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..7593d45877 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|could not connect to server/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN/,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..7ed7c3b5ec 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,12 +11,16 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ plan skip_all => 'channel binding not supported with NSS';
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v19-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (4.4K, ../../7B5A88DF-863A-4B00-B841-0285C1FF70DF@yesql.se/4-v19-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 2a534c2fe3ed673132fd8577c5c5e84583135924 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v19 3/5] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 8 +++++++-
configure.ac | 5 ++++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index d99ec29c6a..c15f8953ee 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18426,6 +18426,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18435,7 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 7b9f4b10a3..01b0ff98b3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2215,13 +2215,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 31f808398c..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -896,6 +896,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 6d85f50b7c..99c1d17e9a 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -114,6 +129,8 @@ pg_strong_random_init(void)
#elif defined(USE_DEV_URANDOM)
/* no initialization needed for /dev/urandom */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ /* TODO: set up NSS context here */
#else
#error no source of random numbers configured
#endif
@@ -202,6 +219,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v19-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (14.2K, ../../7B5A88DF-863A-4B00-B841-0285C1FF70DF@yesql.se/5-v19-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From a7944b4896ad3461f8d866e514ba8c38e9b18690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v19 4/5] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index f043433e31..f7ae3b1be1 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 73c6a6ea4d..e420ced087 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..daa99cea74 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v19-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../7B5A88DF-863A-4B00-B841-0285C1FF70DF@yesql.se/6-v19-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From b0c1a7ad03c4868e4f324c5bc72c4600a7392efb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v19 5/5] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..28b54d321b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 29879b51af..379f861a56 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -442,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -474,6 +479,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-11-16 20:00 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-11-16 20:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 13, 2020, at 4:14 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>> On 12 Nov 2020, at 23:12, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>>
>> I'm not completely sure why this is exposed so easily with an OpenSSL
>> server -- I'm guessing the implementation slices up its packets
>> differently on the wire, causing a read event before NSS is able to
>> decrypt a full record -- but it's worth noting that this case also shows
>> up during NSS-to-NSS psql connections, when handling notifications at
>> the end of every query. PQconsumeInput() reports a hard failure with the
>> current implementation, but its return value is ignored by
>> PrintNotifications(). Otherwise this probably would have showed up
>> earlier.
>
> Should there perhaps be an Assert there to catch those?
Hm. From the perspective of helping developers out, perhaps, but from
the standpoint of "don't crash when an endpoint outside our control does
something strange", I think that's a harder sell. Should the error be
bubbled all the way up instead? Or perhaps, if psql isn't supposed to
treat notification errors as "hard" failures, it should at least warn
the user that something is fishy?
>> (What's the best way to test this case? Are there lower-level tests for
>> the protocol/network layer somewhere that I'm missing?)
>
> Not AFAIK. Having been knee-deep now, do you have any ideas on how to
> implement?
I think that testing these sorts of important edge cases needs a
friendly DSL -- something that doesn't want to make devs tear their hair
out while building tests. I've been playing a little bit with Scapy [1]
to understand more of the libpq v3 protocol; I'll see if that can be
adapted for pieces of the TLS handshake in a way that's easy to
maintain. If it can be, maybe that'd be a good starting example.
> I've incorporated this patch as well as the previous patch for the assertion
> failure on private callback data into the attached v19 patchset. I also did a
> spellcheck and pgindent run on it for ease of review.
Commit 6be725e70 got rid of some psql error messaging that the tests
were keying off of, so there are a few new failures after a rebase onto
latest master.
I've attached a patch that gets the SCRAM tests a little further
(certificate hashing was caught in an infinite loop). I also added error
checks to those loops, along the lines of the existing OpenSSL
implementation: if a suitable digest can't be found, the user will see
an error like
psql: error: could not find digest for OID 'PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA Encryption'
It's a little verbose but I don't think this case should come up in
normal practice.
--Jacob
[1] https://scapy.net/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] nss-fix-hang-when-hashing-certificates.patch (3.2K, ../../5F24348B-10BA-4AA1-999B-1E2AB22B4997@vmware.com/2-nss-fix-hang-when-hashing-certificates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 2f1d58f9c376429ca3ff84d0489824603d2bcd52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 08:55:33 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] nss: fix hang when hashing certificates
---
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
index e7540c4756..b1982ee596 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -813,6 +813,7 @@ be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
SECOidTag signature_alg;
SECOidTag digest_alg;
int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
SECStatus status;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECItem digest;
@@ -824,20 +825,24 @@ be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
return NULL;
signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
- /* Set sha-256 as a default */
- digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
- digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
- while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
{
- if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
{
- digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
- digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
break;
}
+
+ candidate++;
}
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
digest.len = digest_len;
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
index 787bc140a6..2f10e94f72 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
SECOidTag signature_alg;
SECOidTag digest_alg;
int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
PLArenaPool *arena;
SECItem digest;
char *ret;
@@ -552,17 +553,26 @@ pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
return NULL;
signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
- digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
- digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
- while (NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
{
- if (signature_alg == NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->signature)
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
{
- digest_alg = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->hash;
- digest_len = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm->len;
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
break;
}
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2020-11-17 15:00 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-12-04 00:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2020-11-17 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 16 Nov 2020, at 21:00, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> On Nov 13, 2020, at 4:14 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>> I've incorporated this patch as well as the previous patch for the assertion
>> failure on private callback data into the attached v19 patchset. I also did a
>> spellcheck and pgindent run on it for ease of review.
>
> Commit 6be725e70 got rid of some psql error messaging that the tests
> were keying off of, so there are a few new failures after a rebase onto
> latest master.
>
> I've attached a patch that gets the SCRAM tests a little further
> (certificate hashing was caught in an infinite loop). I also added error
> checks to those loops, along the lines of the existing OpenSSL
> implementation: if a suitable digest can't be found, the user will see
> an error like
>
> psql: error: could not find digest for OID 'PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA Encryption'
>
> It's a little verbose but I don't think this case should come up in
> normal practice.
Nice, thanks for the fix! I've incorporated your patch into the attached v20
which also fixes client side error reporting to be more readable. The SCRAM
tests are now also hooked up, albeit with SKIP blocks for NSS, so they can
start getting fixed.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v20-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (109.1K, ../../94E22878-6289-43D5-A674-804F6CB23782@yesql.se/2-v20-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From af799b72951a9dca3823bbd496af86b026fa3978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v20 1/5] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 401 +++++-
configure.ac | 60 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1211 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1105 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3045 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ace4ed5dec..d99ec29c6a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -711,7 +714,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -856,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -868,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -1558,7 +1561,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1572,6 +1574,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8075,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12148,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12466,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13625,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13642,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18061,11 +18378,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 5b91c83fd0..7b9f4b10a3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1405,11 +1434,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2158,11 +2192,13 @@ fi
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
-if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
- if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"" ; then
+ if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = "win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
+ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ USE_NSS_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 2d88d06358..984efc0d7e 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8911,7 +8911,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index d132c5cb48..d476101583 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2870,7 +2870,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54d4047cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1211 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc * fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 2ae507a902..f39977b80c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 3a78d2043e..eb1b028464 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index bb34630e8e..a1a36cb5e2 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4262,7 +4262,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4320,6 +4324,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4348,8 +4364,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 25c55bd642..614f93af09 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
sha2_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 0a23281ad5..74f88b628e 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -192,13 +192,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -282,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -292,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b1152475ac..298d87ecae 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index fb270df678..31f808398c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -893,6 +893,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 705dc69c06..c28b84126d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index 4ac5f4b340..e902f38c8e 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index e7781d010f..8188401659 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53ac06de27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1105 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 97c3805303..ff3b7c2aa6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 3b6a9fbce3..27c16e187f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 1de91ae295..96d7f3f534 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -755,7 +773,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90594bd41b..29879b51af 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -255,12 +262,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 17e480546c..be6df4758a 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -537,6 +538,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1002,6 +1007,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v20-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (53.5K, ../../94E22878-6289-43D5-A674-804F6CB23782@yesql.se/3-v20-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 78c1cf721cce7bc2291d061e4af6dc9eccf58fd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v20 2/5] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 177 +++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 328 ++++++++++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 97 ++++--
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 64 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 ++++-
10 files changed, 664 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index 14cde4f5ba..1b6876ca18 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index a6d2ffbf9e..6e6ca97d95 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 777ee39413..21a654b8a9 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,32 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +63,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +94,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +125,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +208,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +236,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +276,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -151,9 +321,14 @@ ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..5f75d4937d 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 98;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,21 +398,21 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +439,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +515,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +540,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +558,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +584,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..cf5714e544 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,24 +11,39 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+else
+{
+ if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+ {
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+ }
+ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+ {
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 8;
+ }
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,20 +81,25 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
-{
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-}
-else
+
+SKIP:
{
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
+ if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
+ {
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -89,20 +109,21 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
-# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
-# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
-# is chosen here to be unique.
-my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
-copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
-chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
-test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
-# clean up
-unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+ # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+ # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+ # is chosen here to be unique.
+ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+ copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+ chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+ # clean up
+ unlink($client_tmp_key);
+}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..837f0d9891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v20-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (4.4K, ../../94E22878-6289-43D5-A674-804F6CB23782@yesql.se/4-v20-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 493e16351ce5c796b367457b0e40efd1d19885ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v20 3/5] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 8 +++++++-
configure.ac | 5 ++++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index d99ec29c6a..c15f8953ee 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18426,6 +18426,12 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
@@ -18435,7 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 7b9f4b10a3..01b0ff98b3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2215,13 +2215,16 @@ if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+elif test x"$USE_NSS_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_NSS_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use NSS for random number generation])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, Windows native RNG or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 31f808398c..73c39b449c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -896,6 +896,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 6d85f50b7c..99c1d17e9a 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
#include <wincrypt.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
#ifdef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/*
@@ -114,6 +129,8 @@ pg_strong_random_init(void)
#elif defined(USE_DEV_URANDOM)
/* no initialization needed for /dev/urandom */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ /* TODO: set up NSS context here */
#else
#error no source of random numbers configured
#endif
@@ -202,6 +219,29 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
}
return false;
+#elif defined(USE_NSS_RANDOM)
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v20-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (14.2K, ../../94E22878-6289-43D5-A674-804F6CB23782@yesql.se/5-v20-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3f0a4467f48afd730e971e4da2098dc5033a2188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v20 4/5] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 27 ++++++++++--
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..4f6f0cf353 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index a632cf98ba..1a6d4a36bf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1208,6 +1208,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1224,7 +1241,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1426,8 +1445,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 9d4b6ab4a8..bd570deb44 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2482,9 +2484,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2511,6 +2518,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7943,6 +7954,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7969,6 +7985,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c..daa99cea74 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2550,6 +2581,45 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v20-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../94E22878-6289-43D5-A674-804F6CB23782@yesql.se/6-v20-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From fc7bbc41e50f8c0ff49bea998c5e53f421382071 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v20 5/5] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 61eabd2fc0..28b54d321b 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 8748c64e2d..f03e1f5fcf 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1168,14 +1169,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1183,51 +1186,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1240,7 +1259,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 29879b51af..379f861a56 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -442,9 +442,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -474,6 +479,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2020-12-04 00:57 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-19 20:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2020-12-04 00:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Nov 17, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
> Nice, thanks for the fix! I've incorporated your patch into the attached v20
> which also fixes client side error reporting to be more readable.
I was testing handshake failure modes and noticed that some FATAL
messages are being sent through to the client in cleartext. The OpenSSL
implementation doesn't do this, because it logs handshake problems at
COMMERROR level. Should we switch all those ereport() calls in the NSS
be_tls_open_server() to COMMERROR as well (and return explicitly), to
avoid this? Or was there a reason for logging at FATAL/ERROR level?
Related note, at the end of be_tls_open_server():
> ...
> port->ssl_in_use = true;
> return 0;
>
> error:
> return 1;
> }
This needs to return -1 in the error case; the only caller of
secure_open_server() does a direct `result == -1` comparison rather than
checking `result != 0`.
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-12-04 00:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-01-19 20:23 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-01-19 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 4 Dec 2020, at 01:57, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Nov 17, 2020, at 7:00 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>>
>> Nice, thanks for the fix! I've incorporated your patch into the attached v20
>> which also fixes client side error reporting to be more readable.
>
> I was testing handshake failure modes and noticed that some FATAL
> messages are being sent through to the client in cleartext. The OpenSSL
> implementation doesn't do this, because it logs handshake problems at
> COMMERROR level. Should we switch all those ereport() calls in the NSS
> be_tls_open_server() to COMMERROR as well (and return explicitly), to
> avoid this? Or was there a reason for logging at FATAL/ERROR level?
The ERROR logging made early development easier but then stuck around, I've
changed them to COMMERROR returning an error instead in the v21 patch just
sent to the list.
> Related note, at the end of be_tls_open_server():
>
>> ...
>> port->ssl_in_use = true;
>> return 0;
>>
>> error:
>> return 1;
>> }
>
> This needs to return -1 in the error case; the only caller of
> secure_open_server() does a direct `result == -1` comparison rather than
> checking `result != 0`.
Fixed.
cheers ./daniel
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-18 07:08 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-01-18 07:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 04:00:53PM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> Nice, thanks for the fix! I've incorporated your patch into the attached v20
> which also fixes client side error reporting to be more readable. The SCRAM
> tests are now also hooked up, albeit with SKIP blocks for NSS, so they can
> start getting fixed.
On top of the set of TODO items mentioned in the logs of the patches,
this patch set needs a rebase because it does not apply. In order to
move on with this set, I would suggest to extract some parts of the
patch set independently of the others and have two buildfarm members
for the MSVC and non-MSVC cases to stress the parts that can be
committed. Just seeing the size, we could move on with:
- The ./configure set, with the change to introduce --with-ssl=openssl.
- 0004 for strong randoms.
- Support for cryptohashes.
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
This could be done separately.
src/sgml/libpq.sgml needs to document PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss, no?
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YAUz%2FA+KCCzjrvTr@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-01-19 20:21 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-21 05:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-01-19 20:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
> On 18 Jan 2021, at 08:08, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 04:00:53PM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> Nice, thanks for the fix! I've incorporated your patch into the attached v20
>> which also fixes client side error reporting to be more readable. The SCRAM
>> tests are now also hooked up, albeit with SKIP blocks for NSS, so they can
>> start getting fixed.
>
> On top of the set of TODO items mentioned in the logs of the patches,
> this patch set needs a rebase because it does not apply.
Fixed in the attached, which also addresses the points raised earlier by Jacob
as well as adds certificates created entirely by NSS tooling as well as initial
cryptohash support. There is something iffy with these certs (the test fails
on mismatching ciphers and/or signature algorithms) that I haven't been able to
pin down, but to get more eyes on this I'm posting the patch with the test
enabled. The NSS toolchain requires interactive input which makes the Makefile
a bit hacky, ideas on cleaning that up are appreciated.
> In order to
> move on with this set, I would suggest to extract some parts of the
> patch set independently of the others and have two buildfarm members
> for the MSVC and non-MSVC cases to stress the parts that can be
> committed. Just seeing the size, we could move on with:
> - The ./configure set, with the change to introduce --with-ssl=openssl.
> - 0004 for strong randoms.
> - Support for cryptohashes.
I will leave it to others to decide the feasibility of this, I'm happy to slice
and dice the commits into smaller bits to for example separate out the
--with-ssl autoconf change into a non NSS dependent commit, if that's wanted.
> +/*
> + * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
> + * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
> + */
> +#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
> +#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
> This could be done separately.
Based on an offlist discussion I believe this was a misunderstanding, but if I
instead misunderstood that feel free to correct me with how you think this
should be done.
> src/sgml/libpq.sgml needs to document PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss, no?
Good point, fixed.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v21-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (113.9K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/2-v21-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 2e44ad4a7709e700b5e651f238dffb2a439fcd58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 1/6] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 422 +++++-
configure.ac | 56 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1265 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1112 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3122 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 8af4b99021..cc6088b545 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -653,6 +653,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -710,7 +713,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -855,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -867,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -935,6 +939,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1192,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1338,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1491,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1557,7 +1572,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1571,6 +1585,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8087,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12160,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12478,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
fi
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13637,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13654,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14689,7 +15018,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14735,7 +15064,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14759,7 +15088,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14804,7 +15133,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14828,7 +15157,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -18106,6 +18435,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 868a94c9ba..0da8cc9b0b 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1406,11 +1435,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2165,6 +2199,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 1cad311436..1b0c5ce1fa 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8923,7 +8923,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..111b46dea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1265 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc * fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 371dccb852..12b105bbd1 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 17579eeaca..0095a9980e 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 93eb27a2aa..7a4b3dad5d 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,13 +193,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +298,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index f4d9f3b408..67a9f90e5e 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index c4fde3f93d..837e105ffe 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 2b78ed8ec3..79d3a35009 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0572e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 67b1e78512..0a1e47c5a2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,12 +619,23 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..a95450fbba 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +777,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 5634b2d40c..a21eb088b3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -194,12 +194,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -257,12 +264,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 59a42bea97..d3d0ea3c95 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v21-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (56.9K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/3-v21-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 28d9aa2c124cfffcfa3640e09aaba81ff5dc60dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 2/6] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 235 +++++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 346 +++++++++++-------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 97 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++-
10 files changed, 749 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index ab1ef9a475..cee4586eb5 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index 59921b46cf..5391f461a2 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 93335b1ea2..e32b0f89d5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +211,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +239,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +279,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +320,73 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+#NSSFILES2 := ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
+#nssfiles2: $(NSSFILES2)
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
+nssfiles2clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..6b8bca2846 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +602,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..cf5714e544 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,24 +11,39 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+else
+{
+ if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+ {
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+ }
+ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+ {
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 8;
+ }
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,20 +81,25 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
-{
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-}
-else
+
+SKIP:
{
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
+ if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
+ {
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -89,20 +109,21 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
-# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
-# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
-# is chosen here to be unique.
-my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
-copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
-chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
-test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
-# clean up
-unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+ # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+ # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+ # is chosen here to be unique.
+ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+ copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+ chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+ # clean up
+ unlink($client_tmp_key);
+}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v21-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (3.8K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/4-v21-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From e296533d4e5c3491dc55856d475bf85a8c7183e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 3/6] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 3 ++-
configure.ac | 3 ++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cc6088b545..876a0ea839 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18441,6 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
@@ -18467,7 +18468,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0da8cc9b0b..6b6641a094 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
@@ -2210,7 +2211,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 67a9f90e5e..0894ff2bef 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v21-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (19.8K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/5-v21-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From bb8a37864a562cb965083cde345bd3509fb24906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 4/6] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 82864bbb24..6738f8001f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1236,6 +1236,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1252,7 +1269,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1454,8 +1473,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 2bb3bf77e4..3225736f56 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,72 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2569,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2594,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2628,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8065,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8096,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 283352d3a4..d51ba37219 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2446,7 +2477,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2550,6 +2581,87 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> --keyUsage keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v21-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/6-v21-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3ced800109354ac497581fee8539a0267401b626 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 5/6] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index d881e85add..6f804bf032 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 3d74e15ec9..9eb8a3f74d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index a21eb088b3..0c489f9f34 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -444,9 +444,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -476,6 +481,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v21-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch (6.6K, ../../A9C4ADFC-D86B-414A-AF98-7FC14D482198@yesql.se/7-v21-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 21f989bb9083f867446c0e964a13a6553adf6f75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 13:04:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v21 6/6] NSS cryptohash support
---
src/common/Makefile | 5 +
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 248 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 7a4b3dad5d..5a25e5b390 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,11 +85,16 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9cd9c9f3f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+ ctx = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#else
+ ctx = pg_malloc(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#endif
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ ctx->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!ctx->nss_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(ctx->nss_context);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-20 00:40 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-01-20 00:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Tue, 2021-01-19 at 21:21 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> There is something iffy with these certs (the test fails
> on mismatching ciphers and/or signature algorithms) that I haven't been able to
> pin down, but to get more eyes on this I'm posting the patch with the test
> enabled.
Removing `--keyUsage keyEncipherment` from the native_server-* CSR
generation seems to let the tests pass for me, but I'm wary of just
pushing that as a solution because I don't understand why that would
have anything to do with the failure mode
(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM).
> The NSS toolchain requires interactive input which makes the Makefile
> a bit hacky, ideas on cleaning that up are appreciated.
Hm. I got nothing, short of a feature request to NSS...
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-01-20 11:58 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-01-20 11:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 20 Jan 2021, at 01:40, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2021-01-19 at 21:21 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> There is something iffy with these certs (the test fails
>> on mismatching ciphers and/or signature algorithms) that I haven't been able to
>> pin down, but to get more eyes on this I'm posting the patch with the test
>> enabled.
>
> Removing `--keyUsage keyEncipherment` from the native_server-* CSR
> generation seems to let the tests pass for me, but I'm wary of just
> pushing that as a solution because I don't understand why that would
> have anything to do with the failure mode
> (SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM).
Aha, that was a good clue, I had overlooked the required extensions in the CSR.
Re-reading RFC 5280 it seems we need keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment and
digitalSignature to create a valid SSL Server certificate. Adding those indeed
make the test pass. Skimming the certutil code *I think* removing it as you
did cause a set of defaults to kick in that made it work based on the parameter
"--nsCertType sslServer", but it's not entirely easy to make out. Either way,
relying on defaults in a test suite seems less than good, so I've extended the
Makefile to be explicit about the extensions.
The attached v22 rebase incorporates the fixup to the test Makefile, with not
further changes on top of that.
cheers ./daniel
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v22-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (113.9K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/2-v22-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3639ce7798695f32f9950a09b3a6a9a9b1ad90e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 1/6] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 422 +++++-
configure.ac | 56 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1265 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1112 +++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3122 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 8af4b99021..cc6088b545 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -653,6 +653,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -710,7 +713,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -855,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -867,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -935,6 +939,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1192,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1338,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1491,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1557,7 +1572,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1571,6 +1585,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8087,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12160,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12478,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
fi
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13637,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13654,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14689,7 +15018,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14735,7 +15064,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14759,7 +15088,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14804,7 +15133,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14828,7 +15157,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -18106,6 +18435,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 868a94c9ba..0da8cc9b0b 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1406,11 +1435,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2165,6 +2199,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 1cad311436..1b0c5ce1fa 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8923,7 +8923,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..111b46dea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1265 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc * fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
+ peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the peer CN.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
+ else
+ strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 371dccb852..12b105bbd1 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 17579eeaca..0095a9980e 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 93eb27a2aa..7a4b3dad5d 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,13 +193,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +298,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index f4d9f3b408..67a9f90e5e 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index c4fde3f93d..837e105ffe 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 2b78ed8ec3..79d3a35009 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0572e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 67b1e78512..0a1e47c5a2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,12 +619,23 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..a95450fbba 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +777,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 5634b2d40c..a21eb088b3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -194,12 +194,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -257,12 +264,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 59a42bea97..d3d0ea3c95 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v22-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (56.9K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/3-v22-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0c3bce7acbc845aca31251bcc5c564de39aa5f97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 2/6] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 235 +++++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 346 +++++++++++-------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 97 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++-
10 files changed, 749 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index ab1ef9a475..cee4586eb5 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index 59921b46cf..5391f461a2 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 93335b1ea2..d275c89672 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +211,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +239,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +279,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +320,73 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+#NSSFILES2 := ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
+#nssfiles2: $(NSSFILES2)
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
+nssfiles2clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..6b8bca2846 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +602,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..cf5714e544 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,24 +11,39 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+else
+{
+ if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+ {
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+ }
+ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+ {
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 8;
+ }
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,20 +81,25 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
-{
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-}
-else
+
+SKIP:
{
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
+ if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
+ {
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -89,20 +109,21 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
-# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
-# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
-# is chosen here to be unique.
-my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
-copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
-chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
-test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
-# clean up
-unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+ # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+ # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+ # is chosen here to be unique.
+ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+ copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+ chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+ # clean up
+ unlink($client_tmp_key);
+}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v22-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (3.8K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/4-v22-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From f8994dff2e9e49916a23e9fe66dfd0f9fd97841a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 3/6] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 3 ++-
configure.ac | 3 ++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cc6088b545..876a0ea839 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18441,6 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
@@ -18467,7 +18468,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0da8cc9b0b..6b6641a094 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
@@ -2210,7 +2211,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 67a9f90e5e..0894ff2bef 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v22-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (19.8K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/5-v22-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From c03bc0ffb8c0401a1f8c00d01ef5c3f395a8a7f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 4/6] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 82864bbb24..6738f8001f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1236,6 +1236,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1252,7 +1269,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1454,8 +1473,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 2bb3bf77e4..3225736f56 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,72 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2569,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2594,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2628,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8065,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8096,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 283352d3a4..0900ebf28f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2446,7 +2477,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2550,6 +2581,88 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v22-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/6-v22-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 6ff1c2cc4b39883ac315ef654d4a58804653fda7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 5/6] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index d881e85add..6f804bf032 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 3d74e15ec9..9eb8a3f74d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index a21eb088b3..0c489f9f34 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -444,9 +444,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -476,6 +481,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v22-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch (6.6K, ../../8D7F95DB-8F8A-4300-BFDA-656FBAB30FE2@yesql.se/7-v22-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 52445591ec9154acf6497f1d787467bff10a2d13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 13:04:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v22 6/6] NSS cryptohash support
---
src/common/Makefile | 5 +
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 248 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 7a4b3dad5d..5a25e5b390 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,11 +85,16 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9cd9c9f3f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+ ctx = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#else
+ ctx = pg_malloc(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#endif
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ ctx->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!ctx->nss_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(ctx->nss_context);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-20 17:07 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-01-20 17:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Wed, 2021-01-20 at 12:58 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> Aha, that was a good clue, I had overlooked the required extensions in the CSR.
> Re-reading RFC 5280 it seems we need keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment and
> digitalSignature to create a valid SSL Server certificate. Adding those indeed
> make the test pass. Skimming the certutil code *I think* removing it as you
> did cause a set of defaults to kick in that made it work based on the parameter
> "--nsCertType sslServer", but it's not entirely easy to make out.
Lovely. I didn't expect *removing* an extension to effectively *add*
more, but I'm glad it works now.
==
To continue the Subject Common Name discussion [1] from a different
part of the thread:
Attached is a v23 version of the patchset that peels the raw Common
Name out from a client cert's Subject. This allows the following cases
that the OpenSSL implementation currently handles:
- subjects that don't begin with a CN
- subjects with quotable characters
- subjects that have no CN at all
Embedded NULLs are now handled in a similar manner to the OpenSSL side,
though because this failure happens during the certificate
authentication callback, it results in a TLS alert rather than simply
closing the connection.
For easier review of just the parts I've changed, I've also attached a
since-v22.diff, which is part of the 0001 patch.
--Jacob
[1]
https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/7d6a23a7e30540b486abc823f7ced7a93e1da1e8.camel%40vmware.com
Attachments:
[text/x-patch] since-v22.diff (4.9K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/2-since-v22.diff)
download | inline diff:
commit cf6a3e49488b9e795e28713f81f6a4d32702de5d
Author: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
Date: Tue Jan 19 10:32:27 2021 -0800
NSS: handle client cert Common Names like be-secure-openssl
Store an unquoted Common Name into port->peer_cn. This is the bulk of
the patch, because CERT_GetCommonName() always performs RFC 4514
quoting, and the authentication code in the core expects raw data for
direct string comparison.
These changes allow us to handle
- usernames with quotable characters, such as backslashes
- certificates with other name attributes besides Common Name (country
code, organizational unit, etc.)
- certificates without a Common Name
Certificates with embedded NULL bytes in the Common Name will be
rejected in the same manner as the OpenSSL implementation.
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
index 111b46dea8..80d7598662 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -1051,6 +1051,69 @@ pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
return SECFailure;
}
+/*
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len parameter.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN. Decode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer. */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code runs
+ * after certificate authentication has otherwise succeeded,
+ * you'd need to convince a CA implementation to sign a
+ * corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static SECStatus
pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
{
@@ -1058,28 +1121,59 @@ pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServe
Port *port = (Port *) arg;
CERTCertificate *cert;
char *peer_cn;
- int len;
+ unsigned int len;
status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
- if (status == SECSuccess)
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
{
- cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
- len = strlen(cert->subjectName);
- peer_cn = MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
- /*
- * Skip over the key= portion of the key=value containing the peer CN.
- */
- if (strncmp(cert->subjectName, "CN=", 3) == 0)
- strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName + strlen("CN="), len + 1);
- else
- strlcpy(peer_cn, cert->subjectName, len + 1);
- CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
- port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
return status;
}
[text/x-patch] v23-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (116.2K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/3-v23-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 29d6390db3dd8d418c2abda24c285f621f1a5917 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 1/6] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 422 ++++-
configure.ac | 56 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 6 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1359 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 +++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1112 ++++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 1 +
25 files changed, 3216 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 8af4b99021..cc6088b545 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -653,6 +653,9 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -710,7 +713,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
+runstatedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
@@ -855,7 +858,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -867,6 +869,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -935,6 +939,7 @@ datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
@@ -1187,6 +1192,15 @@ do
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
+ -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+ | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+ | --run | --ru | --r)
+ ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+ -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+ | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+ | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+ runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
@@ -1324,7 +1338,7 @@ fi
for ac_var in exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
- libdir localedir mandir
+ libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
@@ -1477,6 +1491,7 @@ Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+ --runstatedir=DIR modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
@@ -1557,7 +1572,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1571,6 +1585,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8071,41 +8087,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12179,7 +12160,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12440,8 +12478,280 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
fi
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13327,7 +13637,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -13344,6 +13654,25 @@ else
fi
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -14689,7 +15018,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14735,7 +15064,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14759,7 +15088,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14804,7 +15133,7 @@ else
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -14828,7 +15157,7 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
-#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
+#define LARGE_OFF_T ((((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31) - 1 + (((off_t) 1 << 31) << 31))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
@@ -18106,6 +18435,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 868a94c9ba..0da8cc9b0b 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1209,7 +1200,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There are currently two supported SSL/TLS libraries, OpenSSL and NSS.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1233,7 +1238,31 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1406,11 +1435,16 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
@@ -2165,6 +2199,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 1cad311436..1b0c5ce1fa 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8923,7 +8923,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 7ca1e9aac5..bdab2a6825 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80d7598662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1359 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc * fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc * fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc * fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc * init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len parameter.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN. Decode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer. */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code runs
+ * after certificate authentication has otherwise succeeded,
+ * you'd need to convince a CA implementation to sign a
+ * corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 371dccb852..12b105bbd1 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-openssl or --with-nss to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 17579eeaca..0095a9980e 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 93eb27a2aa..7a4b3dad5d 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,13 +193,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +298,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index f4d9f3b408..67a9f90e5e 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index c4fde3f93d..837e105ffe 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-common.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
- fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 2b78ed8ec3..79d3a35009 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0572e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 67b1e78512..0a1e47c5a2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -445,7 +448,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,12 +619,23 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..a95450fbba 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +777,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 5634b2d40c..a21eb088b3 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -194,12 +194,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -257,12 +264,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 59a42bea97..d3d0ea3c95 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..49dc4d5864 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ our $config = {
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ nss => undef, # --with-nss=<path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v23-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (56.9K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/4-v23-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From cf3460f1ed6b24162e08ae9a17cfe2ffdd4418e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 2/6] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 4 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 235 +++++++++++-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 346 +++++++++++-------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 97 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++-
10 files changed, 749 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index ab1ef9a475..cee4586eb5 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),yes)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index 59921b46cf..5391f461a2 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..a2bed5336c 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
}
my $clearpass = "FooBaR1";
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 93335b1ea2..d275c89672 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +211,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +239,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +279,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +320,73 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+#NSSFILES2 := ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
+#nssfiles2: $(NSSFILES2)
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
+nssfiles2clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..6b8bca2846 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
+ $openssl = 1;
plan tests => 93;
}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
+}
else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +602,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..cf5714e544 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,24 +11,39 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'no')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
+else
+{
+ if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+ {
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+ }
+ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+ {
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 8;
+ }
+}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,20 +81,25 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
-{
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-}
-else
+
+SKIP:
{
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
+ if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
+ {
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -89,20 +109,21 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
-# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
-# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
-# is chosen here to be unique.
-my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
-copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
-chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
-test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
-# clean up
-unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+ # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+ # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+ # is chosen here to be unique.
+ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+ copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+ chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+ # clean up
+ unlink($client_tmp_key);
+}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v23-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (3.8K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/5-v23-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 7cb545431b5d392e986c81a6253e44b24fd8b8d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 3/6] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 3 ++-
configure.ac | 3 ++-
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index cc6088b545..876a0ea839 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18441,6 +18441,7 @@ $as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
@@ -18467,7 +18468,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 0da8cc9b0b..6b6641a094 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ elif test x"$with_nss" = x"yes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
@@ -2210,7 +2211,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 67a9f90e5e..0894ff2bef 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v23-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (19.8K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/6-v23-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 5d06d659a102948b5d69071749a3b463e354fb1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 4/6] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 30 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 82864bbb24..6738f8001f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1236,6 +1236,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1252,7 +1269,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1454,8 +1473,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 0ac1cb9999..bd09124fb0 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ su - postgres
<listitem>
<para>
- You need <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, if you want to support
+ You need a supported <acronym>SSL</acronym> library, if you want to support
encrypted client connections. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is
also required for random number generation on platforms that do not
have <filename>/dev/urandom</filename> (except Windows). The minimum
@@ -966,6 +966,31 @@ build-postgresql:
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--with-nss</option>
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary>NSS</primary>
+ <secondary>NSPR</secondary>
+ <seealso>SSL</seealso>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
+ connections using <productname>NSS</productname>. This requires the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--with-openssl</option>
<indexterm>
@@ -982,6 +1007,9 @@ build-postgresql:
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
before proceeding.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This option is incompatible with <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 2bb3bf77e4..3225736f56 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,72 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2569,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2594,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2628,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8065,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8096,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 283352d3a4..0900ebf28f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2183,15 +2183,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2211,8 +2217,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2302,6 +2313,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2376,7 +2399,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2423,6 +2446,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2446,7 +2477,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2550,6 +2581,88 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v23-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.9K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/7-v23-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 7cd09cd97fab9db08c1cc4079f718545da163076 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 5/6] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
8 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..c2232e5a4d 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifneq ($(with_ssl),no)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index d881e85add..6f804bf032 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 3d74e15ec9..9eb8a3f74d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..d2270cbe7c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index a21eb088b3..0c489f9f34 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -444,9 +444,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -476,6 +481,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v23-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch (6.5K, ../../a9b663ae4a4b71525e88b75463c865a6693cb4ce.camel@vmware.com/8-v23-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 1436b8b74f25c7a167cf78e7ef038de02f911bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 13:04:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v23 6/6] NSS cryptohash support
---
src/common/Makefile | 5 +
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 248 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 7a4b3dad5d..5a25e5b390 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,11 +85,16 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9cd9c9f3f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+ ctx = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#else
+ ctx = pg_malloc(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+#endif
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ ctx->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!ctx->nss_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(ctx->nss_context);
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ pfree(ctx);
+}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-01-27 07:39 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-01-27 07:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:07:08PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> Lovely. I didn't expect *removing* an extension to effectively *add*
> more, but I'm glad it works now.
My apologies for chiming in. I was looking at your patch set here,
and while reviewing the strong random and cryptohash parts I have
found a couple of mistakes in the ./configure part. I think that the
switch from --with-openssl to --with-ssl={openssl} could just be done
independently as a building piece of the rest, then the first portion
based on NSS could just add the minimum set in configure.ac.
Please note that the patch set has been using autoconf from Debian, or
something forked from upstream. There were also missing updates in
several parts of the code base, and a lack of docs for the new
switch. I have spent time checking that with --with-openssl to make
sure that the obsolete grammar is still compatible, --with-ssl=openssl
and also without it.
Thoughts?
--
Michael
Attachments:
[text/x-diff] 0001-Introduce-with-ssl-openssl-in-configure-options.patch (17.7K, ../../YBEYq7D90hEsxMbA@paquier.xyz/2-0001-Introduce-with-ssl-openssl-in-configure-options.patch)
download | inline diff:
From b3e18564697bdb36a8eba4afe6434294676b528b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 16:36:45 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Introduce --with-ssl={openssl} in configure options
---
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/common/Makefile | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/modules/Makefile | 2 +-
.../modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile | 2 +-
.../ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 2 +-
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 2 +-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 5 +-
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 2 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 2 +-
contrib/Makefile | 2 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 4 +-
configure | 110 +++++++++++-------
configure.ac | 31 +++--
src/Makefile.global.in | 2 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 2 +-
src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl | 2 +-
22 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index f4d9f3b408..55cab4d2bf 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@
/* Define to select named POSIX semaphores. */
#undef USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES
-/* Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl) */
+/* Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl) */
#undef USE_OPENSSL
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index efc5ef760a..8d1d16b0fc 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJS = \
pqmq.o \
pqsignal.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
endif
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 371dccb852..20bf1461ce 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 1a1d0d3406..5422579a6a 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ OBJS_COMMON = \
wait_error.o \
wchar.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index c4fde3f93d..2b7ace52e4 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ OBJS = \
pqexpbuffer.o \
fe-auth.o
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += \
fe-secure-common.o \
fe-secure-openssl.o
diff --git a/src/test/Makefile b/src/test/Makefile
index ab1ef9a475..f7859c2fd5 100644
--- a/src/test/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ifneq (,$(filter ldap,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ldap
endif
endif
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
ifneq (,$(filter ssl,$(PG_TEST_EXTRA)))
SUBDIRS += ssl
endif
diff --git a/src/test/modules/Makefile b/src/test/modules/Makefile
index 59921b46cf..5391f461a2 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unsafe_tests \
worker_spi
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += ssl_passphrase_callback
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
index f81265c296..a34d7ea46a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ssl_passphrase_callback Makefile
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
MODULE_big = ssl_passphrase_func
OBJS = ssl_passphrase_func.o $(WIN32RES)
diff --git a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
index dbc084f870..d9838a5d5a 100644
--- a/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
+++ b/src/test/modules/ssl_passphrase_callback/t/001_testfunc.pl
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use TestLib;
use Test::More;
use PostgresNode;
-unless (($ENV{with_openssl} || 'no') eq 'yes')
+unless ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 93335b1ea2..d545382eea 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ subdir = src/test/ssl
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
-export with_openssl
+export with_ssl
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index fd2727b568..9cf4ee24cb 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSLServer;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
{
plan tests => 93;
}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index a088f71a1a..2bdd638115 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSLServer;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index a53389b728..2d52068310 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ build-postgresql:
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
- <term><option>--with-openssl</option>
+ <term><option>--with-ssl=<replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable></option>
<indexterm>
<primary>OpenSSL</primary>
<seealso>SSL</seealso>
@@ -980,7 +980,8 @@ build-postgresql:
package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ before proceeding. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
+ supported now is <option>openssl</option>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 3d74e15ec9..b6bb23de0f 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
</para>
<para>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 3213c039ca..2a9c45a111 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-openssl</literal>.
+ configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
index 7a4866e338..ae1fd64028 100644
--- a/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \
unaccent \
vacuumlo
-ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
SUBDIRS += sslinfo
else
ALWAYS_SUBDIRS += sslinfo
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 316a26e58d..c0b4f1fcf6 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_openssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index e202697bbf..092e03e8ed 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -653,6 +653,7 @@ LIBOBJS
UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
+with_ssl
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -709,7 +710,6 @@ with_uuid
with_readline
with_systemd
with_selinux
-with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
krb_srvtab
@@ -854,7 +854,6 @@ with_pam
with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
-with_openssl
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -866,6 +865,8 @@ with_libxslt
with_system_tzdata
with_zlib
with_gnu_ld
+with_ssl
+with_openssl
enable_largefile
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
@@ -1556,7 +1557,6 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-bsd-auth build with BSD Authentication support
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
- --with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -1570,6 +1570,8 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
@@ -8070,41 +8072,6 @@ fi
$as_echo "$with_bonjour" >&6; }
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with OpenSSL support" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with OpenSSL support... " >&6; }
-
-
-
-# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
-if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
- withval=$with_openssl;
- case $withval in
- yes)
-
-$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
-
- ;;
- no)
- :
- ;;
- *)
- as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
- ;;
- esac
-
-else
- with_openssl=no
-
-fi
-
-
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_openssl" >&5
-$as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
-
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -12174,7 +12141,64 @@ fi
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There is currently one supported SSL/TLS libraries: OpenSSL.
+#
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl was given.
+if test "${with_ssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_ssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ no)
+ as_fn_error $? "argument required for --with-ssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ *)
+
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+fi
+
+
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_openssl;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+ :
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-openssl option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_openssl=no
+
+fi
+
+
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10001000L" >>confdefs.h
@@ -12435,8 +12459,14 @@ _ACEOF
fi
done
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_start in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_start in -lpam... " >&6; }
@@ -13322,7 +13352,7 @@ done
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
@@ -18098,7 +18128,7 @@ fi
# will be used.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking which random number source to use" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
-if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index a5ad072ee4..f7a2db2574 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -852,15 +852,6 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, bonjour, no,
AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_bonjour])
-#
-# OpenSSL
-#
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with OpenSSL support])
-PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [build with OpenSSL support],
- [AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl)])])
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
-AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
-
#
# SELinux
#
@@ -1205,7 +1196,21 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
fi
fi
+#
+# SSL Library
+#
+# There is currently one supported SSL/TLS libraries: OpenSSL.
+#
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
+ with_ssl=no
+fi
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, openssl, no, [obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl])
if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+ with_ssl=openssl
+fi
+
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
dnl Order matters!
# Minimum required OpenSSL version is 1.0.1
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, [0x10001000L],
@@ -1229,7 +1234,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
# thread-safety. In 1.1.0, it's no longer required, and CRYPTO_lock()
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
fi
+AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'pam' is required for PAM])])
@@ -1402,7 +1411,7 @@ if test "$with_gssapi" = yes ; then
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(gssapi.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([gssapi.h header file is required for GSSAPI])])])
fi
-if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
+if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
@@ -2159,7 +2168,7 @@ fi
# first choice, else the native platform sources (Windows API or /dev/urandom)
# will be used.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
-if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
+if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9a1688c97c..74b3a6acd2 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ with_icu = @with_icu@
with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
-with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_ssl = @with_ssl@
with_readline = @with_readline@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 2f28de0355..1c0c92fcd2 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ sub GetFakeConfigure
$cfg .= ' --with-ldap' if ($self->{options}->{ldap});
$cfg .= ' --without-zlib' unless ($self->{options}->{zlib});
$cfg .= ' --with-extra-version' if ($self->{options}->{extraver});
- $cfg .= ' --with-openssl' if ($self->{options}->{openssl});
+ $cfg .= ' --with-ssl=openssl' if ($self->{options}->{openssl});
$cfg .= ' --with-uuid' if ($self->{options}->{uuid});
$cfg .= ' --with-libxml' if ($self->{options}->{xml});
$cfg .= ' --with-libxslt' if ($self->{options}->{xslt});
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
index 2ef2cfc4e9..5395e211eb 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ our $config = {
tcl => undef, # --with-tcl=<path>
perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
- openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
+ openssl => undef, # --with-ssl=openssl with <path>
uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
--
2.30.0
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YBEYq7D90hEsxMbA@paquier.xyz/3-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-01-27 18:47 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-01-27 18:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Wed, 2021-01-27 at 16:39 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote:
> My apologies for chiming in. I was looking at your patch set here,
> and while reviewing the strong random and cryptohash parts I have
> found a couple of mistakes in the ./configure part. I think that the
> switch from --with-openssl to --with-ssl={openssl} could just be done
> independently as a building piece of the rest, then the first portion
> based on NSS could just add the minimum set in configure.ac.
>
> Please note that the patch set has been using autoconf from Debian, or
> something forked from upstream. There were also missing updates in
> several parts of the code base, and a lack of docs for the new
> switch. I have spent time checking that with --with-openssl to make
> sure that the obsolete grammar is still compatible, --with-ssl=openssl
> and also without it.
>
> Thoughts?
Seems good to me on Ubuntu; builds with both flavors.
From peering at the Windows side:
> --- a/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
> +++ b/src/tools/msvc/config_default.pl
> @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ our $config = {
> tcl => undef, # --with-tcl=<path>
> perl => undef, # --with-perl=<path>
> python => undef, # --with-python=<path>
> - openssl => undef, # --with-openssl=<path>
> + openssl => undef, # --with-ssl=openssl with <path>
> uuid => undef, # --with-uuid=<path>
> xml => undef, # --with-libxml=<path>
> xslt => undef, # --with-libxslt=<path>
So to check understanding: the `openssl` config variable is still alive
for MSVC builds; it just turns that into `--with-ssl=openssl` in the
fake CONFIGURE_ARGS?
<bikeshed color="lightblue">
Since SSL is an obsolete term, and the choice of OpenSSL vs NSS vs
[nothing] affects server operation (such as cryptohash) regardless of
whether or not connection-level TLS is actually used, what would you
all think about naming this option --with-crypto? I.e.
--with-crypto=openssl
--with-crypto=nss
</bikeshed>
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-01-28 06:06 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-28 23:20 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-01-28 06:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 06:47:17PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> So to check understanding: the `openssl` config variable is still alive
> for MSVC builds; it just turns that into `--with-ssl=openssl` in the
> fake CONFIGURE_ARGS?
Yeah, I think that keeping both variables separated in the MSVC
scripts is the most straight-forward option, as this passes down a
path. Once there is a value for nss, we'd need to properly issue an
error if both OpenSSL and NSS are specified.
> Since SSL is an obsolete term, and the choice of OpenSSL vs NSS vs
> [nothing] affects server operation (such as cryptohash) regardless of
> whether or not connection-level TLS is actually used, what would you
> all think about naming this option --with-crypto? I.e.
>
> --with-crypto=openssl
> --with-crypto=nss
Looking around, curl has multiple switches for each lib with one named
--with-ssl for OpenSSL, but it needs to be able to use multiple
libraries at run time. I can spot that libssh2 uses what you are
proposing. It seems to me that --with-ssl is a bit more popular but
not by that much: wget, wayland, some apache stuff (it uses a path as
option value). Anyway, what you are suggesting sounds like a good in
the context of Postgres. Daniel?
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YBJUaMj1EdpWVCgb@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-01-28 23:20 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-29 06:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-01-28 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
> On 28 Jan 2021, at 07:06, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 06:47:17PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
>> Since SSL is an obsolete term, and the choice of OpenSSL vs NSS vs
>> [nothing] affects server operation (such as cryptohash) regardless of
>> whether or not connection-level TLS is actually used, what would you
>> all think about naming this option --with-crypto? I.e.
>>
>> --with-crypto=openssl
>> --with-crypto=nss
>
> Looking around, curl has multiple switches for each lib with one named
> --with-ssl for OpenSSL, but it needs to be able to use multiple
> libraries at run time.
To be fair, if we started over in curl I would push back on --with-ssl meaning
OpenSSL but that ship has long since sailed.
> I can spot that libssh2 uses what you are
> proposing. It seems to me that --with-ssl is a bit more popular but
> not by that much: wget, wayland, some apache stuff (it uses a path as
> option value). Anyway, what you are suggesting sounds like a good in
> the context of Postgres. Daniel?
SSL is admittedly an obsolete technical term, but it's one that enough people
have decided is interchangeable with TLS that it's not a hill worth dying on
IMHO. Since postgres won't allow for using libnss or OpenSSL for cryptohash
*without* compiling SSL/TLS support (used or not), I think --with-ssl=LIB is
more descriptive and less confusing.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-28 23:20 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-29 06:01 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-29 13:13 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-01-29 06:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:20:21AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> SSL is admittedly an obsolete technical term, but it's one that enough people
> have decided is interchangeable with TLS that it's not a hill worth dying on
> IMHO. Since postgres won't allow for using libnss or OpenSSL for cryptohash
> *without* compiling SSL/TLS support (used or not), I think --with-ssl=LIB is
> more descriptive and less confusing.
Okay, let's use --with-ssl then for the new switch name. The previous
patch is backward-compatible, and will simplify the rest of the set,
so let's move on with it. Once this is done, my guess is that it
would be cleaner to have a new patch that includes only the
./configure and MSVC changes, and then the rest: test refactoring,
cryptohash, strong random and lastly TLS (we may want to cut this a
bit more though and perhaps have some restrictions depending on the
scope of options a first patch set could support).
I'll wait a bit first to see if there are any objections to this
change.
--
Michael
Attachments:
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^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-28 23:20 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-29 06:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-01-29 13:13 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-30 01:27 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-01-29 13:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
> On 29 Jan 2021, at 07:01, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:20:21AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> SSL is admittedly an obsolete technical term, but it's one that enough people
>> have decided is interchangeable with TLS that it's not a hill worth dying on
>> IMHO. Since postgres won't allow for using libnss or OpenSSL for cryptohash
>> *without* compiling SSL/TLS support (used or not), I think --with-ssl=LIB is
>> more descriptive and less confusing.
>
> Okay, let's use --with-ssl then for the new switch name. The previous
> patch is backward-compatible, and will simplify the rest of the set,
> so let's move on with it. Once this is done, my guess is that it
> would be cleaner to have a new patch that includes only the
> ./configure and MSVC changes, and then the rest: test refactoring,
> cryptohash, strong random and lastly TLS (we may want to cut this a
> bit more though and perhaps have some restrictions depending on the
> scope of options a first patch set could support).
>
> I'll wait a bit first to see if there are any objections to this
> change.
I'm still not convinced that adding --with-ssl=openssl is worth it before the
rest of NSS goes in (and more importantly, *if* it goes in).
On the one hand, we already have pluggable (for some value of) support for
adding TLS libraries, and adding --with-ssl is one more piece of that puzzle.
We could of course have endless --with-X options instead but as you say,
--with-uuid has set the tone here (and I believe that's good). On the other
hand, if we never add any other library than OpenSSL then it's just complexity
without benefit.
As mentioned elsewhere in the thread, the current v23 patchset has the
--with-ssl change as a separate commit to at least make it visual what it looks
like. The documentation changes are in the main NSS patch though since
documenting --with-ssl when there is only one possible value didn't seem to be
helpful to users whom are fully expected to use --with-openssl still.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-28 23:20 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-29 06:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-29 13:13 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-01-30 01:27 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-01-30 01:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 02:13:30PM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> I'm still not convinced that adding --with-ssl=openssl is worth it before the
> rest of NSS goes in (and more importantly, *if* it goes in).
>
> On the one hand, we already have pluggable (for some value of) support for
> adding TLS libraries, and adding --with-ssl is one more piece of that puzzle.
> We could of course have endless --with-X options instead but as you say,
> --with-uuid has set the tone here (and I believe that's good). On the other
> hand, if we never add any other library than OpenSSL then it's just complexity
> without benefit.
IMO, one could say the same thing for any piece of refactoring we have
done in the past to make the TLS/crypto code more modular. There is
demand for being able to choose among multiple SSL libs at build time,
and we are still in a phase where we evaluate the options at hand.
This refactoring is just careful progress, and this is one step in
this direction. The piece about refactoring the SSL tests is
similar.
> As mentioned elsewhere in the thread, the current v23 patchset has the
> --with-ssl change as a separate commit to at least make it visual what it looks
> like. The documentation changes are in the main NSS patch though since
> documenting --with-ssl when there is only one possible value didn't seem to be
> helpful to users whom are fully expected to use --with-openssl still.
The documentation changes should be part of the patch introducing the
switch IMO: a description of the new switch, as well as a paragraph
about the old value being deprecated. That's done this way for UUID.
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YBS1+otETipGbenX@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-01 20:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-01 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
> On 20 Jan 2021, at 18:07, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
> To continue the Subject Common Name discussion [1] from a different
> part of the thread:
>
> Attached is a v23 version of the patchset that peels the raw Common
> Name out from a client cert's Subject. This allows the following cases
> that the OpenSSL implementation currently handles:
>
> - subjects that don't begin with a CN
> - subjects with quotable characters
> - subjects that have no CN at all
Nice, thanks for fixing this!
> Embedded NULLs are now handled in a similar manner to the OpenSSL side,
> though because this failure happens during the certificate
> authentication callback, it results in a TLS alert rather than simply
> closing the connection.
But returning SECFailure from the cert callback force NSS to terminate the
connection immediately doesn't it?
> For easier review of just the parts I've changed, I've also attached a
> since-v22.diff, which is part of the 0001 patch.
I confused my dev trees and missed to include this in the v23 that I sent out
(which should've been v24), sorry about that. Attached is a v24 which is
rebased on top of todays --with-ssl commit, and now includes your changes.
Additionally I've added a shutdown callback such that we close the connection
immediately if NSS is shutting down from underneath us. I can't imagine a
scenario in which that's benign, so let's take whatever precautions we can.
I've also changed the NSS initialization in the cryptohash code to closer match
what the NSS documentation recommends for similar scenarios, but more on that
downthread where that's discussed.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v24-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch (6.6K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/2-v24-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3155eba6b39fe583a764271359ef326e66cadd1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 13:04:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 6/6] NSS cryptohash support
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 4 +
2 files changed, 259 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e2b5776c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 660387d0e8..180eb0aa3f 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v24-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.6K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/3-v24-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 216441c0910fa9728b9b458ec2fb7ab5645882bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 5/6] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
7 files changed, 863 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index ff01acf3f6..660387d0e8 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -445,9 +445,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -477,6 +482,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v24-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (19.8K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/4-v24-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 5eb0a47349f983709ee431b24dd6332b50b96bef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 4/6] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++++++---
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index e17cdcc816..b33cffb370 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1238,6 +1238,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1254,7 +1271,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1456,8 +1475,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..1b71881c6e 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,15 +976,30 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
- </listitem>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index b7a82453f0..89796de168 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,72 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2569,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2594,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2628,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8065,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8096,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..2578ee8c06 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,88 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v24-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (3.1K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/5-v24-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 60f57667edc89f2c95c3d99882c29d15b16903dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 3/6] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 1 +
configure.ac | 1 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 143726c79c..2b83914289 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18422,6 +18422,7 @@ $as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 59657a6010..6533e10ffd 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2197,6 +2197,7 @@ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 8856a33590..fa5a977617 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v24-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (54.9K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/6-v24-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 6af78eaeed3301ff9586d32b0a3e0a64823b9340 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 2/6] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 233 ++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 350 +++++++++++-------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 96 +++--
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++-
6 files changed, 743 insertions(+), 192 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index d545382eea..d275c89672 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,78 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +211,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +239,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +279,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +320,73 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+#NSSFILES2 := ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
+#nssfiles2: $(NSSFILES2)
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
+nssfiles2clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 7928de4e7c..6b8bca2846 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,20 +4,27 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
}
else
{
- plan tests => 93;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +602,23 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-test_connect_ok(
+TODO:
+{
+ local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
+}
+
+test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..4d7874d420 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,29 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 8;
+}
+else
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -23,12 +41,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,20 +78,25 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
-{
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-}
-else
+
+SKIP:
{
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
+ if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
+ {
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+ }
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -89,20 +106,21 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
-# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
-# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
-# is chosen here to be unique.
-my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
-copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
-chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
-test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
-# clean up
-unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
+ # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+ # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+ # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+ # is chosen here to be unique.
+ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+ copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+ chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+ # clean up
+ unlink($client_tmp_key);
+}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v24-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (108.7K, ../../E79F0466-05A7-4771-85B4-464E25BD2787@yesql.se/7-v24-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 121286d34fd65c6a3cdf6cc9c78ce4fbe87bf90d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v24 1/6] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 294 +++-
configure.ac | 31 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1402 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 5 +
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 ++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1112 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
23 files changed, 3150 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 07da84d401..59657a6010 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index b09dce63f5..fbbe778217 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8928,7 +8928,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..876e54be51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1402 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 20bf1461ce..9a04c093d5 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-ssl to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index eafdb1118e..b023b31c46 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..be8b2583b2 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,17 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,13 +193,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +298,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 55cab4d2bf..8856a33590 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 8ca0583aa9..1eeeff54a8 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0572e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 00b87bdc96..44385ee391 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -439,7 +442,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,12 +619,23 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..a95450fbba 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +777,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90328db04e..ff01acf3f6 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -195,12 +195,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -258,12 +265,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 1c0c92fcd2..5148708969 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-02 00:55 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-02 00:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>
On Mon, 2021-02-01 at 21:49 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> > Embedded NULLs are now handled in a similar manner to the OpenSSL side,
> > though because this failure happens during the certificate
> > authentication callback, it results in a TLS alert rather than simply
> > closing the connection.
>
> But returning SECFailure from the cert callback force NSS to terminate the
> connection immediately doesn't it?
IIRC NSS will send the alert first, whereas our OpenSSL implementation
will complete the handshake and then drop the connection. I'll rebuild
with the latest and confirm.
> > For easier review of just the parts I've changed, I've also attached a
> > since-v22.diff, which is part of the 0001 patch.
>
> I confused my dev trees and missed to include this in the v23 that I sent out
> (which should've been v24), sorry about that. Attached is a v24 which is
> rebased on top of todays --with-ssl commit, and now includes your changes.
No problem. Thanks!
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-02 20:33 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-02 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Tue, 2021-02-02 at 00:55 +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> On Mon, 2021-02-01 at 21:49 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> > > Embedded NULLs are now handled in a similar manner to the OpenSSL side,
> > > though because this failure happens during the certificate
> > > authentication callback, it results in a TLS alert rather than simply
> > > closing the connection.
> >
> > But returning SECFailure from the cert callback force NSS to terminate the
> > connection immediately doesn't it?
>
> IIRC NSS will send the alert first, whereas our OpenSSL implementation
> will complete the handshake and then drop the connection. I'll rebuild
> with the latest and confirm.
I wasn't able to reproduce the behavior I thought I saw before. In any
case I think the current NSS implementation for embedded NULLs will
work correctly.
> > Attached is a v24 which is
> > rebased on top of todays --with-ssl commit, and now includes your changes.
I have a v25 attached which fixes and re-enables the skipped/todo'd
client certificate and SCRAM tests. (Changes between v24 and v25 are in
since-v24.diff.) The server-cn-only database didn't have the root CA
installed to be able to verify client certificates, so I've added it.
Note that this changes the error message printed during the invalid-
root tests, because NSS is now sending the root of the chain. So the
server's issuer is considered untrusted rather than unrecognized.
--Jacob
Attachments:
[text/x-patch] since-v24.diff (6.2K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/2-since-v24.diff)
download | inline diff:
commit 093bb937736cdfc871d8fd479748f93f18108ae0
Author: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
Date: Fri Jan 29 09:32:27 2021 -0800
test/ssl: fix final TODOs and SKIPs
The server-cn-only database didn't have the root CA installed to be able
to verify client certificates. Note that this changes the error message
printed during the invalid-root tests, because the server is now sending
the root of the chain (so the issuer is untrusted rather than
unrecognized).
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index d275c89672..c8032a2c13 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/se
certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 6b8bca2846..5a83a1d277 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -159,12 +159,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's Certificate issuer is not recognized/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
@@ -604,14 +604,10 @@ switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
-TODO:
-{
- local $TODO = "WIP failure cause currently unknown";
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
- "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-}
+test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
+ "intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 4d7874d420..43565bdf6e 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
$nss = 1;
- plan tests => 8;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
}
else
{
@@ -79,24 +80,20 @@ test_connect_ok(
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
-SKIP:
+if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
{
- skip "NSS support for TLS server endpoing is not implemented", 1 if ($nss);
- if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
- {
- test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
- }
- else
- {
- test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
- "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
- }
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
+}
+else
+{
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding is required, but server did not offer an authentication method that supports channel binding/,
+ "SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=require");
}
# Now test when the user has an MD5-encrypted password; should fail
@@ -106,21 +103,17 @@ test_connect_fails(
qr/channel binding required but not supported by server's authentication request/,
"MD5 with SSL and channel_binding=require");
-SKIP:
-{
- skip "NSS support not implemented yet", 1 if ($nss);
- # Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
- # because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
- # be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
- # is chosen here to be unique.
- my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
- copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
- chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
- test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
- "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
- qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
- "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
- # clean up
- unlink($client_tmp_key);
-}
+# Now test with auth method 'cert' by connecting to 'certdb'. Should fail,
+# because channel binding is not performed. Note that ssl/client.key may
+# be used in a different test, so the name of this temporary client key
+# is chosen here to be unique.
+my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
+copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
+chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
+test_connect_fails(
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
+ "dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
+ qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
+ "Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
+# clean up
+unlink($client_tmp_key);
[text/x-patch] v25-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch (108.7K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/3-v25-0001-NSS-Frontend-Backend-and-build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0c00c0ba3a4197eddb7943c1098732384912d6cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:18:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 1/6] NSS Frontend, Backend and build infrastructure
TODO:
* SCRAM channel binding is implemented but doesn't work
* Frontend CRL configuration handling
* Settle on a required version in autoconf
* Move pg_nss.h to a .c file for both frontend and backend
Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
---
configure | 294 +++-
configure.ac | 31 +-
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1402 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/Makefile | 5 +
src/include/common/pg_nss.h | 175 ++
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 15 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1112 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 13 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 20 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 22 +-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +
23 files changed, 3150 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/pg_nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 07da84d401..59657a6010 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index b09dce63f5..fbbe778217 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8928,7 +8928,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..876e54be51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1402 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ ciphercode = pg_find_cipher(c);
+ if (ciphercode != INVALID_CIPHER)
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 20bf1461ce..9a04c093d5 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-ssl to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index eafdb1118e..b023b31c46 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..be8b2583b2 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,17 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/common/pg_nss.h b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..008fee85f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/pg_nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pg_nss.h
+ * Support for NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/pg_nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef PG_NSS_H
+#define PG_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+PRUint16 pg_find_cipher(char *name);
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithms;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithms NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+PRUint16
+pg_find_cipher(char *name)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list = NSS_CipherList;
+
+ while (cipher_list->name)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ return cipher_list->number;
+
+ cipher_list++;
+ }
+
+ return 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* PG_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,13 +193,18 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +298,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 55cab4d2bf..8856a33590 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 8ca0583aa9..1eeeff54a8 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0572e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/pg_nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR remove the definition in a future version (however unlikely that may
+ * be, make sure to put ours back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and PostgreSQL"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+static NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server.
+ */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_alg;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithms *candidate;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+ while (candidate->signature)
+ {
+ if (signature_alg == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ digest_alg = candidate->hash;
+ digest_len = candidate->len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ candidate++;
+ }
+
+ if (!candidate->signature)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_alg));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 00b87bdc96..44385ee391 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -439,7 +442,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,12 +619,23 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..a95450fbba 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,23 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +777,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 90328db04e..ff01acf3f6 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -195,12 +195,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -258,12 +265,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 1c0c92fcd2..5148708969 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1005,6 +1010,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v25-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch (52.8K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/4-v25-0002-NSS-Testharness-updates.patch)
download | inline diff:
From f64fd9a6a6f03d2fb6eb1d5c2c4f31bccf8eaf8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:22:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 2/6] NSS Testharness updates
TODO:
* Generate certificate/keys with NSS tooling for NSS specific test
* Add test for certificate with embedded nulls
* Fix SCRAM tests when channel binding works
Daniel Gustafsson, Jacob Champion
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 234 ++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 340 +++++++++++-------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 37 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 ++++-
6 files changed, 704 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index d545382eea..c8032a2c13 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,79 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +212,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +240,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +280,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +321,73 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+#NSSFILES2 := ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+# ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
+#nssfiles2: $(NSSFILES2)
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
+nssfiles2clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 7928de4e7c..5a83a1d277 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,20 +4,27 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
+
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
}
else
{
- plan tests => 93;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -32,32 +39,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,36 +53,65 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them.
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -149,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -262,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -275,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -285,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -299,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -312,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -328,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -340,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -365,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -406,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -471,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -495,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -536,17 +602,19 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..43565bdf6e 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,30 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -66,6 +79,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser channel_binding=disable",
"SCRAM with SSL and channel_binding=disable");
+
if ($supports_tls_server_end_point)
{
test_connect_ok(
@@ -97,12 +111,9 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
-
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v25-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch (3.1K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/5-v25-0003-NSS-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 61ebfcf1ab77a3e1b730601a8fa418353dc432ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:24:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 3/6] NSS pg_strong_random support
---
configure | 1 +
configure.ac | 1 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 3 +++
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 143726c79c..2b83914289 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -18422,6 +18422,7 @@ $as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
+
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 59657a6010..6533e10ffd 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2197,6 +2197,7 @@ elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
+
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 8856a33590..fa5a977617 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -908,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
#undef USE_NSS
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v25-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch (19.8K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/6-v25-0004-NSS-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 6c23c72132419ed880793383e3efbf294ab4e218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:26:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 4/6] NSS Documentation
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++++++---
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index e17cdcc816..b33cffb370 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1238,6 +1238,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1254,7 +1271,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1456,8 +1475,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..1b71881c6e 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,15 +976,30 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
- </listitem>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index b7a82453f0..89796de168 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,72 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> is only available
+ when the server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2569,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2594,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2628,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8065,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8096,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..2578ee8c06 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,88 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v25-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch (29.6K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/7-v25-0005-NSS-contrib-modules.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0424241820e08e9a7f660f476083898a6976468a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 11:34:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 5/6] NSS contrib modules
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 773 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +-
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 12 +-
7 files changed, 863 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da66152d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index ff01acf3f6..660387d0e8 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -445,9 +445,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -477,6 +482,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
--
2.25.1
[text/x-patch] v25-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch (6.6K, ../../ca450cb8a74de3dcc753386f57a5f1d5221d6916.camel@vmware.com/8-v25-0006-NSS-cryptohash-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 87f5997c5406f080b34ba5836ed197723bd0e28f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2021 13:04:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v25 6/6] NSS cryptohash support
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 4 +
2 files changed, 259 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e2b5776c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the colliding definitions match, else throw an error. In case
+ * NSPR has removed the definition for some reason, make sure to put ours
+ * back again.
+ */
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 660387d0e8..180eb0aa3f 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-04 07:30 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-04 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-02-04 07:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 08:33:35PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> Note that this changes the error message printed during the invalid-
> root tests, because NSS is now sending the root of the chain. So the
> server's issuer is considered untrusted rather than unrecognized.
I think that it is not a good idea to attach the since-v*.diff patches
into the threads. This causes the CF bot to fail in applying those
patches.
Could it be possible to split 0001 into two parts at least with one
patch that includes the basic changes for the build and ./configure,
and a second with the FE/BE changes?
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YBuh9mgyzjWuVJhF@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-02-04 18:35 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-05 06:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 2 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-04 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Thu, 2021-02-04 at 16:30 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 08:33:35PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> > Note that this changes the error message printed during the invalid-
> > root tests, because NSS is now sending the root of the chain. So the
> > server's issuer is considered untrusted rather than unrecognized.
>
> I think that it is not a good idea to attach the since-v*.diff patches
> into the threads. This causes the CF bot to fail in applying those
> patches.
Ah, sorry about that. Is there an extension I can use (or lack thereof)
that the CF bot will ignore, or does it scan the attachment contents?
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-04 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-05 06:35 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
1 sibling, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-02-05 06:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 06:35:28PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> Ah, sorry about that. Is there an extension I can use (or lack thereof)
> that the CF bot will ignore, or does it scan the attachment contents?
The thing is smart, but there are ways to bypass it. Here is the
code:
https://github.com/macdice/cfbot/
And here are the patterns looked at:
cfbot_commitfest_rpc.py: groups = re.search('<a
href="(/message-id/attachment/[^"]*\\.(diff|diff\\.gz|patch|patch\\.gz|tar\\.gz|tgz|tar\\.bz2))">',
line)
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YBznO0chw2oLQf8z@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-04 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-08 23:11 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
1 sibling, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-08 23:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 4 Feb 2021, at 19:35, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2021-02-04 at 16:30 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 08:33:35PM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
>>> Note that this changes the error message printed during the invalid-
>>> root tests, because NSS is now sending the root of the chain. So the
>>> server's issuer is considered untrusted rather than unrecognized.
>>
>> I think that it is not a good idea to attach the since-v*.diff patches
>> into the threads. This causes the CF bot to fail in applying those
>> patches.
>
> Ah, sorry about that. Is there an extension I can use (or lack thereof)
> that the CF bot will ignore, or does it scan the attachment contents?
Naming the file .patch.txt should work, and it serves the double purpose of
making it extra clear that this is not a patch intended to be applied but one
intended to be read for informational purposes.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-02-08 23:08 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-08 23:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 4 Feb 2021, at 08:30, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
> Could it be possible to split 0001 into two parts at least with one
> patch that includes the basic changes for the build and ./configure,
> and a second with the FE/BE changes?
Attached is a new patchset where I've tried to split the patches even further
to try and separate out changes for easier review. While not a perfect split
I'm sure, and clearly only for review purposes, I do hope it helps a little.
There is one hunk in 0002 which moves some OpenSSL specific code from
underneath USE_SSL, but thats about the only non-NSS change left in this
patchset AFAICS.
Additionally, this version moves the code in thee shared header to a proper .c
file shared between frontend and backend as well as performs some general
cleanup around that.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v26-0010-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch (20.0K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/2-v26-0010-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d6e0f53f970461ec07e9616d0cac4db3e143fd48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 10/10] nss: Build infrastructure
Finally this adds the infrastructure to build a postgres installation
with libnss support.
---
configure | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
configure.ac | 31 +++-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/common/Makefile | 6 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 6 +
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 39 ++++-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +++
9 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 07da84d401..59657a6010 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..57d44080b4 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cipher_nss.o \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 55cab4d2bf..fa5a977617 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,12 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 49614106dc..53b5a71726 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cipher_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
@@ -196,12 +201,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -259,12 +271,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -432,9 +451,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -464,6 +488,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 2aa062b2c9..0b0fbffa5e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1008,6 +1013,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0009-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch (5.7K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/3-v26-0009-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0d933420191663ed58a81d2457d423c9160fe54e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 09/10] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
This adds support for using libnss as a crypto backend for the built-
in cryptohash support. Much of this code is similar to the pgcrypto
support.
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 236 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..140d562125
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(ctx->hash_type);
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, object->length);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch (3.6K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/4-v26-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 85e704dd47733aa8884f182f3b76639ca6a7fcd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 08/10] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
disables functionality which currently is OpenSSL specific.
---
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch (24.6K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/5-v26-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 544cde3f968341e3ff3ce7ddac6b07783260cfde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 07/10] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
This extends pgcrypto to be able to use libnss as a cryptographic
backend for pgcrypto much like how OpenSSL is a supported backend.
Blowfish is not a supported cipher in NSS, so the implementation
falls back on the built-in BF code to be compatible in terms of
cipher support.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 753 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
3 files changed, 787 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4fd4680ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0006-nss-Documentation.patch (20.0K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/6-v26-0006-nss-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 97da1c020bfd04448e065d87a12c876b57538638 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 06/10] nss: Documentation
Basic documentation of the new API (keypass hooks) as well as config
parameters and installation. Additionally there is a section on how
to create certificate and keys using the NSS toolchain.
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 ++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 +++++++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++++++---
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 5ef1c7ad3c..5482d83e65 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1238,6 +1238,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1254,7 +1271,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1456,8 +1475,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..1b71881c6e 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,15 +976,30 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
- </listitem>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index b7a82453f0..ad2ec93848 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,70 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname> support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
+ server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2497,6 +2567,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2592,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2626,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8063,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8094,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..2578ee8c06 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,88 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation" />
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</certutil> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0005-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch (1.9K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/7-v26-0005-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 102b76c3d46ec19748ce4ce06ed9435972c30ccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 05/10] nss: pg_strong_random support
This adds support for using the RNG in libnss as a backend for
pg_strong_random.
---
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0004-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch (43.9K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/8-v26-0004-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch)
download | inline diff:
From a595749b283822921dd08e8eceeed33bcb6d9dcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 04/10] nss: Add NSS specific tests
This adds the SSL/Backend/NSS which implements the setup and teardown
required as well as adds the NSS configuration to the existing tests.
The OpenSSL testfiles are reused by repackaging them into NSS databases
in order for the tests to be cross-library. Additional testfiles are
generated by using only the NSS toolchain as well as rudimentary tests
using these.
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 29 ++-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++++++
4 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index d545382eea..6966dc23d2 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,79 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +212,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +240,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +280,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +321,64 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index a6d79e2bfc..394505dd8b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -9,7 +9,20 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -47,19 +60,58 @@ configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
note "testing password-protected keys";
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -107,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -195,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -220,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -233,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -243,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -257,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -270,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -286,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -298,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -323,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -364,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -429,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -453,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -468,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -494,14 +602,18 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 3383b3e531..55fe3922e1 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,26 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -97,7 +110,7 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0003-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch (11.2K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/9-v26-0003-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 243948e1d5ebfd44e0a489813db673ccf6918269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 03/10] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
modules for the implementation details.
No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
teardown is performed.
---
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 62 ++---------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 6 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 7928de4e7c..a6d79e2bfc 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,20 +4,14 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
-}
-else
-{
- plan tests => 93;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -32,32 +26,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +40,22 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
command_fails(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
$node->_update_pid(0);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -546,7 +504,5 @@ test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..3383b3e531 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ test_connect_fails(
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0002-nss-Remove-mentions-and-infra-of-OpenSSL-being-t.patch (3.8K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/10-v26-0002-nss-Remove-mentions-and-infra-of-OpenSSL-being-t.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 8760fe28fff4842011c12fb0a29c22d0c3c11677 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 02/10] nss: Remove mentions and infra of OpenSSL being the
only TLS lib
This rewords comments and messages which indicate that --with-ssl only
has a single possible value, as well as moves OpenSSL specific code in
USE_SSL into USE_OPENSSL.
While in there, remove a trailing period from a single-line OpenSSL
comment to better match project style.
---
src/backend/libpq/hba.c | 2 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 5 +++--
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 3 +--
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 5 ++++-
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 2 +-
5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
index 20bf1461ce..9a04c093d5 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
ereport(elevel,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-ssl to use SSL connections."),
errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
line_num, HbaFileName)));
*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index bc86fdfcdb..ea373a0ae0 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -193,8 +193,9 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL backend specific structures. (Keep these last so that the locations
+ * of other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL
+ * enabled.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 0e50f61b94..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -176,8 +176,7 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 83ebd05ce5..3f726663f6 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
@@ -439,7 +442,7 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
#ifndef USE_NSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 59ce0815cf..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ extern int pg_valid_server_encoding_id(int encoding);
/* === in fe-secure-openssl.c === */
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
typedef int (*PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type) (char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v26-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch (90.5K, ../../5382CB4A-9CF3-4145-BA46-C802615935E0@yesql.se/11-v26-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 7dbc26afad4d3e07c223e88102310fba27fc9519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v26 01/10] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the
same internal API for abstracting library specific details.
A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for
the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key
GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames.
Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to
identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported
in the same way as with OpenSSL.
Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
---
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1366 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++
src/include/common/nss.h | 49 +
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1076 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 25 +-
15 files changed, 2786 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 60c7e115d6..3bec874fa6 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8946,7 +8946,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..637d47e3c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1366 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data,
+ certificate->derCert.data,
+ certificate->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 4cf139a223..5e0c27c134 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index eafdb1118e..b023b31c46 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9799fef32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cipher_nss.c
+ * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
+ * with ciphers
+ *
+ * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cipher_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithm;
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+bool
+pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list;
+
+ for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ {
+ *cipher = cipher_list->number;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool
+pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len)
+{
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate;
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+
+ for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++)
+ {
+ if (signature == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ *algorithm = candidate->hash;
+ *len = candidate->len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a361dd1f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.h
+ * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H
+#define COMMON_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */
+bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher);
+bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len);
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 66a8673d93..bc86fdfcdb 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index d27c8601fa..0e50f61b94 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
* implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
* more implementations in the future.)
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 8ca0583aa9..1eeeff54a8 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2f8dc4902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1076 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule * ca_trust = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context);
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build, but the color
+ * of said bikeshed hasn't yet been determined.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supply a password to decrypt a client certificate.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default password handler callback.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index 00b87bdc96..83ebd05ce5 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -441,6 +441,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
}
#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#ifndef USE_NSS
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index c266ad5b13..59ce0815cf 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..c6f84096a0 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,28 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/*
+ * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
+ * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +782,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-09 06:47 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-02-09 06:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 12:08:37AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> Attached is a new patchset where I've tried to split the patches even further
> to try and separate out changes for easier review. While not a perfect split
> I'm sure, and clearly only for review purposes, I do hope it helps a little.
> There is one hunk in 0002 which moves some OpenSSL specific code from
> underneath USE_SSL, but thats about the only non-NSS change left in this
> patchset AFAICS.
I would have imagined 0010 to be either a 0001 or a 0002 :)
}
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifndef USE_OPENSSL
PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type
PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void)
Indeed. Let's fix that on HEAD, as an independent thing.
errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
- errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
+ errhint("Compile with --with-ssl to use SSL connections."),
Actually, we could change that directly on HEAD as you suggest. This
code area is surrounded with USE_SSL so there is no need to mention
openssl at all.
-/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback. */
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
Makes sense.
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
Fine by me as well, meaning that 0002 could just be committed as-is.
I am also looking at 0003 a bit.
--
Michael
Attachments:
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^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-02-09 09:30 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-09 09:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 9 Feb 2021, at 07:47, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 12:08:37AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> Attached is a new patchset where I've tried to split the patches even further
>> to try and separate out changes for easier review. While not a perfect split
>> I'm sure, and clearly only for review purposes, I do hope it helps a little.
>> There is one hunk in 0002 which moves some OpenSSL specific code from
>> underneath USE_SSL, but thats about the only non-NSS change left in this
>> patchset AFAICS.
>
> I would have imagined 0010 to be either a 0001 or a 0002 :)
Well, 0010 is a 2 in binary =) Jokes aside, I just didn't want to have a patch
referencing files added by later patches in the series.
> errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
> - errhint("Compile with --with-ssl=openssl to use SSL connections."),
> + errhint("Compile with --with-ssl to use SSL connections."),
> Actually, we could change that directly on HEAD as you suggest. This
> code area is surrounded with USE_SSL so there is no need to mention
> openssl at all.
We could, the only reason it says =openssl today is that it's the only possible
value but thats an implementation detail. Changing it now before it's shipped
anywhere means the translation will be stable even if another library is
supported.
> 0002 could just be committed as-is.
It can be, it's not the most pressing patch scope reduction but everything
helps of course.
> I am also looking at 0003 a bit.
Thanks. That patch is slightly more interesting in terms of reducing scope
here, but I also think it makes the test code a bit easier to digest when
certificate management is abstracted into the API rather than the job of the
testfile to perform.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-10 07:23 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-02-10 07:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 10:30:52AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> It can be, it's not the most pressing patch scope reduction but everything
> helps of course.
Okay. I have spent some time on this one and finished it.
> Thanks. That patch is slightly more interesting in terms of reducing scope
> here, but I also think it makes the test code a bit easier to digest when
> certificate management is abstracted into the API rather than the job of the
> testfile to perform.
That's my impression. Still, I am wondering if there could be a
different approach. I need to think more about that first..
--
Michael
Attachments:
[application/pgp-signature] signature.asc (832B, ../../YCOJ7P6yfrvrbaY%2F@paquier.xyz/2-signature.asc)
download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
@ 2021-02-10 12:17 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-10 12:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 10 Feb 2021, at 08:23, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 10:30:52AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> It can be, it's not the most pressing patch scope reduction but everything
>> helps of course.
>
> Okay. I have spent some time on this one and finished it.
Thanks, I'll post a rebased version on top of this soon.
>> Thanks. That patch is slightly more interesting in terms of reducing scope
>> here, but I also think it makes the test code a bit easier to digest when
>> certificate management is abstracted into the API rather than the job of the
>> testfile to perform.
>
> That's my impression. Still, I am wondering if there could be a
> different approach. I need to think more about that first..
Another option could be to roll SSL config into PostgresNode and expose SSL
connections to every subsystem tested with TAP. Something like:
$node = get_new_node(..);
$node->setup_ssl(..);
$node->set_certificate(..);
That is a fair bit more work though, but perhaps we could then easier find
(and/or prevent) bugs like the one fixed in a45bc8a4f6495072bc48ad40a5aa03.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-17 21:35 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-17 21:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 10 Feb 2021, at 13:17, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote:
>
>> On 10 Feb 2021, at 08:23, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 10:30:52AM +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>>> It can be, it's not the most pressing patch scope reduction but everything
>>> helps of course.
>>
>> Okay. I have spent some time on this one and finished it.
>
> Thanks, I'll post a rebased version on top of this soon.
Attached is a rebase on top of this and the recent cryptohash changes to pass
in buffer lengths to the _final function. On top of that, I fixed up and
expanded the documentation, improved SCRAM handling (by using NSS digest
operations which are better suited) and reworded and expanded comments. This
patch version is, I think, feature complete with the OpenSSL implementation.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v27-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch (20.0K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/2-v27-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From c575be67573029f67783f1f4b8a6d62101ed0f53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 9/9] nss: Build infrastructure
Finally this adds the infrastructure to build a postgres installation
with libnss support.
---
configure | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
configure.ac | 31 +++-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/common/Makefile | 6 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 6 +
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 39 ++++-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +++
9 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 07da84d401..59657a6010 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 if you have OpenSSL support.])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..57d44080b4 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cipher_nss.o \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 55cab4d2bf..fa5a977617 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -905,6 +905,12 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
+/* Define to build with NSS support (--with-ssl=nss) */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
+/* Define to use NSS for random number generation */
+#undef USE_NSS_RANDOM
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 49614106dc..53b5a71726 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cipher_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
@@ -196,12 +201,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -259,12 +271,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -432,9 +451,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -464,6 +488,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 2aa062b2c9..0b0fbffa5e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1008,6 +1013,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch (6.1K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/3-v27-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch)
download | inline diff:
From eaaffa978450d909deae19522b1dd6ba51baf5a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 8/9] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
This adds support for using libnss as a crypto backend for the built-
in cryptohash support. Much of this code is similar to the pgcrypto
support.
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 264 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59ba9c1697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ if (len < MD5_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ if (len < SHA1_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ if (len < SHA224_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ if (len < SHA256_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ if (len < SHA384_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ if (len < SHA512_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch (3.6K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/4-v27-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 8d918c0ca525fba5d8739c669829d8e4b8634f04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 7/9] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
disables functionality which currently is OpenSSL specific.
---
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch (24.6K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/5-v27-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d385ea06bf58817860b2dc770c6e452a9fca5beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 6/9] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
This extends pgcrypto to be able to use libnss as a cryptographic
backend for pgcrypto much like how OpenSSL is a supported backend.
Blowfish is not a supported cipher in NSS, so the implementation
falls back on the built-in BF code to be compatible in terms of
cipher support.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 753 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
3 files changed, 787 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4fd4680ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0005-nss-Documentation.patch (32.1K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/6-v27-0005-nss-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d8e599419f1ed7f1bb7e0215fc579f821f14b2d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 5/9] nss: Documentation
Basic documentation of the new API (keypass hooks) as well as config
parameters and installation. Additionally there is a section on how
to create certificate and keys using the NSS toolchain.
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 +++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 305 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 124 +++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 453 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 4df1405d2e..a260d42296 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1238,6 +1238,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1254,7 +1271,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1456,8 +1475,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..3cbd125d59 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,14 +976,31 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index b7a82453f0..d490134b64 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,70 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname> support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
+ server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1623,21 +1693,31 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
If set to 1, data sent over SSL connections will be compressed. If
set to 0, compression will be disabled. The default is 0. This
parameter is ignored if a connection without SSL is made.
- </para>
-
- <para>
SSL compression is nowadays considered insecure and its use is no
- longer recommended. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> 1.1.0 disables
- compression by default, and many operating system distributions
- disable it in prior versions as well, so setting this parameter to on
- will not have any effect if the server does not accept compression.
- </para>
+ longer recommended.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: 1.1.0 disables compression by
+ default, and many operating system distributions disable it in prior
+ versions as well, so setting this parameter to on will not have any
+ effect if the server does not accept compression.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
+ throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
+ can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
+ limiting factor.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
- throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
- can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
- limiting factor.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: SSL compression is not supported in
+ <productname>NSS</productname>, this parameter has no effect.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1646,10 +1726,24 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the file name of the client SSL
- certificate, replacing the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
- This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location of the client SSL
+ certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not
+ made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can replace the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: the nickname of the client SSL
+ certificate.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1658,15 +1752,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslkey</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the location for the secret key used for
- the client certificate. It can either specify a file name that will
- be used instead of the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify a key
- obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external engine
- specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name and
- an engine-specific key identifier. This parameter is ignored if an
- SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location for the secret key used
+ for the client certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL
+ connection is not made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can either specify a file name
+ that will be used instead of the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify
+ a key obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external
+ engine specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name
+ and an engine-specific key identifier.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. Keys
+ should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1677,28 +1786,44 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<para>
This parameter specifies the password for the secret key specified in
<literal>sslkey</literal>, allowing client certificate private keys
- to be stored in encrypted form on disk even when interactive passphrase
+ to be stored in encrypted form even when interactive passphrase
input is not practical.
- </para>
- <para>
- Specifying this parameter with any non-empty value suppresses the
- <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal>
- prompt that <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default
- when an encrypted client certificate key is provided to
- <literal>libpq</literal>.
- </para>
- <para>
- If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
- has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- password callback mechanism for prompts.
- </para>
- <para>
- There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
- facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
- used in a service file connection definition. Users with
- more sophisticated uses should consider using openssl engines and
- tools like PKCS#11 or USB crypto offload devices.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifying this parameter with
+ any non-empty value suppresses the
+ <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal> prompt that
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default when an
+ encrypted client certificate key is provided to
+ <literal>libpq</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
+ has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ password callback mechanism for prompts.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
+ facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
+ used in a service file connection definition. Users with
+ more sophisticated uses should consider using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> engines and tools like PKCS#11 or
+ USB crypto offload devices.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: specifying the parameter is required
+ in case any password protected items are referenced in the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> database, or if the database itself
+ is password protected. If multiple different objects are password
+ protected, the same password is used for all.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1707,11 +1832,27 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslrootcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the name of a file containing SSL
- certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
- If the file exists, the server's certificate will be verified
- to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ This parameter specifies the name of SSL certificate authority
+ (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifies the name of a file
+ containing SSL certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
+ certificate(s). If the file exists, the server's certificate will
+ be verified to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. CA
+ certificates should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>certutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1721,10 +1862,27 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<listitem>
<para>
This parameter specifies the file name of the SSL certificate
- revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in this file, if it
- exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
- server's certificate. The default is
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ revocation list (CRL).
+
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: Certificates listed in this file,
+ if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
+ server's certificate. The default is
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1760,8 +1918,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions may
+ not support the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
the default is <literal>TLSv1.2</literal>, which satisfies industry
best practices as of this writing.
</para>
@@ -1776,8 +1934,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions
+ may not support the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
parameter is ignored and the connection will use the maximum bound
defined by the backend, if set. Setting the maximum protocol version
is mainly useful for testing or if some component has issues working
@@ -2497,6 +2655,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2520,9 +2680,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2549,6 +2714,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -7982,6 +8151,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8182,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..1fcad17a51 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,89 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation">
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</application> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch (1.9K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/7-v27-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 264af1bd9e574032c13d17edc9c46de16bcb3f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 4/9] nss: pg_strong_random support
This adds support for using the RNG in libnss as a backend for
pg_strong_random.
---
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch (43.9K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/8-v27-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4c5abf24bd4b357f6167179882ad401aae6614f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 3/9] nss: Add NSS specific tests
This adds the SSL/Backend/NSS which implements the setup and teardown
required as well as adds the NSS configuration to the existing tests.
The OpenSSL testfiles are reused by repackaging them into NSS databases
in order for the tests to be cross-library. Additional testfiles are
generated by using only the NSS toolchain as well as rudimentary tests
using these.
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 29 ++-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 73 ++++++++
4 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index d545382eea..6966dc23d2 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
ssl/client+client_ca.crt ssl/client-der.key \
ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key ssl/client-encrypted-der.key
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -37,6 +66,10 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -64,6 +97,24 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -77,6 +128,79 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -88,6 +212,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -95,6 +240,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -127,19 +280,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -147,13 +321,64 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index a6d79e2bfc..394505dd8b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -9,7 +9,20 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 93;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 99;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -47,19 +60,58 @@ configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
note "testing password-protected keys";
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -107,82 +159,105 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 2 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -195,14 +270,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -220,12 +295,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
@@ -233,7 +308,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -243,12 +318,12 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
@@ -257,7 +332,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -270,14 +345,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -286,7 +361,7 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
@@ -298,11 +373,11 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL");
@@ -323,32 +398,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, 'native_server-root', 'native_ca-root');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -364,32 +457,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -429,18 +533,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -453,10 +558,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -468,7 +576,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -494,14 +602,18 @@ test_connect_ok(
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 3383b3e531..55fe3922e1 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,26 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -97,7 +110,7 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b31e584a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2];
+ my $keyfile = $_[3];
+
+ my $cert_nickname;
+
+ if ($certfile =~ /native/)
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cert_nickname = $certfile . '.crt__' . $keyfile . '.key';
+ }
+ my $cert_database = $cert_nickname . '.db';
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$cert_database'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch (11.2K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/9-v27-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch)
download | inline diff:
From e080f3d1bfddca5487b33fc246d2114bf989921c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
modules for the implementation details.
No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
teardown is performed.
---
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 62 ++---------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 6 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 80 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 7928de4e7c..a6d79e2bfc 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,20 +4,14 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
-}
-else
-{
- plan tests => 93;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -32,32 +26,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +40,22 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
command_fails(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
$node->_update_pid(0);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -546,7 +504,5 @@ test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..3383b3e531 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ test_connect_fails(
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index f5987a003e..ee901855b5 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,12 +164,19 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -157,26 +184,51 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v27-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch (92.2K, ../../0F5CF84D-26F1-44D0-AEAE-E011D3CEC0E2@yesql.se/10-v27-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4b9ebae85c0756f0092ae3ca15369246f1b662a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v27 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the
same internal API for abstracting library specific details.
A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for
the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key
GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames.
Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to
identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported
in the same way as with OpenSSL.
Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
---
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1388 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++
src/include/common/nss.h | 49 +
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1096 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 25 +-
15 files changed, 2828 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 60c7e115d6..3bec874fa6 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8946,7 +8946,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a17e6c7e5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1388 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if
+ * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929
+ * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1). If something else
+ * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used.
+ */
+ if (digest_alg == SEC_OID_SHA1 || digest_alg == SEC_OID_MD5)
+ {
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(digest_alg);
+ if (!ctx)
+ elog(ERROR, "out of memory");
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ status |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx);
+ status |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, certificate->derCert.data, certificate->derCert.len);
+ status |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, digest.data, &outlen, digest_len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash");
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index 7155b33885..354d8e180b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index eafdb1118e..b023b31c46 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4366,6 +4370,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4394,8 +4410,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9799fef32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cipher_nss.c
+ * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
+ * with ciphers
+ *
+ * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cipher_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithm;
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+bool
+pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list;
+
+ for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ {
+ *cipher = cipher_list->number;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool
+pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len)
+{
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate;
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+
+ for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++)
+ {
+ if (signature == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ *algorithm = candidate->hash;
+ *len = candidate->len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a361dd1f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.h
+ * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H
+#define COMMON_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */
+bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher);
+bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len);
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 7be1a67d69..eb00d9152b 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index a55898c85a..d2860b852f 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 2a12071bad..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
* implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 8ca0583aa9..1eeeff54a8 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0548264f52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1096 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context);
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * If a CRL file has been specified, verify if it exists in the database
+ * but don't fail in case it doesn't.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->
+ /* XXX: Implement me.. */
+ }
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule * *module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * VerifyCertificateNow verifies the validity using PR_now from NSPR as a
+ * timestamp and will perform CRL and OSCP revocation checks. conn->sslcrl
+ * does not impact NSS connections as any CRL in the NSS database will be
+ * used automatically.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * socket, CERTDistNames * caNames,
+ CERTCertificate * *pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey * *pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc * fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 && cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ * Check for the presence of a CA certificate
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQssl_passwd_cb
+ * Supply a password to decrypt an object
+ *
+ * If an object in the NSS database is password protected, or if the entire
+ * NSS database is itself password protected, this callback will be invoked.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss
+ * Default password handler callback
+ *
+ * If no user defined password callback has been set up, the callback below
+ * will try the password set by the sslpassword parameter. Since we by legacy
+ * only have support for a single password, there is little reason to inspect
+ * the slot for the object in question. A TODO is to support different
+ * passwords for different objects, either via a DSL in sslpassword or with a
+ * new key/value style parameter. Users can supply their own password hook to
+ * do this of course, but it would be nice to support something in core too.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
}
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifndef USE_NSS
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index effe0ccf85..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 4db498369c..c6f84096a0 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslpassword; /* client key file password */
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -485,6 +486,28 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/*
+ * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
+ * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -759,7 +782,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-18 20:33 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-18 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
On Wed, 2021-02-17 at 22:35 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> Attached is a rebase on top of this and the recent cryptohash changes to pass
> in buffer lengths to the _final function. On top of that, I fixed up and
> expanded the documentation, improved SCRAM handling (by using NSS digest
> operations which are better suited) and reworded and expanded comments. This
> patch version is, I think, feature complete with the OpenSSL implementation.
fe-secure-nss.c is no longer compiling as of this patchset; looks
like pgtls_open_client() has a truncated statement.
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-22 13:31 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-22 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>
> On 18 Feb 2021, at 21:33, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2021-02-17 at 22:35 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> Attached is a rebase on top of this and the recent cryptohash changes to pass
>> in buffer lengths to the _final function. On top of that, I fixed up and
>> expanded the documentation, improved SCRAM handling (by using NSS digest
>> operations which are better suited) and reworded and expanded comments. This
>> patch version is, I think, feature complete with the OpenSSL implementation.
>
> fe-secure-nss.c is no longer compiling as of this patchset; looks
> like pgtls_open_client() has a truncated statement.
Ouch, I had a local mismerge that snuck in as I moved the branch around for
submission here. The attached fixes that as well as implements the sslcrldir
support that was committed recently. The crldir parameter isn't applicable to
NSS per se since all CRL's are loaded into the NSS database, but it does need
to be supported for the tests.
The crldir commit also made similar changes to the test harness as I had done
to support the NSS database, which made these incompatible. To fix that I've
implemented named parameters in switch_server_cert to make it less magic with
multiple optional parameters.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v28-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch (20.5K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/2-v28-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 35bf6312fb855d4dd18da3614d0c6b5881e4157d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 9/9] nss: Build infrastructure
Finally this adds the infrastructure to build a postgres installation
with libnss support.
---
configure | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
configure.ac | 31 +++-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/common/Makefile | 6 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 12 ++
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 39 ++++-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +++
9 files changed, 402 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index f54f65febe..5ec8970588 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl)])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..57d44080b4 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cipher_nss.o \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 04dc330119..474cc2655c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -322,6 +322,12 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `m' library (-lm). */
#undef HAVE_LIBM
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nspr4' library (-lnspr4). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSPR4
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nss3' library (-lnss3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSS3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
@@ -334,6 +340,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl' library (-lssl). */
#undef HAVE_LIBSSL
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl3' library (-lssl3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSSL3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wldap32' library (-lwldap32). */
#undef HAVE_LIBWLDAP32
@@ -899,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to select named POSIX semaphores. */
#undef USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES
+/* Define to 1 if you have NSS support, */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl) */
#undef USE_OPENSSL
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 49614106dc..53b5a71726 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cipher_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
@@ -196,12 +201,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -259,12 +271,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -432,9 +451,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -464,6 +488,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 2aa062b2c9..0b0fbffa5e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1008,6 +1013,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch (6.1K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/3-v28-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d658748c3c752b31720a2203aff848ac83123b65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 8/9] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
This adds support for using libnss as a crypto backend for the built-
in cryptohash support. Much of this code is similar to the pgcrypto
support.
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 264 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59ba9c1697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ if (len < MD5_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ if (len < SHA1_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ if (len < SHA224_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ if (len < SHA256_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ if (len < SHA384_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ if (len < SHA512_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch (3.6K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/4-v28-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 8c782dee692364d7ba03758b4c877452348e2b29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 7/9] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
disables functionality which currently is OpenSSL specific.
---
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch (24.6K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/5-v28-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 420eca69c0b97560cd29a514555448a3c1d429f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 6/9] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
This extends pgcrypto to be able to use libnss as a cryptographic
backend for pgcrypto much like how OpenSSL is a supported backend.
Blowfish is not a supported cipher in NSS, so the implementation
falls back on the built-in BF code to be compatible in terms of
cipher support.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 753 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
3 files changed, 787 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4fd4680ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0005-nss-Documentation.patch (33.8K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/6-v28-0005-nss-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From b225e9706348314cdf7f382e0dbf03c47e1a5c25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 5/9] nss: Documentation
Basic documentation of the new API (keypass hooks) as well as config
parameters and installation. Additionally there is a section on how
to create certificate and keys using the NSS toolchain.
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 124 +++++++++++-
5 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index e81141e45c..7719f2914d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1272,6 +1272,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1288,7 +1305,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1490,8 +1509,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..3cbd125d59 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,14 +976,31 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 5e25f20843..f84896470a 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,70 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname> support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
+ server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1623,21 +1693,31 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
If set to 1, data sent over SSL connections will be compressed. If
set to 0, compression will be disabled. The default is 0. This
parameter is ignored if a connection without SSL is made.
- </para>
-
- <para>
SSL compression is nowadays considered insecure and its use is no
- longer recommended. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> 1.1.0 disables
- compression by default, and many operating system distributions
- disable it in prior versions as well, so setting this parameter to on
- will not have any effect if the server does not accept compression.
- </para>
+ longer recommended.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: 1.1.0 disables compression by
+ default, and many operating system distributions disable it in prior
+ versions as well, so setting this parameter to on will not have any
+ effect if the server does not accept compression.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
+ throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
+ can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
+ limiting factor.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
- throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
- can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
- limiting factor.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: SSL compression is not supported in
+ <productname>NSS</productname>, this parameter has no effect.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1646,10 +1726,24 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the file name of the client SSL
- certificate, replacing the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
- This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location of the client SSL
+ certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not
+ made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can replace the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: the nickname of the client SSL
+ certificate.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1658,15 +1752,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslkey</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the location for the secret key used for
- the client certificate. It can either specify a file name that will
- be used instead of the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify a key
- obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external engine
- specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name and
- an engine-specific key identifier. This parameter is ignored if an
- SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location for the secret key used
+ for the client certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL
+ connection is not made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can either specify a file name
+ that will be used instead of the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify
+ a key obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external
+ engine specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name
+ and an engine-specific key identifier.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. Keys
+ should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1677,28 +1786,44 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<para>
This parameter specifies the password for the secret key specified in
<literal>sslkey</literal>, allowing client certificate private keys
- to be stored in encrypted form on disk even when interactive passphrase
+ to be stored in encrypted form even when interactive passphrase
input is not practical.
- </para>
- <para>
- Specifying this parameter with any non-empty value suppresses the
- <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal>
- prompt that <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default
- when an encrypted client certificate key is provided to
- <literal>libpq</literal>.
- </para>
- <para>
- If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
- has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- password callback mechanism for prompts.
- </para>
- <para>
- There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
- facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
- used in a service file connection definition. Users with
- more sophisticated uses should consider using openssl engines and
- tools like PKCS#11 or USB crypto offload devices.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifying this parameter with
+ any non-empty value suppresses the
+ <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal> prompt that
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default when an
+ encrypted client certificate key is provided to
+ <literal>libpq</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
+ has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ password callback mechanism for prompts.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
+ facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
+ used in a service file connection definition. Users with
+ more sophisticated uses should consider using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> engines and tools like PKCS#11 or
+ USB crypto offload devices.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: specifying the parameter is required
+ in case any password protected items are referenced in the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> database, or if the database itself
+ is password protected. If multiple different objects are password
+ protected, the same password is used for all.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1707,11 +1832,27 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslrootcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the name of a file containing SSL
- certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
- If the file exists, the server's certificate will be verified
- to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ This parameter specifies the name of SSL certificate authority
+ (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifies the name of a file
+ containing SSL certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
+ certificate(s). If the file exists, the server's certificate will
+ be verified to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. CA
+ certificates should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>certutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1721,13 +1862,29 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<listitem>
<para>
This parameter specifies the file name of the SSL certificate
- revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in this file, if it
- exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
- server's certificate. If neither
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
- taken as
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ revocation list (CRL).
+
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: Certificates listed in this file,
+ if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
+ server's certificate. If neither
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
+ taken as <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1740,18 +1897,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in the files in this
directory, if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to
authenticate the server's certificate.
- </para>
- <para>
- The directory needs to be prepared with the OpenSSL command
- <literal>openssl rehash</literal> or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See
- its documentation for details.
- </para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: the directory needs to be
+ prepared with the OpenSSL command <literal>openssl rehash</literal>
+ or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See its documentation for details.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can
+ be specified together.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can be
- specified together.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1786,8 +1955,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions may
+ not support the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
the default is <literal>TLSv1.2</literal>, which satisfies industry
best practices as of this writing.
</para>
@@ -1802,8 +1971,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions
+ may not support the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
parameter is ignored and the connection will use the maximum bound
defined by the backend, if set. Setting the maximum protocol version
is mainly useful for testing or if some component has issues working
@@ -2523,6 +2692,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2546,9 +2717,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2575,6 +2751,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8188,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8034,6 +8219,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..1fcad17a51 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,89 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation">
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</application> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch (1.9K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/7-v28-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 92a89e2af330650b7307ac85447e07dd1f809b45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 4/9] nss: pg_strong_random support
This adds support for using the RNG in libnss as a backend for
pg_strong_random.
---
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch (52.3K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/8-v28-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 42f6b684ca1ae89c7a6aab3da74b6eeab583c51d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 3/9] nss: Add NSS specific tests
This adds the SSL/Backend/NSS which implements the setup and teardown
required as well as adds the NSS configuration to the existing tests.
The OpenSSL testfiles are reused by repackaging them into NSS databases
in order for the tests to be cross-library. Additional testfiles are
generated by using only the NSS toolchain as well as rudimentary tests
using these.
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 244 ++++++++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 350 ++++++++++++++++++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 31 ++-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 61 +++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 21 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm | 44 +---
6 files changed, 586 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 4b53fdf6c0..8d4afa9dd0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -33,6 +33,36 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
ssl/root+client-crldir ssl/root+server-crldir
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -40,6 +70,10 @@ SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES) $(SSLDIRS)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -67,6 +101,35 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+server-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+server-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -80,6 +143,86 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db: ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+client-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+client-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -91,6 +234,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -98,6 +262,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -130,19 +302,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -168,14 +361,65 @@ ssl/client-crldir: ssl/client.crl
mkdir ssl/client-crldir
cp ssl/client.crl ssl/client-crldir/`openssl crl -hash -noout -in ssl/client.crl`.r0
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
rm -rf $(SSLDIRS)
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 30b68bddbe..dbd49817da 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -9,13 +9,22 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 100;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 106;
}
else
{
- plan tests => 100;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -51,19 +60,78 @@ configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
note "testing password-protected keys";
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
+
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1');
+
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 5
+ if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
+
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1');
+
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -91,7 +159,7 @@ command_ok(
note "running client tests";
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -111,95 +179,118 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 4 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
-# The same for CRL directory
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+ # The same for CRL directory
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# The same for CRL directory
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
"directory CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -212,14 +303,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-multiple-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,20 +328,20 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
# slightly different error message, that's all)
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-single-alt-name', nssdatabase => 'server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -260,21 +351,21 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
# Test server certificate with a CN and SANs. Per RFCs 2818 and 6125, the CN
# should be ignored when the certificate has both.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-and-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -287,14 +378,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-no-names', nssdatabase => 'server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -303,11 +394,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -315,16 +406,16 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL file");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL directory");
@@ -345,32 +436,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'native_server-root', cafile => 'native_ca-root', nssdatabase => 'native_server-root.db');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -386,32 +495,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -451,18 +571,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -475,10 +596,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -490,7 +614,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -514,24 +638,28 @@ test_connect_ok(
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', cafile => 'root_ca', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# test server-side CRL directory
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', undef, undef, 'root+client-crldir');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', crldir => 'root+client-crldir', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db');
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 3383b3e531..801c945e88 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,26 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -47,7 +60,7 @@ $node->start;
# Configure server for SSL connections, with password handling.
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
"scram-sha-256", "pass", "scram-sha-256");
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$ENV{PGPASSWORD} = "pass";
$common_connstr =
"dbname=trustdb sslmode=require sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
@@ -97,7 +110,7 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20633fe41b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
+
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$params->{nssdatabase}'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
index 62b11b7632..ecceaefe57 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -71,18 +71,19 @@ sub init
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub set_server_cert
{
- my $self = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
- my $sslconf =
- "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
- . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+ $params->{crlfile} = 'root+client.crl' unless defined $params->{crlfile};
+ $params->{keyfile} = $params->{certfile} unless defined $params->{keyfile};
- return $sslconf;
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$params->{keyfile}.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='$params->{crlfile}'\n";
+ $sslconf .= "ssl_crl_dir='$params->{crldir}'\n" if defined $params->{crldir};
}
sub get_library
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index e59554f85b..da90b2c1d3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
- set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -202,46 +201,21 @@ sub cleanup
$backend->cleanup();
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
-sub set_server_cert
+# Change the configuration to use the given set of certificate, key, ca and
+# CRL, and potentially reload the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub switch_server_cert
{
- my $node = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
- my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
- my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
- my $crldir;
- my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
-
- $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
-
- # defaults to use crl file
- if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
- {
- $crlfile = $_[3];
- $crldir = $_[4];
- }
+ my $node = shift;
+ my %params = @_;
+ my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
- print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
- unless $pwcmd eq '';
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert(\%params);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='" . $params{passphrase_cmd} . "'\n"
+ if defined $params{passphrase_cmd};
close $sslconf;
- return;
-}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
-# piece of the work.
-sub switch_server_cert
-{
- my $node = $_[0];
- set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch (11.5K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/9-v28-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch)
download | inline diff:
From da2520aec462b80609c318b6c196bcc24a61bf57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
modules for the implementation details.
No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
teardown is performed.
---
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 56 ++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 6 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 83 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 864f6e209f..30b68bddbe 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,12 +4,10 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
@@ -32,32 +30,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +44,22 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
command_fails(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
$node->_update_pid(0);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -574,7 +536,5 @@ test_connect_fails(
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..3383b3e531 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ test_connect_fails(
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 5ec5e0dac8..e59554f85b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,14 +164,21 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
- mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
- copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -159,20 +186,36 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
my $crldir;
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
# defaults to use crl file
if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
{
@@ -182,13 +225,23 @@ sub switch_server_cert
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v28-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch (92.0K, ../../AB4CA717-2B6E-4782-AD7D-4FD99CCB6338@yesql.se/10-v28-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 6d6179180f41746c65ab139e4cf0e85fc5fb84bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v28 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the
same internal API for abstracting library specific details.
A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for
the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key
GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames.
Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to
identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported
in the same way as with OpenSSL.
Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
---
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1388 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++
src/include/common/nss.h | 49 +
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1088 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 25 +-
15 files changed, 2820 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 0649b6b81c..3d51a7c9b8 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8946,7 +8946,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 545635f41a..09ad2ad063 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a17e6c7e5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1388 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if
+ * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929
+ * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1). If something else
+ * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used.
+ */
+ if (digest_alg == SEC_OID_SHA1 || digest_alg == SEC_OID_MD5)
+ {
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(digest_alg);
+ if (!ctx)
+ elog(ERROR, "out of memory");
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ status |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx);
+ status |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, certificate->derCert.data, certificate->derCert.len);
+ status |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, digest.data, &outlen, digest_len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash");
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index d1545a2ad6..be583d7278 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 260ec7b97e..40b9c2a883 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4376,6 +4380,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4404,8 +4420,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9799fef32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cipher_nss.c
+ * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
+ * with ciphers
+ *
+ * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cipher_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithm;
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+bool
+pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list;
+
+ for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ {
+ *cipher = cipher_list->number;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool
+pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len)
+{
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate;
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+
+ for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++)
+ {
+ if (signature == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ *algorithm = candidate->hash;
+ *len = candidate->len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a361dd1f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.h
+ * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H
+#define COMMON_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */
+bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher);
+bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len);
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 7be1a67d69..eb00d9152b 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b41b10620a..ff67d0d20d 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index 2a12071bad..7861b94290 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
* implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index db71fea169..40bc1cd348 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -359,6 +359,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72b0c54d1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1088 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context);
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * VerifyCertificateNow verifies the validity using PR_now from NSPR as a
+ * timestamp and will perform CRL and OSCP revocation checks. conn->sslcrl
+ * does not impact NSS connections as any CRL in the NSS database will be
+ * used automatically.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database &&
+ strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 &&
+ cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ * Check for the presence of a CA certificate
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQssl_passwd_cb
+ * Supply a password to decrypt an object
+ *
+ * If an object in the NSS database is password protected, or if the entire
+ * NSS database is itself password protected, this callback will be invoked.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss
+ * Default password handler callback
+ *
+ * If no user defined password callback has been set up, the callback below
+ * will try the password set by the sslpassword parameter. Since we by legacy
+ * only have support for a single password, there is little reason to inspect
+ * the slot for the object in question. A TODO is to support different
+ * passwords for different objects, either via a DSL in sslpassword or with a
+ * new key/value style parameter. Users can supply their own password hook to
+ * do this of course, but it would be nice to support something in core too.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
}
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifndef USE_NSS
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index effe0ccf85..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index ce36aabd25..d7103f0bf2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -486,6 +487,28 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/*
+ * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
+ * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -760,7 +783,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-02-24 00:11 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-02-24 00:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 14:31 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> The attached fixes that as well as implements the sslcrldir
> support that was committed recently. The crldir parameter isn't applicable to
> NSS per se since all CRL's are loaded into the NSS database, but it does need
> to be supported for the tests.
>
> The crldir commit also made similar changes to the test harness as I had done
> to support the NSS database, which made these incompatible. To fix that I've
> implemented named parameters in switch_server_cert to make it less magic with
> multiple optional parameters.
The named parameters are a big improvement!
Couple things I've noticed with this patch, back on the OpenSSL side.
In SSL::Backend::OpenSSL's set_server_conf() implementation:
> + my $sslconf =
> + "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
> + . "ssl_cert_file='$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
> + . "ssl_key_file='$params->{keyfile}.key'\n"
> + . "ssl_crl_file='$params->{crlfile}'\n";
> + $sslconf .= "ssl_crl_dir='$params->{crldir}'\n" if defined $params->{crldir};
> }
this is missing a `return $sslconf` at the end.
In 001_ssltests.pl:
> -set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
> - 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
> -command_fails(
> - [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
> - 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
> -$node->_update_pid(0);
> +# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
> +# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
> +SKIP:
> +{
> + skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
> + if ($nss);
> +
> + switch_server_cert($node,
> + certfile => 'server-cn-only',
> + cafile => 'root+client_ca',
> + keyfile => 'server-password',
> + nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
> + passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
> +
> + command_fails(
> + [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
> + 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
> + $node->_update_pid(0);
The removal of set_server_cert() in favor of switch_server_cert()
breaks these tests in OpenSSL, because the restart that
switch_server_cert performs will fail as designed. (The new comment
above switch_server_cert() suggests maybe you had a switch in mind to
skip the restart?)
NSS is not affected because we expect the restart to succeed:
> + command_ok(
> + [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
> + 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
but I'd argue that that NSS test and the one after it should probably
be removed. We already know restart succeeded; otherwise
switch_server_cert() would have failed. (The test descriptions also
have the old "restart fails" verbiage.)
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-02-24 12:23 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-02-24 12:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
> On 24 Feb 2021, at 01:11, Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 14:31 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> The attached fixes that as well as implements the sslcrldir
>> support that was committed recently. The crldir parameter isn't applicable to
>> NSS per se since all CRL's are loaded into the NSS database, but it does need
>> to be supported for the tests.
>>
>> The crldir commit also made similar changes to the test harness as I had done
>> to support the NSS database, which made these incompatible. To fix that I've
>> implemented named parameters in switch_server_cert to make it less magic with
>> multiple optional parameters.
>
> The named parameters are a big improvement!
>
> Couple things I've noticed with this patch, back on the OpenSSL side.
> In SSL::Backend::OpenSSL's set_server_conf() implementation:
>
>> + my $sslconf =
>> + "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
>> + . "ssl_cert_file='$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
>> + . "ssl_key_file='$params->{keyfile}.key'\n"
>> + . "ssl_crl_file='$params->{crlfile}'\n";
>> + $sslconf .= "ssl_crl_dir='$params->{crldir}'\n" if defined $params->{crldir};
>> }
>
> this is missing a `return $sslconf` at the end.
Yeah, I was clearly undercaffeinated and forgot to re-run the tests on OpenSSL
after some hackery. Fixed.
> In 001_ssltests.pl:
>
>> -set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
>> - 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
>> -command_fails(
>> - [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
>> - 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
>> -$node->_update_pid(0);
>> +# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
>> +# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
>> +SKIP:
>> +{
>> + skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
>> + if ($nss);
>> +
>> + switch_server_cert($node,
>> + certfile => 'server-cn-only',
>> + cafile => 'root+client_ca',
>> + keyfile => 'server-password',
>> + nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
>> + passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
>> +
>> + command_fails(
>> + [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
>> + 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
>> + $node->_update_pid(0);
>
> The removal of set_server_cert() in favor of switch_server_cert()
> breaks these tests in OpenSSL, because the restart that
> switch_server_cert performs will fail as designed. (The new comment
> above switch_server_cert() suggests maybe you had a switch in mind to
> skip the restart?)
I initially had a restart => 'yes' parameter which turned too repetetive since
nearly all calls wants a restart. When I switched it to an opt-out I missed to
update the tests. Fixed.
> NSS is not affected because we expect the restart to succeed:
>
>> + command_ok(
>> + [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
>> + 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
>
> but I'd argue that that NSS test and the one after it should probably
> be removed. We already know restart succeeded; otherwise
> switch_server_cert() would have failed. (The test descriptions also
> have the old "restart fails" verbiage.)
Agreed, removed.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v29-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch (20.5K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/2-v29-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 373354960ac90aa18b5f20b44ffc6859e71abf03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 9/9] nss: Build infrastructure
Finally this adds the infrastructure to build a postgres installation
with libnss support.
---
configure | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
configure.ac | 31 +++-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/common/Makefile | 6 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 12 ++
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 39 ++++-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 20 +++
9 files changed, 402 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index f54f65febe..5ec8970588 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl)])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..57d44080b4 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cipher_nss.o \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 04dc330119..474cc2655c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -322,6 +322,12 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `m' library (-lm). */
#undef HAVE_LIBM
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nspr4' library (-lnspr4). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSPR4
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nss3' library (-lnss3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSS3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
@@ -334,6 +340,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl' library (-lssl). */
#undef HAVE_LIBSSL
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl3' library (-lssl3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSSL3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wldap32' library (-lwldap32). */
#undef HAVE_LIBWLDAP32
@@ -899,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to select named POSIX semaphores. */
#undef USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES
+/* Define to 1 if you have NSS support, */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl) */
#undef USE_OPENSSL
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 49614106dc..53b5a71726 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cipher_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
@@ -196,12 +201,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -259,12 +271,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -432,9 +451,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -464,6 +488,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 2aa062b2c9..0b0fbffa5e 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +541,10 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -1008,6 +1013,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch (6.1K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/3-v29-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch)
download | inline diff:
From e1772794d2f1f476d5124aab984f1015f3109bbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 8/9] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
This adds support for using libnss as a crypto backend for the built-
in cryptohash support. Much of this code is similar to the pgcrypto
support.
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 264 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59ba9c1697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ if (len < MD5_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ if (len < SHA1_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ if (len < SHA224_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ if (len < SHA256_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ if (len < SHA384_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ if (len < SHA512_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch (3.6K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/4-v29-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 1e73a35c4d08aad1ee7f41172642aaa1e38581f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 7/9] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
disables functionality which currently is OpenSSL specific.
---
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch (24.6K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/5-v29-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4bc85ff8cb3cdac35af2fe2ff48683e46c931228 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 6/9] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
This extends pgcrypto to be able to use libnss as a cryptographic
backend for pgcrypto much like how OpenSSL is a supported backend.
Blowfish is not a supported cipher in NSS, so the implementation
falls back on the built-in BF code to be compatible in terms of
cipher support.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 753 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
3 files changed, 787 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4fd4680ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0005-nss-Documentation.patch (33.8K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/6-v29-0005-nss-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From d69dd599854fa85502ac9a36f97c4f42c7fb3623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 5/9] nss: Documentation
Basic documentation of the new API (keypass hooks) as well as config
parameters and installation. Additionally there is a section on how
to create certificate and keys using the NSS toolchain.
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 124 +++++++++++-
5 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index d7a7376798..6eff5934e2 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1272,6 +1272,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1288,7 +1305,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1490,8 +1509,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..3cbd125d59 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,14 +976,31 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 5e25f20843..f84896470a 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,70 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname> support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
+ server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1623,21 +1693,31 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
If set to 1, data sent over SSL connections will be compressed. If
set to 0, compression will be disabled. The default is 0. This
parameter is ignored if a connection without SSL is made.
- </para>
-
- <para>
SSL compression is nowadays considered insecure and its use is no
- longer recommended. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> 1.1.0 disables
- compression by default, and many operating system distributions
- disable it in prior versions as well, so setting this parameter to on
- will not have any effect if the server does not accept compression.
- </para>
+ longer recommended.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: 1.1.0 disables compression by
+ default, and many operating system distributions disable it in prior
+ versions as well, so setting this parameter to on will not have any
+ effect if the server does not accept compression.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
+ throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
+ can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
+ limiting factor.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
- throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
- can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
- limiting factor.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: SSL compression is not supported in
+ <productname>NSS</productname>, this parameter has no effect.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1646,10 +1726,24 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the file name of the client SSL
- certificate, replacing the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
- This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location of the client SSL
+ certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not
+ made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can replace the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: the nickname of the client SSL
+ certificate.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1658,15 +1752,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslkey</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the location for the secret key used for
- the client certificate. It can either specify a file name that will
- be used instead of the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify a key
- obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external engine
- specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name and
- an engine-specific key identifier. This parameter is ignored if an
- SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location for the secret key used
+ for the client certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL
+ connection is not made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can either specify a file name
+ that will be used instead of the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify
+ a key obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external
+ engine specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name
+ and an engine-specific key identifier.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. Keys
+ should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1677,28 +1786,44 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<para>
This parameter specifies the password for the secret key specified in
<literal>sslkey</literal>, allowing client certificate private keys
- to be stored in encrypted form on disk even when interactive passphrase
+ to be stored in encrypted form even when interactive passphrase
input is not practical.
- </para>
- <para>
- Specifying this parameter with any non-empty value suppresses the
- <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal>
- prompt that <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default
- when an encrypted client certificate key is provided to
- <literal>libpq</literal>.
- </para>
- <para>
- If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
- has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- password callback mechanism for prompts.
- </para>
- <para>
- There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
- facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
- used in a service file connection definition. Users with
- more sophisticated uses should consider using openssl engines and
- tools like PKCS#11 or USB crypto offload devices.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifying this parameter with
+ any non-empty value suppresses the
+ <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal> prompt that
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default when an
+ encrypted client certificate key is provided to
+ <literal>libpq</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
+ has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ password callback mechanism for prompts.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
+ facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
+ used in a service file connection definition. Users with
+ more sophisticated uses should consider using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> engines and tools like PKCS#11 or
+ USB crypto offload devices.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: specifying the parameter is required
+ in case any password protected items are referenced in the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> database, or if the database itself
+ is password protected. If multiple different objects are password
+ protected, the same password is used for all.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1707,11 +1832,27 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslrootcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the name of a file containing SSL
- certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
- If the file exists, the server's certificate will be verified
- to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ This parameter specifies the name of SSL certificate authority
+ (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifies the name of a file
+ containing SSL certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
+ certificate(s). If the file exists, the server's certificate will
+ be verified to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. CA
+ certificates should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>certutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1721,13 +1862,29 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<listitem>
<para>
This parameter specifies the file name of the SSL certificate
- revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in this file, if it
- exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
- server's certificate. If neither
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
- taken as
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ revocation list (CRL).
+
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: Certificates listed in this file,
+ if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
+ server's certificate. If neither
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
+ taken as <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1740,18 +1897,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in the files in this
directory, if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to
authenticate the server's certificate.
- </para>
- <para>
- The directory needs to be prepared with the OpenSSL command
- <literal>openssl rehash</literal> or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See
- its documentation for details.
- </para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: the directory needs to be
+ prepared with the OpenSSL command <literal>openssl rehash</literal>
+ or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See its documentation for details.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can
+ be specified together.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can be
- specified together.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1786,8 +1955,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions may
+ not support the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
the default is <literal>TLSv1.2</literal>, which satisfies industry
best practices as of this writing.
</para>
@@ -1802,8 +1971,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions
+ may not support the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
parameter is ignored and the connection will use the maximum bound
defined by the backend, if set. Setting the maximum protocol version
is mainly useful for testing or if some component has issues working
@@ -2523,6 +2692,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2546,9 +2717,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2575,6 +2751,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8008,6 +8188,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8034,6 +8219,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..1fcad17a51 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,89 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation">
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</application> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch (1.9K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/7-v29-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From bd593ad86cf4d4fca3fe4a89c1b89832bedb9805 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 4/9] nss: pg_strong_random support
This adds support for using the RNG in libnss as a backend for
pg_strong_random.
---
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch (52.2K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/8-v29-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 1ed0d6d2c20d8504090d8d166e6ca20491c108ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 3/9] nss: Add NSS specific tests
This adds the SSL/Backend/NSS which implements the setup and teardown
required as well as adds the NSS configuration to the existing tests.
The OpenSSL testfiles are reused by repackaging them into NSS databases
in order for the tests to be cross-library. Additional testfiles are
generated by using only the NSS toolchain as well as rudimentary tests
using these.
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 244 ++++++++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 342 +++++++++++++++++---------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 31 ++-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 61 +++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 19 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm | 48 +---
6 files changed, 582 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 4b53fdf6c0..8d4afa9dd0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -33,6 +33,36 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
ssl/root+client-crldir ssl/root+server-crldir
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -40,6 +70,10 @@ SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES) $(SSLDIRS)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -67,6 +101,35 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+server-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+server-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -80,6 +143,86 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db: ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+client-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+client-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -91,6 +234,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -98,6 +262,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -130,19 +302,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -168,14 +361,65 @@ ssl/client-crldir: ssl/client.crl
mkdir ssl/client-crldir
cp ssl/client.crl ssl/client-crldir/`openssl crl -hash -noout -in ssl/client.crl`.r0
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
rm -rf $(SSLDIRS)
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 30b68bddbe..25efe791f3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -9,13 +9,22 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 103;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 104;
}
else
{
- plan tests => 100;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -51,19 +60,70 @@ configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
note "testing password-protected keys";
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword',
+ restart => 'no' );
+
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1',
+ restart => 'no');
+
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 3
+ if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
+
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1');
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -91,7 +151,7 @@ command_ok(
note "running client tests";
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -111,95 +171,118 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 4 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
-# The same for CRL directory
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+ # The same for CRL directory
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# The same for CRL directory
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
"directory CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -212,14 +295,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-multiple-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,20 +320,20 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
# slightly different error message, that's all)
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-single-alt-name', nssdatabase => 'server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -260,21 +343,21 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
# Test server certificate with a CN and SANs. Per RFCs 2818 and 6125, the CN
# should be ignored when the certificate has both.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-and-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -287,14 +370,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-no-names', nssdatabase => 'server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -303,11 +386,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -315,16 +398,16 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL file");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL directory");
@@ -345,32 +428,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'native_server-root', cafile => 'native_ca-root', nssdatabase => 'native_server-root.db');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -386,32 +487,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -451,18 +563,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -475,10 +588,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -490,7 +606,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -514,24 +630,28 @@ test_connect_ok(
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', cafile => 'root_ca', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# test server-side CRL directory
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', undef, undef, 'root+client-crldir');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', crldir => 'root+client-crldir', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db');
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 3383b3e531..801c945e88 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,26 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -47,7 +60,7 @@ $node->start;
# Configure server for SSL connections, with password handling.
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
"scram-sha-256", "pass", "scram-sha-256");
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$ENV{PGPASSWORD} = "pass";
$common_connstr =
"dbname=trustdb sslmode=require sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
@@ -97,7 +110,7 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20633fe41b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
+
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$params->{nssdatabase}'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
index 62b11b7632..f74caf67fe 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -71,16 +71,19 @@ sub init
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub set_server_cert
{
- my $self = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
+
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+ $params->{crlfile} = 'root+client.crl' unless defined $params->{crlfile};
+ $params->{keyfile} = $params->{certfile} unless defined $params->{keyfile};
my $sslconf =
- "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
- . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$params->{keyfile}.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='$params->{crlfile}'\n";
+ $sslconf .= "ssl_crl_dir='$params->{crldir}'\n" if defined $params->{crldir};
return $sslconf;
}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index e59554f85b..da25645d25 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
- set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -202,46 +201,25 @@ sub cleanup
$backend->cleanup();
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
-sub set_server_cert
+# Change the configuration to use the given set of certificate, key, ca and
+# CRL, and potentially reload the configuration by restarting the server so
+# that the configuration takes effect. Restarting is the default, passing
+# restart => 'no' opts out of it leaving the server running.
+sub switch_server_cert
{
- my $node = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
- my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
- my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
- my $crldir;
- my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
-
- $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
-
- # defaults to use crl file
- if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
- {
- $crlfile = $_[3];
- $crldir = $_[4];
- }
+ my $node = shift;
+ my %params = @_;
+ my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
- print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
- unless $pwcmd eq '';
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert(\%params);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='" . $params{passphrase_cmd} . "'\n"
+ if defined $params{passphrase_cmd};
close $sslconf;
- return;
-}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
-# piece of the work.
-sub switch_server_cert
-{
- my $node = $_[0];
- set_server_cert(@_);
+ return if (defined($params{restart}) && $params{restart} eq 'no');
+
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch (11.5K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/9-v29-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 8eeae109b4bbcc84b343128b20c371d450d66e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
modules for the implementation details.
No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
teardown is performed.
---
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 56 ++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 6 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 83 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 864f6e209f..30b68bddbe 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,12 +4,10 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
@@ -32,32 +30,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +44,22 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
command_fails(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
$node->_update_pid(0);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -574,7 +536,5 @@ test_connect_fails(
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..3383b3e531 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ test_connect_fails(
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 5ec5e0dac8..e59554f85b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,14 +164,21 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
- mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
- copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -159,20 +186,36 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
my $crldir;
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
# defaults to use crl file
if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
{
@@ -182,13 +225,23 @@ sub switch_server_cert
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v29-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch (92.0K, ../../04E81B50-ACE9-40D3-9C66-7041F969A958@yesql.se/10-v29-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch)
download | inline diff:
From ef8570b22e8d8360a28110d5bae4c11525e637f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v29 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the
same internal API for abstracting library specific details.
A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for
the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key
GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames.
Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to
identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported
in the same way as with OpenSSL.
Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
---
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1388 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++
src/include/common/nss.h | 49 +
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1088 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 25 +-
15 files changed, 2820 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 0649b6b81c..3d51a7c9b8 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8946,7 +8946,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index baa0712c0f..db08a75326 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a17e6c7e5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1388 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if
+ * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929
+ * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1). If something else
+ * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used.
+ */
+ if (digest_alg == SEC_OID_SHA1 || digest_alg == SEC_OID_MD5)
+ {
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(digest_alg);
+ if (!ctx)
+ elog(ERROR, "out of memory");
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ status |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx);
+ status |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, certificate->derCert.data, certificate->derCert.len);
+ status |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, digest.data, &outlen, digest_len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash");
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index d1545a2ad6..be583d7278 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index d626731723..8504a404df 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4308,7 +4308,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4376,6 +4380,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4404,8 +4420,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9799fef32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cipher_nss.c
+ * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
+ * with ciphers
+ *
+ * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cipher_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithm;
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+bool
+pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list;
+
+ for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ {
+ *cipher = cipher_list->number;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool
+pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len)
+{
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate;
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+
+ for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++)
+ {
+ if (signature == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ *algorithm = candidate->hash;
+ *len = candidate->len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a361dd1f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.h
+ * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H
+#define COMMON_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */
+bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher);
+bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len);
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 7be1a67d69..eb00d9152b 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index b41b10620a..ff67d0d20d 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index f10ad0acd6..6e901beba1 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
* implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index db71fea169..40bc1cd348 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -359,6 +359,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72b0c54d1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1088 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context);
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * VerifyCertificateNow verifies the validity using PR_now from NSPR as a
+ * timestamp and will perform CRL and OSCP revocation checks. conn->sslcrl
+ * does not impact NSS connections as any CRL in the NSS database will be
+ * used automatically.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database &&
+ strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 &&
+ cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ * Check for the presence of a CA certificate
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQssl_passwd_cb
+ * Supply a password to decrypt an object
+ *
+ * If an object in the NSS database is password protected, or if the entire
+ * NSS database is itself password protected, this callback will be invoked.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss
+ * Default password handler callback
+ *
+ * If no user defined password callback has been set up, the callback below
+ * will try the password set by the sslpassword parameter. Since we by legacy
+ * only have support for a single password, there is little reason to inspect
+ * the slot for the object in question. A TODO is to support different
+ * passwords for different objects, either via a DSL in sslpassword or with a
+ * new key/value style parameter. Users can supply their own password hook to
+ * do this of course, but it would be nice to support something in core too.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
}
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifndef USE_NSS
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index effe0ccf85..aba32e6635 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -625,6 +625,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index ce36aabd25..d7103f0bf2 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -486,6 +487,28 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/*
+ * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
+ * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -760,7 +783,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-03-03 08:52 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Gustafsson @ 2021-03-03 08:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; +Cc: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
Attached is a rebase which attempts to fix the cfbot Appveyor failure, there
were missing HAVE_ defines for MSVC.
--
Daniel Gustafsson https://vmware.com/
Attachments:
[application/octet-stream] v30-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch (92.0K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/2-v30-0001-nss-Support-libnss-as-TLS-library-in-libpq.patch)
download | inline diff:
From dddbaa5e7414cf05e7c5e7c26810d28f286e3285 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the
same internal API for abstracting library specific details.
A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for
the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key
GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames.
Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to
identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported
in the same way as with OpenSSL.
Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
---
.../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +-
src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 7 +
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1388 +++++++++++++++++
src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 3 +
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 20 +-
src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++
src/include/common/nss.h | 49 +
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +-
src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 3 +
src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +-
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 +
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1088 +++++++++++++
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 +
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 25 +-
15 files changed, 2820 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c
create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h
create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
index 0649b6b81c..3d51a7c9b8 100644
--- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
+++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out
@@ -8946,7 +8946,7 @@ DO $d$
END;
$d$;
ERROR: invalid option "password"
-HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
+HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, cert_database, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size
CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')"
PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE
-- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index baa0712c0f..db08a75326 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
{
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
Assert(port->ssl);
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
+ Assert(port->pr_fd);
+#else
+ Assert(false);
+#endif
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a17e6c7e5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1388 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/base64.h>
+#include <nss/cert.h>
+#include <nss/certdb.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/keyhi.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secder.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secport.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslerr.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
+nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
+
+static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
+
+static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver;
+
+static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data);
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRInt32 pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+ PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout);
+static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd);
+/* Utility functions */
+static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port);
+static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name);
+
+static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
+ PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster
+ *
+ * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the
+ * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could
+ * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the
+ * separation chosen.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLVersionRange supported_sslver;
+
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot
+ * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the
+ * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations.
+ * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured
+ * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In
+ * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back
+ * to the highest version TLS that the library supports.
+ */
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
+ * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
+ * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
+ * make translations easier.
+ */
+ desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max;
+
+ if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.min = ver;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+ {
+ int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version,
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version");
+
+ if (ver == -1)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+ false, false))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ver > 0)
+ desired_sslver.max = ver;
+
+ if (ver < desired_sslver.min)
+ {
+ ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+ errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+ "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+ "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the
+ * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase
+ * repeatedly.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+ (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key;
+ CERTSignedCrl *crl;
+ SECItem crlname;
+ char *cert_database;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
+ * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
+ * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
+ * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
+ * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
+ * explicitly).
+ *
+ * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
+ * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
+ * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
+ * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
+ * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
+ * are ignored.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
+
+ /*
+ * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
+ * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
+ * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
+ * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
+ * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
+ * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
+ * key to exist.
+ *
+ * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
+ * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
+ * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
+ * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
+ * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
+ * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
+ * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
+ * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
+ * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
+ *
+ * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal
+ * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using
+ * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure
+ * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some
+ * details on these.
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("no certificate database specified")));
+
+ cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to connect to socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ *
+ * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in
+ * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be
+ * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which
+ * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just
+ * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we
+ * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real
+ * socket.
+ */
+ model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to open socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in
+ * order to set it up as a server.
+ */
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess ||
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range
+ * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to
+ * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn
+ * them off as well.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites,
+ * set the domestic policy.
+ *
+ * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and
+ * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long
+ * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards
+ * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies
+ * now do the same thing.
+ *
+ * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than
+ * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy.
+ *
+ * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and
+ * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for
+ * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3
+ * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if
+ * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too
+ * coarsely grained.
+ *
+ * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling
+ * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting
+ * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be
+ * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use
+ * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all.
+ */
+ if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0)
+ {
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char *ciphers,
+ *c;
+
+ char *sep = ":;, ";
+ PRUint16 ciphercode;
+ const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
+ * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
+ * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
+ */
+ nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+ for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
+ SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+
+ ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
+
+ for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
+ {
+ if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
+ {
+ status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pfree(ciphers);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the custom IO layer.
+ */
+ layer = init_iolayer(port);
+ if (!layer)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (PR_PushIOLayer(pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ PR_Close(layer);
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to push IO layer")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The certificate requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port);
+ if (!private_key)
+ {
+ if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())),
+ errhint("The private key requires a password.")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to
+ * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS
+ * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is
+ * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the
+ * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature.
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ {
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject);
+ crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE);
+ if (!crl)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the
+ * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData
+ * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server
+ * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for
+ * credential delegation.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private
+ * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our
+ * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can.
+ */
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key);
+
+ /* Set up certificate authentication callback */
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE);
+
+ port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!port->pr_fd)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means
+ * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR
+ * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already
+ * established socket.
+ */
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+ /* Register out shutdown callback */
+ NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_read;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n_read < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ ssize_t n_write;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+ PRIntn flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to
+ * the documentation, required to be zero.
+ */
+ n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (n_write < 0)
+ {
+ err = PR_GetError();
+
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+ {
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ }
+ else
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ if (!port)
+ return;
+
+ if (port->peer_cn)
+ {
+ SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd);
+ pfree(port->peer_cn);
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ PR_Close(port->pr_fd);
+ port->pr_fd = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ if (nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+ nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the
+ * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before
+ * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY.
+ */
+ SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ *
+ * NSS disabled support for TLS compression in version 3.33 and removed the
+ * code in a subsequent release. The API for retrieving information about
+ * compression as well as enabling it is kept for backwards compatibility, but
+ * we don't need to consult it since it was only available for SSLv3 which we
+ * don't support.
+ *
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409587
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ *
+ * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in
+ * case of errors.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion);
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto error;
+
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+error:
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len);
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+
+ certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (certificate)
+ snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber)));
+ else
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *certificate;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ SECStatus status;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ *len = 0;
+ certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!certificate)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'",
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if
+ * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929
+ * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1). If something else
+ * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used.
+ */
+ if (digest_alg == SEC_OID_SHA1 || digest_alg == SEC_OID_MD5)
+ {
+ digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(digest_alg);
+ if (!ctx)
+ elog(ERROR, "out of memory");
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ status |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx);
+ status |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, certificate->derCert.data, certificate->derCert.len);
+ status |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, digest.data, &outlen, digest_len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash");
+ }
+
+ ret = palloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * default_nss_tls_init
+ *
+ * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing
+ * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has
+ * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server
+ * reload, the dummy callback will be installed.
+ *
+ * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's
+ * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack
+ * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly
+ * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private
+ * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is
+ * thus not required but good practice.
+ *
+ * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is
+ * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but
+ * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc.
+ */
+static void
+default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ /*
+ * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call-
+ * back since we must set something.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart
+ * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback.
+ */
+ if (isServerStart)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ {
+ if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ else
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * external_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the
+ * captured password back to NSS.
+ */
+static char *
+external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the
+ * same limit for our callback buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[256];
+ int len;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up,
+ * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this
+ * is a retry attempt then give up immediately.
+ */
+ if (retry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is
+ * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as
+ * well do it right.
+ */
+ prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":",
+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+
+ len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ pfree(prompt);
+
+ if (!len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires
+ * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to
+ * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error
+ * on the PG side.
+ */
+ password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!password)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+ }
+ strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return password;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb
+ *
+ * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or
+ * key, without having a passphrase callback installed.
+ */
+static char *
+dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raw_subject_common_name
+ *
+ * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char
+ * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or
+ * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param.
+ * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL
+ * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it.
+ *
+ * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting
+ * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the
+ * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility
+ * with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+static char *
+raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ CERTName subject = cert->subject;
+ CERTRDN **rdn;
+
+ for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++)
+ {
+ CERTAVA **ava;
+
+ for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++)
+ {
+ SECItem *buf;
+ char *cn;
+
+ if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
+ buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code
+ * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise
+ * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to
+ * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.)
+ *
+ * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and
+ * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found.
+ */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1);
+ memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len);
+ cn[buf->len] = '\0';
+
+ *len = buf->len;
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE);
+ return cn;
+ }
+ }
+
+fail:
+ /* Not found. */
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ *
+ * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will
+ * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ Port *port = (Port *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *cert;
+ char *peer_cn;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return status;
+
+ port->peer_cn = NULL;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+
+ cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */
+ Assert(cert != NULL);
+
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ {
+ /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
+ * CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+
+ pfree(peer_cn);
+ PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0);
+
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+cleanup:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRRecvFN read_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_read;
+
+ read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+ n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_read;
+}
+
+static PRInt32
+pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
+ PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+ PRSendFN send_fn;
+ PRInt32 n_write;
+
+ send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+ n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+
+ return n_write;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
+ * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
+ */
+ fd->secret = NULL;
+ return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
+}
+
+static PRFileDesc *
+init_iolayer(Port *port)
+{
+ const PRIOMethods *default_methods;
+ PRFileDesc *layer;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we
+ * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we
+ * have a complete layer specification.
+ */
+ default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
+ memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods));
+
+ pr_iomethods.recv = pg_ssl_read;
+ pr_iomethods.send = pg_ssl_write;
+ pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close;
+
+ /*
+ * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is
+ * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the
+ * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on
+ * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name.
+ */
+ pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server");
+ if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto
+ * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+ layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods);
+ if (!layer)
+ {
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer")));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */
+ layer->secret = (void *) port;
+
+ return layer;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+ Assert(false);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.0");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.1");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.2");
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return pstrdup("TLSv1.3");
+ }
+
+ return pstrdup("unknown");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
+ * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
+ *
+ * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
+ * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
+ */
+static uint16
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
+{
+ switch (v)
+ {
+ /*
+ * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value
+ * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest
+ * useful version should be set on the connection.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS_ANY:
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS
+ * without support for TLS1.
+ */
+ case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+ case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified error code
+ *
+ * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string,
+ * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is
+ * unable to render a message then we at least have something).
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ return psprintf("%s (%s)",
+ PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT),
+ PR_ErrorToName(errcode));
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLShutdownFunc
+ * Callback for NSS shutdown
+ *
+ * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use
+ * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid
+ * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown
+ * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure
+ * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown
+ * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data)
+{
+ Port *port = (Port *) private_data;
+
+ if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /*
+ * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that
+ * called the shutdown that it was erroneous.
+ */
+ be_tls_close(port);
+ be_tls_destroy();
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index bb603ad209..43a5c5de42 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+char *ssl_database;
+#endif
/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index 4bcf705a30..b6f980e35b 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -4309,7 +4309,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
&ssl_library,
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"OpenSSL",
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+ "NSS",
+#endif
#else
"",
#endif
@@ -4377,6 +4381,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ {
+ {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_database,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY,
gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."),
@@ -4405,8 +4421,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY
},
&SSLCipherSuites,
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
"HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL",
+#elif defined (USE_NSS)
+ "",
#else
"none",
#endif
diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9799fef32d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cipher_nss.c
+ * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
+ * with ciphers
+ *
+ * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cipher_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ SECOidTag signature;
+ SECOidTag hash;
+ int len;
+} NSSSignatureAlgorithm;
+
+static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = {
+
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH},
+
+ {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+ {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH},
+
+ {0, 0}
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ const char *name;
+ PRUint16 number;
+} NSSCiphers;
+
+/*
+ * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h
+ * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be
+ * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing
+ * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less?
+ */
+static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = {
+
+ {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA},
+
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+
+ {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {NULL, 0}
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_find_cipher
+ * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code
+ *
+ * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the
+ * name. Search is performed case insensitive.
+ */
+bool
+pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher)
+{
+ const NSSCiphers *cipher_list;
+
+ for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++)
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0)
+ {
+ *cipher = cipher_list->number;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool
+pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len)
+{
+ const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate;
+
+ candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm;
+
+ for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++)
+ {
+ if (signature == candidate->signature)
+ {
+ *algorithm = candidate->hash;
+ *len = candidate->len;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a361dd1f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/nss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.h
+ * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/nss.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H
+#define COMMON_NSS_H
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+/*
+ * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef
+ * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition.
+ */
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+#include <nspr/prmem.h>
+#include <nspr/prtypes.h>
+
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+
+/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */
+bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher);
+bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len);
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
+#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index 7be1a67d69..eb00d9152b 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *pr_fd;
+#endif
} Port;
#ifdef USE_SSL
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len);
typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart);
+extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook;
+#endif
#endif /* USE_SSL */
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index e4e5c21565..ba31623a5b 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
#ifdef USE_SSL
extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+extern char *ssl_database;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index f10ad0acd6..6e901beba1 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
* implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS)
#define USE_SSL
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 9812a14662..93124f8d42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -359,6 +359,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 15, /* sizeof("prefer-standby") = 15 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+ {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72b0c54d1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1088 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-nss.c
+ * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "fe-secure-common.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+/*
+ * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with
+ * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error.
+ * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this.
+ */
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nspr/nspr.h>
+#include <nspr/prerror.h>
+#include <nspr/prinit.h>
+#include <nspr/prio.h>
+
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/ssl.h>
+#include <nss/sslproto.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+#include <nss/secoidt.h>
+#include <nss/secmod.h>
+
+static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name);
+static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
+static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode);
+static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);
+static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+static int ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol);
+static bool cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn);
+
+static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the
+ * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather
+ * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation:
+ *
+ * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's
+ * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because
+ * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's
+ * strong commitment to backward compatibility."
+ *
+ * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket
+ *
+ * The function is declared in <private/pprio.h>, but as it is a header marked
+ * private we declare it here rather than including it.
+ */
+NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int);
+
+static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
+ * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we
+ * need to keep our own copy.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__darwin__)
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init
+ * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to
+ * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ /* noop */
+}
+
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ conn->has_password = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context);
+ conn->nss_context = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
+ PRFileDesc *model;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ SSLVersionRange desired_range;
+
+ /*
+ * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
+ * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
+ * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
+ * on PR_Init.
+ */
+ PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in
+ * be-secure-nss.c
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+
+ if (conn->cert_database && strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0)
+ {
+ char *cert_database_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->cert_database);
+
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database_path, "", "", "",
+ ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ pfree(cert_database_path);
+
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"),
+ conn->cert_database,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+ if (!conn->nss_context)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Configure cipher policy.
+ */
+ status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
+ * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
+ * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
+ */
+ if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ {
+ status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
+ ca_trust_name,
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions
+ * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works
+ * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API,
+ * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using
+ * it.
+ */
+ pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock);
+ if (!pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR
+ * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it
+ * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which
+ * copes with IPv6 as well.
+ */
+ model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family));
+ if (!model)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE);
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+
+ /*
+ * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has
+ * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1
+ * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as
+ * an NSS environment variable.
+ */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */
+ SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined
+ * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest
+ * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in
+ * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum
+ * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram.
+ */
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range);
+ desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+ if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_min_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_min_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
+ {
+ int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+ if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
+ conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how
+ * to handle failed verifications.
+ */
+ SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+ SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this
+ * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on
+ * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk
+ * of silent downgrades.
+ */
+ conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
+ if (!conn->pr_fd)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
+ * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
+ */
+ PR_Close(model);
+
+ /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn);
+
+ status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */
+ SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn);
+
+ /*
+ * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
+ * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
+ * http server it seems.
+ */
+ SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
+
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
+ }
+ while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 nread;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We
+ * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using
+ * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned
+ * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing
+ * connection.
+ */
+ nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+
+ if (nread == 0)
+ {
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ nread = -1;
+ }
+ else if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR:
+ /* No data available yet. */
+ nread = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+ read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be
+ * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the
+ * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c.
+ */
+ case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR:
+ case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR:
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (nread == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) nread;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Check for the existence of data to be read.
+ *
+ * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API.
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int n;
+
+ /*
+ * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if
+ * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function
+ * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only
+ * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted
+ * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to
+ * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block.
+ */
+ n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+ return (n > 0);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ PRInt32 n;
+ PRErrorCode status;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+
+ n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len);
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ status = PR_GetError();
+
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR:
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return (ssize_t) n;
+}
+
+char *
+pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len)
+{
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ SECOidTag signature_tag;
+ SECOidTag digest_alg;
+ int digest_len;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ SECItem digest;
+ char *ret;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature);
+ if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"),
+ SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+ digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len);
+ digest.len = digest_len;
+
+ status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data,
+ server_cert->derCert.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = pg_malloc(digest.len);
+ memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len);
+ *len = digest_len;
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to.
+ *
+ * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn,
+ int *names_examined,
+ char **first_name)
+{
+ char *server_hostname = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem altname_item;
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ CERTGeneralName *san_list;
+ CERTGeneralName *cn;
+
+ server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd);
+ if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0')
+ goto done;
+
+ /*
+ * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName
+ * verification.
+ */
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ &altname_item);
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item);
+ if (!san_list)
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn))
+ {
+ char *alt_name;
+ int rv;
+ char tmp[512];
+
+ status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp),
+ (char *) cn->name.other.data,
+ cn->name.other.len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ goto done;
+
+ rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp,
+ strlen(tmp),
+ &alt_name);
+ if (alt_name)
+ {
+ if (!*first_name)
+ *first_name = alt_name;
+ else
+ free(alt_name);
+ }
+
+ if (rv == 1)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ {
+ status = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND)
+ status = SECSuccess;
+ else
+ status = SECSuccess;
+
+done:
+ /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+ PR_Free(server_hostname);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode)
+{
+ const char *error;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try
+ * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode.
+ */
+ error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return "unknown TLS error";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ char *modulespec;
+
+ modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent"
+ * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter
+ * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading
+ * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be
+ * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but
+ * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE.
+ */
+ mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+ pfree(modulespec);
+
+ if (mod && mod->loaded)
+ {
+ *module = mod;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* NSS Callbacks */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_cert_auth_handler
+ * Callback for authenticating server certificate
+ *
+ * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function
+ * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With
+ * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full
+ * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ CERTCertificate *server_cert;
+ void *pin;
+
+ Assert(!isServer);
+
+ pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd);
+ server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * VerifyCertificateNow verifies the validity using PR_now from NSPR as a
+ * timestamp and will perform CRL and OSCP revocation checks. conn->sslcrl
+ * does not impact NSS connections as any CRL in the NSS database will be
+ * used automatically.
+ */
+ status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
+ server_cert,
+ checksig,
+ certificateUsageSSLServer,
+ pin,
+ NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also
+ * performing the hostname check for verify-full.
+ */
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ {
+ if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ status = SECFailure;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"),
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_client_auth_handler
+ * Callback for client certificate validation
+ *
+ * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke
+ * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support
+ * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs
+ * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with
+ * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support
+ * just running with a ssl database specified.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a
+ * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames,
+ CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_bad_cert_handler
+ * Callback for failed certificate validation
+ *
+ * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed
+ * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+ PRErrorCode err;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our
+ * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That
+ * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should
+ * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders.
+ */
+ if (!arg)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /*
+ * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer
+ * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database
+ * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to
+ * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->cert_database &&
+ strlen(conn->cert_database) > 0 &&
+ cert_database_has_CA(conn))
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ err = PORT_GetError();
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate
+ * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc.
+ */
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
+ return SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Unreachable */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * PQgetssl
+ *
+ * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning
+ * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
+ * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
+ return conn->pr_fd;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ "key_bits",
+ "compression",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ SSLChannelInfo channel;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ return "NSS";
+
+ status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ return suite.cipherSuiteName;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ static char key_bits_str[8];
+
+ snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits);
+ return key_bits_str;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ switch (channel.protocolVersion)
+ {
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+ return "TLSv1.3";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only
+ * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off
+ * here without checking.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0)
+ return "off";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(const char *protocol)
+{
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+ if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0)
+ return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+#endif
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cert_database_has_CA
+ * Check for the presence of a CA certificate
+ *
+ * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected
+ * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the
+ * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness.
+ */
+static bool
+cert_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ CERTCertList *certificates;
+ bool hasCA;
+
+ /*
+ * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since
+ * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback.
+ */
+ if (conn->has_password)
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn));
+ else
+ certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL);
+ hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates);
+ CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates);
+
+ return hasCA;
+}
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ PQsslKeyPassHook = hook;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQssl_passwd_cb
+ * Supply a password to decrypt an object
+ *
+ * If an object in the NSS database is password protected, or if the entire
+ * NSS database is itself password protected, this callback will be invoked.
+ *
+ * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc.
+ */
+static char *
+PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ conn->has_password = true;
+
+ if (PQsslKeyPassHook)
+ return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg);
+ else
+ return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss
+ * Default password handler callback
+ *
+ * If no user defined password callback has been set up, the callback below
+ * will try the password set by the sslpassword parameter. Since we by legacy
+ * only have support for a single password, there is little reason to inspect
+ * the slot for the object in question. A TODO is to support different
+ * passwords for different objects, either via a DSL in sslpassword or with a
+ * new key/value style parameter. Users can supply their own password hook to
+ * do this of course, but it would be nice to support something in core too.
+ */
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in
+ * retrying as it hasn't changed.
+ */
+ if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0)
+ return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
}
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifndef USE_NSS
+
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
+PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+char *
+PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
+
/* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */
#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
index 47a098b4b9..d9aa65d887 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h
@@ -624,6 +624,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook);
extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
+/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */
+typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo;
+typedef int PRIntn;
+typedef PRIntn PRBool;
+
+/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */
+typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index 0c9e95f1a7..f15af39222 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ struct pg_conn
char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */
+ char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
@@ -507,6 +508,28 @@ struct pg_conn
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/*
+ * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
+ * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+ void *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */
+ void *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */
+
+ /*
+ * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no
+ * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need
+ * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they
+ * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to
+ * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only
+ * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is
+ * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't
+ * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of
+ * these.
+ */
+ bool has_password;
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
@@ -781,7 +804,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
*/
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
+#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID))
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len);
#endif
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch (11.5K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/3-v30-0002-Refactor-SSL-testharness-for-multiple-library.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 4fae9756dfcfe37d86ca01d3c3879dd76b6f314f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
modules for the implementation details.
No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
teardown is performed.
---
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 56 ++--------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 6 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} | 83 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
rename src/test/ssl/t/{SSLServer.pm => SSL/Server.pm} (78%)
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 864f6e209f..30b68bddbe 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -4,12 +4,10 @@ use PostgresNode;
use TestLib;
use Test::More;
-use File::Copy;
-
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
@@ -32,32 +30,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
-# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
-# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
-#
-# This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
-# of the tests.
-my @keys = (
- "client", "client-revoked",
- "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
- "client-encrypted-der");
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
- or die
- "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
- chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
- or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
-}
-
-# Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
-# necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
-# permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
-# up phase.
-copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key");
-chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key";
-push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
-
#### Set up the server.
note "setting up data directory";
@@ -72,32 +44,22 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, SSL::Server::ssl_library(), 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
'trust');
note "testing password-protected keys";
-open my $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
command_fails(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
$node->_update_pid(0);
-open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
-print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='server-cn-only.crt'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
-print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo secret1'\n";
-close $sslconf;
-
+set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
+ 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
command_ok(
[ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
@@ -574,7 +536,5 @@ test_connect_fails(
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
# clean up
-foreach my $key (@keys)
-{
- unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
-}
+
+SSL::Server::cleanup();
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 410b9e910d..3383b3e531 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use File::Copy;
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
-use SSLServer;
+use SSL::Server;
if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
# This is the hostname used to connect to the server.
@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ test_connect_fails(
# clean up
unlink($client_tmp_key);
-
-done_testing($number_of_tests);
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62b11b7632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package SSL::Backend::OpenSSL;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+use File::Copy;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+
+our (@keys);
+
+INIT
+{
+ @keys = (
+ "client", "client-revoked",
+ "client-der", "client-encrypted-pem",
+ "client-encrypted-der");
+}
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'OpenSSL' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_openssl_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::OpenSSL';
+
+ my $backend = $class->new();
+
+ return $backend;
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
+ # of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
+ #
+ # This changes ssl/client.key to ssl/client_tmp.key etc for the rest
+ # of the tests.
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ copy("ssl/${key}.key", "ssl/${key}_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/${key}.key to ssl/${key}_tmp.key for permissions change: $!";
+ chmod 0600, "ssl/${key}_tmp.key"
+ or die "failed to change permissions on ssl/${key}_tmp.key: $!";
+ }
+
+ # Also make a copy of that explicitly world-readable. We can't
+ # necessarily rely on the file in the source tree having those
+ # permissions. Add it to @keys to include it in the final clean
+ # up phase.
+ copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key")
+ or die
+ "couldn't copy ssl/client.key to ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ chmod 0644, "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key"
+ or die
+ "failed to change permissions on ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key: $!";
+ push @keys, 'client_wrongperms';
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $certfile = $_[1];
+ my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ foreach my $key (@keys)
+ {
+ unlink("ssl/${key}_tmp.key");
+ }
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
similarity index 78%
rename from src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
rename to src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index 5ec5e0dac8..e59554f85b 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSLServer.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -23,19 +23,39 @@
# explicitly because an invalid sslcert or sslrootcert, respectively,
# causes those to be ignored.)
-package SSLServer;
+package SSL::Server;
use strict;
use warnings;
use PostgresNode;
+use RecursiveCopy;
use TestLib;
use File::Basename;
use File::Copy;
use Test::More;
+use SSL::Backend::OpenSSL qw(get_new_openssl_backend);
+use SSL::Backend::NSS qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+our ($openssl, $nss, $backend);
+
+# The TLS backend which the server is using should be mostly transparent for
+# the user, apart from individual configuration settings, so keep the backend
+# specific things abstracted behind SSL::Server.
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_openssl_backend();
+ $openssl = 1;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $backend = get_new_nss_backend();
+ $nss = 1;
+}
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
+ set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -144,14 +164,21 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
close $sslconf;
# Copy all server certificates and keys, and client root cert, to the data dir
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
- chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
- copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
- copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
- mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
- copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ if (defined($openssl))
+ {
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/server-*.key", $pgdata);
+ chmod(0600, glob "$pgdata/server-*.key") or die $!;
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root_ca.crt", $pgdata);
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client.crl", $pgdata);
+ mkdir("$pgdata/root+client-crldir");
+ copy_files("ssl/root+client-crldir/*", "$pgdata/root+client-crldir/");
+ }
+ elsif (defined($nss))
+ {
+ RecursiveCopy::copypath("ssl/nss", $pgdata . "/nss") if -e "ssl/nss";
+ }
# Stop and restart server to load new listen_addresses.
$node->restart;
@@ -159,20 +186,36 @@ sub configure_test_server_for_ssl
# Change pg_hba after restart because hostssl requires ssl=on
configure_hba_for_ssl($node, $servercidr, $authmethod);
+ # Finally, perform backend specific configuration
+ $backend->init();
+
return;
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-sub switch_server_cert
+sub ssl_library
+{
+ return $backend->get_library();
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ $backend->cleanup();
+}
+
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
+sub set_server_cert
{
my $node = $_[0];
my $certfile = $_[1];
my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
+ my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
+ my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
my $crldir;
my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
+ $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
+
# defaults to use crl file
if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
{
@@ -182,13 +225,23 @@ sub switch_server_cert
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
+ unless $pwcmd eq '';
close $sslconf;
+ return;
+}
+# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
+# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
+# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
+# piece of the work.
+sub switch_server_cert
+{
+ my $node = $_[0];
+ set_server_cert(@_);
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch (52.2K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/4-v30-0003-nss-Add-NSS-specific-tests.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 3f808ad0fa6c3022a473c14ff3e273223b1c799d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 3/9] nss: Add NSS specific tests
This adds the SSL/Backend/NSS which implements the setup and teardown
required as well as adds the NSS configuration to the existing tests.
The OpenSSL testfiles are reused by repackaging them into NSS databases
in order for the tests to be cross-library. Additional testfiles are
generated by using only the NSS toolchain as well as rudimentary tests
using these.
---
src/test/ssl/Makefile | 244 ++++++++++++++++++
src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl | 342 +++++++++++++++++---------
src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl | 31 ++-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm | 61 +++++
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm | 19 +-
src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm | 48 +---
6 files changed, 582 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 4b53fdf6c0..8d4afa9dd0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -33,6 +33,36 @@ SSLFILES := $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.key) $(CERTIFICATES:%=ssl/%.crt) \
SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
ssl/root+client-crldir ssl/root+server-crldir
+# Even though we in practice could get away with far fewer NSS databases, they
+# are generated to mimic the setup for the OpenSSL tests in order to ensure
+# we isolate the same behavior between the backends. The database name should
+# contain the files included for easier test suite code reading.
+NSSFILES := ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client_ca.crt.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+client.crl \
+ ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db \
+ ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_ca-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_server-root.db \
+ ssl/nss/native_client-root.db
+
# This target re-generates all the key and certificate files. Usually we just
# use the ones that are committed to the tree without rebuilding them.
#
@@ -40,6 +70,10 @@ SSLDIRS := ssl/client-crldir ssl/server-crldir \
#
sslfiles: $(SSLFILES) $(SSLDIRS)
+# Generate NSS certificate databases corresponding to the OpenSSL certificates.
+# This target will fail unless preceded by nssfiles-clean.
+nssfiles: $(NSSFILES)
+
# OpenSSL requires a directory to put all generated certificates in. We don't
# use this for anything, but we need a location.
ssl/new_certs_dir:
@@ -67,6 +101,35 @@ ssl/%_ca.crt: ssl/%_ca.key %_ca.config ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/new_certs_dir
rm ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
echo "01" > ssl/$*_ca.srl
+ssl/nss/%_ca.crt.db: ssl/%_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n $*_ca.crt -i ssl/$*_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt ssl/nss/root.crl ssl/nss/server.crl
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/server.crl -d $@ -B
+
+ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db: ssl/root+server_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/root.crl -d $@ -B
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+server-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+server-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
# Server certificates, signed by server CA:
ssl/server-%.crt: ssl/server-%.key ssl/server_ca.crt server-%.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/server-$*.key -out ssl/server-$*.csr -config server-$*.config
@@ -80,6 +143,86 @@ ssl/server-ss.crt: ssl/server-cn-only.key ssl/server-cn-only.crt server-cn-only.
openssl x509 -req -days 10000 -in ssl/server-ss.csr -signkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -out ssl/server-ss.crt -extensions v3_req -extfile server-cn-only.config
rm ssl/server-ss.csr
+# pk12util won't preserve the password when importing the password protected
+# key, the password must be set on the database *before* importing it as the
+# password in the pkcs12 envelope will be dropped.
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo "secret1" > password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C" -f password.txt
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -inkey ssl/server-password.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passin 'pass:secret1' -passout 'pass:secret1'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-password.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'secret1' -K 'secret1'
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db: ssl/server-cn-only.crt ssl/server-cn-only.key
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-only.crt -i ssl/server-cn-only.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-only.key -in ssl/server-cn-only.crt -certfile ssl/server_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-only.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db: ssl/nss/server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db
+ for c in $(shell ls ssl/root+client-crldir) ; do \
+ echo $${c} ; \
+ openssl crl -in ssl/root+client-crldir/$${c} -outform der -out ssl/nss/$${c} ; \
+ crlutil -I -i ssl/nss/$${c} -d $@ -B ; \
+ done
+
+ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-multiple-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-multiple-alt-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db: ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -i ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -inkey ssl/server-single-alt-name.key -in ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -certfile ssl/server-single-alt-name.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-single-alt-name.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db: ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -i ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.key -in ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-cn-and-alt-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-cn-and-alt-names.pfx -d $@ -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db: ssl/server-no-names.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-no-names.crt -i ssl/server-no-names.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -inkey ssl/server-no-names.key -in ssl/server-no-names.crt -certfile ssl/server-no-names.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-no-names.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+ssl/nss/server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db: ssl/server-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/server-revoked.crt -i ssl/server-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n server_ca.crt -i ssl/server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root_ca.crt -i ssl/root_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/server-revoked.key -in ssl/server-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/server-revoked.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/server-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Password-protected version of server-cn-only.key
ssl/server-password.key: ssl/server-cn-only.key
openssl rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout 'pass:secret1'
@@ -91,6 +234,27 @@ ssl/client.crt: ssl/client.key ssl/client_ca.crt
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client.csr ssl/temp.crt
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n root+client_ca.crt -i ssl/root+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
+# Client certificate with encrypted key, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db: ssl/client.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ echo 'dUmmyP^#+' > $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N -f $@.pass
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n ssl/client.crt -i ssl/client.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -f $@.pass -n root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -inkey ssl/client-encrypted-pem.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passin pass:'dUmmyP^#+' -passout pass:'dUmmyP^#+'
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-encrypted-pem.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W 'dUmmyP^#+' -k $@.pass
+
# Another client certificate, signed by the client CA. This one is revoked.
ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl req -new -key ssl/client-revoked.key -out ssl/client-revoked.csr -config client.config
@@ -98,6 +262,14 @@ ssl/client-revoked.crt: ssl/client-revoked.key ssl/client_ca.crt client.config
openssl x509 -in ssl/temp.crt -out ssl/client-revoked.crt # to keep just the PEM cert
rm ssl/client-revoked.csr ssl/temp.crt
+ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db: ssl/client-revoked.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client-revoked.crt -i ssl/client-revoked.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n client_ca.crt -i ssl/client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -inkey ssl/client-revoked.key -in ssl/client-revoked.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client-revoked.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
# Convert the key to DER, to test our behaviour there too
ssl/client-der.key: ssl/client.key
openssl rsa -in ssl/client.key -outform DER -out ssl/client-der.key
@@ -130,19 +302,40 @@ ssl/root+client_ca.crt: ssl/root_ca.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
ssl/client+client_ca.crt: ssl/client.crt ssl/client_ca.crt
cat $^ > $@
+# Client certificate, signed by client CA
+ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db: ssl/client+client_ca.crt
+ $(MKDIR_P) $@
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -N --empty-password
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/client+client_ca.crt -i ssl/client+client_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ certutil -d "sql:$@" -A -n ssl/root+server_ca.crt -i ssl/root+server_ca.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -out ssl/nss/client.pfx -inkey ssl/client.key -in ssl/client.crt -certfile ssl/client_ca.crt -passout pass:
+ pk12util -i ssl/nss/client.pfx -d "sql:$@" -W ''
+
#### CRLs
ssl/client.crl: ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -revoke ssl/client-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name client_ca -gencrl -out ssl/client.crl
+ssl/nss/client.crl: ssl/client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/server.crl: ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -revoke ssl/server-revoked.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name server_ca -gencrl -out ssl/server.crl
+ssl/nss/server.crl: ssl/server.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
ssl/root.crl: ssl/root_ca.crt
openssl ca -config cas.config -name root_ca -gencrl -out ssl/root.crl
+ssl/nss/root.crl: ssl/root.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
+ssl/nss/root+client.crl: ssl/root+client.crl
+ openssl crl -in $^ -outform der -out $@
+
# If a CRL is used, OpenSSL requires a CRL file for *all* the CAs in the
# chain, even if some of them are empty.
ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
@@ -168,14 +361,65 @@ ssl/client-crldir: ssl/client.crl
mkdir ssl/client-crldir
cp ssl/client.crl ssl/client-crldir/`openssl crl -hash -noout -in ssl/client.crl`.r0
+#### NSS specific certificates and keys
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db:
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ echo y > nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo 10 >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ echo y >> nss_ca_params.txt
+ cat nss_ca_params.txt | certutil -S -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* \
+ -s "CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression tests,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m 5432 -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -z Makefile -Z SHA256
+ rm nss_ca_params.txt
+
+ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.db
+ certutil -L -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -a > ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+
+# Create and sign a server certificate
+ssl/nss/native_server-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" \
+ -s "CN=common-name.pg-ssltest.test,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ echo 1 > nss_server_params.txt
+ echo 9 >> nss_server_params.txt
+ cat nss_server_params.txt | certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-root -i ssl/nss/native_server-$*.csr \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der -m 5433 --keyUsage dataEncipherment,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment \
+ --nsCertType sslServer --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_server-$*.db/" -n ssl/native_server-$*.crt -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_server_$*.der
+ rm nss_server_params.txt
+
+# Create and sign a client certificate
+ssl/nss/native_client-%.db: ssl/nss/native_ca-%.pem
+ $(MKDIR_P) ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db
+ certutil -N -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" --empty-password
+ certutil -R -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db/" -s "CN=ssltestuser,OU=PostgreSQL test suite" \
+ -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256 -z Makefile
+ certutil -C -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.db/" -c ca-$* -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.csr -o ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der \
+ -m 5434 --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature --nsCertType sslClient \
+ --certVersion 1 -Z SHA256
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n ca-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i ssl/nss/native_ca-$*.pem
+ certutil -A -d "sql:ssl/nss/native_client-$*.db" -n native_client-$* -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i ssl/nss/native_client-$*.der
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca-certindex* ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
rm -rf $(SSLDIRS)
+.PHONY: nssfiles-clean
+nssfiles-clean:
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
+
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -rf tmp_check
rm -rf ssl/*.old ssl/new_certs_dir ssl/client*_tmp.key
+ rm -rf ssl/nss
# Doesn't depend on $(SSLFILES) because we don't rebuild them by default
check:
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 30b68bddbe..25efe791f3 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -9,13 +9,22 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ plan tests => 103;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
{
- plan skip_all => 'OpenSSL not supported by this build';
+ $nss = 1;
+ plan tests => 104;
}
else
{
- plan tests => 100;
+ plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
#### Some configuration
@@ -51,19 +60,70 @@ configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
note "testing password-protected keys";
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo wrongpassword');
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+# Since the passphrase callbacks operate at different stages in OpenSSL and
+# NSS we have two separate blocks for them
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases aren't checked on server restart in NSS", 2
+ if ($nss);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword',
+ restart => 'no' );
+
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1',
+ restart => 'no');
+
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+}
-set_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root+client_ca',
- 'server-password', 'echo secret1');
-command_ok(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file');
-$node->_update_pid(1);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "Certificate passphrases are checked on connection in NSS", 3
+ if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo wrongpassword');
+
+ test_connect_fails(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ qr/\QSSL error\E/,
+ "connect to server with incorrect key password configured");
+
+ switch_server_cert($node,
+ certfile => 'server-cn-only',
+ cafile => 'root+client_ca',
+ keyfile => 'server-password',
+ nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-password.key.db',
+ passphrase_cmd => 'echo secret1');
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect to server with correct key password configured");
+}
# Test compatibility of SSL protocols.
# TLSv1.1 is lower than TLSv1.2, so it won't work.
@@ -91,7 +151,7 @@ command_ok(
note "running client tests";
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -111,95 +171,118 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist|Peer's certificate issuer has been marked as not trusted by the user/,
"connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
-
-# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
-# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/client_ca.crt.db",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ # NSS supports partial chain validation, so this test doesn't work there.
+ # This is similar to the OpenSSL option X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN which
+ # we don't allow.
+ skip "NSS support partial chain validation", 2 if ($nss);
+ # Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
+ # must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+}
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=require");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-ca");
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connect with correct server CA cert file sslmode=verify-full");
-# Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
-# be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CA ordering is irrelevant in NSS databases", 2 if ($nss);
+
+ # Test with cert root file that contains two certificates. The client should
+ # be able to pick the right one, regardless of the order in the file.
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-1.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 1");
+ # How about import the both-file into a database?
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/both-cas-2.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "cert root file that contains two certificates, order 2");
+}
# CRL tests
# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "CRL's are verified when adding to NSS database", 4 if ($nss);
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA");
-# The same for CRL directory
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+ # The same for CRL directory
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/client-crldir",
+ qr/SSL error/,
+ "directory CRL belonging to a different CA");
+}
# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crl.db",
"CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# The same for CRL directory
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
"directory CRL with a non-revoked cert");
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -212,14 +295,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-multiple-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-multiple-alt-names.crt__server-multiple-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -237,20 +320,20 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
# slightly different error message, that's all)
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-single-alt-name');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-single-alt-name', nssdatabase => 'server-single-alt-name.crt__server-single-alt-name.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -260,21 +343,21 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
);
# Test server certificate with a CN and SANs. Per RFCs 2818 and 6125, the CN
# should be ignored when the certificate has both.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-and-alt-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-and-alt-names', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-and-alt-names.crt__server-cn-and-alt-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -287,14 +370,14 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name "common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate/,
"certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-no-names');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-no-names', nssdatabase => 'server-no-names.crt__server-no-names.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -303,11 +386,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate|requested domain name does not match the server's certificate./,
"server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
# Test that the CRL works
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
$common_connstr =
"user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
@@ -315,16 +398,16 @@ $common_connstr =
# Without the CRL, succeeds. With it, fails.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connects without client-side CRL");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/server.crl cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__server.crl.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL file");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrldir=ssl/root+server-crldir cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt__root+server.crldir.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"does not connect with client-side CRL directory");
@@ -345,32 +428,50 @@ command_like(
# Test min/max SSL protocol versions.
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
"connection success with correct range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.2 ssl_max_protocol_version=TLSv1.1 cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid SSL protocol version range/,
"connection failure with incorrect range of TLS protocol versions");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_min_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_min_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol minimum bound");
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls",
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require ssl_max_protocol_version=incorrect_tls cert_database=ssl/nss/root+server_ca.crt.db",
qr/invalid ssl_max_protocol_version value/,
"connection failure with an incorrect SSL protocol maximum bound");
+# tests of NSS generated certificates/keys
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS specific tests", 1 if ($openssl);
+
+ switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'native_server-root', cafile => 'native_ca-root', nssdatabase => 'native_server-root.db');
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require user=ssltestuser",
+ "NSS generated certificates"
+ );
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
### Test certificate authorization.
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-revoked', nssdatabase => 'server-revoked.crt__server-revoked.key.db');
+
note "running server tests";
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
# no client cert
test_connect_fails(
@@ -386,32 +487,43 @@ test_connect_ok(
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in unencrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
-);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in unencrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-der_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
"certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted PEM format"
);
-# correct client cert in encrypted DER
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
- "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
-);
+SKIP:
+{
+ skip "NSS database not implemented in the Makefile", 1 if ($nss);
+ # correct client cert in encrypted DER
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-der_tmp.key sslpassword='dUmmyP^#+'",
+ "certificate authorization succeeds with correct client cert in encrypted DER format"
+ );
+}
# correct client cert in encrypted PEM with wrong password
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong'",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key sslpassword='wrong' cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client-encrypted-pem.key.db",
+ qr!connection requires a valid client certificate|\Qprivate key file "ssl/client-encrypted-pem_tmp.key": bad decrypt\E!,
"certificate authorization fails with correct client cert and wrong password in encrypted PEM format"
);
@@ -451,18 +563,19 @@ command_like(
'-P',
'null=_null_',
'-d',
- "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
+ "$common_connstr user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
'-c',
"SELECT * FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()"
],
qr{^pid,ssl,version,cipher,bits,compression,client_dn,client_serial,issuer_dn\r?\n
- ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/CN=ssltestuser,1,\Q/CN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
+ ^\d+,t,TLSv[\d.]+,[\w-]+,\d+,f,/?CN=ssltestuser,1,/?\QCN=Test CA for PostgreSQL SSL regression test client certs\E\r?$}mx,
'pg_stat_ssl with client certificate');
# client key with wrong permissions
SKIP:
{
skip "Permissions check not enforced on Windows", 2 if ($windows_os);
+ skip "Key not on filesystem with NSS", 2 if ($nss);
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -475,10 +588,13 @@ SKIP:
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ qr/unable to verify certificate|certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
"certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
);
+$common_connstr =
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db";
+
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
@@ -490,7 +606,7 @@ test_connect_fails(
# works, iff username matches Common Name
# fails, iff username doesn't match Common Name.
$common_connstr =
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=require dbname=verifydb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
@@ -514,24 +630,28 @@ test_connect_ok(
);
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', cafile => 'root_ca', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$common_connstr =
- "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client+client_ca.crt__client.key.db";
test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
-test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+
+test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
+ qr/connection requires a valid client certificate|SSL error/,
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing");
# test server-side CRL directory
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', undef, undef, 'root+client-crldir');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', crldir => 'root+client-crldir', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.crldir.db');
# revoked client cert
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key cert_database=ssl/nss/client-revoked.crt__client-revoked.key.db",
qr/SSL error/,
"certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert with server-side CRL directory");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index 3383b3e531..801c945e88 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,26 @@ use lib $FindBin::RealBin;
use SSL::Server;
-if ($ENV{with_ssl} ne 'openssl')
+my $openssl;
+my $nss;
+
+my $supports_tls_server_end_point;
+
+if ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'openssl')
+{
+ $openssl = 1;
+ # Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point =
+ check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
+ plan tests => $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
+{
+ $nss = 1;
+ $supports_tls_server_end_point = 1;
+ plan tests => 9;
+}
+else
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
@@ -23,12 +42,6 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# This is the pattern to use in pg_hba.conf to match incoming connections.
my $SERVERHOSTCIDR = '127.0.0.1/32';
-# Determine whether build supports tls-server-end-point.
-my $supports_tls_server_end_point =
- check_pg_config("#define HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID 1");
-
-my $number_of_tests = $supports_tls_server_end_point ? 9 : 10;
-
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
@@ -47,7 +60,7 @@ $node->start;
# Configure server for SSL connections, with password handling.
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, $SERVERHOSTCIDR,
"scram-sha-256", "pass", "scram-sha-256");
-switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only');
+switch_server_cert($node, certfile => 'server-cn-only', nssdatabase => 'server-cn-only.crt__server-cn-only.key.db');
$ENV{PGPASSWORD} = "pass";
$common_connstr =
"dbname=trustdb sslmode=require sslcert=invalid sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR";
@@ -97,7 +110,7 @@ my $client_tmp_key = "ssl/client_scram_tmp.key";
copy("ssl/client.key", $client_tmp_key);
chmod 0600, $client_tmp_key;
test_connect_fails(
- "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR",
+ "sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=$client_tmp_key sslrootcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR cert_database=ssl/nss/client.crt__client.key.db",
"dbname=certdb user=ssltestuser channel_binding=require",
qr/channel binding required, but server authenticated client without channel binding/,
"Cert authentication and channel_binding=require");
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20633fe41b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/NSS.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package SSL::Backend::NSS;
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Exporter;
+
+our @ISA = qw(Exporter);
+our @EXPORT_OK = qw(get_new_nss_backend);
+
+sub new
+{
+ my ($class) = @_;
+
+ my $self = { _library => 'NSS' };
+
+ bless $self, $class;
+
+ return $self;
+}
+
+sub get_new_nss_backend
+{
+ my $class = 'SSL::Backend::NSS';
+
+ return $class->new();
+}
+
+sub init
+{
+ # Make sure the certificate databases are in place?
+}
+
+sub get_library
+{
+ my ($self) = @_;
+
+ return $self->{_library};
+}
+
+sub set_server_cert
+{
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
+
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+
+ my $sslconf =
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='ssl/$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file=''\n"
+ . "ssl_database='nss/$params->{nssdatabase}'\n";
+
+ return $sslconf;
+}
+
+sub cleanup
+{
+ # Something?
+}
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
index 62b11b7632..f74caf67fe 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Backend/OpenSSL.pm
@@ -71,16 +71,19 @@ sub init
# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
sub set_server_cert
{
- my $self = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || $certfile;
+ my $self = $_[0];
+ my $params = $_[1];
+
+ $params->{cafile} = 'root+client_ca' unless defined $params->{cafile};
+ $params->{crlfile} = 'root+client.crl' unless defined $params->{crlfile};
+ $params->{keyfile} = $params->{certfile} unless defined $params->{keyfile};
my $sslconf =
- "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n"
- . "ssl_key_file='$keyfile.key'\n"
- . "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ "ssl_ca_file='$params->{cafile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_cert_file='$params->{certfile}.crt'\n"
+ . "ssl_key_file='$params->{keyfile}.key'\n"
+ . "ssl_crl_file='$params->{crlfile}'\n";
+ $sslconf .= "ssl_crl_dir='$params->{crldir}'\n" if defined $params->{crldir};
return $sslconf;
}
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
index e59554f85b..da25645d25 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/SSL/Server.pm
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ elsif ($ENV{with_ssl} eq 'nss')
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
configure_test_server_for_ssl
- set_server_cert
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
@@ -202,46 +201,25 @@ sub cleanup
$backend->cleanup();
}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file,
-sub set_server_cert
+# Change the configuration to use the given set of certificate, key, ca and
+# CRL, and potentially reload the configuration by restarting the server so
+# that the configuration takes effect. Restarting is the default, passing
+# restart => 'no' opts out of it leaving the server running.
+sub switch_server_cert
{
- my $node = $_[0];
- my $certfile = $_[1];
- my $cafile = $_[2] || "root+client_ca";
- my $keyfile = $_[3] || '';
- my $pwcmd = $_[4] || '';
- my $crlfile = "root+client.crl";
- my $crldir;
- my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
-
- $keyfile = $certfile if $keyfile eq '';
-
- # defaults to use crl file
- if (defined $_[3] || defined $_[4])
- {
- $crlfile = $_[3];
- $crldir = $_[4];
- }
+ my $node = shift;
+ my %params = @_;
+ my $pgdata = $node->data_dir;
open my $sslconf, '>', "$pgdata/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
- print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert($certfile, $cafile, $keyfile);
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='$crlfile'\n" if defined $crlfile;
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_dir='$crldir'\n" if defined $crldir;
- print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='$pwcmd'\n"
- unless $pwcmd eq '';
+ print $sslconf $backend->set_server_cert(\%params);
+ print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='" . $params{passphrase_cmd} . "'\n"
+ if defined $params{passphrase_cmd};
close $sslconf;
- return;
-}
-# Change the configuration to use given server cert file, and reload
-# the server so that the configuration takes effect.
-# Takes the same arguments as set_server_cert, which it calls to do that
-# piece of the work.
-sub switch_server_cert
-{
- my $node = $_[0];
- set_server_cert(@_);
+ return if (defined($params{restart}) && $params{restart} eq 'no');
+
$node->restart;
return;
}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch (1.9K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/5-v30-0004-nss-pg_strong_random-support.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 1cf91c96694b75ee3270fef57ddc932577de48f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 4/9] nss: pg_strong_random support
This adds support for using the RNG in libnss as a backend for
pg_strong_random.
---
src/port/pg_strong_random.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
index 07f24c0089..40de237628 100644
--- a/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
+++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
@@ -137,7 +137,55 @@ pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
return false;
}
-#else /* not USE_OPENSSL or WIN32 */
+#elif defined(USE_NSS)
+
+#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE
+#undef BITS_PER_BYTE
+#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#if defined(BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#if BITS_PER_BYTE != pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#error "incompatible byte widths between NSPR and postgres"
+#endif
+#else
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+#endif
+#undef pg_BITS_PER_BYTE
+
+void
+pg_strong_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* No initialization needed on NSS */
+}
+
+bool
+pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ if (!nss_context)
+ return false;
+
+ status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+
+ if (status == SECSuccess)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
/*
* Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0005-nss-Documentation.patch (33.8K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/6-v30-0005-nss-Documentation.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 7fe27c0915af47f8d252c35ce3dde90cde4b4784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 5/9] nss: Documentation
Basic documentation of the new API (keypass hooks) as well as config
parameters and installation. Additionally there is a section on how
to create certificate and keys using the NSS toolchain.
---
doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml | 43 +++++
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml | 28 ++-
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml | 31 ++-
doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml | 124 +++++++++++-
5 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
index 4e5ec983c0..7b02c8a622 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
@@ -441,6 +441,28 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSPR</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR">
+ Netscape Portable Runtime</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>NSS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS">
+ Network Security Services</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>ODBC</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -539,6 +561,17 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>PKCS#12</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink
+ url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12">
+ Public-Key Cryptography Standards #12</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>PL</acronym></term>
<listitem>
@@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">
+ Transport Layer Security</ulink>
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><acronym>TOAST</acronym></term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
index 967de73596..1608e9a7c7 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
@@ -1272,6 +1272,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
+ <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
+ <indexterm>
+ <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
+ </indexterm>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
+ keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ connections. This parameter can only be set in the
+ <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
+ line.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry id="guc-ssl-ciphers" xreflabel="ssl_ciphers">
<term><varname>ssl_ciphers</varname> (<type>string</type>)
<indexterm>
@@ -1288,7 +1305,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
version 1.3 connections. The default value is
- <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
+ <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
+ been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
</para>
@@ -1490,8 +1509,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
<para>
Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
- default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
- mechanism is used.
+ default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
+ mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
+ no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
+ empty password.
</para>
<para>
The command must print the passphrase to the standard output and exit
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
index 66ad4ba938..3cbd125d59 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
@@ -976,14 +976,31 @@ build-postgresql:
<listitem>
<para>
Build with support for <acronym>SSL</acronym> (encrypted)
- connections. The only <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable>
- supported is <option>openssl</option>. This requires the
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> package to be installed.
- <filename>configure</filename> will check for the required
- header files and libraries to make sure that your
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
- before proceeding.
+ connections. <replaceable>LIBRARY</replaceable> must be one of:
</para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>openssl</option> to build with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ package to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check
+ for the required header files and libraries to make sure that
+ your <productname>OpenSSL</productname> installation is sufficient
+ before proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <option>nss</option> to build with <productname>libnss</productname> support.
+ This requires the <productname>NSS</productname> package to be installed. Additionally,
+ <productname>NSS</productname> requires <productname>NSPR</productname>
+ to be installed. <filename>configure</filename> will check for the
+ required header files and libraries to make sure that your
+ <productname>NSS</productname> installation is sufficient before
+ proceeding.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index cc20b0f234..73f94158c7 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -830,6 +830,12 @@ int callback_fn(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn);
<function>longjmp(...)</function>, etc. It must return normally.
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -846,6 +852,70 @@ PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void);
</synopsis>
</para>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ support.
+ </para>
+
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqsetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> lets an application override
+ <application>libpq</application>'s default handling of password protected
+ objects in the <application>NSS</application> database using
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-sslpassword"/> or interactive prompting.
+
+<synopsis>
+void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook);
+</synopsis>
+
+ The application passes a pointer to a callback function with signature:
+<programlisting>
+char *callback_fn(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg);
+</programlisting>
+ which <application>libpq</application> will call
+ <emphasis>instead of</emphasis> its default
+ <function>PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> password handler. The
+ callback should determine the password for the token and return a
+ pointer to it. The returned pointer should be allocated with the NSS
+ <function>PORT_Strdup</function> function. The token for which the
+ password is requested is recorded in the slot anc can be identified by
+ calling <function>PK11_GetTokenName</function>. If no password is
+ known, the callback should return <literal>NULL</literal>. The memory
+ will be owned by <productname>NSS</productname> and should not be
+ freed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless
+ the server was compiled with <productname>NSS</productname> support.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id="libpq-pqgetsslkeypasshook-nss">
+ <term><function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function><indexterm><primary>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</primary></indexterm></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> returns the current
+ <productname>NSS</productname> password hook, or <literal>NULL</literal>
+ if none has been set.
+
+<synopsis>
+PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
+</synopsis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
+ server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
+ </para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1638,21 +1708,31 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
If set to 1, data sent over SSL connections will be compressed. If
set to 0, compression will be disabled. The default is 0. This
parameter is ignored if a connection without SSL is made.
- </para>
-
- <para>
SSL compression is nowadays considered insecure and its use is no
- longer recommended. <productname>OpenSSL</productname> 1.1.0 disables
- compression by default, and many operating system distributions
- disable it in prior versions as well, so setting this parameter to on
- will not have any effect if the server does not accept compression.
- </para>
+ longer recommended.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: 1.1.0 disables compression by
+ default, and many operating system distributions disable it in prior
+ versions as well, so setting this parameter to on will not have any
+ effect if the server does not accept compression.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
+ throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
+ can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
+ limiting factor.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- If security is not a primary concern, compression can improve
- throughput if the network is the bottleneck. Disabling compression
- can improve response time and throughput if CPU performance is the
- limiting factor.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: SSL compression is not supported in
+ <productname>NSS</productname>, this parameter has no effect.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1661,10 +1741,24 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the file name of the client SSL
- certificate, replacing the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
- This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location of the client SSL
+ certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL connection is not
+ made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can replace the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: the nickname of the client SSL
+ certificate.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1673,15 +1767,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslkey</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the location for the secret key used for
- the client certificate. It can either specify a file name that will
- be used instead of the default
- <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify a key
- obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external engine
- specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name and
- an engine-specific key identifier. This parameter is ignored if an
- SSL connection is not made.
+ This parameter specifies the name or location for the secret key used
+ for the client certificate. This parameter is ignored if an SSL
+ connection is not made.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: can either specify a file name
+ that will be used instead of the default
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/postgresql.key</filename>, or it can specify
+ a key obtained from an external <quote>engine</quote> (engines are
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> loadable modules). An external
+ engine specification should consist of a colon-separated engine name
+ and an engine-specific key identifier.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. Keys
+ should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1692,28 +1801,44 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<para>
This parameter specifies the password for the secret key specified in
<literal>sslkey</literal>, allowing client certificate private keys
- to be stored in encrypted form on disk even when interactive passphrase
+ to be stored in encrypted form even when interactive passphrase
input is not practical.
- </para>
- <para>
- Specifying this parameter with any non-empty value suppresses the
- <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal>
- prompt that <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default
- when an encrypted client certificate key is provided to
- <literal>libpq</literal>.
- </para>
- <para>
- If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
- has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- password callback mechanism for prompts.
- </para>
- <para>
- There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
- facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
- used in a service file connection definition. Users with
- more sophisticated uses should consider using openssl engines and
- tools like PKCS#11 or USB crypto offload devices.
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifying this parameter with
+ any non-empty value suppresses the
+ <literal>Enter PEM pass phrase:</literal> prompt that
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> will emit by default when an
+ encrypted client certificate key is provided to
+ <literal>libpq</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If the key is not encrypted this parameter is ignored. The parameter
+ has no effect on keys specified by <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ engines unless the engine uses the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
+ password callback mechanism for prompts.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ There is no environment variable equivalent to this option, and no
+ facility for looking it up in <filename>.pgpass</filename>. It can be
+ used in a service file connection definition. Users with
+ more sophisticated uses should consider using
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> engines and tools like PKCS#11 or
+ USB crypto offload devices.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: specifying the parameter is required
+ in case any password protected items are referenced in the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> database, or if the database itself
+ is password protected. If multiple different objects are password
+ protected, the same password is used for all.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1722,11 +1847,27 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<term><literal>sslrootcert</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- This parameter specifies the name of a file containing SSL
- certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
- If the file exists, the server's certificate will be verified
- to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ This parameter specifies the name of SSL certificate authority
+ (<acronym>CA</acronym>) certificate(s).
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: specifies the name of a file
+ containing SSL certificate authority (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
+ certificate(s). If the file exists, the server's certificate will
+ be verified to be signed by one of these authorities. The default is
+ <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crt</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: this parameter has no effect. CA
+ certificates should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>certutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1736,13 +1877,29 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
<listitem>
<para>
This parameter specifies the file name of the SSL certificate
- revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in this file, if it
- exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
- server's certificate. If neither
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
- <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
- taken as
- <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ revocation list (CRL).
+
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: Certificates listed in this file,
+ if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to authenticate the
+ server's certificate. If neither
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrl'/> nor
+ <xref linkend='libpq-connect-sslcrldir'/> is set, this setting is
+ taken as <filename>~/.postgresql/root.crl</filename>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1755,18 +1912,30 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
revocation list (CRL). Certificates listed in the files in this
directory, if it exists, will be rejected while attempting to
authenticate the server's certificate.
- </para>
- <para>
- The directory needs to be prepared with the OpenSSL command
- <literal>openssl rehash</literal> or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See
- its documentation for details.
- </para>
+ <itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname>: the directory needs to be
+ prepared with the OpenSSL command <literal>openssl rehash</literal>
+ or <literal>c_rehash</literal>. See its documentation for details.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can
+ be specified together.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
- <para>
- Both <literal>sslcrl</literal> and <literal>sslcrldir</literal> can be
- specified together.
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ <productname>NSS</productname>: This parameter has no effect. CRL
+ files should be loaded into the <productname>NSS</productname>
+ database using the <application>crlutil</application> tool.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
</para>
+
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1801,8 +1970,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions may
+ not support the most modern protocol versions. If not specified,
the default is <literal>TLSv1.2</literal>, which satisfies industry
best practices as of this writing.
</para>
@@ -1817,8 +1986,8 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
for the connection. Valid values are <literal>TLSv1</literal>,
<literal>TLSv1.1</literal>, <literal>TLSv1.2</literal> and
<literal>TLSv1.3</literal>. The supported protocols depend on the
- version of <productname>OpenSSL</productname> used, older versions
- not supporting the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
+ version of the SSL library used, older versions
+ may not support the most modern protocol versions. If not set, this
parameter is ignored and the connection will use the maximum bound
defined by the backend, if set. Setting the maximum protocol version
is mainly useful for testing or if some component has issues working
@@ -2597,6 +2766,8 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
</para>
<para>
The struct(s) available depend on the SSL implementation in use.
+ </para>
+ <para>
For <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, there is one struct,
available under the name "OpenSSL", and it returns a pointer to the
<productname>OpenSSL</productname> <literal>SSL</literal> struct.
@@ -2620,9 +2791,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
- This structure can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
- certificates, and more. Refer to the <productname>OpenSSL</productname>
- documentation for information about this structure.
+ For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
+ the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
+ <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ These structures can be used to verify encryption levels, check server
+ certificates, and more. Refer to the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library
+ documentation for information about these structures.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -2649,6 +2825,10 @@ void *PQgetssl(const PGconn *conn);
<xref linkend="libpq-PQsslInUse"/> instead, and for more details about the
connection, use <xref linkend="libpq-PQsslAttribute"/>.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function returns <literal>NULL</literal> when <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ librariaes other than <productname>OpenSSL</productname> are used.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8082,6 +8262,11 @@ void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -8108,6 +8293,11 @@ void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of <application>libpq</application>.
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ This function does nothing when using <productname>NSS</productname> as
+ the <acronym>SSL</acronym> library.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index bf877c0e0c..1fcad17a51 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2185,15 +2185,21 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<indexterm zone="ssl-tcp">
<primary>SSL</primary>
+ <secondary>TLS</secondary>
</indexterm>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> has native support for using
<acronym>SSL</acronym> connections to encrypt client/server communications
for increased security. This requires that
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname> is installed on both client and
+ a supported TLS library is installed on both client and
server systems and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
+ Supported libraries are <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname>. The terms <acronym>SSL</acronym> and
+ <acronym>TLS</acronym> are often used interchangeably to mean a secure
+ connection using a <acronym>TLS</acronym> protocol, even though
+ <acronym>SSL</acronym> protocols are no longer supported.
</para>
<sect2 id="ssl-setup">
@@ -2213,8 +2219,13 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</para>
<para>
- To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, files containing the server certificate
- and private key must exist. By default, these files are expected to be
+ To start in <acronym>SSL</acronym> mode, a server certificate
+ and private key must exist. The below sections on the different libraries
+ will discuss how to configure these.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ By default, these files are expected to be
named <filename>server.crt</filename> and <filename>server.key</filename>, respectively, in
the server's data directory, but other names and locations can be specified
using the configuration parameters <xref linkend="guc-ssl-cert-file"/>
@@ -2304,6 +2315,18 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</note>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="ssl-nss-config">
+ <title>NSS Configuration</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> will look for certificates and keys
+ in the <productname>NSS</productname> database specified by the parameter
+ <xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/> in <filename>postgresql.conf</filename>.
+ The parameters for certificate and key filenames are used to identify the
+ nicknames in the database.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
<sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
<title>Using Client Certificates</title>
@@ -2378,7 +2401,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
- <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
+ <title>SSL Server File Parameter Usage</title>
<para>
<xref linkend="ssl-file-usage"/> summarizes the files that are
@@ -2425,6 +2448,14 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
<entry>client certificate must not be on this list</entry>
</row>
+ <row>
+ <entry><xref linkend="guc-ssl-database"/></entry>
+ <entry>certificate database</entry>
+ <entry>contains server certificates, keys and revocation lists; only
+ used when <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is built with support
+ for <productname>NSS</productname>.</entry>
+ </row>
+
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
@@ -2448,7 +2479,7 @@ pg_dumpall -p 5432 | psql -d postgres -p 5433
</sect2>
<sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
- <title>Creating Certificates</title>
+ <title>Creating Certificates with OpenSSL</title>
<para>
To create a simple self-signed certificate for the server, valid for 365
@@ -2552,6 +2583,89 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
</sect2>
+ <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
+ <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
+
+ <para>
+ When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
+ be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
+ load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
+ use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
+<programlisting>
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
+</programlisting>
+ This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
+ the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Then load the server key, which require converting it to
+ <acronym>PKCS#12</acronym> format using the
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> tools:
+<programlisting>
+openssl pkcs12 -export -out server.pfx -inkey server.key -in server.crt \
+ -certfile root.crt -passout pass:
+pk12util -i server.pfx -d server.db -W ''
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Finally a certificate revocation list can be loaded with the following
+ commands:
+<programlisting>
+crlutil -I -i server.crl -d server.db -B
+</programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
+ <sect2 id="nss-ssl-certificate-creation">
+ <title>Creating Certificates with NSS</title>
+
+ <para>
+ To create a simple self-signed CA and certificate for the server, use the
+ following NSS commands. Replace
+ <replaceable>*.yourdomain.com</replaceable> with the server's host
+ name. Remove <replaceable>--empty-password</replaceable> in order to set
+ a password protecting the databases. The password can be passed to
+ <application>certutil</application> with the <literal>-f</literal> parameter.
+ First create a self-signed CA. To use a different certificate validity
+ time than the default, use <replaceable>-v</replaceable> to specify the
+ number of months of validity.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir root_ca.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:root_ca.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -S -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -s "CN=<replaceable>ca.yourdomain.com</replaceable>" \
+ -x -k rsa -g 2048 -m <replaceable>5432</replaceable> -t CTu,CTu,CTu \
+ --keyUsage certSigning -2 --nsCertType sslCA,smimeCA,objectSigningCA \
+ -Z SHA256
+certutil -L -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -n root_ca -a > root_ca.pem
+</programlisting>
+ Now create a server certificate database, and create a certificate signing
+ request for the CA. Then sign the request with the already created CA and
+ insert the certificate chain into the certificate database.
+<programlisting>
+mkdir server_cert.db
+certutil -N -d "sql:server_cert.db/" --empty-password
+certutil -R -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -s "CN=dbhost.yourdomain.com" \
+ -o server_cert.csr -g 2048 -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -C -d "sql:root_ca.db/" -c root_ca -i server_cert.csr \
+ -o server_cert.der -m <replaceable>5433</replaceable> \
+ --keyUsage keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment,digitalSignature \
+ --nsCertType sslServer -Z SHA256
+
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n root_ca -t CTu,CTu,CTu -a -i root_ca.pem
+certutil -A -d "sql:server_cert.db/" -n server_cert -t CTu,CTu,CTu -i server_cert.der
+</programlisting>
+ The server certificate is loaded into the certificate database as well as
+ the CA certificate in order to provide the chain of certificates.
+ </para>
+ </sect2>
+
</sect1>
<sect1 id="gssapi-enc">
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch (24.6K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/7-v30-0006-nss-Support-NSS-in-pgcrypto.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 0874ca2ce4b0fb31f6c935c65fc1ca78747af0fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 6/9] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
This extends pgcrypto to be able to use libnss as a cryptographic
backend for pgcrypto much like how OpenSSL is a supported backend.
Blowfish is not a supported cipher in NSS, so the implementation
falls back on the built-in BF code to be compatible in terms of
cipher support.
---
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile | 7 +-
contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c | 753 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml | 38 +-
3 files changed, 787 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index c0b4f1fcf6..ede7a78146 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
+NSS_SRCS = nss.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c blf.c
+NSS_TESTS = sha2 des 3des
+
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
ZLIB_OFF_TST = pgp-zlib-DISABLED
-CF_SRCS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_SRCS), $(OSSL_SRCS))
-CF_TESTS = $(if $(subst openssl,,$(with_ssl)), $(INT_TESTS), $(OSSL_TESTS))
+CF_SRCS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_SRCS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_SRCS), $(INT_SRCS)))
+CF_TESTS = $(if $(findstring openssl, $(with_ssl)), $(OSSL_TESTS), $(if $(findstring nss, $(with_ssl)), $(NSS_TESTS), $(INT_TESTS)))
CF_PGP_TESTS = $(if $(subst no,,$(with_zlib)), $(ZLIB_TST), $(ZLIB_OFF_TST))
SRCS = \
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4fd4680ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * nss.c
+ * Wrapper for using NSS as a backend for pgcrypto PX
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "px.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "common/nss.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define our own mechanisms for Blowfish as it's not implemented by NSS.
+ */
+#define BLOWFISH_CBC (1)
+#define BLOWFISH_ECB (2)
+
+/*
+ * Data structures for recording cipher implementations as well as ongoing
+ * cipher operations.
+ */
+typedef struct nss_digest
+{
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *hash_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+} nss_digest;
+
+typedef struct cipher_implementation
+{
+ /* Function pointers to cipher operations */
+ int (*init) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv);
+ unsigned (*get_block_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_key_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ unsigned (*get_iv_size) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+ int (*encrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ int (*decrypt) (PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res);
+ void (*free) (PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+ /* The mechanism describing the cipher used */
+ union
+ {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE nss;
+ CK_ULONG internal;
+ } mechanism;
+ int keylen;
+ bool is_nss;
+} cipher_implementation;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ NSSInitContext *context;
+ PK11Context *crypt_context;
+ SECItem *params;
+
+ PK11SymKey *encrypt_key;
+ PK11SymKey *decrypt_key;
+} nss_cipher;
+
+typedef struct internal_cipher
+{
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+ BlowfishContext context;
+} internal_cipher;
+
+typedef struct nss_cipher_ref
+{
+ const char *name;
+ const cipher_implementation *impl;
+} nss_cipher_ref;
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static unsigned nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+static unsigned nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc);
+
+/*
+ * nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType
+ *
+ * Returns the corresponding SECOidTag for the passed hash type. NSS 3.43
+ * includes HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType for this purpose, but at the time of
+ * writing is not commonly available so we need our own version till then.
+ */
+static SECOidTag
+nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashType type)
+{
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD2)
+ return SEC_OID_MD2;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgMD5)
+ return SEC_OID_MD5;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA1)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA224)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA256)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA384)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ if (type == HASH_AlgSHA512)
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_block_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->blocklength;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_digest_result_size(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ return object->length;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_free(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(digest->context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_update(PX_MD *pxmd, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestOp(digest->hash_context, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_reset(PX_MD *pxmd)
+{
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+
+ PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+}
+
+static void
+nss_digest_finish(PX_MD *pxmd, uint8 *dst)
+{
+ unsigned int outlen;
+ nss_digest *digest = (nss_digest *) pxmd->p.ptr;
+ const SECHashObject *object;
+
+ object = HASH_GetHashObject(digest->hash_type);
+ PK11_DigestFinal(digest->hash_context, dst, &outlen, object->length);
+}
+
+int
+px_find_digest(const char *name, PX_MD **res)
+{
+ PX_MD *pxmd;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ bool found = false;
+ nss_digest *digest;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ HASH_HashType t;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API function for looking up a digest algorithm from a name
+ * string, but there is a publicly accessible array which can be scanned
+ * for the name.
+ */
+ for (t = HASH_AlgNULL + 1; t < HASH_AlgTOTAL; t++)
+ {
+ SECOidTag hash_oid;
+ char *p;
+
+ hash_oid = nss_GetHashOidTagByHashType(t);
+
+ if (hash_oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(hash_oid);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(hash->desc, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NSS saves the algorithm names using SHA-xxx notation whereas
+ * OpenSSL use SHAxxx. To make sure the user finds the requested
+ * algorithm let's remove the dash and compare that spelling as well.
+ */
+ if ((p = strchr(hash->desc, '-')) != NULL)
+ {
+ char tmp[12];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, hash->desc, p - hash->desc);
+ memcpy(tmp + (p - hash->desc), p + 1, strlen(hash->desc) - (p - hash->desc) + 1);
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(tmp, name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ return PXE_NO_HASH;
+
+ digest = palloc(sizeof(*digest));
+
+ digest->context = nss_context;
+ digest->hash_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ digest->hash_type = t;
+ if (digest->hash_context == NULL)
+ {
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(digest->hash_context);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(digest->hash_context, PR_TRUE);
+ pfree(digest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pxmd = palloc(sizeof(*pxmd));
+ pxmd->result_size = nss_digest_result_size;
+ pxmd->block_size = nss_digest_block_size;
+ pxmd->reset = nss_digest_reset;
+ pxmd->update = nss_digest_update;
+ pxmd->finish = nss_digest_finish;
+ pxmd->free = nss_digest_free;
+ pxmd->p.ptr = (void *) digest;
+
+ *res = pxmd;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen, const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ blowfish_setkey(&cipher->context, key, klen);
+ if (iv)
+ blowfish_setiv(&cipher->context, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ buf = palloc(dlen);
+ memcpy(buf, data, dlen);
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_encrypt_ecb(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_encrypt_cbc(buf, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ memcpy(res, buf, dlen);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bf_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dlen & 7)
+ return PXE_NOTBLOCKSIZE;
+
+ memcpy(res, data, dlen);
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.internal == BLOWFISH_ECB)
+ blowfish_decrypt_ecb(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+ else
+ blowfish_decrypt_cbc(res, dlen, &cipher->context);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bf_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ internal_cipher *cipher = (internal_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+
+ pfree(cipher);
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static int
+nss_symkey_blockcipher_init(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *key, unsigned klen,
+ const uint8 *iv)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECItem iv_item;
+ unsigned char *iv_item_data;
+ SECItem key_item;
+ int keylen;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+
+ if (cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_CBC ||
+ cipher->impl->mechanism.nss == CKM_AES_ECB)
+ {
+ if (klen <= 128 / 8)
+ keylen = 128 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 192 / 8)
+ keylen = 192 / 8;
+ else if (klen <= 256 / 8)
+ keylen = 256 / 8;
+ else
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+ }
+ else
+ keylen = cipher->impl->keylen;
+
+ key_item.type = siBuffer;
+ key_item.data = (unsigned char *) key;
+ key_item.len = keylen;
+
+ /*
+ * If hardware acceleration is configured in NSS one can theoretically get
+ * a better slot by calling PK11_GetBestSlot() with the mechanism passed
+ * to it. Unless there are complaints, using the simpler API will make
+ * error handling easier though.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+ if (!slot)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ /*
+ * The key must be set up for the operation, and since we don't know at
+ * this point whether we are asked to encrypt or decrypt we need to store
+ * both versions.
+ */
+ cipher->decrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DECRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ cipher->encrypt_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipher->impl->mechanism.nss,
+ PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item,
+ NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (!cipher->decrypt_key || !cipher->encrypt_key)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ if (iv)
+ {
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = (unsigned char *) iv;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * The documentation states that either passing .data = 0; .len = 0;
+ * in the iv_item, or NULL as iv_item, to PK11_ParamFromIV should be
+ * done when IV is missing. That however leads to segfaults in the
+ * library, the workaround that works in modern library versions is
+ * to pass in a keysized zeroed out IV.
+ */
+ iv_item_data = palloc0(nss_get_iv_size(pxc));
+ iv_item.type = siBuffer;
+ iv_item.data = iv_item_data;
+ iv_item.len = nss_get_iv_size(pxc);
+ }
+
+ cipher->params = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, &iv_item);
+
+ /* If we had to make a mock IV, free it once made into a param */
+ if (!iv)
+ pfree(iv_item_data);
+
+ if (cipher->params == NULL)
+ return PXE_CIPHER_INIT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_decrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_DECRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+nss_encrypt(PX_Cipher *pxc, const uint8 *data, unsigned dlen, uint8 *res)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = (nss_cipher *) pxc->ptr;
+ SECStatus status;
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!cipher->crypt_context)
+ {
+ cipher->crypt_context =
+ PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+ cipher->decrypt_key, cipher->params);
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_CipherOp(cipher->crypt_context, res, &outlen, dlen, data, dlen);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+nss_free(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+ PRBool free_ctx = PR_TRUE;
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->encrypt_key);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(cipher->decrypt_key);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cipher->crypt_context, free_ctx);
+ NSS_ShutdownContext(cipher->context);
+ pfree(cipher);
+
+ pfree(pxc);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetBlockSize(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss, NULL);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return cipher->impl->keylen;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+nss_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ nss_cipher *cipher = pxc->ptr;
+
+ return PK11_GetIVLength(cipher->impl->mechanism.nss);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_block_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_key_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 448 / 8;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+bf_get_iv_size(PX_Cipher *pxc)
+{
+ return 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cipher Implementations
+ */
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 8,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_CBC,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_des3_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ .keylen = 24,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_cbc = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_CBC,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_aes_ecb = {
+ .init = nss_symkey_blockcipher_init,
+ .get_block_size = nss_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = nss_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = nss_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = nss_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = nss_decrypt,
+ .free = nss_free,
+ .mechanism.nss = CKM_AES_ECB,
+ .keylen = 32,
+ .is_nss = true
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_ecb = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_ECB,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+static const cipher_implementation nss_bf_cbc = {
+ .init = bf_init,
+ .get_block_size = bf_get_block_size,
+ .get_key_size = bf_get_key_size,
+ .get_iv_size = bf_get_iv_size,
+ .encrypt = bf_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = bf_decrypt,
+ .free = bf_free,
+ .mechanism.internal = BLOWFISH_CBC,
+ .keylen = 56,
+ .is_nss = false
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup table for finding the implementation based on a name. CAST5 as well
+ * as BLOWFISH are defined as cipher mechanisms in NSS but error out with
+ * SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM. Blowfish is implemented using the internal
+ * implementation while CAST5 isn't supported at all at this time,
+ */
+static const nss_cipher_ref nss_cipher_lookup[] = {
+ {"des", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-cbc", &nss_des_cbc},
+ {"des-ecb", &nss_des_ecb},
+ {"des3-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"3des-cbc", &nss_des3_cbc},
+ {"des3-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"3des-ecb", &nss_des3_ecb},
+ {"aes", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"aes-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"rijndael", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-cbc", &nss_aes_cbc},
+ {"rijndael-ecb", &nss_aes_ecb},
+ {"blowfish", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"blowfish-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {"bf", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-cbc", &nss_bf_cbc},
+ {"bf-ecb", &nss_bf_ecb},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * px_find_cipher
+ *
+ * Search for the requested cipher and see if there is support for it, and if
+ * so return an allocated object containing the playbook for how to encrypt
+ * and decrypt using the cipher.
+ */
+int
+px_find_cipher(const char *alias, PX_Cipher **res)
+{
+ const nss_cipher_ref *cipher_ref;
+ PX_Cipher *px_cipher;
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ NSSInitContext *nss_context;
+ nss_cipher *cipher;
+ internal_cipher *int_cipher;
+
+ for (cipher_ref = nss_cipher_lookup; cipher_ref->name; cipher_ref++)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(cipher_ref->name, alias) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!cipher_ref->name)
+ return PXE_NO_CIPHER;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the PX_Cipher to pass back to PX describing the operations to
+ * perform in order to use the cipher.
+ */
+ px_cipher = palloc(sizeof(*px_cipher));
+ px_cipher->block_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_block_size;
+ px_cipher->key_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_key_size;
+ px_cipher->iv_size = cipher_ref->impl->get_iv_size;
+ px_cipher->free = cipher_ref->impl->free;
+ px_cipher->init = cipher_ref->impl->init;
+ px_cipher->encrypt = cipher_ref->impl->encrypt;
+ px_cipher->decrypt = cipher_ref->impl->decrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the private data, which is different for NSS and internal ciphers
+ */
+ if (cipher_ref->impl->is_nss)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it. At
+ * some point we might want to allow users to use stored keys in the
+ * database rather than passing them via SELECT encrypt(), and then
+ * this need to be changed to open a user specified database.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
+ NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
+ NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
+ NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+
+ /* nss_cipher is the private state struct for the operation */
+ cipher = palloc(sizeof(*cipher));
+ cipher->context = nss_context;
+ cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ cipher->crypt_context = NULL;
+
+ px_cipher->ptr = cipher;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int_cipher = palloc0(sizeof(*int_cipher));
+
+ int_cipher->impl = cipher_ref->impl;
+ px_cipher->ptr = int_cipher;
+ }
+
+ *res = px_cipher;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index b6bb23de0f..bf486f0c07 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ digest(data bytea, type text) returns bytea
<literal>sha224</literal>, <literal>sha256</literal>,
<literal>sha384</literal> and <literal>sha512</literal>.
If <filename>pgcrypto</filename> was built with
- <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, more algorithms are available, as
- detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl"/>.
+ <productname>OpenSSL</productname> or <productname>NSS</productname>,
+ more algorithms are available, as
+ detailed in <xref linkend="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss"/>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -764,7 +765,7 @@ pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
Which cipher algorithm to use.
</para>
<literallayout>
-Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>)
+Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: <literal>3des</literal>, <literal>cast5</literal>; NSS-only: <literal>3des</literal>)
Default: aes128
Applies to: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
</literallayout>
@@ -1153,8 +1154,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<para>
<filename>pgcrypto</filename> configures itself according to the findings of the
main PostgreSQL <literal>configure</literal> script. The options that
- affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal> and
- <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ affect it are <literal>--with-zlib</literal>,
+ <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal> and <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1169,14 +1170,16 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
BIGNUM functions.
</para>
- <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl">
- <title>Summary of Functionality with and without OpenSSL</title>
- <tgroup cols="3">
+ <table id="pgcrypto-with-without-openssl-nss">
+ <title>Summary of Functionality with and without external cryptographic
+ library</title>
+ <tgroup cols="4">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Functionality</entry>
<entry>Built-in</entry>
<entry>With OpenSSL</entry>
+ <entry>With NSS</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
@@ -1184,51 +1187,67 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<entry>MD5</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA1</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>SHA224/256/384/512</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Other digest algorithms</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
+ <entry>yes (Note 1)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blowfish</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>AES</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
<entry>no</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>CAST5</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>no</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Raw encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Symmetric encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>PGP Public-Key encryption</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
<entry>yes</entry>
+ <entry>yes</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
@@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
- Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
+ Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
+ <productname>NSS</productname> supports
is automatically picked up.
This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
explicitly.
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch (3.6K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/8-v30-0007-nss-Support-NSS-in-sslinfo.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 55fb70f3a3338d0c056ed682c1477a1ed7f1637b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 7/9] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
disables functionality which currently is OpenSSL specific.
---
contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
index 30cae0bb98..3aadd90aa6 100644
--- a/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
+++ b/contrib/sslinfo/sslinfo.c
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#include "postgres.h"
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#endif
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
PG_MODULE_MAGIC;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
static Datum X509_NAME_field_to_text(X509_NAME *name, text *fieldName);
static Datum ASN1_STRING_to_text(ASN1_STRING *str);
@@ -31,6 +34,7 @@ typedef struct
{
TupleDesc tupdesc;
} SSLExtensionInfoContext;
+#endif
/*
* Indicates whether current session uses SSL
@@ -131,6 +135,7 @@ ssl_client_serial(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Converts OpenSSL ASN1_STRING structure into text
*
@@ -282,7 +287,23 @@ ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
else
return result;
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_client_dn_field);
+Datum
+ssl_client_dn_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_issuer_field);
+Datum
+ssl_issuer_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
/*
* Returns current client certificate subject as one string
@@ -338,6 +359,7 @@ ssl_issuer_dn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
}
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
/*
* Returns information about available SSL extensions.
*
@@ -471,3 +493,13 @@ ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* All done */
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(ssl_extension_info);
+Datum
+ssl_extension_info(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+ PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+#endif /* USE_NSS */
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
index 2a9c45a111..f3ae2fc3b8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/sslinfo.sgml
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
<para>
This extension won't build at all unless the installation was
- configured with <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>.
+ configured with SSL support, such as <literal>--with-ssl=openssl</literal>
+ or <literal>--with-ssl=nss</literal>.
</para>
<sect2>
@@ -208,6 +209,9 @@ emailAddress
the X.500 and X.509 standards, so you cannot just assign arbitrary
meaning to them.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -223,6 +227,9 @@ emailAddress
Same as <function>ssl_client_dn_field</function>, but for the certificate issuer
rather than the certificate subject.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -238,6 +245,9 @@ emailAddress
Provide information about extensions of client certificate: extension name,
extension value, and if it is a critical extension.
</para>
+ <para>
+ This function is only available when using <productname>OpenSSL</productname>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch (6.1K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/9-v30-0008-nss-Support-NSS-in-cryptohash.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 33148e547591226881d109aa6e4a71dda2279c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 8/9] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
This adds support for using libnss as a crypto backend for the built-
in cryptohash support. Much of this code is similar to the pgcrypto
support.
---
src/common/cryptohash_nss.c | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 264 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
diff --git a/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59ba9c1697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * cryptohash_nss.c
+ * Set of wrapper routines on top of NSS to support cryptographic
+ * hash functions.
+ *
+ * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/nss.h"
+
+#include <nss/nss.h>
+#include <nss/hasht.h>
+#include <nss/pk11func.h>
+#include <nss/pk11pub.h>
+#include <nss/secitem.h>
+#include <nss/sechash.h>
+#include <nss/secoid.h>
+#include <nss/secerr.h>
+
+#include "common/cryptohash.h"
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/resowner.h"
+#include "utils/resowner_private.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * In the backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for
+ * resowner cleanup handling. In the frontend, use malloc to be able
+ * to return a failure status back to the caller.
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
+#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
+#else
+#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
+#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Internal pg_cryptohash_ctx structure.
+ */
+struct pg_cryptohash_ctx
+{
+ pg_cryptohash_type type;
+
+ PK11Context *pk11_context;
+ HASH_HashType hash_type;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwner resowner;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_create
+ *
+ * Create and allocate a new hash context. Returns NULL on failure in the
+ * frontend, and raise error without returning in the backend.
+ */
+pg_cryptohash_ctx *
+pg_cryptohash_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
+{
+ NSSInitParameters params;
+ pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
+ SECOidData *hash;
+ SECStatus status;
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the resource owner has space to remember this reference.
+ * This can error out with "out of memory", so do this before any other
+ * allocation to avoid leaking.
+ */
+ ResourceOwnerEnlargeCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner);
+#endif
+
+ ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case PG_MD5:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_MD5;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA224;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ ctx->hash_type = SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
+ */
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
+ params.length = sizeof(params);
+ status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ctx->type = type;
+ hash = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ctx->hash_type);
+ ctx->pk11_context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash->offset);
+ if (!ctx->pk11_context)
+ {
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
+ ResourceOwnerRememberCryptoHash(CurrentResourceOwner,
+ PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+
+ return ctx;
+
+error:
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+ errmsg("out of memory")));
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_init
+ * Initialize the passed hash context
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_init(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx->pk11_context);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_update
+ *
+ * Update a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_update(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ status = PK11_DigestOp(ctx->pk11_context, data, len);
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_final
+ *
+ * Finalize a hash context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+pg_cryptohash_final(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+
+ switch (ctx->type)
+ {
+ case PG_MD5:
+ if (len < MD5_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA1:
+ if (len < SHA1_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA224:
+ if (len < SHA224_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA256:
+ if (len < SHA256_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA384:
+ if (len < SHA384_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ case PG_SHA512:
+ if (len < SHA512_LENGTH)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx->pk11_context, dest, &outlen, len);
+
+ if (status != SECSuccess)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_cryptohash_free
+ *
+ * Free a hash context and the associated NSS context.
+ */
+void
+pg_cryptohash_free(pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ PRBool free_context = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->pk11_context, free_context);
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+ ResourceOwnerForgetCryptoHash(ctx->resowner, PointerGetDatum(ctx));
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_cryptohash_ctx));
+ FREE(ctx);
+}
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
[application/octet-stream] v30-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch (21.3K, ../../21FABD55-5F80-4D8B-B994-3DB81D8742EE@yesql.se/10-v30-0009-nss-Build-infrastructure.patch)
download | inline diff:
From 96f38247b460a62e601d9d650d1336a46dc041c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH v30 9/9] nss: Build infrastructure
Finally this adds the infrastructure to build a postgres installation
with libnss support.
---
configure | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
configure.ac | 31 +++-
src/backend/libpq/Makefile | 4 +
src/common/Makefile | 6 +
src/include/pg_config.h.in | 12 ++
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile | 5 +
src/tools/msvc/Install.pm | 3 +-
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm | 39 ++++-
src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm | 26 +++
9 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index ce9ea36999..143726c79c 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ UUID_LIBS
LDAP_LIBS_BE
LDAP_LIBS_FE
with_ssl
+NSPR_CONFIG
+NSS_CONFIG
PTHREAD_CFLAGS
PTHREAD_LIBS
PTHREAD_CC
@@ -1570,7 +1572,7 @@ Optional Packages:
use system time zone data in DIR
--without-zlib do not use Zlib
--with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]
- --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)
+ --with-ssl=LIB use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)
--with-openssl obsolete spelling of --with-ssl=openssl
Some influential environment variables:
@@ -12462,8 +12464,274 @@ done
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ if test -z "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nss-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSS_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$NSS_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSS_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSS_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSS_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSS_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSS_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSS_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -z "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ for ac_prog in nspr-config
+do
+ # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $NSPR_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$NSPR_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+NSPR_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_NSPR_CONFIG
+if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+ test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG" && break
+done
+
+else
+ # Report the value of NSPR_CONFIG in configure's output in all cases.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSPR_CONFIG... " >&6; }
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NSPR_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$NSPR_CONFIG" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for NSS_InitContext in -lnss3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char NSS_InitContext ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return NSS_InitContext ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nss3_NSS_InitContext" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSS3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnss3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nss3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for PR_GetDefaultIOMethods in -lnspr4... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_nspr4_PR_GetDefaultIOMethods" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBNSPR4 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lnspr4 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'nspr4' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for SSL_GetImplementedCiphers in -lssl3... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return SSL_GetImplementedCiphers ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ssl3_SSL_GetImplementedCiphers" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_LIBSSL3 1
+_ACEOF
+
+ LIBS="-lssl3 $LIBS"
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "library 'ssl3' is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_NSS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify openssl" "$LINENO" 5
+ as_fn_error $? "--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss" "$LINENO" 5
fi
@@ -13369,6 +13637,23 @@ else
fi
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/ssl.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_ssl_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "nss/nss.h" "ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_nss_nss_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -18131,6 +18416,9 @@ $as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: NSS" >&5
+$as_echo "NSS" >&6; }
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
@@ -18160,7 +18448,7 @@ fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers." "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index f54f65febe..5ec8970588 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ fi
#
# There is currently only one supported SSL/TLS library: OpenSSL.
#
-PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl)])
+PGAC_ARG_REQ(with, ssl, [LIB], [use LIB for SSL/TLS support (openssl, nss)])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"" ; then
with_ssl=no
fi
@@ -1235,8 +1235,28 @@ if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
# function was removed.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([CRYPTO_lock])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL], 1, [Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl)])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ # TODO: fallback in case nss-config/nspr-config aren't found.
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSS_CONFIG, nss-config)
+ PGAC_PATH_PROGS(NSPR_CONFIG, nspr-config)
+ if test -n "$NSS_CONFIG"; then
+ NSS_LIBS=`$NSS_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSS_CFLAGS=`$NSS_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+ if test -n "$NSPR_CONFIG"; then
+ NSPR_LIBS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --libs`
+ NSPR_CFLAGS=`$NSPR_CONFIG --cflags`
+ fi
+
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $NSS_LIBS $NSPR_LIBS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS $NSPR_CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nss3, NSS_InitContext, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nss3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(nspr4, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'nspr4' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl3, SSL_GetImplementedCiphers, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([library 'ssl3' is required for NSS])])
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_NSS], 1, [Define to 1 if you have NSS support,])
elif test "$with_ssl" != no ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify openssl])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--with-ssl must specify one of openssl or nss])
fi
AC_SUBST(with_ssl)
@@ -1414,6 +1434,9 @@ fi
if test "$with_ssl" = openssl ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/ssl.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
+elif test "$with_ssl" = nss ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/ssl.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/ssl.h> is required for NSS])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(nss/nss.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <nss/nss.h> is required for NSS])])
fi
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
@@ -2170,6 +2193,8 @@ fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test x"$with_ssl" = x"openssl" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
+elif test x"$with_ssl" = x"nss" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([NSS])
elif test x"$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
else
@@ -2179,7 +2204,7 @@ else
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"no" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
-PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
+PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL, NSS, native Windows API or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers.])
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 8d1d16b0fc..045d2c2f6b 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ OBJS = \
ifeq ($(with_ssl),openssl)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS += be-secure-nss.o
+endif
endif
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
diff --git a/src/common/Makefile b/src/common/Makefile
index 5422579a6a..57d44080b4 100644
--- a/src/common/Makefile
+++ b/src/common/Makefile
@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ OBJS_COMMON += \
protocol_openssl.o \
cryptohash_openssl.o
else
+ifeq ($(with_ssl),nss)
+OBJS_COMMON += \
+ cipher_nss.o \
+ cryptohash_nss.o
+else
OBJS_COMMON += \
cryptohash.o \
md5.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o
endif
+endif
# A few files are currently only built for frontend, not server
# (Mkvcbuild.pm has a copy of this list, too). logging.c is excluded
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 04dc330119..474cc2655c 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -322,6 +322,12 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `m' library (-lm). */
#undef HAVE_LIBM
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nspr4' library (-lnspr4). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSPR4
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nss3' library (-lnss3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNSS3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
@@ -334,6 +340,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl' library (-lssl). */
#undef HAVE_LIBSSL
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ssl3' library (-lssl3). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSSL3
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wldap32' library (-lwldap32). */
#undef HAVE_LIBWLDAP32
@@ -899,6 +908,9 @@
/* Define to select named POSIX semaphores. */
#undef USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES
+/* Define to 1 if you have NSS support, */
+#undef USE_NSS
+
/* Define to 1 to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-ssl=openssl) */
#undef USE_OPENSSL
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index f74677eaf9..e10d8bef42 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ OBJS += \
fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_ssl), nss)
+OBJS += \
+ fe-secure-nss.o
+endif
+
ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
OBJS += \
fe-gssapi-common.o \
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
index ea3af48777..afe72a7e97 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Install.pm
@@ -438,7 +438,8 @@ sub CopyContribFiles
{
# These configuration-based exclusions must match vcregress.pl
next if ($d eq "uuid-ossp" && !defined($config->{uuid}));
- next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl}));
+ next if ($d eq "sslinfo" && !defined($config->{openssl})
+ && !defined($config->{nss}));
next if ($d eq "xml2" && !defined($config->{xml}));
next if ($d =~ /_plperl$/ && !defined($config->{perl}));
next if ($d =~ /_plpython$/ && !defined($config->{python}));
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
index 49614106dc..53b5a71726 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_openssl.c');
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'protocol_openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash_nss.c');
+ push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cipher_nss.c');
+ }
else
{
push(@pgcommonallfiles, 'cryptohash.c');
@@ -196,12 +201,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$postgres->FullExportDLL('postgres.lib');
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options.
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$postgres->RemoveFile('src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -259,12 +271,19 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgcommon, $libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove appropriate files
- # if building without OpenSSL.
- if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ # if building without various options
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-common.c');
+ }
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
+ {
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c');
+ }
if (!$solution->{options}->{gss})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-gssapi-common.c');
@@ -432,9 +451,14 @@ sub mkvcbuild
push @contrib_excludes, 'xml2';
}
+ if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl} && !$solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo';
+ }
+
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
- push @contrib_excludes, 'sslinfo', 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
+ push @contrib_excludes, 'ssl_passphrase_callback';
}
if (!$solution->{options}->{uuid})
@@ -464,6 +488,11 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'openssl.c',
'pgp-mpi-openssl.c');
}
+ elsif ($solution->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $pgcrypto->AddFiles('contrib/pgcrypto', 'nss.c',
+ 'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c', 'blf.c');
+ }
else
{
$pgcrypto->AddFiles(
diff --git a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
index 69b08591cc..f175d7aa24 100644
--- a/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
+++ b/src/tools/msvc/Solution.pm
@@ -299,10 +299,13 @@ sub GenerateFiles
HAVE_LIBLDAP => undef,
HAVE_LIBLDAP_R => undef,
HAVE_LIBM => undef,
+ HAVE_LIBNSPR4 => undef,
+ HAVE_LIBNSS3 => undef,
HAVE_LIBPAM => undef,
HAVE_LIBREADLINE => undef,
HAVE_LIBSELINUX => undef,
HAVE_LIBSSL => undef,
+ HAVE_LIBSSL3 => undef,
HAVE_LIBWLDAP32 => undef,
HAVE_LIBXML2 => undef,
HAVE_LIBXSLT => undef,
@@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ sub GenerateFiles
USE_LLVM => undef,
USE_NAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES => undef,
USE_OPENSSL => undef,
+ USE_NSS => undef,
USE_PAM => undef,
USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C => undef,
USE_SSE42_CRC32C => undef,
@@ -540,6 +544,13 @@ sub GenerateFiles
$define{HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL} = 1;
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $define{USE_NSS} = 1;
+ $define{HAVE_LIBNSPR4} = 1;
+ $define{HAVE_LIBNSS3} = 1;
+ $define{HAVE_LIBSSL3} = 1;
+ }
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config.h', \%define, 1);
$self->GenerateConfigHeader('src/include/pg_config_ext.h', \%define, 0);
@@ -998,6 +1009,21 @@ sub AddProject
}
}
}
+ if ($self->{options}->{nss})
+ {
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\..\public\nss');
+ $proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nss} . '\include\nspr');
+ foreach my $lib (qw(plds4 plc4 nspr4))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib\lib' . "$lib.lib", 0);
+ }
+ foreach my $lib (qw(ssl3 smime3 nss3))
+ {
+ $proj->AddLibrary($self->{options}->{nss} .
+ '\lib' . "\\$lib.dll.lib", 0);
+ }
+ }
if ($self->{options}->{nls})
{
$proj->AddIncludeDir($self->{options}->{nls} . '\include');
--
2.21.1 (Apple Git-122.3)
=
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-03-21 23:49 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Frost @ 2021-03-21 23:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
Greetings,
* Daniel Gustafsson (daniel@yesql.se) wrote:
> Attached is a rebase which attempts to fix the cfbot Appveyor failure, there
> were missing HAVE_ defines for MSVC.
> Subject: [PATCH v30 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq
>
> This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support
> in libpq to allow encrypted connections. The implementation is done
maybe add 'using NSS' to that first sentence. ;)
> +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
> @@ -2849,7 +2849,14 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
> {
> int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
>
> +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
> Assert(port->ssl);
> +#elif defined(USE_NSS)
> + /* TODO: should we rename pr_fd to ssl, to keep consistency? */
> + Assert(port->pr_fd);
> +#else
> + Assert(false);
> +#endif
Having thought about this TODO item for a bit, I tend to think it's
better to keep them distinct. They aren't the same and it might not be
clear what's going on if one was to somehow mix them (at least if pr_fd
continues to sometimes be a void*, but I wonder why that's being
done..? more on that later..).
> +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
[...]
> +/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
> +static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
> +nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
> +static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
> +
> +static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
Happy to be told I'm missing something, but the above two variables seem
to only be used in init_iolayer.. is there a reason they're declared
here instead of just being declared in that function?
> + /*
> + * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
> + * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
> + * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
> + * make translations easier.
> + */
Should we pull these error messages out into another header so that
they're in one place to make sure they're kept consistent, if we really
want to put the effort in to keep them the same..? I'm not 100% sure
that it's actually necessary to do so, but defining these in one place
would help maintain this if we want to. Also alright with just keeping
the comment, not that big of a deal.
> +int
> +be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
> +{
> + SECStatus status;
> + PRFileDesc *model;
> + PRFileDesc *pr_fd;
pr_fd here is materially different from port->pr_fd, no? As in, one is
the NSS raw TCP fd while the other is the SSL fd, right? Maybe we
should use two different variable names to try and make sure they don't
get confused? Might even set this to NULL after we are done with it
too.. Then again, I see later on that when we do the dance with the
'model' PRFileDesc that we just use the same variable- maybe we should
do that? That is, just get rid of this 'pr_fd' and use port->pr_fd
always?
> + /*
> + * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
> + * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
> + * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify
> + * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially
> + * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions
> + * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation
> + * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or
> + * explicitly).
> + *
> + * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done
> + * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be
> + * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various
> + * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was
> + * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters
> + * are ignored.
> + */
> + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ );
> +
> + /*
> + * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If
> + * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the
> + * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but
> + * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can
> + * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones.
> + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side
> + * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and
> + * key to exist.
> + *
> + * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single
> + * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any
> + * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are
> + * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled
> + * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has
> + * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to
> + * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS
> + * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented.
> + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456
The above seems to indicate that we will be requiring at least 3.12,
right? Yet above we have code to work with NSPR versions before 2.1?
Maybe we should put a stake in the ground that says "we only support
back to version X of NSS", test with that and a few more recent versions
and the most recent, and then rip out anything that's needed for
versions which are older than that? I have a pretty hard time imagining
that someone is going to want to build PG v14 w/ NSS 2.0 ...
> + {
> + char *ciphers,
> + *c;
> +
> + char *sep = ":;, ";
> + PRUint16 ciphercode;
> + const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers;
> +
> + /*
> + * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start
> + * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down-
> + * grades to a weaker cipher than expected.
> + */
> + nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
> + for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++)
> + SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
> +
> + ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites);
> +
> + for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep))
> + {
> + if (!pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode))
> + {
> + status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE);
> + if (status != SECSuccess)
> + {
> + ereport(COMMERROR,
> + (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c)));
> + return -1;
> + }
> + }
> + }
Maybe I'm a bit confused, but doesn't pg_find_cipher return *true* when
a cipher is found, and therefore the '!' above is saying "if we don't
find a matching cipher, then run the code to set the cipher ...". Also-
we don't seem to complain at all about a cipher being specified that we
don't find? Guess I would think that we might want to throw a WARNING
in such a case, but I could possibly be convinced otherwise. Kind of
wonder just what happens with the current code, I'm guessing ciphercode
is zero and therefore doesn't complain but also doesn't do what we want.
I wonder if there's a way to test this?
I do think we should probably throw an error if we end up with *no*
ciphers being set, which doesn't seem to be happening here..?
> + /*
> + * Set up the custom IO layer.
> + */
Might be good to mention that the IO Layer is what sets up the
read/write callbacks to be used.
> + port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, pr_fd);
> + if (!port->pr_fd)
> + {
> + ereport(COMMERROR,
> + (errmsg("unable to initialize")));
> + return -1;
> + }
Maybe a comment and a better error message for this?
> + PR_Close(model);
This might deserve one also, the whole 'model' construct is a bit
different. :)
> + port->ssl_in_use = true;
> +
> + /* Register out shutdown callback */
*our
> +int
> +be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
> +{
> + SECStatus status;
> + SSLChannelInfo channel;
> + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
> +
> + status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel));
> + if (status != SECSuccess)
> + goto error;
> +
> + status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite));
> + if (status != SECSuccess)
> + goto error;
> +
> + return suite.effectiveKeyBits;
> +
> +error:
> + ereport(WARNING,
> + (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s",
> + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()))));
> + return 0;
> +}
It doesn't have to be much, but I, at least, do prefer to see
function-header comments. :) Not that the OpenSSL code has them
consistently, so obviously not that big of a deal. Goes for a number of
the functions being added.
> + /* Found a CN, ecode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */
*decode
> +static PRInt32
> +pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
> + PRIntervalTime timeout)
> +{
> + PRRecvFN read_fn;
> + PRInt32 n_read;
> +
> + read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
> + n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
> +
> + return n_read;
> +}
> +
> +static PRInt32
> +pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
> + PRIntervalTime timeout)
> +{
> + PRSendFN send_fn;
> + PRInt32 n_write;
> +
> + send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
> + n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
> +
> + return n_write;
> +}
> +
> +static PRStatus
> +pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
> + * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
> + */
> + fd->secret = NULL;
> + return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
> +}
Regarding these, I find myself wondering how they're different from the
defaults..? I mean, the above just directly called
PR_GetDefaultIOMethods() to then call it's close() function- are the
fd->lower_methods->recv/send not the default methods? I don't quite get
what the point is from having our own callbacks here if they just do
exactly what the defaults would do (or are there actually no defined
defaults and you have to provide these..?).
> +/*
> + * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss
> + * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version
> + *
> + * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and
> + * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure.
> + */
> +static uint16
> +ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v, const char *guc_name)
guc_name isn't actually used in this function..? Is there some reason
to keep it or is it leftover?
Also, I get that they do similar jobs and that one is in the frontend
and the other is in the backend, but I'm not a fan of having two
'ssl_protocol_version_to_nss()'s functions that take different argument
types but have exact same name and do functionally different things..
> +++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
> @@ -4377,6 +4381,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
> check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL
> },
>
> +#ifdef USE_NSS
> + {
> + {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
> + gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."),
> + NULL
> + },
> + &ssl_database,
> + "",
> + NULL, NULL, NULL
> + },
> +#endif
We don't #ifdef out the various GUCs even if SSL isn't compiled in, so
it doesn't seem quite right to be doing so here? Generally speaking,
GUCs that we expect people to use (rather than debugging ones and such)
are typically always built, even if we don't build support for that
capability, so we can throw a better error message than just some ugly
syntax or parsing error if we come across one being set in a non-enabled
build.
> +++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
> +/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + *
> + * cipher_nss.c
> + * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working
> + * with ciphers
> + *
> + * This should only bse used if code is compiled with NSS support.
*be
> +++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
> @@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ typedef struct Port
> SSL *ssl;
> X509 *peer;
> #endif
> +
> +#ifdef USE_NSS
> + void *pr_fd;
> +#endif
> } Port;
Given this is under a #ifdef USE_NSS, does it need to be / should it
really be a void*?
> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
> @@ -359,6 +359,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
> "Target-Session-Attrs", "", 15, /* sizeof("prefer-standby") = 15 */
> offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
>
> + {"cert_database", NULL, NULL, NULL,
> + "CertificateDatabase", "", 64,
> + offsetof(struct pg_conn, cert_database)},
I mean, maybe nitpicking here, but all the other SSL stuff is
'sslsomething' and the backend version of this is 'ssl_database', so
wouldn't it be more consistent to have this be 'ssldatabase'?
> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c
> + * This logic exist in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is
*exists
> + /*
> + * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init
> + * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the
> + * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion
> + * on PR_Init.
> + */
> + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
See same comment I made above- and also there's a comment earlier in
this file that we don't need to PR_Init() even ...
> + {
> + conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
> + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
> + NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
> + NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
> + if (!conn->nss_context)
> + {
> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
> + libpq_gettext("unable to create certificate database: %s"),
> + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
> + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
> + }
> + }
That error message seems a bit ... off? Surely we aren't trying to
actually create a certificate database here?
> + /*
> + * Configure cipher policy.
> + */
> + status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
> + if (status != SECSuccess)
> + {
> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
> + libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"),
> + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
> +
> + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
> + }
Probably good to pull over at least some parts of the comments made in
the backend code about SetDomesticPolicy() actually enabling everything
(just like all the policies apparently do)...
> + /*
> + * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the
> + * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can
> + * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify*.
> + */
> + if (!conn->cert_database && conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
> + {
> + status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\"");
> + if (status != SECSuccess)
> + {
> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
> + libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load NSS trust module \"%s\" : %s"),
> + ca_trust_name,
> + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError()));
> +
> + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
> + }
> + }
Maybe have something a bit more here about "maybe you should specifify a
cert_database" or such?
> + if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0)
> + {
> + int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
> +
> + if (ssl_max_ver == -1)
> + {
> + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
> + libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"),
> + conn->ssl_max_protocol_version);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver;
> + }
In the backend code, we have an additional check to make sure they
didn't set the min version higher than the max.. should we have that
here too? Either way, seems like we should be consistent.
> + * The model can now we closed as we've applied the settings of the model
*be
> + * onto the real socket. From hereon we should only use conn->pr_fd.
*here on
Similar comments to the backend code- should we just always use
conn->pr_fd? Or should we rename pr_fd to something else?
> + /*
> + * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to. This is required,
> + * albeit mostly applies to when opening a connection to a traditional
> + * http server it seems.
> + */
> + SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host);
We should probably also set SNI, if available (NSS 3.12.6 it seems?),
since it looks like that's going to be added to the OpenSSL code.
> + do
> + {
> + status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd);
> + }
> + while (status != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
We don't seem to have this loop in the backend code.. Is there some
reason that we don't? Is it possible that we need to have a loop here
too? I recall in the GSS encryption code there were definitely things
during setup that had to be looped back over on both sides to make sure
everything was finished ...
> + if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v')
> + return SECFailure;
Seems a bit grotty to do this (though I see that the OpenSSL code does
too ... at least there we have a comment though, maybe add one here?).
I would have thought we'd actually do strcmp()'s like above.
> + /*
> + * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
> + * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
> + */
> + if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
> + return conn->pr_fd;
> + return NULL;
> +}
Is there never a reason someone might want the pointer returned by
NSS_InitContext? I don't know that there is but it might be something
to consider (we could even possibly have our own structure returned by
this function which includes both, maybe..?). Not sure if there's a
sensible use-case for that or not just wanted to bring it up as it's
something I asked myself while reading through this patch.
> + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
> + {
> + switch (channel.protocolVersion)
> + {
> +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
> + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
> + return "TLSv1.3";
> +#endif
> +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
> + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
> + return "TLSv1.2";
> +#endif
> +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
> + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
> + return "TLSv1.1";
> +#endif
> + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
> + return "TLSv1.0";
> + default:
> + return "unknown";
> + }
> + }
Not sure that it really matters, but this seems like it might be useful
to have as its own function... Maybe even a data structure that both
functions use just in oppostie directions. Really minor tho. :)
> diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
> --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> @@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
> }
> #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
>
> +#ifndef USE_NSS
> +
> +PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
> +PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
> +{
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +void
> +PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
> +{
> + return;
> +}
> +
> +char *
> +PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
> +{
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +#endif /* USE_NSS */
Isn't this '!USE_NSS'?
> diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> index 0c9e95f1a7..f15af39222 100644
> --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ struct pg_conn
> char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
> char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
> char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */
> + char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
> char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
> char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
> char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
> @@ -507,6 +508,28 @@ struct pg_conn
> * OpenSSL version changes */
> #endif
> #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
> +
> +/*
> + * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
> + * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
> + */
I'm a bit confused- what are the conflicts being caused here..?
Certainly under USE_OPENSSL we use the actual OpenSSL types..
> Subject: [PATCH v30 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
>
> The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
> set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
> library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
> modules for the implementation details.
>
> No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
> teardown is performed.
Presumably this could be committed ahead of the main NSS support?
> Subject: [PATCH v30 4/9] nss: pg_strong_random support
> +++ b/src/port/pg_strong_random.c
> +bool
> +pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
> +{
> + NSSInitParameters params;
> + NSSInitContext *nss_context;
> + SECStatus status;
> +
> + memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
> + params.length = sizeof(params);
> + nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms,
> + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB |
> + NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN |
> + NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
> +
> + if (!nss_context)
> + return false;
> +
> + status = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf, len);
> + NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
> +
> + if (status == SECSuccess)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +#else /* not USE_OPENSSL, USE_NSS or WIN32 */
I don't know that it's an issue, but do we actually need to init the NSS
context and shut it down every time..?
> /*
> * Without OpenSSL or Win32 support, just read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*or NSS
> Subject: [PATCH v30 5/9] nss: Documentation
> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
> @@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
> </listitem>
> </varlistentry>
>
> + <varlistentry>
> + <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
> + <listitem>
> + <para>
> + <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security";
> + Transport Layer Security</ulink>
> + </para>
> + </listitem>
> + </varlistentry>
We don't have this already..? Surely we should..
> diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
> index 967de73596..1608e9a7c7 100644
> --- a/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
> @@ -1272,6 +1272,23 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
> </listitem>
> </varlistentry>
>
> + <varlistentry id="guc-ssl-database" xreflabel="ssl_database">
> + <term><varname>ssl_database</varname> (<type>string</type>)
> + <indexterm>
> + <primary><varname>ssl_database</varname> configuration parameter</primary>
> + </indexterm>
> + </term>
> + <listitem>
> + <para>
> + Specifies the name of the file containing the server certificates and
> + keys when using <productname>NSS</productname> for <acronym>SSL</acronym>
> + connections. This parameter can only be set in the
> + <filename>postgresql.conf</filename> file or on the server command
> + line.
*SSL/TLS maybe?
> @@ -1288,7 +1305,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
> connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
> currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
> version 1.3 connections. The default value is
> - <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
> + <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
> + been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
> + <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
> reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
> </para>
Shouldn't we say something here wrt NSS?
> @@ -1490,8 +1509,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
> <para>
> Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
> decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
> - default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
> - mechanism is used.
> + default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
> + <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
> + mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
> + no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
> + empty password.
> </para>
Maybe we should point out here that this requires the database to not
require a password..? So if they have one, they need to set this, or
maybe we should provide a default one..
> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
> +<synopsis>
> +PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void);
> +</synopsis>
> + </para>
> +
> + <para>
> + <function>PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss</function> has no effect unless the
> + server was compiled with <productname>nss</productname> support.
> + </para>
We should try to be consistent- above should be NSS, not nss.
> + <listitem>
> + <para>
> + <productname>NSS</productname>: specifying the parameter is required
> + in case any password protected items are referenced in the
> + <productname>NSS</productname> database, or if the database itself
> + is password protected. If multiple different objects are password
> + protected, the same password is used for all.
> + </para>
> + </listitem>
> + </itemizedlist>
Is this a statement about NSS databases (which I don't think it is) or
about the fact that we'll just use the password provided for all
attempts to decrypt something we need in the database? Assuming the
latter, seems like we could reword this to be a bit more clear.
Maybe:
All attempts to decrypt objects which are password protected in the
database will use this password.
?
> @@ -2620,9 +2791,14 @@ void *PQsslStruct(const PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name);
> + For <productname>NSS</productname>, there is one struct available under
> + the name "NSS", and it returns a pointer to the
> + <productname>NSS</productname> <literal>PRFileDesc</literal>.
... SSL PRFileDesc associated with the connection, no?
> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
> @@ -2552,6 +2583,89 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
> </para>
> </sect2>
>
> + <sect2 id="nss-certificate-database">
> + <title>NSS Certificate Databases</title>
> +
> + <para>
> + When using <productname>NSS</productname>, all certificates and keys must
> + be loaded into an <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database.
> + </para>
> +
> + <para>
> + To create a new <productname>NSS</productname> certificate database and
> + load the certificates created in <xref linkend="ssl-certificate-creation" />,
> + use the following <productname>NSS</productname> commands:
> +<programlisting>
> +certutil -d "sql:server.db" -N --empty-password
> +certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n server.crt -i server.crt -t "CT,C,C"
> +certutil -d "sql:server.db" -A -n root.crt -i root.crt -t "CT,C,C"
> +</programlisting>
> + This will give the certificate the filename as the nickname identifier in
> + the database which is created as <filename>server.db</filename>.
> + </para>
> + <para>
> + Then load the server key, which require converting it to
*requires
> Subject: [PATCH v30 6/9] nss: Support NSS in pgcrypto
> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
> <row>
> <entry>Blowfish</entry>
> <entry>yes</entry>
> <entry>yes</entry>
> + <entry>yes</entry>
> </row>
Maybe this should mention that it's with the built-in implementation as
blowfish isn't available from NSS?
> <row>
> <entry>DES/3DES/CAST5</entry>
> <entry>no</entry>
> <entry>yes</entry>
> + <entry>yes</entry>
> + </row>
Surely CAST5 from the above should be removed, since it's given its own
entry now?
> @@ -1241,7 +1260,8 @@ gen_random_uuid() returns uuid
> <orderedlist>
> <listitem>
> <para>
> - Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> supports
> + Any digest algorithm <productname>OpenSSL</productname> and
> + <productname>NSS</productname> supports
> is automatically picked up.
*or? Maybe something more specific though- "Any digest algorithm
included with the library that PostgreSQL is compiled with is
automatically picked up." ?
> Subject: [PATCH v30 7/9] nss: Support NSS in sslinfo
>
> Since sslinfo to a large extent use the be_tls_* API this mostly
*uses
> Subject: [PATCH v30 8/9] nss: Support NSS in cryptohash
> +++ b/src/common/cryptohash_nss.c
> + /*
> + * Initialize our own NSS context without a database backing it.
> + */
> + memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
> + params.length = sizeof(params);
> + status = NSS_NoDB_Init(".");
We take some pains to use NSS_InitContext elsewhere.. Are we sure that
we should be using NSS_NoDB_Init here..?
Just a, well, not so quick read-through. Generally it's looking pretty
good to me. Will see about playing with it this week.
Thanks!
Stephen
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^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-03-23 19:04 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-25 23:22 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
3 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Frost @ 2021-03-23 19:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
Greetings,
* Daniel Gustafsson (daniel@yesql.se) wrote:
> > On 22 Mar 2021, at 00:49, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote:
>
> Thanks for the review! Below is a partial response, I haven't had time to
> address all your review comments yet but I wanted to submit a rebased patchset
> directly since the current version doesn't work after recent changes in the
> tree. I will address the remaining comments tomorrow or the day after.
Great, thanks!
> This rebase also includes a fix for pgtls_init which was sent offlist by Jacob.
> The changes in pgtls_init can potentially be used to initialize the crypto
> context for NSS to clean up this patch, Jacob is currently looking at that.
Ah, cool, sounds good.
> > They aren't the same and it might not be
> > clear what's going on if one was to somehow mix them (at least if pr_fd
> > continues to sometimes be a void*, but I wonder why that's being
> > done..? more on that later..).
>
> To paraphrase from a later in this email, there are collisions between nspr and
> postgres on things like BITS_PER_BYTE, and there were also collisions on basic
> types until I learned about NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT. By moving the juggling of this
> into common/nss.h we can use proper types without introducing that pollution
> everywhere. I will address these places.
Ah, ok, and great, that sounds good.
> >> +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c
> > [...]
> >> +/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
> >> +static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart);
> >> +nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init;
> >
> >> +static PRDescIdentity pr_id;
> >> +
> >> +static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods;
> >
> > Happy to be told I'm missing something, but the above two variables seem
> > to only be used in init_iolayer.. is there a reason they're declared
> > here instead of just being declared in that function?
>
> They must be there since NSPR doesn't copy these but reference them.
Ah, ok, interesting.
> >> + /*
> >> + * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a
> >> + * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error
> >> + * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to
> >> + * make translations easier.
> >> + */
> >
> > Should we pull these error messages out into another header so that
> > they're in one place to make sure they're kept consistent, if we really
> > want to put the effort in to keep them the same..? I'm not 100% sure
> > that it's actually necessary to do so, but defining these in one place
> > would help maintain this if we want to. Also alright with just keeping
> > the comment, not that big of a deal.
>
> It might make sense to pull them into common/nss.h, but seeing the error
> message right there when reading the code does IMO make it clearer so it's a
> doubleedged sword. Not sure what is the best option, but I'm not married to
> the current solution so if there is consensus to pull them out somewhere I'm
> happy to do so.
My thought was to put them into some common/ssl.h or something along
those lines but I don't see it as a big deal either way really. You
make a good point that having the error message there when reading the
code is nice.
> > Maybe we should put a stake in the ground that says "we only support
> > back to version X of NSS", test with that and a few more recent versions
> > and the most recent, and then rip out anything that's needed for
> > versions which are older than that?
>
> Yes, right now there is very little in the patch which caters for old versions,
> the PR_Init call might be one of the few offenders. There has been discussion
> upthread about settling for a required version, combining the insights learned
> there with a survey of which versions are commonly available packaged.
>
> Once we settle on a version we can confirm if PR_Init is/isn't needed and
> remove all traces of it if not.
I don't really see this as all that hard to do- I'd suggest we look at
what systems someone might reasonably deploy v14 on. To that end, I'd
say "only systems which are presently supported", so: RHEL7+, Debian 9+,
Ubuntu 16.04+. Looking at those, I see:
Ubuntu 16.04: 3.28.4
RHEL6: v3.28.4
Debian: 3.26.2
> > I have a pretty hard time imagining that someone is going to want to build PG
> > v14 w/ NSS 2.0 ...
>
> Let alone compiling 2.0 at all on a recent system..
Indeed, and given the above, it seems entirely reasonable to make the
requirement be NSS v3+, no? I wouldn't be against making that even
tighter if we thought it made sense to do so.
> > Also- we don't seem to complain at all about a cipher being specified that we
> > don't find? Guess I would think that we might want to throw a WARNING in such
> > a case, but I could possibly be convinced otherwise.
>
> No, I think you're right, we should throw WARNING there or possibly even a
> higher elevel. Should that be a COMMERROR even?
I suppose the thought I was having was that we might want to allow some
string that covered all the OpenSSL and NSS ciphers that someone feels
comfortable with and we'd just ignore the ones that don't make sense for
the particular library we're currently built with. Making it a
COMMERROR seems like overkill and I'm not entirely sure we actually want
any warning since we might then be constantly bleating about it.
> > Kind of wonder just what happens with the current code, I'm guessing ciphercode
> > is zero and therefore doesn't complain but also doesn't do what we want. I
> > wonder if there's a way to test this?
>
> We could extend the test suite to set ciphers in postgresql.conf, I'll give it
> a go.
That'd be great, thanks!
> > I do think we should probably throw an error if we end up with *no*
> > ciphers being set, which doesn't seem to be happening here..?
>
> Yeah, that should be a COMMERROR. Fixed.
I do think it makes sense to throw a COMMERROR here since the connection
is going to end up failing anyway.
> >> +pg_ssl_read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
> >> + PRIntervalTime timeout)
> >> +{
> >> + PRRecvFN read_fn;
> >> + PRInt32 n_read;
> >> +
> >> + read_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
> >> + n_read = read_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
> >> +
> >> + return n_read;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static PRInt32
> >> +pg_ssl_write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags,
> >> + PRIntervalTime timeout)
> >> +{
> >> + PRSendFN send_fn;
> >> + PRInt32 n_write;
> >> +
> >> + send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
> >> + n_write = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
> >> +
> >> + return n_write;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static PRStatus
> >> +pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
> >> +{
> >> + /*
> >> + * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack.
> >> + * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.)
> >> + */
> >> + fd->secret = NULL;
> >> + return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd);
> >> +}
> >
> > Regarding these, I find myself wondering how they're different from the
> > defaults..? I mean, the above just directly called
> > PR_GetDefaultIOMethods() to then call it's close() function- are the
> > fd->lower_methods->recv/send not the default methods? I don't quite get
> > what the point is from having our own callbacks here if they just do
> > exactly what the defaults would do (or are there actually no defined
> > defaults and you have to provide these..?).
>
> It's really just to cope with debug builds of NSPR which assert that fd->secret
> is null before closing.
And we have to override the recv/send functions for this too..? Sorry,
my comment wasn't just about the close() method but about the others
too.
> >> + /*
> >> + * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access
> >> + * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se.
> >> + */
> >> + if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0)
> >> + return conn->pr_fd;
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +}
> >
> > Is there never a reason someone might want the pointer returned by
> > NSS_InitContext? I don't know that there is but it might be something
> > to consider (we could even possibly have our own structure returned by
> > this function which includes both, maybe..?). Not sure if there's a
> > sensible use-case for that or not just wanted to bring it up as it's
> > something I asked myself while reading through this patch.
>
> Not sure I understand what you're asking for here, did you mean "is there ever
> a reason"?
Eh, poor wording on my part. You're right, the question, reworded
again, was "Would someone want to get the context returned by
NSS_InitContext?". If we think there's a reason that someone might want
that context then perhaps we should allow getting it, in addition to the
pr_fd. If there's really no reason to ever want the context from
NSS_InitContext then what you have here where we're returning pr_fd is
probably fine.
> >> diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> >> index c601071838..7f10da3010 100644
> >> --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> >> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
> >> @@ -448,6 +448,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn)
> >> }
> >> #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
> >>
> >> +#ifndef USE_NSS
> >> +
> >> +PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type
> >> +PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void)
> >> +{
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +void
> >> +PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook)
> >> +{
> >> + return;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +char *
> >> +PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
> >> +{
> >> + return NULL;
> >> +}
> >> +#endif /* USE_NSS */
> >
> > Isn't this '!USE_NSS'?
>
> Technically it is, but using just /* USE_NSS */ is consistent with the rest of
> blocks in the file.
Hrmpf. I guess it seems a bit confusing to me to have to go find the
opening #ifndef to realize that it's actally !USE_NSS.. In other words,
I would think we'd actually want to fix all of these, heh. I only
actually see one case on a quick grep where it's wrong for USE_OPENSSL
and so that doesn't seem like it's really a precedent and is more of a
bug. We certainly say 'not OPENSSL' in one place today too and also
have a number of places where we have: #endif ... /* ! WHATEVER */.
> >> diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> >> index 0c9e95f1a7..f15af39222 100644
> >> --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> >> +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
> >> @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ struct pg_conn
> >> char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */
> >> char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */
> >> char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */
> >> + char *cert_database; /* NSS certificate/key database */
> >> char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */
> >> char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */
> >> char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */
> >> @@ -507,6 +508,28 @@ struct pg_conn
> >> * OpenSSL version changes */
> >> #endif
> >> #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
> >> +
> >> +/*
> >> + * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required
> >> + * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions.
> >> + */
> >
> > I'm a bit confused- what are the conflicts being caused here..?
> > Certainly under USE_OPENSSL we use the actual OpenSSL types..
>
> It's referring to collisions with for example BITS_PER_BYTE which is defined
> both by postgres and nspr. Since writing this I've introduced src/common/nss.h
> to handle it in a single place, so we can indeed use the proper types without
> polluting the file. Fixed.
Great, thanks!
> >> Subject: [PATCH v30 2/9] Refactor SSL testharness for multiple library
> >>
> >> The SSL testharness was fully tied to OpenSSL in the way the server was
> >> set up and reconfigured. This refactors the SSLServer module into a SSL
> >> library agnostic SSL/Server module which in turn use SSL/Backend/<lib>
> >> modules for the implementation details.
> >>
> >> No changes are done to the actual tests, this only change how setup and
> >> teardown is performed.
> >
> > Presumably this could be committed ahead of the main NSS support?
>
> Correct, I think this has merits even if NSS support is ultimately rejected.
Ok- could you break it out on to its own thread and I'll see about
committing it soonish, to get it out of the way?
> >> Subject: [PATCH v30 5/9] nss: Documentation
> >> +++ b/doc/src/sgml/acronyms.sgml
> >> @@ -684,6 +717,16 @@
> >> </listitem>
> >> </varlistentry>
> >>
> >> + <varlistentry>
> >> + <term><acronym>TLS</acronym></term>
> >> + <listitem>
> >> + <para>
> >> + <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security";
> >> + Transport Layer Security</ulink>
> >> + </para>
> >> + </listitem>
> >> + </varlistentry>
> >
> > We don't have this already..? Surely we should..
>
> We really should, especially since we've had <acronym>TLS</acronym> in
> config.sgml since 2014 (c6763156589). That's another small piece that could be
> committed on it's own to cut down the size of this patchset (even if only by a
> tiny amount).
Ditto on this. :)
> >> @@ -1288,7 +1305,9 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
> >> connections using TLS version 1.2 and lower are affected. There is
> >> currently no setting that controls the cipher choices used by TLS
> >> version 1.3 connections. The default value is
> >> - <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal>. The default is usually a
> >> + <literal>HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL</literal> for servers which have
> >> + been built with <productname>OpenSSL</productname> as the
> >> + <acronym>SSL</acronym> library. The default is usually a
> >> reasonable choice unless you have specific security requirements.
> >> </para>
> >
> > Shouldn't we say something here wrt NSS?
>
> We should, but I'm not entirely what just yet. Need to revisit that.
Not sure if we really want to do this but at least with ssllabs.com,
postgresql.org gets an 'A' rating with this set:
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
AES128-GCM-SHA256
AES256-GCM-SHA384
AES128-SHA256
AES256-SHA256
AES128-SHA
AES256-SHA
DES-CBC3-SHA
!DSS
Which also seems kinda close to what the default when built with OpenSSL
ends up being? Thought the ssllabs report does list which ones it
thinks are weak and so we might consider excluding those by default too:
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=postgresql.org&s=2a02%3a16a8%3adc51%3a0%3a0%3a0%3...
> >> @@ -1490,8 +1509,11 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
> >> <para>
> >> Sets an external command to be invoked when a passphrase for
> >> decrypting an SSL file such as a private key needs to be obtained. By
> >> - default, this parameter is empty, which means the built-in prompting
> >> - mechanism is used.
> >> + default, this parameter is empty. When the server is using
> >> + <productname>OpenSSL</productname>, this means the built-in prompting
> >> + mechanism is used. When using <productname>NSS</productname>, there is
> >> + no default prompting so a blank callback will be used returning an
> >> + empty password.
> >> </para>
> >
> > Maybe we should point out here that this requires the database to not
> > require a password..? So if they have one, they need to set this, or
> > maybe we should provide a default one..
>
> I've added a sentence on not using a password for the cert database. I'm not
> sure if providing a default one is a good idea but it's no less insecure than
> having no password really..
I was meaning a default callback to prompt, not sure if that was clear.
> > Just a, well, not so quick read-through. Generally it's looking pretty
> > good to me. Will see about playing with it this week.
>
> Thanks again for reviewing, another version which addresses the remaining
> issues will be posted soon but I wanted to get this out to give further reviews
> something that properly works.
Fantastic, thanks again!
Stephen
Attachments:
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download
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-23 19:04 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-25 23:22 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-03-25 23:59 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 0 replies; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-03-25 23:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Fri, 2021-03-26 at 00:22 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> > On 23 Mar 2021, at 20:04, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote:
> >
> > Eh, poor wording on my part. You're right, the question, reworded
> > again, was "Would someone want to get the context returned by
> > NSS_InitContext?". If we think there's a reason that someone might want
> > that context then perhaps we should allow getting it, in addition to the
> > pr_fd. If there's really no reason to ever want the context from
> > NSS_InitContext then what you have here where we're returning pr_fd is
> > probably fine.
>
> I can't think of any reason, maybe Jacob who has been knee-deep in NSS contexts
> have insights which tell a different story?
The only thing you can do with a context pointer is shut it down, and I
don't think that's something that should be exposed.
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
@ 2021-03-24 00:05 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 00:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
3 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Jacob Champion @ 2021-03-24 00:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; +Cc: pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; michael@paquier.xyz <michael@paquier.xyz>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 00:38 +0100, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
> This rebase also includes a fix for pgtls_init which was sent offlist by Jacob.
> The changes in pgtls_init can potentially be used to initialize the crypto
> context for NSS to clean up this patch, Jacob is currently looking at that.
I'm having a hell of a time trying to get the context stuff working.
Findings so far (I have patches in progress for many of these, but it's
all blowing up because of the last problem):
NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT is hardcoded for NSS_InitContext(), so we probably
don't need to pass it explicitly. NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD is apparently
meant to hack around libraries that do their own PKCS loading; do we
need it?
NSS_ShutdownContext() can (and does) fail if we've leaked handles to
objects, so we need to check its return value. Once this happens,
future NSS_InitContext() calls behave poorly. Currently we leak the
pr_fd as well as a handful of server_cert handles.
NSS_NoDB_Init() is going to pin NSS in memory. For the backend this is
probably okay, but for libpq clients that's probably not what we want.
The first database loaded by NSS_InitContext() becomes the "default"
database. This is what I'm currently hung up on. I can't figure out how
to get NSS to use the database that was loaded for the current
connection, so in my local patches for the issues above, client
certificates fail to load. I can work around it temporarily for the
tests, but this will be a problem if any libpq clients load up multiple
independent databases for use with separate connections. Anyone know if
this is a supported use case for NSS?
--Jacob
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-24 00:05 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
@ 2021-03-24 00:28 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-03-24 15:54 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Michael Paquier @ 2021-03-24 00:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>; +Cc: daniel@yesql.se <daniel@yesql.se>; sfrost@snowman.net <sfrost@snowman.net>; pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; hlinnaka@iki.fi <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; thomas.munro@gmail.com <thomas.munro@gmail.com>; andres@anarazel.de <andres@anarazel.de>
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 12:05:35AM +0000, Jacob Champion wrote:
> The first database loaded by NSS_InitContext() becomes the "default"
> database. This is what I'm currently hung up on. I can't figure out how
> to get NSS to use the database that was loaded for the current
> connection, so in my local patches for the issues above, client
> certificates fail to load. I can work around it temporarily for the
> tests, but this will be a problem if any libpq clients load up multiple
> independent databases for use with separate connections. Anyone know if
> this is a supported use case for NSS?
Are you referring to the case of threading here? This should be a
supported case, as threads created by an application through libpq
could perfectly use completely different connection strings.
--
Michael
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^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
* Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-28 06:39 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2021-06-03 17:37 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com>
2021-06-03 17:47 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 19:53 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
2021-06-03 20:14 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com>
2021-06-03 20:49 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 20:55 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
@ 2021-06-03 21:06 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2021-06-03 21:11 ` Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 218+ messages in thread
From: Bruce Momjian @ 2021-06-03 21:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>; +Cc: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>; Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>; Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>; Postgres hackers <pgsql-hackers@lists.postgresql.org>; Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>; Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>; Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>; Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 04:55:45PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> writes:
> > It might also put us a hard spot if the next TLS spec ends up being called
> > something other than TLS? It's clearly happened before =)
>
> Good point. I'm inclined to just stick with the SSL terminology.
I wonder if we should use SSL/TLS in more places in our documentation.
--
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us
EDB https://enterprisedb.com
If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.
^ permalink raw reply [nested|flat] 218+ messages in thread
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Thread overview: 218+ messages (download: mbox mbox.gz follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-05-15 20:46 Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-06-25 15:39 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-03 11:51 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-10 05:10 ` Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-11 22:03 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-15 22:16 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-20 13:35 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-21 20:16 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-29 01:06 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-17 01:02 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-17 21:19 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 22:02 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-07-15 09:26 ` Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@gmail.com>
2020-07-15 18:35 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-07-15 22:18 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-07-31 20:44 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 16:46 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-03 19:18 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-08-04 21:42 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-08-05 20:38 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew.dunstan@2ndquadrant.com>
2020-09-17 07:41 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-17 09:41 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-09-29 05:59 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2020-09-29 07:52 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-02 20:01 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 12:24 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-20 19:15 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-27 20:07 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-27 20:18 ` Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
2020-11-04 13:09 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-06 20:37 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-06 23:11 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-10 20:11 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-10 22:28 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-11 18:17 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-11 18:57 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-12 22:12 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-13 12:14 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-16 20:00 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2020-11-17 15:00 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-12-04 00:57 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-19 20:23 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-18 07:08 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-19 20:21 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 00:40 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-20 11:58 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-20 17:07 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-27 07:39 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-27 18:47 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-28 06:06 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-28 23:20 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-29 06:01 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-29 13:13 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-30 01:27 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:55 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 20:33 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-04 07:30 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-04 18:35 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-05 06:35 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-08 23:11 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-08 23:08 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-09 06:47 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-09 09:30 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-10 07:23 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-10 12:17 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-17 21:35 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-18 20:33 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-22 13:31 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-24 00:11 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-24 12:23 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-03 08:52 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-21 23:49 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-22 23:38 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-23 19:04 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-25 23:22 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-03-25 23:59 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 00:05 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 00:28 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-03-24 15:54 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 17:00 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-24 17:41 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 18:10 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-24 23:56 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-26 19:33 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-26 22:03 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-26 22:05 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-03-31 22:15 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-04-01 04:10 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-04-01 14:15 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2021-05-27 20:31 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-05-28 09:04 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-14 22:15 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-06-15 22:08 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-15 23:50 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-06-16 13:31 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-16 16:15 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-06-16 19:52 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-23 13:48 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-07-19 19:33 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-07-26 13:26 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-08-10 17:22 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-08-18 00:06 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-08-18 00:32 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-08-18 09:48 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-09-08 18:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-09-20 09:38 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-09-27 23:07 ` Rachel Heaton <rachelmheaton@gmail.com>
2021-09-30 12:17 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-09-30 16:04 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-10-01 00:02 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-10-01 06:55 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-10-04 16:14 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-10-05 13:08 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-10-05 15:05 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-10-29 04:31 ` Kevin Burke <kevin@burke.dev>
2021-10-29 04:36 ` Kevin Burke <kevin@burke.dev>
2021-10-29 11:54 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-05 10:01 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-09 18:59 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-09 19:02 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-09 21:22 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-10 13:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-15 19:51 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-15 21:44 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-15 22:37 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-16 14:45 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-16 18:26 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-17 18:42 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-23 14:12 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-23 22:39 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-24 11:59 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-11-24 13:46 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-24 13:49 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-11-25 13:39 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-12-15 22:05 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-12-20 17:27 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2021-09-21 00:06 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-09-27 13:44 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-09-27 16:29 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-09-27 19:40 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-11-30 19:03 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-12-15 22:10 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-12-16 19:56 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2022-01-15 04:42 ` Julien Rouhaud <rjuju123@gmail.com>
2022-01-17 14:09 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-18 06:36 ` Julien Rouhaud <rjuju123@gmail.com>
2022-01-18 12:42 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-18 16:24 ` Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
2022-01-23 21:20 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2022-01-26 20:39 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-26 23:59 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2022-01-27 00:51 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2022-01-28 14:08 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-28 14:30 ` Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
2022-01-28 15:10 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-31 13:24 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-31 16:24 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-01-31 21:48 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-01 10:09 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-01 20:12 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-02-01 21:52 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2022-02-02 21:08 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2022-02-03 18:42 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-02-04 18:04 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2022-02-04 19:57 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-01-31 21:32 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2022-01-31 21:51 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-03 14:07 ` Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@enterprisedb.com>
2022-02-03 14:53 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-03 18:43 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-02-03 19:16 ` Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@enterprisedb.com>
2022-02-03 19:33 ` Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
2022-02-04 18:22 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2022-02-04 18:33 ` Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
2022-02-04 18:39 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2022-02-04 19:48 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-04 20:03 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-02-04 20:18 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-02-04 19:59 ` Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
2022-01-18 16:37 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2022-01-19 09:01 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2022-01-25 22:26 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2022-01-26 18:25 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-03-24 03:54 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-03-24 23:00 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-04-01 23:17 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-04-04 22:13 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-04-05 02:12 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-04-08 08:10 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-21 05:21 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-01-22 01:14 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-01-29 12:57 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-01-29 18:46 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-01 20:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-02-02 00:42 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
2021-02-02 01:06 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-01 13:25 ` Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
2021-02-01 20:51 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-28 06:39 ` Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
2020-10-28 10:56 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-10-29 15:20 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-01 13:13 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
2020-11-01 22:04 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2020-11-02 14:17 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
2020-11-04 13:14 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 17:37 ` Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com>
2021-06-03 17:47 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 19:53 ` Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>
2021-06-03 20:14 ` Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com>
2021-06-03 20:49 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 20:55 ` Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-06-03 20:58 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-03 21:06 ` Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
2021-06-03 21:11 ` Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
2021-06-03 21:13 ` Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
2021-06-04 17:44 ` Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>
2021-01-13 17:07 ` Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
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