From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
To: Lamar Owen <lamar.owen@wgcr.org>
Cc: Sergio A. Kessler <ser@perio.unlp.edu.ar>
Cc: pgsql-interfaces@postgreSQL.org <pgsql-interfaces@postgreSQL.org>
Subject: Re: [INTERFACES] pg_pwd
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 1999 17:57:58 -0500
Message-ID: <28767.943138678@sss.pgh.pa.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <99112017500100.00543@lorc.wgcr.org>
Lamar Owen <lamar.owen@wgcr.org> writes:
> And yes, this IS a glaring security hole, IF the user postgres has a postgres
> password. Just WHY is pg_pwd mode 666 in the first place??
Because it's written out with a backend-side COPY operation, and
backend-side COPY makes *every* file it creates mode 666.
As I commented earlier in this thread, I think COPY ought not create
files with looser permissions than 644 (does anyone know why that's
not true already?). But that still wouldn't be good enough for pg_pwd.
Maybe it would be worthwhile to try to force pg_pwd in particular
to be written with just mode 600. In the standard configuration that
shouldn't make any difference ... but if people are going to use
hacked-up initdb code, as you evidently are doing, we probably should
not rely on the data directory to be locked up tightly...
regards, tom lane
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To: pgsql-interfaces@postgresql.org
Cc: tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us, lamar.owen@wgcr.org, ser@perio.unlp.edu.ar
Subject: Re: [INTERFACES] pg_pwd
In-Reply-To: <28767.943138678@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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